Transformation after two decades of agrarian reform program

Pamela Crosby MSc in Geography Candidate Department of Geography University of the Philippines Diliman

Introduction

In the Philippines, a large proportion of the population is involved in the agricultural sector. According to the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), an office under the Department of Agriculture (DA), about 12.03 million were employed in the agriculture sector. It represents about 35 percent of the country's employment in 2008. In terms of wage, an agricultural worker earns on average Php325 (7.3 US dollars)* daily, if employed in agricultural lands within the National Capital Region, the political and economic center of the Philippines or between Php185-257 (4.2-5.8 US dollars), if employed outside NCR (National Wages and Productivity Commission, 2008). Comparing these figures to earnings from non-agricultural employment, Php325-362 (7.3-8.1 US dollars) in NCR and Php183-287 (4.1-6.5 US dollars) outside NCR, the difference is quite significant. Oftentimes the terms agricultural is often equated to rural although they are not necessarily so. These words in turn are associated with poverty, backwardness, and underdevelopment. The bleak characterization of the rural-agricultural areas is attributed to landlessness, or more aptly, to unequal access to land, which in turn, maintains the dependency of the landless on landed entities, be they traditional landlords or huge commercial companies. In both cases, tenant farmers and farm workers are treated as mere tillers of land and have no decision-making power over the utilization of the land and the resources in it.

For rural developers, the way then to correct stagnation and poverty in the rural areas is to redistribute land, which is tantamount to redistributing wealth and power (Thiesenhusen, 2001; Borras, 2008b). By having access to land, tillers are no longer forced into an iniquitous sharing

*Based on the average exchange rate in 2008.

system with landlords or pressed into oftentimes-onerous wage labor system. Access to land also means freedom to diversify their livelihoods, directly join in the agricultural market, or even move away from agriculture.

On the other hand, landlords attempt to preserve their landholdings by sidestepping the agrarian reform programs using overt and covert means, from converting agricultural lands into other uses to employing outright armed resistance. Two decades after the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in the Philippines, what has happened then to the former landlords, the beneficiaries of the CARP, and their respective lands?

This paper outlines some of the findings of my masteral thesis which examines the impacts of agrarian reform on the social relations in the study area and on the production and reproduction spaces in the said community. The study is being conducted on three agrarian reform (AR) sites in the municipality of Buenavista, namely, Poblacion, Catulin, and Lilukin.

Agrarian Reform Impact Studies in the Philippines In the Philippines, most CARP impact assessment studies focus on the socioeconomic effects of the CARP, particularly on poverty alleviation and policy implications (see studies done by Balisacan, Borras and the PIDS). Many of these have been concerned with evaluating the success rate of the CARP and only a few have been concerned with the spatial effects of the program on the physical land itself. Among these few is a study done by Ballesteros & de la Cruz (2006) who examined the impacts of the CARP on land ownership concentration in the rice-growing areas in Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon. One of the evitable effects of the CARP is the decline of large consolidate rice lands and the increase of small rice farm landholdings, at least for a certain period of time. In one of the conclusions of the author, these agrarian reform sites in Nueva Ecija did not experience much change since farmers who benefited from the CARP eventually re-sold or pawned their lands not necessarily to their old landlords but to new land buyers, which is also a common practice among the CARP beneficiaries of Buenavista, Quezon.. What happens is that a new breed of landowners is emerging in these villages.

In relation to this, a study done by Llanto & Dingcong (1991) examine the frequently forgotten actors/stakeholders in the CARP, which are the landowners. Among the important focus of the study are the factors that encourage or discourage the shift of landowners from agriculture to industry and the impact of agrarian reform on their income and investment behavior. However, the authors discussed only the economizing behaviors and response of landowners to the CARP and portrayed them as rational entrepreneurs which is not always the case, especially in the Philippines where land is laden with political and social functions. It is a common fact that land reform programs are often met with resistance from large land owning entities.

Area of Study Buenavista was established as the 37th municipality of the Province of Quezon in the northeastern Philippines on August 26, 1950. However, it already existed as a small village (or a sitio) in the 1800s, founded by Spaniards who settled in the area. It has 37 barangays (the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines), with a total area of 16,135.07 hectares and a total population of 23,834 (as of 2003), such that 1.48 people live in an hectare of land.

Buenavista is a fifth-class municipality, meaning, it has an annual income of 10 million pesos to 20 million pesos (217,037.4 US dollars to 434,074.9 US dollars), which is practically at the bottom of the income classification of municipalities in the country. It is part of the Bondoc Peninsula, a sub-region located in the southern portion of the province. Buenavista is approximately 226 km southeast of Manila and about 114 km southeast of Lucena, Quezon Provinces capital and lone city.

Buenavista is an agricultural municipality, with 62% of its total land area (or 10,009 hectares), devoted for agricultural use. Of these 10,009 hectares, 8,153.8 or 81% of the agricultural area is planted with coconut. However, just like the rest of the Bondoc Peninsula subregion, has been handicapped by its physical geography. This area is characterized by a hilly and mountainous topography, high soil erodibility, and by leached upland soils. Moreover, this municipality is often in the path of typhoons that originate in the Pacific area.

Land, Agriculture and the Rise of Agrarian Elites In the Rise and Fall of Elites, the English translation of Paretos Un applicazione di teorie sociologiche, elite was defined as the strongest, the most energetic, and the most capable for good as well as evil, and that, peoples are always governed by an elite. Mosca, on the other hand, defined the elite by distinguishing two classes of people in a society: one that rules and one that is ruled. He continued, The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent. While Paretos and Moscas definitions did not particularly discuss the rise of agrarian elites, their definitions provide a good starting point in discussing the assent of agrarian elites and their roles in rural politics in the Philippines. Questions like how do the elites come to power, and maintain their legitimacy in the countrysides need to be addresses.

Wolters (1984), in his Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon, stated that the local elites rose to power when they started to amass lands in rural areas where most of supplies of land were. This process was a result of two developments that happened in the country during the colonial times: first, the incorporation of prominent native members of the population into the colonial government and, second, the opening of the Philippine archipelago to the world market through commodity production. The Spanish colonial government forcibly opened to the international market by mandating exportation of agricultural products. To produce more cash crops, many of the land owners had their hacienda tilled by peasants under the kasam sharecropping system (or the landlord-tenant system). This started the feudalistic feature of the rural-agricultural Philippines.

The feudalistic relationship between the landlord and the tenants, however, did not remain economic. As the landlords flourished economically, they did also politically. Due to their

financial power, they became the financiers of political parties and even became the candidates themselves that they eventually became part of the Philippine political system (von Albertini, 1971; McCoy, 1998). What the country then had at this time were economic and political landlords (McCoy, 1998; Hutchcroft, 2000). Landlordism and Agrarian Reform in the Philippines The notion and reality of power that is equated to ownership of land is deeply entrenched in the Philippine society, even before Christianity and Islam arrived in the country. However, the widescale acquisition and (mis)appropriation of land proliferated during the Spanish period in the country, particularly in the lowlands (Wolters, 1984; McCoy, 1993; Veneracion, 2001). Villages or pueblo, and later on, municipalities were set up while land grants were handed out to obedient implementers of the colonization project of the Spanish crown through the encomienda, alcadia and estancia systems. These systems, wherein large tracts of lands were cultivated for cash crops or used for ranching (Veneracion, 2001:85-103), are feudalistic in nature. Because of the prestige associated with owning large areas of land, many individuals started acquiring them on their own. It was during this period that land grabbing became rampant despite the regalian doctrine. The Spanish Period, and the American Period, subsequently, in the Philippines gave birth to the present landlords in the country. Landlordism or the landlord-tenant system was abolished since the passing of the institution of the Republic Act 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL of 1988), which is the legal basis for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is a ten-year program that is implemented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The deadline for CARP was 1998 but it was extended until 2008, a decade late of the original deadline. However, a recent resolution of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee (PARC), signed this February 2007, states a plan to extend the program beyond 2008. Agrarian reform is defined as: the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, irrespective

of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares of stock, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work. (RA 6657, Section 3a)

This was reiterated by DAR, the main body tasked to implement the CARP: Agrarian reform is the redistribution of agricultural lands to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement. It includes the provision of support services such as: credit extension, irrigation, roads and bridges, marketing facilities, human resource and institutional development.

Agrarian reform, therefore, does not only mean redistribution of lands but providing the beneficiaries with extension services and incentives to the beneficiaries.

However, despite the delay in meeting the deadline for the CARP, the government is positive that it is producing concrete results as evidenced in DARs 2006 Annual Accomplishment Report. DAR reported that it was able to distribute 96% of its targeted 130,000 hectares for that particular year. The governments optimism was bolstered by positive praises from international observers, as reflected in a news article published in DARs website citing the country as a model for agrarian reform implementation (Intl. rural devt planners: laud RP agrarian program, May 31, 2007, http://www.dar.gov.ph). Ironically, at the same page, another headline reads, Police, soldiers key to CARPs success (May 31, 2007, http://www.dar.gov.ph). This mentions the violence associated with the implementation of the CARP in areas that are controlled by prominent figures, usually politicians and businessmen. This same conflict echoes the same resistance from many of the lawmakers, staged at the time when CARL was still a bill. Many congressmen objected to the provisions of the bill because it threatens their own large

landholdings back in their provinces. These legislators were not only political elites, but were, firstly, agrarian elites.

Fragmentation of Land, Redistribution of Power? In the Philippine countryside, land remains in the core of resource conflicts, and parallel to these, of the rural development agenda. The dichotomy between the landed and the landless continues to define the political, economic, and socio-cultural landscapes of the rural areas. In a country where most people still depend on agriculture, land remains one of the most important factor of production or capital. However, it is also true that land is more than an economic factor. It has political and social functions such that in many rural areas in the Philippines, control of the land means control of the people within this land. Land-owning entities occupy the upper tier of society they are the wealthy, the force that can dictate the development trajectory (or lack thereof) of barangays, towns, even provinces, they are the ones whereupon the landless are depending on for socioeconomic and political security. Land means power.

The series of agrarian reform programs in the Philippines aimed to rectify the problem of inequality based on land ownership through the redistribution scheme. The Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988 mandated the abolishment of the tenancy system in the country to make way for a society where first, no one is excluded from access to land and other capitals, and two, access to these resources is equal for everyone.

More than the fragmentation of lands, land redistribution projects have more profound effects. Going back to the premise of the CARP, it aims to upset the existing power relations between the tenants, farm workers and other beneficiaries and the landlords by providing a level playing field. For the past decades, a number of studies conducted particularly by the Popular Institute for Democratic Studies (PIDS) (see Llanto & Dingcong, 1991; Sanchez, 1991; Geron, 1994; Reyes, 2002; Llantos & Ballesteros, 2003; Ballesteros & de la Cruz, 2006; Adriano, 2008; Ballesteros & Cortes, 2008; Leonen, 2008) assessed the socioeconomic impacts and policy implications of the CARP. Most of these studies reflect the failure of the program in achieving its goals, thereby, presenting only pictures of a stagnant rural, i.e., low-density in terms of settlements; agricultural, i.e., land use is still predominated by crops production, countryside,

which are not particularly accurate; and one that is still defined by traditional patron-client bonds. Buenavista presents a classic example of what seems to be feudalistic society, or one that is characterized by landlord-tenant/patron-client relationship. Ownership of most of the lands is concentrated to only a few families, among them the Reyes and the Uy families (Franco, 2005). During the Marcos regime, the Reyeses in particular, rose to political power and held the leadership of the local government unit of Buenavista from 1972 until 1986. It was during this time that they supposedly amassed most of the lands in the municipality. After the collapse of the Marcos government, they were able to re-establish their power as economic and political elites in the area by employing the classic guns, goons, and gold operandi. To counter these forces, the New Peoples Army (NPA) has also entered the area. Since then, this municipality, just like the Bondoc Peninsula in general, has become a hotspot for violent encounters between the armed landlords, the NPA, and the military. Because of the reign of terror in this municipality, Buenavista is practically cut off from other outside influences.

By exercising various forms of power play, those in power aim that certain persons, perspectives, issues or conflicts never enter the overt political arena, thereby, maintaining the status quo. The implementation of the CARP has led many landlords to practice all their means of power to resist the program. Either they overtly refuse to participate in the program or they circumvent the law. Yet, despite this resistance, Buenavista has a strong farmers cooperative and a functioning Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). These two were instrumental in winning the case between a group of farmers in one of the agrarian reform sites and the Domingo Reyes estate, owned by the one of the most influential and powerful families in Bondoc Peninsula. In December 1998, the farmers were granted almost 164 hectares of the hacienda (Franco, 2005). As of 2006, other pockets of agrarian reform areas have dotted the once consolidated landholdings of the said family. It is important to note the complexities of Buenavista. The success of the land redistribution program in this municipality is said to be attributed to several factors: 1) the presence of organized farmers group, in the form of a cooperative, that openly fought for its members

claims to the land; 2) a functioning Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO), which is the main implementer of the CARP in the local communities, 3) the entry of local and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society and other agrarian/rural reform advocate groups that assist the farmers/tenants in their fight for their lands, and 4) the overt and covert initiatives practiced by the farmers at the individual level to oppose the existing large land owners in the area. On the other hand, there are also factors that stall the success of the agrarian reform program in Buenavista: 1) the continuing influx of migrants, mostly landless farmers, from the Bicol region, who eventually become dependent on land owning entities; 2) the new propaganda and tactics used by these landlords to halt the CARP program like conversion of their remaining landholdings into non-agricultural lands and re-buying back lands from the CARP beneficiaries; and 3) CARP grantees who re-sell or pawn their lands to their former landlords.

Agrarian Reform and the Peasants The remaining hacienda of the Reyeses in Buenavista has about 155 tenants, subject to the 70-30 crop sharing system (locally known as tersyohan), in favor of the landlord. Among these tenants are caretakers or overseers cum estate managers, locally known as enkargados, of the coconut plantations. They are the most trusted men of the landowner. The landowners do not directly negotiate with their tenants but through these enkargados. This implies a hierarchy within the tenants: the caretakers/overseers/managers/enkargados above the ordinary tenants who work directly on the land.

Prior to the agrarian reform, harvests of the tenants are turned over to the enkargados who, in turn, would oversee the processing of the nuts into copra. Ordinarily, the same tenants who harvested the nuts would transport the nuts to the drying area, de-husk and cook (through smoking) the nuts to become copra. The enkargado would then sell the copra to coconut buyers, usually, in the capital town of Quezon, Province. The profit from this would be divided between the landlord who gets 70% of the share and the enkargado who gets the remaining share. The enkargado, in turn, pays the tenants at a rate of P10 per kilo of copra that were produced, with additional payments for their extra labor. However, during the land redistribution program, this Reyeses started to engage the services of non-tenants who are willing to work as farm workers in

the hacienda. This has been a source of conflict between the legitimate tenants and the outsiders.

According to some of the tenants of the hacienda, during and after the process of the redistribution of the Reyes lands to the beneficiaries, the landowners, through the enkargados, started hiring farmworkers from other barangays and municipalities into the plantation. It was a ploy to show the local agrarian reform office that the Reyeses have no remaining tenants. However, this scheme displaced more than ten families who are legitimate tenants of the plantation. The displaced households are now squatters on the land they once tilled.

Moreover, the landlords have been blaming the agrarian reform for the shutting down of the two oil mills, reasoning that because their coconut plantations were reduced to more than half of their original sizes, the supply coconut coming from the remaining area of the plantation can not support the operation of the oil mills.

Emerging Actors in the Agricultural Industry While the Reyeses remain to dominate and control the municipality and its political and economic structures, a number of actors and groups are starting to emerge as players in the coconut industry of this locality. They may be in the form of independent coconut traders, individuals who took the land redistribution program as an opportunity to provide alternatives to the new small holders of lands by setting up relatively higher buying price for copra (12-14 pesos versus the fixed ten pesos rate at the hacienda).

Corporations have also started to tap the human labor of the municipality by contracting them to be farmworkers in their own plantations. One of these attempts was the plan of San Miguel Corporation to initiate a cassava planting program in Buenavista. Produce from these farms would be used to supply the beer manufacturing of this corporation. However, this plan did not push through, much to the disappointment of the local people.

One of the significant events in Buenavista is the emergence of peasant organizations and farmers cooperatives which, after winning their battles against the Reyeses for their rights to

10

their own lands, became an empowering tool for its members. These cooperatives and groups provide its members capital through credit system to start up their own farms.

Despite the changes brought about by the agrarian reform program and the emerging opportunities for the population of Buenavista, this place and its people remain tied to the Reyeses. Why this is so?

This may be explained by the persisting patron-client culture in Buenavista. While some tenants were able to acquire their own lands, they were not fully emancipated from their bondage to their former landlords. For one, they cannot freely exercise their new-found freedom because the municipality is militarized. This can be observed by the presence of military checkpoints and military personnel regularly patrolling the municipality. These are supposedly means to intercept members of the NPA. Some farmers, however, claim that these are surveillance ploys of the Reyeses to identify individuals or groups, like the farmers associations, who are plotting against the clan. This paranoia is so obvious that new comers in the municipality like migrants have to endure frequent visitations from the military or the police. Even researchers are treated circumspectly, and kept close, by the mayors minions, under the guise of protecting the people from possible NPA harassment while in the area. The Reyeses also try to proliferate this antiNPA attitude by casting the latter into bad light and accusing them of extortion (in the form of revolutionary tax collection, which, according to the government, the proceeds do not go to the people but to the NPA members pockets), theft and harassment. The military is necessary to protect the people from these aggravations. The whole municipality then becomes under the protection of the government, which, in this case, is the Reyeses.

Migrants and the Persistence of Patron-Client Relationship

Because of its proximity to the Bicol and Visayas regions, Buenavista has been experiencing a steady inflow of migrants. Ironically, these migrants are landless families escaping poverty in their own hometowns. All of those who ended up in Buenavista became squatters in the Reyeses lands. These people have been permitted by Mayor Reyes to put up their houses in his lands but forbidden them to till the land. This leads to total dependency on the part of the migrants to the

11

Reyeses. Some of them seek and are able to work as farmworkers in the hacienda, either as harvesters, nut collectors, or de-huskers. However, these jobs do not pay much and too temporary. There are no other employments available in the municipality. Clerical positions in the municipal hall were already occupied by people who have connections with the mayor. Engaging in the transportation sector is not an option either since the migrants do not have the capital to buy or rent vehicles, in the first place. The only option left is farming or fishing, the latter still underdeveloped, and so, unprofitable. Since the migrants do not have access to lands, some of them resort to stealing coconuts (or paglulusot) or other crops from the plantation. Others have no choice but to use a portion of their backyard to plant vegetables or corn, even if this is prohibited. Many of them are caught by the military who are regularly monitoring the migrants/squatters in the Reyeses lands.

Persisting Patronage The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 aims first, promote social justice justice, second, move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization,and third, establish owner cultivatorship of economic-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture by prioritizing the welfare of the landless and a more equitable distribution and ownership of land. With the CARP, large landholdings of family elites like the Reyeses were already fragmented, if not completely presumably, and distributed to once landless tenants. However, bondage to these elites persists. Does it only show that the agrarian reform has freed these tenants in title only but not politically, economically and socially? This is so the case, at least in Buenavista, where the agrarian reform program did not necessarily emancipated the peasants from the onerous patronage system. For many years to come, this will be the case if the government itself is dominated by agrarian elites who control the economic and political powers that legitimize their authority over the masses. REFERENCES Adriano, F.D. (2008). CARP institutional assessment in a post-2008 transition scenario: Toward a new rural development architecture. Discussion Paper Series 2008-06. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

12

Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M.S. (1962). The Two Faces of Power. American Political Science Review 56, 941-52.

Ballesteros, M. & Cortez, F. (2008). CARP institutional assessment in a post-2008 transition scenario: Implications for land administration and management, Discussion Paper Series 2008-07. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Ballesteros, M. & de la Cruz, A. (2006). Land reform and changes in land ownership concentration: Evidence from rice-growing villages in the Philippines. Discussion Paper Series 2006-21. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Bello, W., Docena, H.; De Guzman, M.; and Malig, M.L. (2004). Multilateral punishment: the Philippines in the WTO, 1995-2003 The anti-development state: Tthe political economy of permanent crisis in the Philippines. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.

Bernstein, H. (1994). Agrarian classes in capitalist development. In L. Sklair (Ed.), Capitalism and development. New York and London: Routledge.

Bernstein, H. & Byres, T. (2001). From peasant studies to agrarian change. Journal of Agrarian Change, 1 (1), 1-56.

Borras, S., Jr. (2008a). Competing Views and Strategies on Agrarian Reform, Volume I: International Perspective. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Borras, S., Jr. (2008b). Competing Views and Strategies on Agrarian Reform, Volume II: Philippine Perspective. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Borras, S., Jr. (1998). The bibingka strategy in land reform implementation : autonomous peasant movements and state reformists in the Philippines. Quezon City : Institute for Popular Democracy

13

Connelly, J. & Smith, G. (1999). Politics and the environment: From theory to practice. London & New York: Routledge.

Dahl, R. (1957). The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science 2, 201-15.

Department of Agriculture-Agribusiness and Marketing Assistance Service (DA-AMAS) .(1999). Coconut industry situationer report, accessed at

<http://www.da.gov.ph/agribiz/coconut.html>

Eder, J. F. (1993). Family farming and household enterprise in a Philippine community, 19711988. Journal of Asian Studies, 52(3), 647-671.

Franco, J. (2005). On just grounds: The new struggle for land and democracy in Bondoc Peninsula. In J. Franco & S. Borras, Jr. (Eds.), On just grounds : Struggling for agrarian justice and citizenship rights in the rural Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.

Franco, J. & Borras, S., Jr. (Eds.) (2005). On just grounds: Struggling for agrarian justice and citizenship rights in the rural Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy.

Geron, M.P. (1994). The impact of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) on the crop sector. Discussion Paper Series 1994-14. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Hart, G., Turton, A. & White, B. (1992). Agrarian transformation, local processes and the state in Southeast Asia. Berkeley and Loas Angeles: University of California Press.

Houston, Charles O., Jr. (1953). The Philippine coconut industry, 1934-1950 Philippine Geographical Journal, 1(2&3), 61-90.

14

Hutchcroft, P.(2002). Colonial masters, national politicos and provincial lords: central authority and local autonomy in the American Philippines 19001913, Journal of Asian Studies, 59, 277306.

Kerkvliet, B. (1991). Everyday politics in the Philippines: class and status relations in a Central Luzon Village. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Lactao, Ernesto. (1990). Structural adjustments in the coconut industry: an analysis of current policies and development alternatives. Saliksik, Research Paper, Philippine Peasant Institute, Quezon City, Philippines.

Leonen, M. (2008). CARP institutional assessment in a post-2008 transition scenario: Reforms for the agrarian justice system. Discussion Paper Series 2008-10. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Llanto, G. & Ballesteros, M. (2003). Land issues in poverty reduction strategies and the development agenda: Philippines. Discussion Paper Series 2003-03. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Llanto, G. & Dingcong, C. (1991). Impact of agrarian reform on landowners: A review of literature and a framework. Discussion Paper Series 1991-14. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Llorito, D.L. (2002). Quezon's feudal system blamed for insurgency. Accessed at <http://www.manilatimes.net/others/special/2002/oct/24/20021024spe.html>

Maunahan, M.V.; Huelgas, Z.M.; Sardido, M.L.; Alino, J.B.; Deomampo, N.R. (1998). Commodity industry analysis: coconut. Commodity Industry Analysis Ser. No. 4.

McCoy, A.W. (ed.). (1998). Anarchy of families: state and families in the Philippines. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press.

15

Morales, H., Jr.; Putzel, J., Lara, F., Jr. &Quitoriano, E. (Eds.) (2001). Agrarian reform, rural politics, institutional change and globalization. Quezon City: Project Development Institute.

Park, Seung Woo and Green, Gary P. (1995). Agricultural restructuring and capitalist industrialization: the cases of South Korea and the Philippines, Kasarinlan, 11 (2), 103148.

Putzel, James. (2002). A captive land : the politics of agrarian reform in the Philippines. London: Monthly Review Press, 1992.

Reyes, C. (2002). Impact of agrarian reform on poverty. Discussion Paper Series 2002-02. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

Rigg, J. (2001). More than the soil: Rural change in Southeast Asia. Harlow: Prentice Hall.

Rigg, J. (1997). Southeast Asia: The human landscape of modernization and development. London: Routledge.

Roseberry, W. (1983). From peasant studies to proletarianization studies. Studies in Comparative International Development, 18(1/2), 69-89.

Scott, J. (1976). The moral economy of the peasant : rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. (1985). Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. & Kerkvliet, B. (eds.) (1986). Everyday forms of peasant resistance in Southeast Asia, Journal of Peasant Studies, 13 (2).

16

Scott, J. & Kerkvliet, B. (1973). The politics of survival: peasant response to progress in Southeast Asia, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4 (2), 241-268. Shanin, T. (1989). Peasants and peasant Societies, 2nd Edition. Oxford: Basil and Blackwell.

Thiesenhusen, W. (2001). Poverty amidst plenty. In H. Morales et al (Eds.). Agrarian reform, rural politics, institutional change and globalization. Quezon City: Project Development Institute.

Thorner, D., Kerblay, B. & Smith, R.E.F. (eds.). (1966). A.V. Chayanov on the Theory of Peasant Economy. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Tiglao, R. (1980). The political economy of the Philippine coconut industry. Third World Studies. Commodity Studies No. 1, December 1980.

United Coconut Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UCAP). (1980). The socio-economic profile of the coconut farmers in the Quezon-Batangas-Laguna (QBL) area. Manila: UCAP.

Zoleta-Nantes, D. B. Z. (2001). A process-documentation of the community managed agrarian reform program. An unpublished report submitted to the Department of Agrarian Reform, Quezon City, Philippines.

17