Aaron Samson

Philosophy 24

Pekka

9 February 2007

Duty or Charity
In Peter Singer’s essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” he argues that we

cannot draw the distinction between charity and duty in the way we normally draw it. As

a result of this he concludes that it is our moral obligation to give all time and money we

have in excess to those who are suffering from a lack thereof. After examining how

Singer comes to these conclusions, I will analyze his premises and conclusions in an

attempt to prove that no one should be morally obligated to give all they need short of

survival.

In order to understand Singer’s arguments fully, we must first establish what he

means by charity and duty. Singer defines charity as the act of giving when we are not

morally obligated to do so, while duty is a moral obligation(Singer 235). It should

therefore be noted that anything that can be considered a moral duty cannot be considered

charity.

Singer’s first premise is that “Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and

medical care are bad.”(Singer 231) He identifies this premise to be obvious and therefore

uncontestable, warranting no analysis. Singer’s second premise is “If it is in our power to

prevent something bad from happening we ought morally to do it if we can without

sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance”(Singer 231). He later offers an

alternative premise which will be given in my assessment of his arguments. Roughly

stated, this means that if we can prevent something bad from happening, we must take

every action to prevent it that does not cause something equally bad or worse to happen.

As a result of these two premises, Singer concludes that we are morally obligated

to prevent the death and suffering of people who lack food, shelter, and medical attention

because these are bad things (Singer 235). Singer continues that if these are moral

obligations, what we normally view as charity is a misconception (Singer 235). Because

charity implies giving when one is not obligated to give, and we are morally obligated to

give to those who are suffering, we cannot call giving to those in need charity. Singer’s

intention is not to say that charity is nonexistent, simply that our definition of charity is

wrong (Singer 235).

Singer offers another conclusion from his premises. Because we are morally

obligated to prevent bad things from happening if we can, and suffering from lack of

necessity is bad, then we are morally obligated to give as much time and money as we

possibly can without putting ourselves in the state that these people are in (Singer 235).

He offers that if everyone were to give a small amount the need could be taken care of

and there would be no need to give more; however everyone does not give and there is

still a need, so we are morally obligated to give what we can until either the need is

satisfied or we can give no more without putting ourselves in an equally bad position

(Singer 236).

Though I agree that we are morally obligated to prevent something bad from

happening if we can, I do not agree that taking this moral obligation to the extreme is the

right thing to do. In order to prove this I will first examine the plausibility of Singer’s

second premise.
 Singer gives two options for his second premise: a stronger one and a weaker one.

The stronger one offers that if we can, we are morally obligated to prevent something bad

from happening without compromising something of comparable moral importance

(Singer 233). There are two problems that I see with this premise. The first is that unless

we use the “eye for an eye” argument, how are we to define what something of

comparable moral importance is? If this means that we are to do anything short of killing

someone to save a person’s life, then how do we equate what is comparably morally

important in a situation that requires you take a different route than even exchange? I

shall offer an example: If you had the choice between chopping off the hands of ten

musicians to save one person’s life, which would you choose, and how would you decide

if it is less bad for 10 musicians to lose their hands or one man to lose his life? The

second problem with this statement is that it condones any act that does not cause

something as bad or worse to happen. In these terms, since the death of eight people is

not as bad as the deaths of nine people, we should feel no qualms about killing eight to

save nine. Singer offers a response to this in his weaker version of this statement.

This premise states that if we can prevent something bad from happening without

sacrificing anything of moral significance, we are morally obligated to do so (Singer

233). Though this version saves us from the choice of whether to do bodily harm to

others or anything of that nature, there is still the issue of an undefined term. What is

morally significant to some is not to others, and what is not to others is morally

significant to some. Singer contests that there are certain things that can and cannot be

considered morally significant; the killing or hurting of a human being is morally

significant under these views, as is doing harm to yourself or anyone else. Singer also
argues that getting one’s feet wet is not a morally significant reason to save a drowning

child if there is no danger to oneself (Singer 233). There are still grey areas in this matter;

many feel that lying is of extreme moral significance; does this mean we are not morally

obligated to lie to save a life? In the reverse case, there are some whose idea of what is

morally significant would sharply deter from that of others; some would save the life of

an endangered animal over an unknown human being with no qualms, though most

would condemn this behavior on the grounds that that no animal can be considered

morally significant when the life of a human is in question.

The issue of where to draw the line exists in one of Singer’s conclusions as well.

Singer’s conclusion that we are morally obligated to give any excess time and

possessions to those who lack the necessities to survive suffers the same ailments as his

premises. Naturally Singer speaks of simple pleasures: a cup of coffee, a new television,

and things of this sort. But if taken to its extreme this argument is both dangerous and in

violation of human nature.

In Plato’s Republic the Glaucon calls the “city in speech” “fit for sows,” because

its people have nothing more than basic necessities. It is argued and agreed that people

are unhappy unless they have more than basic necessities, and it is a violation of human

nature to force them to live without these necessities if they are capable of obtaining

them.

The danger of Singer’s conclusion comes from the idea that there is no limit to

when we can stop giving, short of doing just as much damage to ourselves. Under

Singer’s conclusion any free time or money should be spent working to help poverty-

stricken areas. First, there is the idea that any extra time should be spent helping. This
means that there is no need for school, because people can live off of low-income jobs

and still have the few necessities they need. It won’t be comfortable, but it’s doable, and

the extra time not spent in school can be spent volunteering. There is also no need for

leisure time, because leisure time is an unnecessary luxury, and Any sex other than for the

purpose of procreation can and should be discontinued under these premises. The list of

donations is almost infinite under conclusion we are morally obligated to donate any

spare time to help these causes by either working to make more money to donate or

volunteering.

The other danger comes economically. One objection that I raise to Singer is that

if we give as much as is necessary, though we are not giving more than our means, there

is always the possibility of losing a job and having no savings to live off of. Singer’s

argument states that any excess should be spent to help those who are in need; savings are

excess in this sense. Having money for the sake of having it is unnecessary to our

survival. We might need it in the future, but there are people who need it now. This holds

the true for insurance as well; it can be concluded that Singer’s argument provides that

any money spent on insurance should be instead sent to those without food or shelter,

because though we risk losing all of our possessions to fire or flood, we cannot be sure

that this will happen, while we can be sure that these people are starving. One might

object and say that savings and insurance are exceptions, however Singer’s argument that

anything we do not need to survive should be given away clearly gives no exceptions.

I agree with Singer’s argument that we cannot draw the distinction between duty

and charity, for I believe it is everyone’s moral obligation to give. Because of the obvious

flaws in Singer’s argument however, I do not believe that his other conclusion holds true.
There must be lines and distinctions for how much is morally correct to give; there are

too many risks with excess giving, and excess giving does not necessarily promote

general welfare, because though people are alive, it is an empty existence on but not quite

over the brink of poverty.