Analytical Solutions of N-Person Games

MIKLOS N. SZILAGYI
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721

Received May 27, 2011; revised September 25, 2011; accepted November 1, 2011

The possibility of analytical solutions of N-person games is presented. A simple formula provides valuable information about the outcomes of such games with linear payoff functions and Pavlovian agents. Experiments performed with our simulation tool for the multiagent stag hunt dilemma game are presented. For the case of Pavlovian agents the game has nontrivial but remarkably regular solutions. If both payoff functions are linear and the real solutions of Eq. (2) are both positive, then the analytical solutions are remarkably accurate. 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 17: 5462, 2012 Key Words: agent-based simulation; N-person games; stag hunt dilemma

1. INTRODUCTION
e will consider N-person games in which each participant has a choice between two actions. The participants can be individuals, collectives of persons, organizations, or even computer programs. We simply call them agents. Usually these two actions are cooperating with each other for the common good or defecting (following their selfish short-term interests). As a result of its choice, each agent receives a reward or punishment (payoff) that is dependent on its choice as well as the choices of all the others. Their decisions to cooperate or defect will accumulate over time to produce a result that will determine the success or failure of the given artificial society. Our agent-based simulation tool developed for social and economic experiments with a large number of decision-makers operating in a stochastic environment [1]

Correspondance to: Miklos N. Szilagyi, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721 (e-mail: mns171717@yahoo.com)

makes it possible to simulate any iterated N-person game with a wide range of user-defined parameters. It is a genuine multiagent tool and it is quite different from programs analyzing repeated two-person games. It is suitable for an unlimited number of agents with various personalities. We were able to perform interesting nontrivial experiments with this tool [28]. The agents are described as stochastic learning cellular automata, i.e., as combinations of cellular automata [9, 10] and stochastic learning automata [11, 12]. The cellular automaton format describes the environment in which the agents interact. In our model, this environment is not limited to the agents immediate neighbors. The number of neighborhood layers around each agent and the agents location determine the number of its neighbors. The depth of agent As neighborhood is defined as the maximum distance, in three orthogonal directions, that agent B can be from agent A and still be in its neighborhood. An agent at the edge or in the corner of the available space has fewer neighbors than one in the middle. The neighborhood may extend to the entire array of agents. In this case the agents interact with all other agents simultaneously.

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Q 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Vol. 17, No. 4 DOI 10.1002/cplx.21385 Published online 13 February 2012 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com)

FIGURE 1

Payoff (reward/penalty) functions for cooperators (C) and defectors (D). The horizontal axis (x) represents the ratio of the number of cooperators to the total number of agents; the vertical axis is the reward/penalty provided by the environment. In this figure, C(x) 5 22 1 4x and D(x) 5 21 1 2x (stag hunt dilemma).

As it is a realistic simulation model of any N-person game, the user is able to define parameters such as the size and shape of the simulation environment, the payoff functions, updating schemes for subsequent actions, personalities of the agents, and the definition of the neighborhood. Our simulation environment is a two-dimensional array of the participating agents. The aggregate cooperation proportion changes over subsequent iterations. At each iteration, every agent chooses an action according to the payoff received for its previous action. The updating occurs simultaneously for all agents. In an iterative game the aggregate cooperation proportion changes in time, i.e., over subsequent iterations. The agents take actions according to probabilities updated on the basis of the reward/penalty received for their previous actions and of their personalities. The updating scheme may be different for different agents. This means that agents with completely different personalities can be allowed to interact with each other in the same experiment. Agents with various personalities and various initial states and actions can be placed anywhere in the array. The response of the environment is influenced by the actions of all participating agents. The updated probabilities lead to new decisions by the agents that are rewarded/penalized by the environment. With each iteration, the software tool draws the array of agents in a window on the computers screen, with each agent in the array colored according to its most recent action. The experimenter can view and record the evolution of the society of agents as it changes in time. After a

certain number of iterations the proportion of cooperators stabilizes to either a constant value or oscillates around such a value. When everything else is fixed, the payoff (reward/penalty) functions determine the game. The payoff functions are given as two curves: one (C) for a cooperator and another (D) for a defector. The payoff to each agent depends on its choice, on the distribution of other players among cooperators and defectors, and also on the properties of the environment. The payoff curves are functions of the ratio of cooperators to the total number of neighbors (Figure 1). The freedom of using arbitrary functions for the determination of the reward/penalty system makes it possible to simulate a wide range of games and other social situations, including those where the two curves intersect each other. There are an infinite variety of payoff curves. In addition, stochastic factors can be specified to represent stochastic responses from the environment. Zero stochastic factors mean a deterministic environment. Even in the almost trivial case when both payoff curves are straight lines and the stochastic factors are both zero, four parameters specify the environment. Attempts to describe it with a single variable [13, 14] are certainly too simplistic. The relative position of the two payoff curves with respect to each other does not always determine the outcome of the game. Ordinal preference is not enough to represent the payoff functions: the actual amounts of reward and punishment may be as important as the relative situation of the two curves. The horizontal axis x in Figure 1 represents the number of cooperators related to the total number of agents. We will assume that the payoffs are linear functions of this ratio for both choices and the game is uniform, i.e., the payoff functions are the same for all agents. Point P corresponds to the punishment when all agents defect, R is the reward when all agents cooperate, T is the temptation to defect when everybody else cooperates, and S is the suckers payoff for cooperating when everyone else defects. C(0) and D(1) are impossible by definition, but we will follow the generally accepted notation by extending both lines to the full range of 0 x 1 and denoting C(0) 5 S and D(1) 5 T that makes it simpler to define the payoff functions. For large number of agents this extension is not even noticeable. We connect by straight lines point S with point R (cooperators payoff function C) and point P with point T (defectors payoff function D). Thus the payoff to each agent depends on its choice and on the distribution of other players among cooperators and defectors. There are 4! 5 24 different orderings of the values of P, R, S, and T. Each of them represents a different type of game. For the payoff functions shown in Figure 1, we have

S<P<T <R

(1)

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that represents the N-person stag hunt dilemma, also known as assurance game, coordination game, and trust dilemma. The two payoff functions intersect each other in this case. It is a social dilemma, because R > S and T > P simultaneously [15]. The two-person stag hunt dilemma and its applications have been studied in the literature [16]. Pacheco et al. published a mathematical analysis of the Nperson case in 2009 [17] but without using any payoff functions. We assume that the agents are distributed in and fully occupy a finite two-dimensional space, the updates are simultaneous, the agents have no goals, know nothing about each other, and they cannot refuse participation in any iteration. This restriction leaves the problems of payoff curves, neighborhood, and personalities open for investigation. The outcome of the game strongly depends on the personalities of the agents. We use the term personality in the sense of decision heuristics (repeated-game strategies), to represent the fact that different agents react differently to the same stimulus from their environment. For example, agents with short-term rationality will always choose defection; benevolent agents will ignore their short-term interests and will all cooperate, etc. This is one of the most important characteristics of the game. Personalities of the agents may represent genetic as well as cultural differences between them. The psychological literature on the impact of personalities in social dilemmas is summarized in [18]. Personalities are usually neglected in the literature. We have considered N-person Prisoners Dilemmas with various personalities of the participating agents. Different agents may have quite different personalities in the same experiment [2]. The agents personalities may also change in time based on the influences by other agents. We used five personality components to represent human behavior in [19]. In the present work we investigate analytical solutions for N-person games with crossing payoff functions and Pavlovian agents.

particular action is reinforced [20]. This law was confirmed by Pavlovs experiments. Pavlovian agents behavior is determined by stochastic learning rules that provide more powerful and realistic results than the deterministic rules usually used in cellular automata. Stochastic learning means that behavior is not determined but only shaped by its consequences, i.e., an action of the agent will be more probable but still not certain after a favorable response from the environment. Kraines and Kraines [21], Macy [22], Flache and Hegselmann [23], and others used such agents for the investigation of iterated two-person games. Pavlovian solutions can be predicted for any situation. We have developed an algorithm that accurately predicts the final aggregate outcome for any combination of Pavlovian agents and any payoff functions [5]. The predictions are exact for an infinite number of agents but the experimental results of the simulation approximate the predictions very closely even for a few hundred agents. An even more convenient approach is to use an analytical formula for the prediction of the solutions. Let us assume that in a society of N Pavlovian agents the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, the ratio of cooperators is x, and the ratio of defectors is (1 2 x) at a certain time. We have shown [3] that when the cooperators receive the same total payoff as the defectors, i.e.,

x Cx 1 xDx;

(2)

2. ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
One of the simplest and most important personality profiles is the Pavlovian with a linear updating scheme. The agents probability of choosing the previously chosen action again changes by an amount proportional to its reward or penalty for its previous action (the coefficient of proportionality is called the learning rate). Of course, the probabilities always remain in the interval between 0 and 1. These agents are primitive enough not to know anything about their rational choices but they have enough intelligence to learn a behavior according to Thorndikes law: if an action is followed by a satisfactory state of affairs, then the tendency of the agent to produce that

an equilibrium occurs. This may happen if C(x) and D(x) are either both negative or both positive. In the first case,a stable equilibrium was observed. In the second case, an unstable equilibrium occurred. In case of linear payoff functions the equilibrium equation is quadratic. If its solutions are real, they are x1 (stable attractor) and x2 (unstable repulsor). When the initial cooperation ratio is below x2, the solution of the game converges toward x1 as an oscillation while it stabilizes exactly when the initial cooperation ratio is above x2. The latter case does not result in the aggregate cooperation proportion converging to 1, as one would expect. This is because, for an individual agent that started off as a defector, there is always some likelihood that the agent will continue to defect. This probability is initially small but continues to increase if the agent is always rewarded for defecting. If the number of agents is sufficiently large, then there will be some agents that continue to defect until their cooperation probability reaches zero due to the successive rewards they have received, and these agents will defect forever. In case of complex solutions, Eq. (2) does not give any information about the game.

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FIGURE 2

or the D(x) curve is entirely negative but C(x) changes sign. The situation is similar to case (b). However, the region where both C(x) and D(x) are negative may be too narrow to produce a solution according to Eq. (2). The most interesting case is when both C(x) and D(x) change sign. In this case both equilibria exist and Eq. (2) always works. For the payoff functions of Figure 1 the solutions are x1 5 1/3 (stable attractor) and x2 5 1/2 (unstable repulsor). This corresponds to case (e) (see the discussion above). Simulation results are shown in Figure 2. The graphs represent the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations for different initial cooperation ratios x0. We see that Eq. (2) works perfectly. After about 60 iterations the trajectories start to oscillate around x1 for any value of x0 in the interval 0 x0 < x2. If x0 > x2, the stable solution appears at about the 30th iteration at a value below 1. Let us start moving both payoff functions up together. If C 5 21 1 4x and D 5 2x, the solutions of Eq. (2) are x1 5 0 and x2 5 1/2. This is case (c). Figure 3 shows the simulation results. In this case the trajectories are always stable and they are different from the previous case. In the interval 0 x0 < x3 the solutions of the game are zero as required by Eq. (2). The value of x3 is about 0.45. However, in the region x3 < x0 < x2 the solutions are below x3 but well above zero and they depend on the value of x0. If x0 > x2, the stable solutions are now much further from the total cooperation than in the previous case.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, Figure 1 gives the payoff curves, and the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.51, 0.49, and 0.00, respectively.

Naturally, the results are strongly dependent on the payoff functions. In case of Pavlovian agents the relative situation of the two payoff curves with respect to each other does not determine the outcome of the game. It is equally important to know the actual values of the payoffs. We have performed numerous experiments with our simulation tool for N-person games with crossing payoff functions. There are 12 different such games [6]. For the sake of space economy we will show the results using the example of the N-person Stag Hunt dilemma only. When the agents have Pavlovian personalities, the following cases are possible for the application of Eq. (2): a. Both curves are positive for any value of x. In this case only the unstable equilibrium exists and the solution of the game depends on the value of this equilibrium and on the initial ratio of cooperators. When the initial cooperation ratio is below x2, the solution of the game stabilizes at a lower value between zero and x2. When the initial cooperation ratio is above x2, the final stable ratio has a higher value between x2 and 1. b. Both C(x) and D(x) are negative for all values of x. In this case only the stable equilibrium exists and the solution of the game always converges to x1. c. The C(x) curve is entirely positive but D(x) changes sign from negative to positive as the value of x grows or the D(x) curve is entirely positive and C(x) changes sign. The situation is similar to case (a). The only difference is that in this case the region where both C(x) and D(x) are positive may be too narrow to produce a solution according to Eq. (2). d. The C(x) curve is entirely negative but D(x) changes sign from negative to positive as the value of x grows

FIGURE 3

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 21 1 4x and D(x) 5 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.60, 0.55, 0.51, 0.49, 0.48, 0.45, and 0.40, respectively.

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FIGURE 4

FIGURE 6

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 20.8 1 4x and D(x) 5 0.2 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.55, 0.49, 0.48, and 0.45, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 1 1 4x and D(x) 5 2 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.55, 0.49, 0.48, 0.45, 0.40, 0.35, 0.30, 0.25, and 0.20, respectively.

Moving further in the same direction, we find trajectories shown in Figure 4 when C 5 20.8 1 4x and D 5 0.2 1 2x. In this case x1 5 20.067 and x2 5 1/2. The negative value of x1 points to the fact that in this case there is no such region in the interval 0 x 1 where both functions would be simultaneously negative (by definition x is always positive). This is still case (c) and the simulation results are similar to the previous case. Figure 5 refers to the case when C 5 4x and D 5 1 1 2x. Now x1 5 21/3 and x2 5 1/2. The behavior of the tra-

jectories follows the previous trend even stronger. When we move to C 5 1 1 4x and D 5 2 1 2x, we have x1 5 22/3 and x2 5 1/2. The behavior of the trajectories corresponds to case (a). Equation (2) is of little use in this case (Figure 6). Let us reverse the direction now and move both payoff functions down together. When C 5 23 1 4x, D 5 22 1 2x the solutions are x1 5 1/2 and x2 5 2/3. This is case (d). Figure 7 shows that the trajectories strictly

FIGURE 5

FIGURE 7

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 4x and D(x) 5 1 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.55, 0.49, 0.48, 0.45, 0.40, 0.35, and 0.30, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 23 1 4x and D(x) 5 22 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.67, 0.66, and 0.00, respectively.

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FIGURE 8

FIGURE 10

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 24 1 4x and D(x) 5 23 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.99 and 0.00, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 210 1 4x and D(x) 5 29 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 1.00 and 0.00, respectively.

follow Eq. (2). When x0 > x2, all agents cooperate in this case. The next step is C 5 24 1 4x, D 5 23 1 2x. The solutions are x1 5 1/2 and x2 5 1. This is the limit of case (b) because C 5 0 at x 5 1. In this case only the stable equilibrium exists and the solutions all converge to x1, independent of the value of x0 (Figure 8). Going one step further, we arrive at C 5 25 1 4x, D 5 24 1 2x. The solutions are x1 5 1/2 and x2 5 4/3 reflect-

ing the fact that this is case (b). There is no such region in the interval 0 x 1 where both functions would be simultaneously positive. The trajectories strictly follow Eq. (2) for any value of x0 (Figure 9). If we jump down to C 5 210 1 4x, D 5 29 1 2x, the solutions are x1 5 1/2 and x2 5 3. We observe the emergence of wild oscillations of the trajectories during the first ten iterations, after which the trajectories settle down to x1 for any value of x0 (Figure 10).

FIGURE 9

FIGURE 11

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 25 1 4x and D(x) 5 24 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 1.00 and 0.00, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 2x and D(x) 5 21 1 x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.99 and 0.00, respectively.

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FIGURE 12

FIGURE 14

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 6x and D(x) 5 21 1 3x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.40, 0.32, and 0.00, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 4x and D(x) 5 21.1 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.80, 0.60, 0.40, 0.20, and 0.00, respectively.

Let us now change the slopes of both payoff functions simultaneously by varying the value of b in the following formulae:

C 2 2b x D 1 b x

(3)

The solutions of Eq. (2) are simply 1/3 and 1/b for this case.

If b < 3, then x1 5 1/3 and x2 5 1/b. Let us choose b 5 1 which is the limiting case of this game. This is case (b). All trajectories converge to x1 (Figure 11). If b 5 3, the two solutions coincide: x1 5 x2 5 1/3. This is case (e). Three trajectories are shown in Figure 12. If b > 3, then x1 5 1/b and x2 5 1/3. Let us choose b 5 5. This is again case (e) but with only a small region where both payoff functions are negative. Therefore, the trajecto-

FIGURE 13

FIGURE 15

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 10x and D(x) 5 21 1 5x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.40, 0.32, 0.25, and 0.00, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 4x and D(x) 5 21.07 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.45, 0.43, and 0.00, respectively.

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FIGURE 16

FIGURE 17

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 4x and D(x) 5 20.5 1 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.62, 0.60, and 0.00, respectively.

Evolution of the game for the case when all agents are Pavlovian, the neighborhood is the entire collective of agents, and the payoff curves are C(x) 5 22 1 4x and D(x) 5 2x. The graphs show the proportions of cooperating agents as functions of the number of iterations. The initial cooperation ratios from top to bottom curves are 0.80, 0.70, 0.67, and 0.66, respectively.

ries shown on Figure 13 are now similar to those of Figures 3 and 4. Finally, we will change the separation of the two payoff functions. We keep the C function unchanged as C 5 22 1 4x and vary the D function according to the formula D 5 22 1 k 1 2x. The determinant of Eq. (2) is then equal to 12 12 k k2 which is positive when k < 0.928. Then the roots of Eq. (2) are both complex. When k 5 0, the C curve is entirely above the D curve and perfect cooperation occurs at any value of x0. The trajectories for k 5 0.9 are shown in Figure 14. After a hundred iterations, cooperation is approached but not reached. At k 5 0.93 the two solutions are x1 5 0.41 and x2 5 0.44. This is case (e). The trajectories start to follow Eq. (2) (Figure 15). k 5 1 corresponds to the original situation (Figure 2).

At k 5 1.5 the two solutions are x1 5 0.14 and x2 5 0.61. This is still case (e). The trajectories follow Eq. (2) (Figure 16). Finally, at k 5 2 the two solutions are x1 5 0 and x2 5 2/3. This is case (c) and the trajectories behave similarly to those in Figure 3 (Figure 17). When the neighborhood is only a finite number of layers deep, each agent has less neighbors whose behavior can influence its reward/penalty. In this case, the trajectories do not strictly follow the predictions of Eq. (2) but have similar tendencies. To summarize, we can say that if both payoff functions are linear and the real solutions of Eq. (2) are both positive, then the predictions of Eq. (2) are almost always valid. This simple formula provides valuable information about the outcomes of N-person games with linear payoff functions and Pavlovian agents.

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