Epistemic Evil

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

By

Joel Thomas Tierno

CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS PRESS

Epistemic Evil, by Joel Thomas Tierno This book first published 2007 by Cambridge Scholars Press 15 Angerton Gardens, Newcastle, NE5 2JA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright 2007 by Joel Thomas Tierno All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN 1-84718-059-0

This volume is dedicated to my parents,

JOSEPH, DOLORES AND JAMES,

with gratitude and love for too much to name.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................xi INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................1 PART I: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS CHAPTER ONE: ON GOD...............................................................................12 1. On the Concept of God ............................................................................ 12 2. A Qualification Concerning Gods Power ................................................13 3. Gods Character and the Character of the Creation...................................14 4. God and Good ...........................................................................................15 CHAPTER TWO: THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL ............................................................................................................17 1. The Logical Formulation of the Problem of Evil ......................................17 2. The Evidential Formulation of the Problem of Evil..................................20 3. A Third Formulation of the Problem of Evil.............................................21 CHAPTER THREE: THE BEST-OF-ALL-POSSIBLE-WORLDS HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................................24 1. A Modified Form of the Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis...........24 A. The Problem of Free Agents Other Than God......................................24 B. The Pluralistic Hypothesis....................................................................25 C. The Argument from the Universe as a Part of a Larger Whole ............25 D. The Argument from Gods Omnipotence.............................................25 E. Summation............................................................................................26 2. Robert Adams on the Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis ...............27 3. Evaluating Adams Arguments .................................................................29 A. About Condition 3' ...............................................................................30 B. About Conditions 1 and 2.....................................................................31 C. About the Value of Grace.....................................................................33 4. Adams Argument in Application to This World......................................36 5. The Best-of-All-Possible-Worlds Hypothesis and the Problem of Evil...37

viii

Table of Contents

CHAPTER FOUR: THE INTENSION AND EXTENSION OF MORAL EVIL.............................................................................................. 39 1. Difficulties with Definitions of Moral Evil...............................................39 2. Toward a Definition of Moral Evil ...........................................................45 PART II: EPISTEMIC EVIL CHAPTER FIVE: THE CLASSICAL LOCUS .................................................48 1. Descartes Formulation of the Problem of Erroneous Judgment ..............48 2. A Critique of Descartes Formulation of the Problem ..............................49 CHAPTER SIX: PARADIGMATIC CASES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL ..............52 CHAPTER SEVEN: EXAMPLES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL...............................59 1. The Cases Case I: The Headmaster and the Pupil .......................................................59 Case II: The Graduate Student ...................................................................61 Case III: The Couple and Their Automobile..............................................62 Case IV: The Doctor and His Patient.........................................................64 Case V: The Marriage Proposal .................................................................65 Case VI: Choosing a Career.......................................................................66 2. The Significance of the Cases ...................................................................67 CHAPTER EIGHT: NATURAL EVIL AND EPISTEMIC EVIL ....................69 1. About Natural Evil ....................................................................................69 2. The Analogy of Epistemic Evil to Natural Evil ........................................69 CHAPTER NINE: THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: PART 1 ..........71 CHAPTER TEN: MOTIVATION AND RESPONSIBILITY...........................77 1. Regarding Compulsory Theoretical Judgments ........................................77 A. Natural Desires.....................................................................................77 B. Learned Desires....................................................................................81 C. Practical Circumstances........................................................................86 2. Regarding Compulsory Practical Judgments ............................................87 3. An Important Qualification Concerning Practical Judgments...................89 4. The Strength of Motivation.......................................................................92 CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: PART 2 ....94 CHAPTER TWELVE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL ........97

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

ix

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: DESCARTES APOLOGETICS.............................101 1. The Epistemological Argument ..............................................................103 2. Critical Analysis of the Epistemological Argument................................103 3. The Metaphysical Argument...................................................................108 4. Critical Analysis of the Metaphysical Argument ....................................109 5. A Complex Argument: Exposition and Critique.....................................110 6. The Psychological Argument ..................................................................111 7. Descartes on the Source of Human Errors of Judgment and How Such Errors May Be Avoided .................................................113 A. The Source of Human Errors of Judgment.........................................113 B. Descartes Method of Avoiding Error ................................................113 8. Critical Analysis of the Psychological Argument ...................................114 9. The Argument From Freedom of the Will ..............................................116 10. Critical Analysis of the Argument from the Freedom of the Will...........118 11. Another Complex Argument: Exposition and Critique...........................118 12. The Argument From Divine Liberty .......................................................120 13. Critical Analysis of the Argument from Divine Liberty .........................121 CHAPTER FOURTEEN: CONTEMPORARY APOLOGETICS AND EPISTEMIC EVIL .................................................................................125 1. Alvin Plantinga .......................................................................................125 2. Marilyn McCord Adams .........................................................................132 3. Richard Swinburne..................................................................................143 4. John Hick ................................................................................................148 5. Bruce Reichenbach .................................................................................151 6. Summation ..............................................................................................157 CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE THEODICEAN CONSEQUENCES OF EPISTEMIC EVIL.....................................................................................158 CHAPTER SIXTEEN: ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS.................................161 1. Epistemic Evil Is Necessarily Associated with Future-Oriented Judgments ...............................................................................................161 2. Epistemic Evil and Gods Obligation to Optimize Good ........................164 3. Epistemic Evil and the Wrongful Actions of Others...............................165 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: THE RELATIVE INTRACTABILITY OF EPISTEMIC EVIL.....................................................................................166 1. Moral Evil and Epistemic Evil ................................................................166 2. Natural Evil and Epistemic Evil..............................................................167

Table of Contents

EPILOGUE ......................................................................................................169 1. Is Epistemic Evil Logically Necessary?..................................................169 2. Is Epistemic Evil Related to the Existence of a Greater Good? ..............170 3. Is Epistemic Evil Related to the Nonexistence of a Greater Evil? ..........170 4. Is Epistemic Evil a Consequence of the Defective Actions of Agents Agents Other Than God? .........................................................................171 5. Summation ..............................................................................................171 NOTES.............................................................................................................172 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................176 INDEX .............................................................................................................179

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to recognize a debt of gratitude to several individuals who have participated, at one point or another, in the extended process that has issued in this essay: Thomas J. Donahue, Georges Dicker, Peter H. Hare, Richard T. Hull, the late Richard R. LaCroix. Most especially, I would like to express my gratitude to Gina M. Sully, who twice read earlier drafts of this manuscript and made innumerable judicious suggestions.

INTRODUCTION
The first question is: What is a problem of evil? There has been some disagreement about this. For the purposes of this inquiry, problems of evil arise from apparent incongruities between the character of the alleged creator of the universe and the observed character of the universe itself. The universe is purported to be the work of a being without defect. The universe is observed to have certain apparently defective features. It would seem that the universe ought not to have these features if it is the work of such a being. Thus arise the problems of evil. As used by moral and social philosophers, evil is opposed to morally good. The meaning of the term is slightly different in the context of the discussion of the problem of evil. In that context, evil consists in the suffering of sentient beings. Thus natural phenomena may be properly associated with evil in this sense, though such phenomena are clearly not evil in the moral sense. The features of the universe that are associated with problems of evil cause the relevantly innocent to suffer. Who are the relevantly innocent? Individuals are relevantly innocent with respect to a specific evil when there is no defect in their conduct that accounts for their suffering that evil. It might be objected that evils may be warranted by defects in agents conduct that have no direct connection to those evils. It is not necessary that there be some defect in our conduct which makes us liable to a specific evil for that evil to be justified. This claim implies that our actions do not have to be relevantly defective. My suffering in one context may be warranted by a wrong that I have committed in some other context. If God punishes in this way, he either does not intend punishment to serve an educative function or does not understand punishment very well. If transgressions and their punishments are thus uncoupled, people are unlikely to associate them. The punishment is unlikely to be perceived as punishment. The possibility of learning anything specific from the punishment is thus effectively eliminated. The dominant analogy concerning the relation of God to human beings is that of a profoundly concerned and caring parent to a somewhat wayward child. Do loving parents administer painful punishments that are designed such that their children are unable to learn from those punishments? No. To knowingly do so would have to be considered cruel and abusive. It follows that administering such punishments would signal either profound ignorance or a defect in the character of the punisher. Profound ignorance is incompatible with Gods omniscience. Defective character is incompatible with Gods omnibenevolence.

Introduction

In short, Gods cardinal attributes would be a barrier to his administering punishments of this type. A second difficulty arises for those who insist that the relevantly innocent do not suffer unjustly. If no one who is relevantly innocent suffers unjustly then every specific instance of suffering is related to some failing of the sufferer. Further, the suffering and the failing from which it arises are somehow commensurate. This implies that the sum total of evil that individuals endure in their lives is quantitatively proportionate to the sum total of the wrongs they perpetrate. This notion is ludicrous. Experience refutes it. Profoundly evil people often suffer relatively little. Joseph Stalin, one of the twentieth centurys greatest butchers, basically had things the way the he wanted them throughout his life. He suffered little physically and endured little frustration in the execution of his political objectives. Other people perpetrate so much evil that the claim that their suffering is quantitatively proportionate to the suffering they cause is absurd. Adolph Hitler undoubtedly suffered in his life, but it cannot be seriously supposed that the suffering he endured was proportionate to the suffering he caused. The list of such persons is undoubtedly long. So is the list of good people who have suffered greatly. Noted examples include Sir Thomas More, Galileo, Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Finally, the claim that the relevantly innocent do not suffer violates the core of Christian doctrine. Jesus is said to have been the innocent lamb who suffered so that our sins may be forgiven. Here is a manson of God or otherwisewho suffered greatly and did very little, if anything, wrong. Gods willingness to permit the relevantly innocent to suffer requires explanation. We would hardly select divine or Godlike as the appropriate adjectives to characterize the behavior of parents who consistently fail to protect their relevantly innocent children from easily avoided harms. Abusive, or at best negligent, seem more fitting characterizations. Yet Gods creatures, even when their behavior is relevantly unimpeachable, are frequently made to suffer harms that God could easily prevent. Why does God not protect the relevantly innocent from suffering? This is no merely theoretical question. Human history is a tapestry heavily dappled with the blood, tears, and anguished cries of the relevantly innocent. This demands explanation. In addressing the existence of evil within the creation, philosophers and theologians have traditionally distinguished between evil that has its source in human action and evil that has its source in the natural world. The evil that has its source in human action is called moral evil. It is said to be consequent upon the intentional actions of free agents. Natural evil has its source within the natural domain. It is said to follow from naturally occurring objects and phenomena through the inevitable operation of natural laws.

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

The classification of evils into moral and natural is widely regarded as exhaustive. One aim of this essay is to demonstrate that this is not so. A third form of evil will be discussed in detail below. I call this third form of evil epistemic evil. It surfaces in the context of our effort to make correct judgments. It is ultimately rooted in our unavoidable ignorance of information we require to make truthful judgments about the world in which we live and the best choices about our own actions. Epistemic evil is associated with human action, but it cannot be properly regarded as moral evil. In Part I of this essay, various preliminary points of clarification and foundational considerations are addressed that are relevant to the argument regarding epistemic evil presented in Part II. Chapter 1 is devoted to discussion of the concept of God. It is necessary to identify and briefly clarify the attributes of God that provide the basis for problems of evil. This is the business of the first section of Chapter 1. In the second section, I take a closer look at Gods omnipotence and offer a clarification of what it means to say that God can do whatever is logically possible. Finally, I consider the notion that Gods character would be reflected in his creation. This notion is a presupposition of all problems of evil and therefore deserves some consideration. In Chapter 2, I begin by outlining and critiquing what is known as the logical formulation of the problem of evil. Next, I consider a proposed reformulation of the problem known as the evidential formulation of the problem of evil. I argue that whereas the logical formulation of the problem is too strong, the evidential formulation is unnecessarily weak. I defend an alternative conception of the nature of problems of evil. I argue that problems of evil are best understood as problems of ontological incompatibility. The hypothesis of an infinitely perfect creator has existential implications. It has implications about the character of the creation. Certain forms of evil in the creation cannot cohere existentially with an infinitely perfect creator. Those who advance problems of evil contend that such forms of evil actually exist. Chapter 3 focuses on Robert Adams argument regarding the best-of-allpossible-worlds hypothesis. I defend an importantly modified variant of the best-of-all-possible-worlds hypothesis. I agree with Adams in rejecting the view that God can create only one universe, that is, the best of all possible universes. I nonetheless maintain that there are definite limitations upon the character of Gods creation. Among these is a limitation regarding imperfections in the universe insofar as God determines its character. In the final section of this chapter, I argue that the best-of-all-worlds hypothesis is not actually central to those who advance problems of evil. Their arguments do not presuppose that hypothesis. In Chapter 4, the intension and the extension of the concept of moral evil are discussed. I begin by noting that there are many definitions of moral evil in the

Introduction

literature. These definitions are shown to be extensionally as well as intensionally divergent. In other words, these definitions are shown to diverge in their comparative assessments of what count as moral evils. I then consider a number of different specific actions in an effort to sufficiently sharpen the intension of the concept for the purposes of this inquiry. I close by arguing that, contrary to the traditional view, there is evil within the human domain of the universe that is not moral evil. More specifically, I argue that not all of the evil consequent upon the intentional actions of free agents is moral evil. These arguments set the stage for Part II of the essay. In Part II, I formulate and defend the problem of epistemic evil. In Chapter 5, the problematic of Descartes Fourth Meditation is outlined. This is the classical locus for the inquiry into the theodicean significance of human errors of judgment. I begin by briefly explaining how the problematic of the Fourth Meditation emerges from the conclusions of the Third Meditation. I then explain Descartes formulation of the problem of epistemic evil. Finally, I argue that Descartes formulation of the problem is deficient in two related ways. The first defect is that he treats all errors of judgment as if they are relevantly similar in the context of this problem. That is a serious mistake. The second defect, which follows from the first, is that Descartes formulates the problem of epistemic evil universally. He wants to know why we should ever judge erroneously. The real problem is why we should err under certain specifiable conditions. I try to correct these deficiencies. In Chapter 6, I outline the character of paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil. My objective is to give a detailed characterization of the errors of judgment that lie at the heart of this problem. In this context, five variables are considered. The first is the conditions that motivate the judgment. The second is the consequences of the agents previous judgments and actions. The third is the deliberative procedure the agent employs in arriving at the judgment. The fourth is the quality of the agents judgmentit must be substantively incorrect. The fifth is the impact of the judgmentit must have significant adverse consequences for the human beings that are affected by it. Through this discussion, the essential nature of epistemic evil is brought to light. The judgments associated with epistemic evil concern matters that agents cannot be reasonably criticized for judging. These judgments are made through procedures that agents cannot be reasonably criticized for employing. These judgments are substantively incorrect. The errors involved in these judgments lead to human suffering. In Chapter 7, several examples of epistemic evil are discussed in considerable detail. The aim here is to give the reader a sense of the sorts of judgments that are connected with this form of evil. Though the examples are tied to particular cultural and historical institutions, circumstances, and artifacts,

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

similar examples can surely be found from every age and every culture. The essential point is that these judgments are commonplace. There is nothing extraordinary about them. Everyone has suffered, at one time or another, from epistemic evil. This form of evil is more pervasive than either moral evil or natural evil, and that is no small claim. In Chapter 8, epistemic evil is compared to natural evil. The aim is to show that these two forms of evil are analogous in certain important ways. I begin by briefly characterizing natural evil. I define natural evil as suffering consequent upon natural objects and phenomena and the inevitable operations of natural laws. I then argue that paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil and the most disturbing cases of natural evil are alike in that the people involved cannot be reasonably blamed for bringing about the suffering that they endure. The relevant instances of natural evil and epistemic evil seem to be connected with the world as we find it. There is no clearly identifiable means available to those involved through which they could reliably circumvent the evil. Chapter 9 addresses the issue of where the responsibility for epistemic evil lies. I begin by distinguishing two forms of responsibility for acts of erroneous judgment: motivational responsibility and methodological responsibility. Motivational responsibility focuses on the reasons the agent passes judgment upon the subject of the error. Methodological responsibility focuses on the reasons the agents judgment is erroneous. Factoring these two forms of responsibility together, we arrive at a four-category classification of erroneous judgments. In the first category are acts of judgment such that the agent is neither motivationally responsible for the act of judgment nor methodologically responsible for the error of judgment. In the second category are acts of judgment such that the agent is motivationally responsible for the act of judgment but not methodologically responsible for the error of judgment. In the third category are acts of judgment such that the agent is not motivationally responsible for the act of judgment, but is methodologically responsible for the error of judgment. In the final category are acts of judgment such that the agent is motivationally responsible for the act of judgment and methodologically responsible for the error of judgment. This discussion of responsibility carries through Chapters 10 and 11. Chapter 10 carefully examines different types of judgments, different forms of motivation, and different degrees of motivation. First, I discuss theoretical judgments, and then I discuss practical judgments. Under each of these headings, judgments motivated by natural desires, by learned desires, and by practical circumstances are considered in detail. In the third section of the chapter, I offer an important qualification regarding practical judgments based on the fact that human beings enter into relations of opposition in which it is impossible for everyone to succeed. The chapter ends with a discussion of

Introduction

different strengths of motivation. Here I deal with the significance of the distinction between judgments we are compelled to make by the forms of motivation that have been discussed earlier in the chapter and judgments that we are merely disposed to make by those forms of motivation. In Chapter 11, I argue that the hypothetical nature of the relation between the creator and the creation that is characteristic of Judaeo-Christian theism entails that God shares a measure of the responsibility for some of the errors of judgment discussed in Chapter 10. God has created the world in which the agents who make these errors live and judge. He has created the agents themselves. He bears a measure of responsibility for their motivations. He bears a measure of responsibility for the information that is available to them. He bears a measure of responsibility for limits in their powers to organize and utilize that information in the process of arriving at their judgments. The final result is that people are motivated to judge when they cannot judge both rightly (employing a reliable procedure) and correctly (making the substantively correct judgment). In Chapter 12, I discuss the consequences of epistemic evil for human beings. My aim is to show that epistemic evil has seriously harmful effects. This discussion anticipates the objection that erroneous judgments which cannot be systematically avoided do not lead to significant human suffering and, therefore, are normatively insignificant. In the course of this discussion, I identify six categories of judgment that differ from one another in terms of their objects. First, there are judgments regarding the natures of the entities that populate the world in which we live and act. Second, there are judgments concerning selfregarding ends. In other words, judgments regarding what, if it is procured, will promote our welfare or happiness. Third, there are judgments concerning selfregarding means. In other words, judgments regarding how to get what we want. Fourth, there are judgments concerning what will be beneficial to othersotherregarding ends. Fifth, there are judgments concerning how to realize otherregarding ends. Finally, there are purely theoretical judgments. I argue that every one of these forms of erroneous judgment often has significant adverse consequences for the human beings that are affected by them. In Chapter 13, Descartes apologetics regarding human errors of judgment are considered. Descartes offers five arguments regarding such errors. The first is the epistemological argument. According to this argument, our finite powers of comprehension are insufficient to properly understand human errors of judgment. The second is the metaphysical argument. This argument is related to the epistemological argument, but differs from it by specifying the exact nature of the limitation in human reason that accounts for our inability to understand human error. The problem is that understanding human error requires a perspective that comprehends the totality of Gods creation. Human reason,

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

being finite and limited, cannot gain such a perspective. The third argument is the psychological argument. According to this argument, the human capacity for error is a contingent consequence of the relations between two human faculties: the will and the understanding. The important point, according to Descartes, is that both of these faculties are perfectly adequate to their proper purpose. We have received no faculty from God that is inherently defective. The fourth argument is the argument from free will. According to this argument, human errors of judgment, insofar as they depend upon God, are consequent upon a perfection in our nature. It follows that human error is actually evidence of Gods perfection. He empowers us to err through a misuse of our capacity to judge freely. Human errors of judgment result from the abuse of a faculty which was bestowed so that we might judge both freely and aright concerning those matters that fall within the range of our comprehension. God cannot make us free and simultaneously withhold from us the capacity for error. By giving us the power to judge freely he makes us more rather than less perfect creatures. The fifth argument is the argument from divine liberty. According to this reasoning, Gods control over the creation is absolute and free. It follows that God can have no obligations in relation to the creation. Consequently, evil, including epistemic evil, requires no specific explanation. When an agents power within a given domain is absolute and free, that agent never has to explain anything he or she does within that domain. In the course of Chapter 13 all of these arguments are critically evaluated and found to be wanting. In Chapter 14, I outline the positions of some the leading contemporary apologists. Because I have argued that paradigmatic cases of epistemic evil and the most troubling instances of natural evil are importantly analogous, I focus on apologetics concerning natural evil. Specifically, I consider arguments offered by Alvin Plantinga, Marilyn McCord Adams, Richard Swinburne, John Hick, and Bruce Reichenbach. After thorough, and I hope faithful, expositions of their arguments, I carefully critique each argument as an explanation of natural evil. Finally, I consider how these apologetics apply to epistemic evil. In each case, I find serious problems with the arguments of these apologists in relation to natural evil. I also find that these arguments have little, if any, force in relation to epistemic evil. Chapter 15 focuses on the theodicean consequences of the inquiry. What follows from the arguments that I have made regarding erroneous judgments that cannot be systematically avoided in terms of the plausibility of the claim that the universe issues from the creative activity of a being without defect? In other words, what does this inquiry indicate concerning the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis? I conclude that cases of erroneous judgment that cannot be systematically avoided, and the suffering consequent upon those cases, provide strong prima facie evidence against the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis.

Introduction

The burden of proof falls to the theists. If the errors of judgment involved in paradigmatic instances of epistemic evil are compatible with theism, it is incumbent upon theists to show this. I can imagine no way that this might be done. In Chapter 16, I anticipate several objections that may be raised against my argument. The first objection is that epistemic evil is inevitably associated with future-oriented judgments. If this is true, it is beyond Gods power to do anything about such evil. The second objection is that the world is better off containing epistemic evil than it would be if it did not contain epistemic evil. This is the familiar gambit of asserting that what appears evil from a limited perspective, is actually good for a perspective that comprehends the totality of being and all of the relations between its parts. The third objection is that the conditions which lead to epistemic evil actually result from the decisions and subsequent actions of agents other than God. The argument of Chapter 17 is that the epistemic problem of evil is the most intractable of the three major problems of evil. Though I think that there are serious problems with apologetics regarding both natural evil and moral evil, there are at least initially plausible explanations of both of these forms of evil. There does not appear to be any comparably plausible explanation of epistemic evil. It is very difficult to understand what can be gained by the existence of errors of judgment that cannot be systematically avoided and that lead to significant impoverishment of the human condition. In the Epilogue, I apply the conception of problems of evil developed in Chapter 2 to the problem of epistemic evil. I argue that epistemic evil is not logically necessary. I argue that epistemic evil is not related to the existence of a greater good. I argue that epistemic evil is not related to the non-existence of a greater evil. I close by arguing that human beings have a legitimate right to complain about the inadequacy of their received faculties in relation to the judgments that are necessary or warranted given the character of their received situations. The ultimate aim of this essay is to demonstrate that the supposition that God has created the universe leads to a serious problem. It produces a form of inconsistency. The inconsistency emerges when we compare the character of the universe as it is revealed through observation and personal experience to what we would expect the universe to be like if it were the handiwork of an infinitely perfect creator. It turns out that the universe has surprising defects. Suppose it can be established that there are harms human beings endure that cannot be properly related to defects in their actions. It would follow, on the JudaeoChristian creation hypothesis, that there are defects within the creation that cannot be adequately explained without reference to the actions of God. This leads to a problem of evil. Justifying the claim that there are such defects within

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

the creation is the burden you inherit when you attempt to establish a problem of evil. Meeting that burden is the central business of this essay.

PART I PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

CHAPTER ONE ON GOD

The first section of this chapter is devoted to clarification of the concept of God as far as such clarification is necessary for the purposes of this inquiry. In the second section, I devote special attention to the practical implications of Gods omnipotence. In the third section, I discuss the notion that Gods nature is reflected in the creation. In the final section, I consider a possible objection to the argument of the third section.

1. On the Concept of God

As the use of the proper name God implies, the line of reasoning developed below is directed against the Judaeo-Christian creation hypothesis. Some points of clarification are in order before the argument proceeds. First, my understanding of the relevant features of the Judaeo-Christian concept of God should be specified. Second, the basis for the assumption that God's character would be revealed in his creative works should be supplied. The proper name God is generally used to refer to an infinitely perfect being that has created the universe out of nothing (ex nihilo). Gods infinite perfection is taken to imply that he lacks no consistently conceivable perfection compatible with his spiritual nature. Stated positively, God possesses infinitely, completely, or in the most perfect form possible, all those perfections that can apply to a spiritual being. This abstract notion of infinite perfection is somewhat slippery. Attributing specific characteristics to God concretizes it. Three of these characteristics are considered his cardinal attributes. These characteristics are omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. God's omnipotence implies that he can do anything that can be consistently conceived. The only states of affairs that God cannot make actual involve contradictions in their conception. Such states of affairs could never truly be states of affairs. They are impossible states of affairs. Power is limited by possibility. What is beyond possibility is not potentially actual. Gods inability to actualize what is not potentially actual is no real inability at all. When it is said that God cannot do the impossible, it does not follow that there is something that God cannot do. Practically, this conception of Gods power implies that God can do whatever he wills as long as it does not involve a contradiction. All logically possible states of affairs are actually possible for

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

13

God. This is an extreme claim. It may be open to serious challenges. Still, it is characteristic of Judaeo-Christians to make this claim. God's omniscience implies that he has actual knowledge of every potential object of knowledge. God knows everything that can be known. More specifically, Gods omniscience implies that he possesses: (i) perfect and complete knowledge of physical reality or what exists, (ii) perfect and complete knowledge of normative reality or what is good and right and what is evil and wrong, (iii) perfect and complete practical or instrumental knowledge; that is, knowledge of how to achieve what he intends, (iv) perfect and complete theoretical knowledge or knowledge of mathematical, logical, and scientific truth, and (v) perfect knowledge of every immediate or direct consequence of each action he takes. It follows, from a practical point of view, that God knows how to do whatever he wills without doing anything that he does not will, unless doing the former without the latter would involve a contradiction. It might be suggested that the qualification, unless it would involve a contradiction, is superfluous. The argument would be that God never wills the contradictory. But this is not at all obvious. On the contrary, it seems that there might be cases in which, in a certain sense, God unwillingly brings about certain states of affairs. There might be evils that God brings about because those evils are associated with the minimally defective means to procuring greater goods or averting greater evils. God does not positively will these evils. He would prefer to bring about the greater goods or avert the greater evils without bringing about these evils. He simply cannot do so. If there are such evils, it is perfectly natural to say that there is a sense in which they are against Gods will. God would prefer that these evils not exist. He simply cannot bring it about that they do not exist without also bringing it about that the greater goods to which they are connected do not exist. God's omnibenevolence implies that his will is free from defect or perfectly good. The will to do evil is wholly absent in God. God always aims at good and seeks to avoid evil. He always acts with the intention of bringing about as much good relative to evil as he can in the specific situation. It is contrary to Gods nature to opt for an alternative that is inferior to another alternative open to him. God is a good optimizer.

2. A Qualification Concerning Gods Power

Some complications arise concerning Gods power. There are states of affairs that are logically possible in one sense that God cannot bring about. Consider the existence of Mount Everest. There is no contradiction involved in the notion of a universe without this mountain. God could bring about a universe just like this one except that it lacks Mount Everest. Mount Everest is a contingent being.

14

Chapter One

The claim Mount Everest does not exist is not a logically contradictory claim. We cannot be sure that it is false without having knowledge of the world. The claim Mount Everest never existed is also not logically contradictory. There is surely something strange about this proposition, but it is not logically incoherent. Again, knowing this claim is false requires information about the world. Once Everest is actual, however, God cannot subsequently bring about the state of affairs that it never existed. The propositions Everest once existed and Everest never existed are inconsistent. These propositions cannot both be true. The first proposition is, as a matter of contingent fact, true. It follows that no one is in the position of being able to make the second proposition true. That is not logically possible. The claim that God can bring it about that what now exists never existed, implies that God can do the logically impossible. We can know that this claim is incorrect without knowing anything about the world. So, then, the claim What now exists cannot be made to have never existed is a logical truth. One does not need to know anything about the world to know that this claim is true. So, God cannot bring it about that a contingent state of affairs that has become actual should subsequently cease to have ever been actual. Mount Everest falls within the extension of the class of things that now exist. Adding the factual premise Everest exists to our logical truth, we can derive the conclusion that it is false Mount Everest never existed. So there are many states of affairs that do not involve a contradiction in their conceptionfor example, that Mount Everest never existedthat God cannot bring about. These are states of affairs such that, as a matter of contingent fact, bringing them about would involve doing what cannot be consistently conceived. Thus, there are many states of affairs that are consistently conceivable when considered in and of themselves that, as a matter of contingent fact, would imply the inconceivable if they were to be made actual. God cannot make these perfectly conceivable states of affairs actual.

3. Gods Character and the Character of Gods Creation

Epistemic evil has its foundation in the recognition of an apparent incongruity between the alleged character of the creator and the observable character of the creation. All problems of evil presuppose that the character of the creator should be reflected in the character of the creation. Is this presupposition justified? It is. From God's omnipotence, it follows that God has the power to achieve whatever he wills as long as he does not will the inconceivable. From God's omniscience, it follows that God knows how to achieve whatever he wills and, unless it would involve a contradiction, only what he wills. From the former fact about God's power coupled with the latter fact about God's knowledge, it follows that whenever God acts he achieves what he wills and only what he

Epistemic Evil: A Third Problem of Evil

15

wills unless he wills the inconceivable. Within the boundaries of logical possibility, there is a perfect alignmenta one-to-one correspondence between what God intends and the consequences of his actions. This correspondence supplies the basis for the contention that God's character would be reflected in the created universe. That the universe is, as far as possible, free of contingent evil not logically connected to Gods good purposes follows from this fact coupled with God's omnibenevolence. Gods omnibenevolence implies that, all other things being equal, he never prefers an act that issues in a greater evil to an act that issues in a lesser evil.

4. God and Good

It is possible to object to the claim that Gods omnibenevolence has existential implications for the creation. The suggestion that Gods actions could have significant theodicean implications presupposes that there is a basis for moral value independent of God. This basis provides an independent standard for judgments of moral value. This standard can therefore be employed in evaluating the moral quality of Gods acts. The argument that the character of the creator does not create constraints on the character of the creation could be premised upon the notion that there is no basis for moral value independent of God. It would follow that there is no standard for judgments of moral value that can be meaningfully applied to Gods actions. If there is no such standard, then it is nonsense to claim that any act of God's, regardless of its impact upon the character of the creation, is morally defective. Ruling out such evaluative judgments implies that God's character places no limits upon the character of the creation. Any claim to the effect that some feature of the creation entailed a defect in the creator would be groundless. This result follows if good is defined in terms of what God wills. It also follows if the qualities good and bad cannot be properly applied to the actions of God. On the first view, the sole necessary and sufficient condition in light of which states of affairs are good and actions are right is that they accord with Gods will. The claim that some feature of the creation is good would therefore reduce to the claim that God willed it. Since God is omnipotent he cannot be coerced. It would follow that Gods acts are right in virtue of the fact that they are Gods acts. It would also follow that the states of affairs that God brings into being are good in virtue of the fact that God has brought them into being. If, as the second view implies, the notions of good and bad do not apply to the actions of God, then God is outside the moral domain. Applying evaluative terms to his actions would therefore involve a category mistake. The claims that result from such mistakes are literally nonsense.

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Chapter One

Both of these views imply that nothing can be inferred about Gods character from the existence of needless and pointless suffering in the creation. On the first view, the claim that God is omnibenevolent, although it sounds significant, is practically and existentially vacuous. Gods omnibenevolence collapses into Gods omnipotence. It adds nothing substantive to the concept of God. God remains absolutely unconstrained in terms of what he can will and what he can do. On the second view, the claim that God is omnibenevolent involves a category mistake. Referring to Gods actions as good is like referring to dreams as green or theories as aerodynamic. I think neither of these views is tenable. For the purposes of the present inquiry, full-blown critical discussions of these views are not required. I presuppose they are both false. The plain fact is that the vast majority of JudaeoChristians do contend that their god is omnibenevolent. When they claim that their god is omnibenevolent, they do take themselves to saying something about God that is both meaningful and important. If they are right, then these two views are wrong. If they are wrong, then their god is not the true god.

CHAPTER TWO THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Two conceptions of the problem of evil are critically examined in this chapter. They are the logical formulation of the problem and the evidential formulation of the problem. I ultimately offer a third formulation of the problem that I think is preferable to either of these formulations.

1. The Logical Formulation of the Problem of Evil1

In the logical formulation, the problem of evil is treated as a problem of internal inconsistency. As J. L. Mackie put it:
God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would have to be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once 2 must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.

The problematic claims are God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and Evil exists. Mackie argues that these claims form an inconsistent triad. He contends that this inconsistency can be demonstrated if we add a few additional premises or quasi-logical rules regarding the proper meaning and use of the terms good, evil, and omnipotence. One difficulty with Mackies formulation is that he does not appreciate the relevance of Gods omniscience to the problem of evil. God must have complete and perfect factual knowledge to ensure that he is aware of all the features of existence. Without such knowledge he might be wholly unaware of some evils. God must also have complete and perfect normative knowledge so that he will recognize evils (events that involve suffering) as evil (states of affairs that are disvaluable). Without such knowledge he might not know that some contingent feature of what exists ought to be eliminated. Finally, God must have complete and perfect practical or instrumental knowledge. He must know how to bring about any logically possible state of affairs. Without such knowledge God may both recognize an evil and have the power to eliminate it but lack knowledge of how to do so. Gods infinite perfection, understood as implying his three

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Chapter Two

cardinal attributes, is crucial to the proper formulation of the problem. Mackies version of the problem might be reformulated such that the following set of propositions is said to be inconsistent: 1. God is omnipotent. 2. God is omniscient. 3. God is omnibenevolent. 4. There is evil in the universe. The unstated presupposition that permits the inference of Gods non-existence from 1 through 4 above is as follows: 5. No evil can exist in the creation of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being. This presupposition is problematic. Even an infinitely perfect being is limited by the laws of logic. It seems that a number of forms of evil can exist in the creation of an infinitely perfect being as a result of this limitation. Before delineating these forms of evil, it is best to clarify the logical terrain. We are raising a logical question when we inquire into the forms of evil that are possible in the creation of an infinitely perfect being. We are seeking logically possible forms of evil. The question of whether or not there are any instances of these forms of evil is irrelevant. Raising this factual question demonstrates a failure to grasp the logical geography. Those who advance the logical problem of evil contend that the claims Evil exists and God is infinitely perfect are logically inconsistent. To refute this claim, it is sufficient to point out that there are forms of evil that could exist under the supposition that the creator is infinitely perfect. Among the evils that can exist in the creation of an infinitely perfect being are evils that are: a. logically necessary such that the act of creating a universe without them could not be consistently conceived.

To create any universe without these evils would involve a contradiction. God cannot accomplish the contradictory. Therefore, God cannot eliminate such evils from the universe. Again, the claim is not that there are any such evils. The point is that such evils could exist in the universe even if it were the creation of an infinitely perfect being. As long as the universe was at least potentially good on the whole, it could contain such evils and be the work of God.