EN BANC [A.C. No. 4431. June 19, 1997] PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs.

JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent. DECISION REGALADO, J.: Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are in incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary. In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct.[1] After an answer[2] and a reply[3] were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court, in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following recommendation: WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly appreciated: Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed by VicePresident Joseph E. Estrada. Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special Proceeding No. 9054650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years. Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant ( TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996 ). After the wedding, they received their guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their usual work and activities. At 6:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked it would have been just a call at the wrong number. What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called complainant a nagger, saying Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawat gusto ko. Get that marriage contract and have it burned. Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologized for what happened ( TSN, p. 13, April 10, 1996 ). Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that he ( Judge Makasiar ) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him ( Exh. A ). On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification ( Exhs. D and D-1 ). Exhibit C, marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when he married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did,

to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent ( Exh. B ); Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead ( Exh. E ); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. F and F-1). Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely but a sham marriage. He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. B, in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ( Exh. 4 ). After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[4] He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that his previous marriage had been annulled. Respondents subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a sham marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondents sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequence of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.[5] On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice Purisima which we quote with approval: That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnized a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a). That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code,i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and complied with. The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a sham marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying I do with complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage. Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the criminal case for Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No. 9367048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and Librada Pea had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and respondent void. Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pea had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled. But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive finding as to whether or not respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7, 1994 was a sham marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein complainant in

the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded, respondent was not justified in resorting to a sham marriage to protect her (complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis. In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a sham marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay sacrilege. From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. [6] Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.[7] However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure. WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. SO ORDERED.

CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES V VILLALUZ REGALADO; June 19, 1997 NATURE: Petition for the disbarment on the grounds of grossly immoral and grave misconduct

FACTS: -Complainant is the presiding judge of Branch 108 of the RTC of Pasay City while respondent is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime Commission, and a retired justice of the Court of Appeals -Complainant was widowed by the presumption of death of her 1st husband, upon a decree of presumption of death after 16- year absence -Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1977when respondent was the presiding judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig for the murder case involving the death of the complainants son. Since then, the respondent became a close family friend. -On January 7, 1994, the complainant and the respondent got married in a civil wedding, with all the essential and formal requisites present. -On the afternoon of their wedding day, the respondent fetched the complainant from her house in QC to stay in the respondents condo unit. There was a phone call and when the complainant answered, a woman was on the other end of the line offending the complainant with insulting remarks. The complainant confronted the respondent about the caller and the confrontation ended up in a heated exchange of words, to the point where the respondent said to the complainant, Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae, 'yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko'. Get that marriage contract and have it burned." With that, the complainant left the respondent and after that, they never contacted each other again. -Several months after, in a bible study session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the bible group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between the respondent and a certain Lydia Geraldez. After hearing that, on June 6, 1995 the complainant filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A"). -On August 7, 1995, when complainant discovered that the respondent falsified his marriage contract (Exh C.) dated May 10, 1994 by stating that he is single, the complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1"). The complainant also presented the Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"), the Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1"). Respondents claim: The respondent claimed that he only voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract bet. Him and the complainant in an effort to help the complainant in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher in 1993 and that their marriage was just a sham marriage -Also, he claims that when he got married to the complainant, his first marriage with Librada Pea was still subsisting because the decision declaring its annulment had not yet become final and executory (required publication not yet done), as certified by Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4"). ISSUE: HELD: WON the respondent is guilty of gross immorality and grave misconduct? YES, respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

Ratio: The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law Reasoning: The respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. A former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, and, thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals is surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong, if granted that he was just helping the complainant in the administrative case filed against her. -The respondent gave his voluntary consent to the marriage, and with all the legal requisites for the marriage present, he should have known that his marriage with the complainant was valid. -the respondent stated under oath that his marriage with Librada Pea had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by second marriage, his first marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled. Disposition: WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar offense hereafter. SO ORDERED.

CORDOVA V CORDOVA
PER CURIAM; November 29, 1989 NATURE: Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the Bar

FACTS: - Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to then CJ Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence Cordova with immorality and acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The complaint was forwarded to the IBP, Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and investigation. - The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified complain to which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband. - On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling several times. The hearings never took place as she failed to appear. - The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices were sent to him. - In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant informed the commission that she and her husband have already reconciled. - In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the parties to appear before it for the confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and to file formal motion to dismiss the complaint. Neither responded and nothing was heard from either party since then. The findings of the IBP Board of Governors: - Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this arriage, two (2) children were born. - In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. - Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, using the name Fely Cordova. - Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while failing to support his legitimate family. - On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig - Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family. - In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter along with him - Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainants, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC of Bislig, gave her custody of their children. - Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family. ISSUE: WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of the complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case. HELD: The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent earn carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. Ratio: - An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. - The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

MALCOLM; March 23, 1929

IN RE: TAGORDA

FACTS: Luis Tagorda, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Provincial Board of Isabela admits that the previous election he used a card which states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and a notary public (he can execute deed of sales, etc). He also admits that he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that despite his election as member of the Board, he will still exercise his profession as a lawyer and notary public, even adding that he will only charge three pesos for registration of their land titles. ISSUES: 1. WON Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting employment 2. WON Tagorda should be disbarred HELD: 1. YES. Sec 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act 2828) states that "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide: 27- The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is nprofessional... Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable. 28 -It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred. - The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional. With the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. 2. NO. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are: first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.

DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE AQUINO; May 10, 1985 NATURE Administrative Case FACTS Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and 9 other lawyers from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of Cathay Products Intl. Inc. to HE Gabriel (a client). Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being represented by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus this Administrative Case. ISSUE WON the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie HELD Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot practice law in the country. Using the name constitutes representation of being associated with the firm which is deemed to be unethical. Respondents are enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% COLLANTES V RENOMERON PER CURIAM; August 16, 1991 FACTS: - A complaint of disbarment is filed with a related administrative case against Renomeron of the Registrar of Deeds in Tacloban. - Collantes was the house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision and filed the case with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision in Jan 1987. - Feb 16, 1987 no action was made by Renomeron despite follow-ups made by Collantes. Renomeron requested Collantes to submit additional requirements which Collantes complied with. - Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance of V&G with certain special agreement between then that V&G would provide Renomeron with a weekly Tacloban-Manil round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket money. He said he would act favorably on their application if that agreement would be fulfilled. - Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through his niece. But pocket money was not given. - Renomeron then imposed additional requirements which angered Collantes, leading the latter to challenge Renomeron to act on the 163 pending applications by V&G within 24 hours. - May 22, 1987 Renomeron denied the application for ambiguity of the subject matter. - Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated the matter to the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration. - The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable. - The NLTDRA recommended Renomerons case to the DOJ and the Secretary of Justice found him guilty. The president then dismissed Renomeron from public service. - A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against Renomeron. ISSUE WON the disbarment case against Renomeron would prosper given the administrative case HELD - Yes, the administrative complaint has to do with his position in public service. The disbarment case has to do with his status as member of the Integrated Bar. - Renomeron violated the lawyers oath. - The Code of Professional Responsibility 1.01 forbids a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

FERNANDO; August 31, 1976

MISAMIN V SAN JUAN

FACTS: - It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain. in the Metro Manila Police force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non-appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. - Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice. Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." ISSUE: WON a lawyer-public officer may represent a private client during his tenure

HELD: NO, but since evidence is lacking to discipline Atty. Miguel San Juan, the case is dismissed. The Court noted that the Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. - The conclusion arrived at by the SolicitorGeneral that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. - This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the Complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied.

CARPIO; March 31, 2006 NATURE: Disbarment case

LIM-SANTIAGO V SAGUCIO

FACTS: - Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter and administratrix of the property of Alfonso Lim, the former president of Taggat Industries. After his death, Lim-Santiago took over the management of the company. Respondent Carlos Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, until he was appointed Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. - Some employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint against Lim-Santiago for withholding payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause for 1 year and 3 months (1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997). Sagucio, as the asst. Prov. Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He recommended the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Art288 of the labor code of the Philippines. - Lim-Santiago alleges that Sagucio is guilty of representing conflicting interests, a violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor, which is expressly prohibited in RA6713. Sagucio defends himself by saying that he accepted payment from Taggat even after his appointment as government prosecutor but said that such payments were not for representation but for consultancy services. Also, he contends that 5 years have passed since he was connected with the company, thus there was no conflict of interest. ISSUES 1. WON there are conflicting interests in this case 2. WON the private practice of law includes consultancy services 3. WON disbarment is the appropriate penalty HELD - There are no conflicting interests. Sagucio is not guilty of representing conflicting interests as prohibited in Rule 15.03 of CPR. He left Taggat in 1992, and the non-payment of wages occurred in 1996-1997, years after the relation to Taggat has been terminated. In a charge for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against the former client any CONFIDENTIAL informationacquired through his previous employment. Although a lawyer owes a former client to maintain inviolate of the clients confidence, this responsibility does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. That he was a former personnel manager and the case is laborrelated is not sufficient basis to charge Sagucio of representing conflicting interests. The payment for consultancy services conducted by Sagucio falls under the private practice of law which is specifically prohibited by RA6713 (the court applies the liberal definition of the practice of law as given in Cayetano v Monson). However, Sagucio cannot be punished for this violation under the CPR, for such violations are not subject to disciplinary action under the CPR. On the other hand, this violation is also a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 (a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful conduct), thus he can be punished for violating canon 1. The penalty is a suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year (basis is the Civil Service Law and Rules).

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; January 23, 2006

DALISAY V MAURICIO

NATURE: Motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated April 22, 2005 finding Atty. Melanio Batas Mauricio, Jr., respondent, guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. FACTS:- On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00- 044, entitled Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana, respondent, pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount of P56,000.00 from complainant, respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused. - On January 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, found that for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent. She recommended that respondent be required to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be dismissed. On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121, adopting and approving in toto Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation. On April 22, 2005, we rendered the assailed Decision. Incidentally, upon learning of our Decision, respondent went to the MTC, Branch I, Binangonan, Rizal to verify the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. There, he learned of the trial courts Decision dated December 6, 2001 holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official records of the Municipal Assessor and the Registry of Deed. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant charging her with violations of Article 171 and 172 and/or Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged that complainant offered tampered evidence. - In this motion for reconsideration, respondent raises the following arguments. First, complainant did not engage his services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. She hired him for the purpose of filing two new petitions, a petition for declaration of nullity of title and a petition for review of a decree. Second, Civil Case No. 00-044 was considered submitted for decision as early as August 6, 2001, or more than two months prior to October 13, 2001, the date he was engaged as counsel, hence, he could not have done anything anymore about it. Third, complainant refused to provide him with documents related tothe case, preventing him from doing his job. And fourth, complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. - In her opposition to the motion, complainant contends that: (1) respondent violated the principle of confidentiality between a lawyer and his client when he filed falsification charges against her; (2) respondent should have returned her money; (3) respondent should have verified the authenticity of her documents earlier if he really believed that they are falsified; and (4) his refusal to return her money despite this Courts directive constitutes contempt. ISSUE: WON respondent lawyer should be disciplined for failing to render services despite payment of his client HELD: YES. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted devotion. - Respondent assumed such obligations when he received the amount of P56,000.00 from complainant and agreed to handle Civil Case No. 00-044. Unfortunately, he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. As we have ruled earlier, there is nothing in the records to show that he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044. Neither is there any evidence nor pleading submitted to show that he initiated new petitions. - Undoubtedly, respondents present version is a flagrant departure from his previous pleadings. This cannot be countenanced. A party should decide early what version he is going to advance. A change of theory in the latter stage of the proceedings is objectionable, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play, justice and due process. The present administrative case was resolved by the IBP on the basis of respondents previous admission that complainant engaged his legal services in Civil Case No. 00-044. He cannot now unbind himself from such admission and its consequences. In fact, if anything at all has been achieved by respondents inconsistent assertions, it is his dishonesty to this Court. - At any rate, assuming arguendo that complainant indeed engaged respondents services in filing the two (2) new petitions, instead of Civil Case No. 00-044, still, his liability is unmistakable. There is nothing in the records to show that he filed any petition. The ethics of the profession demands that, in such a case, he should immediately return the filing fees to complainant. In Parias v. Paguinto,[10]

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we held that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected from the client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Per records, complainant made repeated demands, but respondent is yet to return the money. - Neither do we find merit in respondents second argument. The fact that Civil Case No. 00-044 was already submitted for decision does not justify his inaction. After agreeing to handle Civil Case No. 00-044, his duty is, first and foremost, to enter his appearance. Sadly, he failed to do this simple task. He should have returned complainants money. Surely, he cannot expect to be paid for doing nothing. - In his third argument, respondent attempts to evade responsibility by shifting the blame to complainant. He claims that she refused to provide him with documents vital to the case. This is preposterous. When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own, managed to verify the authenticity of complainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client. - Finally, in an ironic twist of fate, respondent became the accuser of complainant. In his fourth argument, respondent accuses her of offering falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her. He thus justifies his inability to render legal services to complainant. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence in Civil Case No. 00-044, will it be sufficient to exonerate respondent? We believe not. First, Canon 19 outlines the procedure in dealing with clients who perpetrated fraud in the course of a legal proceeding. Consistent with its mandate that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides: Rule 19.02 A lawyer who has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. - As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted complainant and ask her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her. Understandably, respondent failed to follow the above-cited Rule. This is because there is no truth to his claim that he did not render legal service to complainant because she falsified the documentary evidence in Civil Case No.00-044. This brings us to the second reason why we cannot sustain his fourth argument. The pleadings show that he learned of the alleged falsification long after complainant had terminated their attorney-client relationship. It was a result of his active search for a justification of his negligence in Civil Case No. 00-044. In fine, let it be stressed that the authority of an attorney begins with his or her retainer. It gives rise to a relationship between an attorney and a client that is highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public.

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CASTRO; July 30, 1975 NATURE:

CASTANEDA V AGO

- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS: - 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries. -1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson - 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal - Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied - 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem - 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties - 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued - 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition - Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy HELD - No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. - Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice. - A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.

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