William Pekrul INR4303, Nolan 9/18/07 Allison Wonderland: Pun Intended What is the ultimate determinant of a nations foreign

policy with regards to any given issue in the international environment? If foreign policy refers to the goals a nations officials seek to obtain abroad, the values that give rise to those goals and the means implemented in order to attain them, an observer must identify whose values form the basis of that policy. This problem concerning values is at the center of Stephen Krasners criticism of Graham Allisons conceptual models. Krasners article, Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland), is a general response to growing acceptance of bureaucratic features as constraining or directing foreign policy and a direct response to Allisons conceptual models in terms of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In broad terms, Krasners assertion that bureaucratic approaches to foreign policy are misleading, dangerous, and compelling, is a valid warning not to underestimate the Presidents role in developing foreign policy (successful or otherwise). This notion, when applied to Allisons overall approach to his conceptual models and their application to the Cuban Missile Crisis, reveals the real basis of Krasners argument: Failures in foreign policy formulation and implementation are the result of corresponding failures by decision makers to develop consistent and clear values. First, the Cuban Missile Crisis is a useful case for comparing the virtues of rational policy models versus those of bureaucratic and organizational models. The information available to decision makers and the perceived feasibility of a set of possible actions in the context of a limited timeframe for action created a unique situation for later evaluation. In this particular historical example, Krasner notes, President Kennedy identified the situation as one of great

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importance, and he devoted immense amounts of time and attention to dealing with it. Allison presents several examples of how bureaucratic interests and standard operating procedures might have affected the actions considered by the President; out of six possible U.S. responses to the crisis, only a naval blockade was a legitimate option. Krasner disagrees with the supposed inevitability of Kennedys decision based on a predefined role and governmental circumstances, asserting that a different man could have chosen differently, (Krasner 171-172). Despite President Kennedys extraordinary level of involvement in the process of policy formation and implementation, some factors remained out of his control. Conflict between the CIA and the Air Force concerning reconnaissance flights may have delayed the discovery of anti-ballistic missiles in Cuba, and the Executive Committee operated with incomplete information about the mobility of the missiles. Krasner, however, contends that the ultimate decision about what action to take still principally belonged to President Kennedy. After the initial decision was implemented, the Navy ignored a request to tighten the blockade by adhering to their predetermined plans for such a maneuver. The actual execution of the blockade, Krasner agrees with Allison, was ultimately of little consequence; the intention was more about a show of American firmness than keeping (more) missiles from entering Cuba. Krasner asserts that the President creates much of the bureaucratic environment which surrounds him through appointments, and any limits imposed by standard operating proceduresare a function of the values of decision makers, (Krasner 169). Given a delicate predicament such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in which the President is as involved as he was, how do such bureaucratic and organizational considerations contradict the interests of the chief decision maker? Krasner suggests that inconsistencies such as this are the result of inconsistencies or ambiguities of the Presidents values. Failure to take decisive action, then,

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reflects a confusion over values which afflicts the society in general and its leaders in particular, rather than bureaucratic or organizational constraints (Krasner 179). More broadly, the actions of the state (and any agencies acting on its behalf) directly reflect the values of chief decision makers. In a system where the chief executive possesses an unprecedented amount of influence over the nations foreign policy, this stance suggests, and Krasner affirms, that consequences of foreign policy choices are largely the responsibility of the President. Much of Krasners position is based on contesting Allisons application of his conceptual models to the Cuban Missile Crisis, rather than developing the concept of Presidential values as a factor in policy formulation. Allison mentions conceptual lenses that color an analysts view of evidence, a notion that gives some insight to how Krasner conceived of his values approach. Krasner does not prescribe to the organizational or bureaucratic schools of thought, while at the same time realizing the rational policy model in its ideal form is not practical. This approach, while compelling, appears to be limited in its predictive and explanatory capacities. Any policy failure, in this case, would only be the result of indistinct, imprudent, or improperly communicated values; a rather ambiguous measurement for policy evaluation. Allisons models may be excessively general, or not directly applicable to a given policy issue, but they are a useful starting point for reconsidering how to study foreign policy. Each model provides a different view of the processes and events involved in a decision, emphasizing different actors and concerns as parts of the same course of action. A more complete approach, Allison suggests, may be achieved by supplementing the rational policy model with concepts from the organizational and bureaucratic models. More important than the intrinsic explanatory or predictive qualities of these models is their additional possibility to inspire other alternative views of the policy process.