Complicity, Repression, and Regionalism: Yan Baohang and Centripetal Nationalism, 1931-1949 Author(s): Rana Mitter Source: Modern

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Complicity, Repression, and Regionalism

Yan Baohang and Centripetal Nationalism, 1931-1949 RANAMITTER
Universityof Oxford

On 23 June 1946, a groupof delegatesfroman organization calling itself the NortheasternPolitical ReconstructionCouncil (Dongbei zhengzhijianshe xiehui) arrivedat Nanjingby train.They intendedto presenta petitionto the partiesin the negotiationson the Chinesecivil warbetweenthe Nationalistsor Guomindang (GMD) andthe Chinese CommunistParty(CCP),chairedby Americanstatesmanand soldier GeneralGeorge C. Marshall. The delegates were led by YanBaohang,a veterannationalist,social activist, and, since 1937, memberof the CCP.Yanwas originally from the areanearShenyang,the Northeast'slargestcity, buthadfled the Japaneseoccupationand had been living in exile in Beiping and then Chongqing since 1931. During the precedingsixteen years, he had risked arrestby the Japaneseand the GMD, both of whom opposed his activities. Yan and his group were met by security police them in the waiting room, then demandedthat who first barricaded Yancome outside andaddressthe crowdof around3,000 people who hadgatheredoutsidethe station.Yanagreed,butwhen he mountedthe by platform, he was surrounded secret agents intent on barracking him. Yan recordedhis recollectionsof the event. Some of the agents starting calling out to him, "Kneel down, you Communist, kneel down!"Yan repliedangrily,

AUTHOR'S NOTE: My thanks to Robert Bickers, Henrietta Harrison, Wu Yuwen,and two commentson earlierdraftsof thisarticle. Responsibility anonymousreadersfortheirthoughtful for errors is, of course, my own. 1999 44-68 Vol. MODERN CHINA, 25 No. 1,January ? 1999SagePublications, Inc. 44

Mitter/ YAN AND CENTRIPETAL BAOHANG NATIONALISM45

What are you saying? I'm one of those Northeastern people, one of those who fought Japanfrom the very first. For fourteen years, we neverbowed a kneeto the enemy.Today,in frontof the Chinesepeople, I want to preservethe dignity of the Chinese people. But look at you! You've got guns? Fine, so shoot me! [YanBaohang, 1947: 294]

One cannottake Yan's self-aggrandizing versions of his actions at face value. Whatis interestingin his own accountof his angryriposte was the termsin whichhe phrasedit. Accused of CCPmembership, he did not addressthe charge directly.Instead, he chose to defend his his honorby stressinghis nationalismbutalso, andcomplementarily, credentials. regional This articleconsidersone aspectof the historyof conflictingidentities and constructionsof the nationin moder China,an issue raised by a growingnumberof scholarsin recentyears.Thereis an emerging view that both the Communistsand the Nationalists,with their centralizingagendas,forciblyimposedtheirmodel of nationhoodon others. However,here we examine circumstancesin which people who representedthemselves in terms of identities that were suppressed turnedout, on occasion, to have repressedthose identitiesthemselves for a particular purpose.This phenomenonbecamemore obvious and in the circumstancesof the Manchuriancrisis of the early urgent 1930s andthe Warof ResistanceagainstJapan.I begin with a considerationof the role of the nation as a focus of identity in Republican China and suggest that in the case of Northeast, there was a gulf between the rhetoricand practiceof nationbuilding.Therefollows a summaryof the life story of YanBaohang,the Shenyangintellectual andpolitical activistwhose writingsareexaminedhere.The concluding section discusses the conflicts in identity with which Yan and those like him hadto grappleduringa timeof nationalcrisis. Havingat first in practicefavoreda high degreeof Northeastern regionalautonomy, afterthe 1931 occupation,Yanwas forcedto boost the centralizing version of nationalismendorsedby Nanjingto serve his immediate political ends; ironically,his success in this aim helped strengthen the centralizingdoctrineso much thathis postwarattemptsto regain more autonomyfor the Northeastcould find no purchase.

46 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY 1999

NATION AND REGION:DYNAMIC ATTACHMENTS

For more than two decades, the relationshipbetween nation and region in China has been a subject of scholarly interest(e.g., Lary, 1974; Kapp, 1973; Fincher, 1981). Recent works (Fitzgerald,1994; Duara, 1995) have highlightedthe way in which the political groups and agendasdominantin Chinain the twentiethcenturyhave stressed the importanceof the nation, in the form of the unitarystate, as the only legitimate model for China's polity, whetherbased on race, as suggestedby Sun Zhongshan(Sun Yat-sen)andJiangJieshi (Chiang Kai-shek), or class, as in Communist ideology. John Fitzgerald observes that this mode of thinkingis centuriesold, stemmingfrom the desire of the imperialgovernmentto find a legitimatingcover for its own system of rule, stressingthe importanceof a unitarygovernmenteven when none in fact existed.However,he notes thattherewas differencebetweenthe way in which the imperialsysa fundamental tem and the Nationalists of the Republic viewed the relationship and betweenthe professedformof government the realityof the polity that it governed. "The Empire tolerated variety among localities of because it fearedmass horizontalcommunication the kind we now whereasthis samediversitywas associate with politicalnationalism," deeply disturbingfor the Nationalists(Fitzgerald,1994: 28). Duara argues against granting special status to nationalismin China as a unique mode of consciousness, suggesting that in premoder and moder society alike,the creationof a single dominant identitycannot fromchallengingthe hegemonicreprenarratives alternative "prevent sentationof political community"(Duara, 1995: 81). Yet, it is clear has thatcentralization a long historyin Chinesepolitical thought.To the importanceof this force thatinevitablydrawsthe eleemphasize mentsthatconstructits vision to the center,I shallreferto this version nationalism." of nationalismas "centripetal China-in particular, the The circumstancesof twentieth-century crisis of war and occupation-pushed centripetalnationalismto the fore. However, some of those whose voices were as a consequence not by downgraded thatversionof nationalism only did not tryto fight contributed it. Political circumstances to back against it but actively forced certain groups to sacrifice parts of their identity,which they

Mitter/ YAN AND CENTRIPETAL BAOHANG NATIONALISM47

might otherwise have stressed, for a more immediate political purpose. in Northeasterners the early twentiethcentury,like otherChinese, shared a series of coexisting identities: cultural,national, regional, ethnic,andgendered.Therehavebeen many provincial,generational, of studieson the relationship the Northeastto the rest of sophisticated Chinain the earlypartof this century(e.g., R. Lee, 1970;McCormack, 1977; Crossley, 1990: 187-213), which have shown how both "Man'Manchu'" identity churia"(McCormack,1977: 52) and "traditional (Crossley, 1997: 6) were constructsthat served particularpolitical agendas. Shifting allegiances and identities characterizethe region andthe period;nonetheless,Hannationalismdid emergeas a political force in the late Qing andthe earlyRepublic.The natureof thatnationalism in the Northeastis examinedbelow. The uneasy relationshipof the three Northeasternprovinces of China (Fengtian,namedLiaoningbetween 1929 and 1931; Jilin; and Heilongjiang) to Jiang Jieshi's governmentin Nanjing gives some idea of the de facto federalismthatcharacterized governanceduring much of the Republicanperiod,even when the ideology of federalism (liansheng zizhi) had been exiled to the peripheryof political discourse afterthe early 1920s. Officially,the regionhad affiliateditself to the Nanjinggovernmentin December 1928. But the affiliationwas more in name thansubstance.Neitherthe militaristrulerof the Northeast, ZhangXueliang, nor otherregionalelites had any interestin letting Jiang Jieshi gain control over the riches of the region, which includedfertile agricultural land, burgeoningindustry(albeit mainly controlled by the Japanese),and the second largest army in China. When the structuresof administrationchanged after 1928 in the Northeast, it was less the result of pressure from Nanjing than of the Zhang Xueliang's own plans for transforming region. The idea of nation among Northeasterners, among other Chias nese, was dynamic, in that attachmentsto nation and region could coexist at levels of intensitythatchangedconstantlyaccordingto circumstances.At a time when manyof the chief threatsto nationalunity, despite political rhetoricaboutimperialism,were from within China of (such as civil warsandfinancialinstability),the attractions regional were very clear.In the Northeast,prominentcivilian elites autonomy such as Zhang Zuolin's finance minister, Wang Yongjiang, could

48 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY 1999

advocate baojing anmin (protectthe bordersand bring peace to the (McCormack, people), a philosophyveryclose to regionalseparatism 1977: 148). The rhetoricaldebate of the 1920s was largely divided between those who advocatedbaojinganminandthose who adopted the unifying language of the Nationalistrevolution.However, even when the advocatesof the latterrose to powerunderZhangXueliang from 1928 to 1931, the actualpracticeof regionalgovernmenthardly changed at all. Thereremainedde facto autonomyin terms of actual policy. In contrast,duringthe 1930s, this de facto autonomywas no longer acceptable.The events leading to the Pacific War,startingwith the Manchuriancrisis of 1931, forced starknew choices on the inhabitants of the region. On 18 September1931, the JapaneseKwantung launcheda full-scale occupationof the Army,stationedin Manchuria, region. Withina few months,they had set up a Japanese-controlled, Manchukuo.Althoughcollaboration nominally independent"state," with the occupierswas the most common responseamong the occupied population,thousandsof refugees did flee the Japanese,ending up in North China. Jiang Jieshi decided early on thathe did not have the resourcesto launch a counterattackagainst the Japanese. Instead, he relied on rhetoricand appealsto the League of Nations.For manyChinese, the or, occupationof the Northeastwas eithertoo remoteto understand at worst, a matterof nationalhumiliationthat injuredtheirpsyches but not theirphysicalwell-being. But for the Northeasterners themselves, it was a matterof directconcern.As long as the Japaneseremainedin charge,theirhomes andpropertyall lay behindenemy lines. Furtherwere ended more, theircareersandassociatedstatusas powerbrokers at a stroke.For a groupof seasonedpoliticalactivistsfromShenyang, this was the cue to launch a counterattack againstthe nonresistance of Jiang Jieshi, via a pressuregroup, the NortheastNational policy for SalvationSociety (NNSS: Dongbeikang-Riminzhongjiuguohui), which Yan Baohangwas head of propaganda. Yan and his allies needed to agitatefor a short-term political goal, the removalof the Japanesefromthe Northeastby JiangJieshi. In his diary,Yan'sfriendandfellow NNSS committeememberWangHuayi claimed that "thecentralgovernmentis secretlyplottingto eliminate

Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG AND CENTRIPETAL NATIONALISM49

the powerof the Northeast... so thatthe Northeastwill no longerplay [a role] on the Chinese political stage"(WangHuayi, 1931-1933: 24 Dec. 1931). They calculated that the only rhetoric that would the empowerthemfor this goal was one thatcharacterized occupation of the Northeast in terms of the dominantdiscourse of centralized nationhood. In 1938, on the seventhanniversary the occupationof Manchuof ria, when the whole countrywas at war,Yan stated,
The SeptemberEighteenthIncident was the most bitter date for our of Chinese nation(minzu),the beginningof the destruction ourterritorial sovereignty.... Compatriots may certainlythinkthatthis September EighteenthMemorialDay began in the Northeast.It is Northeasterners who have sufferedJapaneseoppressionthe longest, and most painfully,thereforethey are the most eager in the resistancestruggle comagainstJapan.... The anti-Japanese struggleof us Northeastern patriots stands in the frontline of the whole nation's anti-Japanese struggle. [YanBaohang, 1938: 257]

With language of this sort over the previousseven years, Yan and his friendshadbeen calling JiangJieshi'sbluff:if Chinareallywas indivisible, here was Jiang'schance to prove it by sending in troops to retakethe Northeastern provinces.To makethis challengework,howdiscussions of regionalautonomynow had to be stifled. Allowever, ing any rhetoricalspace for the benefitsof federalism,or the devolved authority that Zhang Xueliang's government had enjoyed before 1931, would have dilutedtheirmessage thatthe invasionwas a crisis for all of Chinaandthatthe Northeasterners were Chinese as much as were people from Jiangsuor Guangdong.' Yan and his fellow propagandists allowed themselves to be drawn into the centripetalforce of this versionof nationalismandaddedto it. In a sense, however, they succeeded only too well. As their propagandaportrayingthe Northeastas an integralpartof Chinabecame a more solid and recognizedpartof the nationaldiscourse,particularly nationalismof which the duringthe Warof Resistance,the centripetal propagandanecessarily formed a partbecame more and more of an unmovablefeatureof the political landscape.The desire for autonomous government in the Northeast now bore an uncomfortable

1999 50 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY

that similarityto thejustificationof "self-determination" the Japanese had used to gloss over the establishmentof Manchukuo.As late as 1945, the Japanesehad made an icon of Wang Yongjiang(who had died in 1927), the advocateof baojinganmin(TajimaTomiho, 1945). The Japanese portrayedhim as a proto-Manchukuo patriot whose East Asian Co-Prosperity vision had foreshadowed the Greater fromNanjing'srulewas to come perilSphere.To advocateseparation Whenthe war of ously close to this territory hanjian,or collaboration. ended andthe ultimateaim of removingthe Japanesefromthe Northeast had been achieved, Yan tried to returnto the previous model, stressing once again that the Northeasternersneeded to exercise regionalautonomy.His protestsfell on deaf ears.JiangJieshi showed no willingness to let the Northeasterners regain the autonomy that had enjoyed before 1931. Yan, who had turnedto the Commuthey as nists in frustration early on as 1937, insteadput his faith in a CCP victory to bring about his vision of the Northeast.As events would prove,his faithin Mao was as vainas the hope he once placedin Jiang. those that live Groupswith strongregionalidentities,particularly their attachments. often fluctuatein the strengthof on the periphery, Duara (1995: 13) cites the case of Assam, which was a hotbed of nationalistsentimentunderthe BritishRaj, but has been the scene of an equally strongseparatistmovementin an independentIndia.Brogan (1985: 638) pointsoutthatthe Deep South,whose secession came close to destroyingthe UnitedStates,showeda "sturdy by patriotism" the early twentiethcentury.In the Indiancase, the conflict switched to from being international domestic. For the Americans,the reverse as the scarsof the Civil Warwere forgottenin the four forhappened eign conflicts thatthe United States enteredin this century. ForYanBaohangandhis friends,the switchwas likewise domestic to foreign. They had to downgradetheir own regional narrativein nationalismthatservedthe needs of a groupnow favorof a centripetal not to defend their region from takeoverfrom the center in seeking who answeredonly to Tokyo.FedNanjingbutfromoutsideattackers eralism could not provide the necessary glue as it was too close to nor separatism; was it even practical,as only a centralizedstatecould fight Japan.

AND CENTRIPETAL Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG NATIONALISM51

BAOHANG THELIFEAND TIMESOF YAN

Yan Baohang (1895-1968) was born in a village in Haicheng County,Fengtianprovince.Althoughhe was from a poor family, he well enoughat the village school to encouragea memberof performed the local elite to supporthis education.From 1913 to 1918, he studied at the Normal College in Shenyang and came under various influbut ences: he convertedto Christianity, also came into contact with in Nationalistideas, andparticipated protestsagainstthe Twenty-One Demandsin 1915. In 1916, he becameactive in the ShenyangYMCA (Wang Lianjie, 1995: 429-30). Here and at college, Yan met other young activists interestedin educationas a means of revivingChina, includingWangZhuoran,Du Zhongyuan,and Gao Chongmin,all of exile movement whom wouldbe active in the post-1931 Northeastern Yuwen and Su Yan, 1991: 288). (Wu Yan gained widespread admirationfor his educational work in Shenyang, attractingthe attention of Zhang Xueliang, son of the regionalmilitaristleaderZhangZuolin. In 1920, the YMCA sent Yan to Beijing; it was there,in the nationalcapitalduringthe May Fourth era, thathe began to develop his ideas on nationalism.Back in Shenyang, he set up a group at the YMCA to discuss New Cultureideas, which proved to be the startingpoint for his rise to political prominence. In 1925, when Fengtian studentsdemonstratedin sympathy with the May Thirtiethstrikers,Yanwas called in by the city authorithe ties andmediatedthe conflict successfully,persuading studentsto call off their demonstrationswhile convincing provincial governor WangYongjiangnot to carryout reprisalsagainstthe ringleaders,but insteadto receive studentrepresentatives a consultativeconference at (Wang Lianjie, 1992: 135; 1995: 430-32). Shortly afterward,the YMCA awardedYana scholarshipto Edinburgh University,wherehe studied for a certificate in social studies, after which he traveled widely within Europe(1925 Yearbook). In 1928, while Yan was away from the Northeast,Zhang Zuolin was assassinatedandZhangXueliangtook his place. Havingreturned to Shenyang in 1929, Yanjoined with his friends Lu Guangji, Gao Chongmin, Wang Huayi, and Che Xiangchen to form a Liaoning

/ 1999 52 MODERNCHINA JANUARY

Provincial National Foreign Affairs Association (Liaoningsheng NationalForguominwaijiaoxiehui), laterrenamedthe Northeastern eign Affairs Association. This organizationaimed to "seek China's freedom and equal status,"chiefly by agitatingagainstthe Japanese presence in the region, and by 1931, it had 46 branchesacross the Northeast.Yanalso set up withinthe YMCA a LiaoningAnti-Opium
Association and a Liaoning Provincial Nationalist Educational

AdvancementAssociation (Liaoningshengguomin changshi cujintheme: in 1930, the hui). These activities also had an anti-Japanese educationalassociation'sspeakerswent out on fourteenoccasions to talkabout"exposingvariouscrimesandsecretplansthe Japanesehad for invadingthe Northeast" (WuYuwenandSu Yan, 1991:289; Wang 1995: 433). Lianjie, In the wartimeyears, when Yan promotedan image of the Northeasternersas nationalists,he stressedthe role thatthey had had from the first in opposing the Japaneseand, by way of evidence, cited the NationalForeignAffairsAssociaestablishmentof the Northeastern tion in the wake of the 1927 Ji'nanincident.Yandid not mentionthat the group was his brainchild,implying that it was the spontaneous product of popularNortheasternrage against the Japanese."Every time the Japaneseplannedto cause an incident,"statedYan in 1938, "theassociation,leadingits 5,000 members,wouldcall uponthe patriotic youths of all places in the Northeastto makea righteousappealto the whole countryandthe whole worldaboutthe Japaneseinvasionof the Northeast"(YanBaohang, 1938: 258). The legalizationof the GMD in the Northeastafter1929 meantthat the nationalistactivistsall becamepartymembers;YanBaohangwas one of thirteenNortheastern delegates sent to Nanjing for the GMD nationalconferencein May 1931 (ZhaoJie, 1993: 300). ZhangXueliang likewise followed Nationalist rhetoric when he announced in December 1928 thathe wouldofficially affiliatehis regionto the Nanof However,the practicalmanifestations thataffiliajing government. PoliticalCouncil,the main tion were fairly limited.The Northeastern almostentirelymadeup of body of theregion,remained governmental of local militarists,with only one representative Nanjing,Fang Benren. Zhang did not want outsiders to take over the region, and he remainedan uneasy ally of JiangJieshi;for example,he took several PlainsWar. monthsto weigh in on Nanjing'sside in the 1930Northern

Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG AND CENTRIPETAL NATIONALISM53

The Manchurianincident of 18 September1931 and the ensuing JapanesetakeovermeantthatYanBaohangand othersclose to Zhang Xuelianghadto join the exodus southto Beiping. Once there,they set up the NNSS, which agitatedagainstJiangJieshi'spolicy of nonresistance to the Japanese.The groupprovidedsupportfor the resistance but fightersin Manchuria, they hadthe greatestimpactwhen they created anddistributed in Chinaaboutthe Northpropaganda intramural easternresistance.Yanwas one of the NNSS's propaganda coordinators and was responsiblefor much of the spreadof a perceptionof heroic anti-Japaneseresistance in the Northeastthat permeatedthe public consciousness in the 1930s and provoked anger against the nonresistancepolicy. What kind of nationalism,then, did Yan espouse, and how did he juxtapose his various identities?We do not have his writings from before 1932, but we can extrapolatefrom some of the indirect evidence. For instance, the organizationsthat he ran, with their promodernization anti-imperialist and stance,reflectedthe standard elite, educated nationalism that was found in many of the New Culture advocatesof the period.In addition,his membership the GMD sugin to gests thathe was prepared subscribeat least nominallyto Nationalist principles.After 1931, the NNSS journal,Jiltguo xunkan,which Yan endorsedas the organization's head of propaganda, also took an elite, HannationalistlateQing/earlyRepublicanview of whatChina's nationhood meant, argu ing strongly social Darwinist ters that in China had to triumphin the world system of nation-statesif its survival was to be ensured.Furthermore, languageof Yan'spost-1932 the articlesshows thathis rhetoricfittedneatlyinto the standard centralizing nationalistmold. flavorin the way this nationalYet,therewas a strongNortheastern ism was expressed:the discourseshoweda strongstreakof Northeastern exceptionalism.NeitherYannor his associateshad any desire for true regional separatismand loudly advocateda unified China, but they simultaneouslybelieved that the Northeasthad a special place within the polity and that as Northeasterners, they deserved special treatment privileges.The region'sconnectionto the rest of China and On had,afterall, alwaysbeen ambivalent. one hand,manyof those who came there over the centuries were settlers from intramural China,

54 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY 1999

fleeing disastersat home or forcedinto exile; yet even while they were separatedphysically and emotionally from their native places, they broughtcommoncustoms andreligionwith them to the Northeast,as well as taking on aspects of the indigenous culture of the region (R. Lee, 1970: 80, 102). However,after 1931, Yanandthose like him could no longerjuggle the paradoxicalpositions noted by Fitzgerald (1994: 40), by which in the 1920s "evenprovincialelites favoringa still the high degreeof regionalautonomy" supported call for a strong state, which was necessary for the goals-whether improvedlabor conditions, the ending of extraterritorial rights on their territory,or simply betterpublic hygiene-that they advocated. The NNSS was made illegal after the TangguTruce of 31 May 1933, and Yan and his allies were forced into a new organization namedthe Fudonghui(Revive the East Association).The Fudonghui the quickly attracted attentionof JiangJieshi's securitychief, Dai Li, but ZhangXueliang's interventionled to a compromise:the association was to be dissolved andreplacedby a Siwei xuehui (FourBonds Study Society), with a committee of memberschosen by Jiang and Zhang.The society had its first meeting on 10 April 1934. Although had some NNSS stalwarts, includingWangHuayiandWangZhuoran, the new body, Yan Baohangrefused to participatefor several joined months, stating that the Siwei xuehui was not sufficiently antiJapanese.In December 1934, afterZhangXuelianghadpleadedwith him to change his mind, Yanwas appointedhead of the organization, presidingovera committeewith sevendelegateschosenby Zhangand eight chosen by Jiang. However, Yan was almost immediatelyprovoked into resigning,when he was orderedto publicize Jiang's New Life policies. Once again, only Zhang Xueliang's intervention,persuading Yan that cooperationwith Jiang Jieshi was the best way to recoverthe Northeast, keptYanin office (WangLianjie,1992:147-53). However, during this period, Zhang himself became increasingly unhappyas he saw the Japaneseencroachfurtherinto North China of while Nanjing's attentionfocused on the extermination the CCP. In the infamous Xi'an incident of 1936, Zhang kidnappedJiang Jieshi, releasing him only when he had agreed to establish a united front with the CCP against the Japanese.Zhang was placed under house arrestafterthe incident,which left Yandeprivedof his patron of more than a decade's standing and drove him furthertowardthe

AND CENTRIPETAL Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG NATIONALISM55

Communists.In January1937, Yanmet Zhou Enlai for the firsttime, and in Septemberof thatyear he joined the CCP.The wartimeUnited Frontpolicy, althoughviewed with suspicionby both sides, nonetheless made conditions easier for Communists in Nationalist areas, although Yan decided to be prudentand did not declare his party affiliationopenly. In between the lattertwo events, the Warof Resistancebroke out. This affectedYandirectly;the Northeastern SalvationGeneralCouncil (NSGC:Dongbeijiuwang zonghui),which he hadhelped set up in June 1937, hadto move almostimmediatelyto Nanjingandthenon to Wuhan in November (having been legalized the previous month). Finally, in October 1938, the NSGC split in three directions, with membersgoing to Xi'an, the Southwest,and,in Yan'scase, to the wartime capital of Chongqing.By 1942, JiangJieshi was worriedabout the strengthof the NSGC. He demandedthatit mergewith the a rival Association (Dongbei xiehui) (led by organization,the Northeastern who had from 1931 been more loyal to his political Northeasterners line), and when the NSGC's leaders refused, their organizationwas bannedand once again had to carryon underground. The NSGC's connectionswith the CCP grew stronger,and by the end of the war, a Communist-backed NortheastExecutive Political Council (Dongbei xingzheng zhengzhi weiyuanhui)had been set up. Yan was elected to it on 20 August 1946 and spent most of that year engaged in lobbying the Marshall negotiations on the civil war betweenthe GMD andCCP.FromOctober,afterthe talkshadin effect from Chongqingto Shenyang,where he was collapsed, Yanreturned in propagandaactivities, and continued to be promoted employed within the official hierarchy.After the establishmentof the People's Republicin 1949, Yanwas assigned to the foreign ministry,wherehe served for ten years, before retiringat the age of 65. Yan's life was to end unhappily.As an intellectual,a formerGMD member,and a recently retiredofficial associatedclosely with Zhou Enlai, he was a clear targetfor the CulturalRevolution.In 1967, he was arrested,andhavingbeen severelymaltreated, died in custody he on 22 May 1968. He was posthumouslyrehabilitated January1978. in His reputationin his native Liaoning grew, and in 1995, a set of his essays and an illustratedbiography were published in Shenyang,

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under the editorshipof membersof his family and prominentlocal academics (WangLianjie, 1995: 435-56).

CRISIS AND CENTRIPETALNATIONALISM

The theme thatemergesclearly from Yan'swritingis his commitmentto a distinctNortheastern identity.Yet,to createa climate favorof the recapture his region,Yanhad to portraythe recoveryof the ing and Northeastas essentialto the maintenance developmentof the cenerasingany ideas of regionalautonomy tripetalnationalistnarrative, in or even devolution.As JiangJieshicontinuedto be obdurate his polYanhadto become moreandmorestridentin his of nonresistance, icy advocacy of centripetalnationalism.By the time that Jiang finally went to war with Japan,and certainlyby 1945, the centripetaldiscourse was so dominant,thanksto the efforts of Yan and those like him, that the latter'sattemptsin 1945-1949 to resurrecta regionally were in vain. based alternative The NNSS's propaganda effort, coordinatedby Yan Baohangand his close friendDu Zhongyuan,centeredon shapingthe popularpercrisis. No mention was now made of the ception of the Manchurian status that the Northeasthad had even when nominally ambiguous affiliated with Nanjing from 1928 to 1931. Nor was any allowance given for the peculiarstatusthatthe Japanesehad had in the region: and afterall, since 1905, they hadbeen imperialists exploiters,butthis was complicatedby theirsimultaneouspresenceas employers image andprovidersof educationandhealthcaretakenup by manyChinese (C. -S. Lee, 1983: 56). The political agendaof the NNSS meantthatit had to stress the Northeast's commonality with the rest of China, ratherthanits differences. A Rhetoricwas the key tool for the creationof the new narrative. of the Northeasternpopulation was inconstructed representation sertedin a nationalistframework languageandimagesthatstressed by to contribution the national struggle.The symthe Northeasterners' was bolic centerof the NNSS propaganda the resistancemovementin the Northeast,whose fight againstthe Japaneseoccupationwas contrastedwith the nonresistancepolicy of Nanjing.The NNSS was the most important groupto have a regularliaison with the anti-Japanese

Mitter/ YAN AND CENTRIPETAL BAOHANG NATIONALISM57

fightersin the key 1931-1933 periodwhen images andperceptionsof the resistancewere being formed.Its political officers-in particular, Che Xiangchen-played a pivotalrole in persuadingthe best-known resistancefightersto sendreportsof theiractivitiesto the newspapers, government,and League of Nations phrasedin standardized, repetitive terms that correspondedwith the NNSS's constructedimage of the resistance.The resistancebecame perceivedby the media and the Chinese public as patrioticfighterswho were thwarted only by the reluctanceof the centralgovernment help them.In a 1933 essay writto ten to commemoratethe second anniversary the SeptemberEightof eenth Incident,Yan declared, Thissummer, the armies cameouteverywhere in although resistance
profusion,andresistedceaselessly, they hadno sourceof ammunition, no aid with supplies, so how could they maintaina lengthy struggle? The governmentshould set up some means to assist them, to allow themto continueto strugglewith theenemy,so thattheplansof the savage Japanesewill not be realized. [YanBaohang, 1933: 255]

The 1,700 resistancefighters who had come to Beiping by 1938, Yan claimed, "do not fear death,they do not want money. They have sacrificedeverythingthey have, and their only goal is to drive Japanese imperialismout of China"(Yan Baohang, 1938: 259). In fact, only around 1% of the populationof the Northeastjoined the resistance (and many of those were banditswhose depredationsalienated the local population),but the propaganda Yan and others made it of seem as thoughresistance,rather thanacceptanceor activecollaboration, was the most widespreadresponse. Naturally,Yan did not aim single-handedly to turn the Northeasternresistance into an antiappeasementicon. The NNSS had the advantageof having one of its highest officers, Du Zhongyuan,in place as an editorialiston China's most popularweekly journal,Shenghuozhoukan,editedby Zou Taofen (Coble, 1991: 77-87). Up to 1.5 million readersmay havereadthe heroic version of the resistancestorypromotedby the NNSS, andMa Zhanshan,the resistance leader who stood up to the Japanese in a doomedbattleat the Nonni Riverin Heilongjiang,in November1931, rapidlyfoundhimself the recipientof largesumscollected by newspaper readerseager to rewardhim for his heroism;for example, 30,000

1999 58 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY

yuan came from readers of the Tianjin gongbao alone (Wang Ju and Shao Yuchun, 1991: 60). The Japanese occupation of a large region, forcing thousands of refugees into exile, gave national identity a preeminence it had not previously enjoyed and boosted the effectiveness of the NNSS's propaganda. But like a drug that destroys one bodily function to save another, it had the effect of solidifying the supremacy of centripetal nationalism at the expense of a regional identity. Yan and the other NNSS propagandists translated their newly created vision of the resistance among the Northeastern population into a political manifesto for the Chinese nation as a whole: The whole country,from top to bottom, ought to come right to its senses, and whip into action. The governmentwill ... overcome the current problems of personality,and shortly strengthenthe whole political organization, urgently reconstruct, firm up the national strength,andswiftly set up a planfor therecoveryof the lost territories. When it comes to the destructionof the countryandloss of the homes of the people of the Northeast,the land of our ancestraltombs, the run fields in which the barbarians amok like jackals and tigers, our is very grave,and we ought... bravelyto go forth,neiresponsibility therbreakingoff norturningback,to fightto the deathwith the enemy. Until the day thatthe Sino-Japanese struggleis ended, we will not end the fight. Our compatriotsin the south must vigorously show their and enthusiasm[forourcause] ... keep an eye on the government, help the volunteerarmiesin Manchuria.[YanBaohang, 1933: 255-56] This quotation reveals that Yan had two goals in mind. On the one hand, he was keen to show how important it was that the Chinese outside Manchuria defy the nonresistance policy and contribute to the fight against the occupation. On the other hand, he wished to downplay the purely local considerations that in reality powerfully motivated the Northeastern resistance fighters and instead portray their concern for the country as a whole. But it was the outbreak of open hostilities in 1937 that gave Yan the opportunity to crow about how he had been right all along. More particularly, though, he was able to tie in what even Jiang now acknowledged was a national crisis with the continuing efforts of the Northeasterners:

AND CENTRIPETAL Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG NATIONALISM59

Before the SeventhJulyIncident[atLugouqiao,7 July 1937, the beginning of the Warof Resistance],realizingthatan invasionby Japanwas imminent and that the Northeasternpeople had a responsibility to prosecutethe Warof Resistance,the formerNNSS, the Northeastern Volunteer UnitedArmy,andtheNortheastern Army,the Anti-Japanese People's Salvation organizations from all over China formed an Salvation unprecedentedly largeunion,andestablisheda Northeastern Council [NESC:Dongbeijiuwangzonghui]in Beiping. Not long after it was set up, the LugouqiaoIncidenttook place, andthe NESC at once set up armedsections, sendingout guerrillatroopsall aroundBeiping. ... They maintained territory sixteen countiesin Hebei, andeven the of the blue-sky and white-sun nationalflag is flying there. [Yan today, Baohang, 1938: 260] Written in 1938, this piece addressed itself to the most important campaign of the moment: Now the governmenthas appealedto the people to join togethertheir troops for the War of Resistance, for the great task of defending Wuhan. For the past year, the NESC has not only unceasingly responded to the government'sappeal, but positively taken part in now organizingwartime every action, every task, and is furthermore taskforces, andcarryingout all sortsof propaganda taskswith the great aim of defendingWuhan.[p. 260] Yan was particularly incensed that Jiang Jieshi should have declared that "our thirty million Northeastern compatriots should positively, bravely fight to the death for the country, for the people, for themselves." "The facts of the last seven years," retorted Yan, "prove that the Northeastern people have already obeyed the Generalissimo's order, and the Northeastern people are fighting more bravely and enthusiastically than ever to recover the lost territories" (Yan Baohang, 1938: 261). Yan made a similar point in a 1940 essay: many of his "Northeastern compatriots" had fled their homeland "for one goal only: they are not willing to become slaves from a destroyed country; they are not willing to be at the enemy's beck and call, to be enslaved, to be oppressed" (Yan Baohang, 1940: 262).

60 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY 1999

THENATURE THENORTHEASTERN OF DISCOURSE

The picture of a Northeasternnationalism,strongly tinged with regionalexceptionalismand autonomy,in strugglewith the centripetal nationalismof the GMD andCCP is itself misleadingbecause the narrative createdby Yanandhis colleagues was essentiNortheastern alized in severalimportantways. As WangHuayi noted in his diary aftera dinnerwithNortheastern exiles who did not support NNSS, the "Werecognizedthat saving the countryis more important than anyelse, and that we shouldn't have any internalfactional strife thing before the Northeasthas been recovered"(WangHuayi, 1931-1933: 18 Jan. 1932). This attitudereflects the reality that discourses are always simplified to ease the spread of their particularpolitical agenda. Yet, the very definition of "the Northeast"itself was open to a numberof conflictingvisions. To startwith, the Northeastbefore and for after 1931 had often come to be shorthand "Fengtian/Liaoning," as thatYanandhis associatesperpetuated, particularly the something vast majorityof themcame fromthatprovince.Yet,the post-I911 pemovements(again,nevermenriod had seen powerfulJilin separatist the tioned in post-1931 dialogue). Furthermore, provinces were not treatedequally: an examinationof the relativelevels of spendingby Zhang Xueliang's governmentin the three Northeasternprovinces shows a huge disparityin favor of Liaoning.For example, education spendingin Liaoningin 1929 was 16.3 million yuan,whereasin Jilin, which hada populationaround60%the size of Liaoning's,it was only 0.52 million (Dai Manshukoku gekan, 1933: 227, 476-77). This disparitydid not surfacein public as the need for a nationalized version of the events in the Northeastbecame apparentafter 1931. But that did not mean that it did not exist. In October 1932, a groupof JilinandHeilongjiangactivistsdeclaredan intentionto set up their own separatesection in the NNSS. Wang Huayi and the other Liaoningese activists decided that they would neither supportnor activelyopposethismovement,andin fact,the separatesectionsnever materialized,but the issue of Liaoning dominationsoured relations within the group(WangHuayi, 1931-1933: 28 Oct. 1932). Therewas also an essentializationof ethnic difference.This again that is in directcontrastto the Japanesepropaganda at least nominally

Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG AND CENTRIPETAL NATIONALISM61

claimed thatthe new "state" Manchukuo of would unite the five races of the region (Chinese, Japanese,Manchu,Mongol, and Korean).In contrast, the centralizednationalismof Yan and the NNSS writers allows only for what is, by implication,a Han Chinese narrativeof resistance. The Japanese are made purely Other (the enemy), and Manchus,Mongols, and Koreansalmostalways turnup as collaborators.The need to includethe Northeastin the constructof the (implicitly Han) nationforcedthe NNSS to exclude those who could muddy the watersof nationalunitywith ethnicdifference:in a sense, this echoes the discourseof the late Qing, in which the Taipingsandthen Chinese nationalistsposited the Manchusas the Otheragainstwhom the Chinese had to rise up (Crossley, 1997: 189-94). This version of events also ignores the reality that collaborationbetween the Han population and the Japanese occupiers in Manchukuo was widespread,andit was a phenomenonthatin partstemmedfromthe social role thatagencies of Japaneseimperialismsuchas the SouthManchurian Railway had played in the region in the first decades of the century. YanBaohang'sNortheastern discoursealso had to force itself into the preexistingformsof 1930s politics. The NNSS hadremainedloyal to the GMD, as far as possible, even thoughit hadbeen drivenundergroundin 1933. It was not until 1937 thatYanBaohangfelt it necessary to join the CCP.An essay Yan wrote in 1964 gives a complex explanationfor this delay. Yan claimed that as early as 1924, he had had contacts in Shenyangwith the underground partyand takenpart in activities that it had organized.He said that he had peripherally appliedto join the CCP in 1927, but first he and then his sponsor,Su Ziyuan, had gone abroad,to Scotland and the USSR, respectively (YanBaohang, 1964). However,it seems likely thatthe arrestof Yan's in patron,ZhangXueliang,in early 1937 was also instrumental finally Yan despairof the Nationalists. making Duringthe war,Yancontinuedto be activein groupsthatpromoted the Northeasterninterest,even when he was furtheraway from the region than ever. As well as the NSGC, he worked with many Northeastern-oriented groupsin Chongqing,includingthe Northeastern Resistance and National Salvation Council, the Northeastern Youth Society, and the Liaoning-Jilin-Heilongjiang-Rehe Exiles' Native Place Society (WangLianjie, 1995: 444). He riskedpolitical

62 MODERNCHINA /JANUARY1999

troubleon behalf of Northeastern issues as well, arguingin 1939 with the Northeastern to Association,which he felt had given approval the sacrificeof the Northeastas partof the GMD's strategyof accommodatingthe Japanese.Even afterhis involvementwith the CCP andhis contacts with Zhou Enlai, Yanremainedvery much a Northeasterner who hadjoined the Communists,ratherthana Communistwho happened to have come from the Northeast.

THEFAILURE POSTWAR OF REALIGNMENT

The civil war between the Nationalists and Communists (1945-1949) was one of the first conflicts of the early Cold Warand fed concernswider thanthe fate of the Chinesethemselves.As Levine's (1987) Anvilof Victory boththe GMD andthe CCP demonstrates, control of the Northeastas a key in their bid to control the regarded whole of China. The CCP succeeded in gaining local trust and theircontrolof the Northeastby giving a strongimpresstrengthening sion that, unlike the GMD, it was concerned with the questions of and regionalrepresentation autonomy. the after Jieshi still deeply distrusted Northeasterners Japan's Jiang in surrender: a no-win formulation,those who had collaboratedwith the Japanesewere traitorsto the Chinese nation, but those who had nonresistance resistedweretaintedby havingdefiedhis prewar policy. refused to release Zhang Xueliang from house arrest and Jiang installed Xiong Shihui, originallyfrom Jiangxi and hated by Northeasternactivistsfor his associationwiththe pro-appeasement political studyclique beforethe war,as the directorof the NortheastHeadquarters of the MilitaryAffairsCommission.Jiangalso put forwardplans to divide the Northeastfromthreeinto nine provinces.In contrast,the CCP madea show of concernfor the opinionsof nativeNortheasternOf flourishthanin implementation. ers. Yet,this was morea rhetorical nineteenCentralCommitteemembersassigned to Manchuria during the civil war,only threewere Northeasterners (andtwo of those were only alternatemembers)(Levine, 1987: 108). As events would show, of the Northeasterners broughtinto the CCPadministration the region fromthe scene once the warhadended in 1945-1948 soon disappeared in 1949 (Levine, 1987: 114). But in 1946-1949, the contrastbetween

Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG AND CENTRIPETAL NATIONALISM63

the behaviorof the Nationalistsandthe Communistswas clearnotjust to Yan but to the whole Northeastern community. From 1945 to 1946, Yan lobbied for Northeastern interestsunder the aegis of the reformed NSGC, now renamed the Northeastern Political Reconstruction Council,duringthe GMD-CCPnegotiations. His essays of the time, written shortly after the failure of the talks, show his pro-CCPconvictionsclearlybutare also revealingabouthis to continuing commitment to the reinstatementof Northeasterners in theirown region.Yanclaimed thatat a dinnerin April 1946, power he had said to the GMD negotiatorShao Lizi, "TheGuomindang... will force the Northeastern people to follow the route of selfdetermination!" (YanBaohang, 1947: 271). In fact, we cannotbe sure is thatYan said any such thing. What is important thatYan, in a published article, chose to drive home the differencebetween the GMD and the CCP positions not in terms of class strugglebut in terms of regional autonomy. Yan was a willing listener to the CCP's siren wordsof supportforNortheastern regionalidentity.A 1947 essay continued with a now long-standingtheme-that Jiang Jieshi had never fully accepted that the Northeastwas an integralpartof the Chinese nation and had been prepared leave it in Japanesehandsas long as to North China was returnedto Nanjing'scontrol:"Thefour characters kangzhan daodi [war of resistance to the end], according to [the meant the restorationof the situationto that GMD's] interpretation, to the SeventhJuly Incident,butthey neverspoke of fighting all prior the way up to the Yalu River! [where the NortheastbordersKorea]" (Yan Baohang, 1947: 265). But having complainedthatJianghad not treatedthe Northeastas an integralpartof Chinaduringthe war,Yannow attackedhim for imposing centralcontrolon the region.Yan'scommentssuggest a desire to to return the pre-1931days whenthe Northeastcould runits own afto This must fairs,with only nominalattachment a centralgovernment. haveonce againaroused Jiang'ssuspicionsabouttheNortheasterners:
To prevent the old powers in the Northeast from rising again, they threwWanFulin, Ma Zhanshan, Zou Zuohua(who all in fact had early on declaredtheir loyalty to the Guomindang)and others out of their positions in the Northeast,and sent in time-servingpartyofficials, to become chairmenof the nine provinces.Not only did they not release

1999 64 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY

GeneralZhangXueliang,butthey almostcompletelycrushedhim, and to to south,andwas not permitted return the Northeast.[YanBaohang, 1947: 266] Ma Zhanshan was an iconic figure of resistance, whose campaign against the Japanese had provided the mainstay of the propaganda that Yan had coordinated in his NNSS days. He had also fought in Jiang's armies during the War of Resistance, making his exclusion from power in the postwar settlement even more difficult to justify. Yan went on to discuss his own situation: It has been more thanfifteen years fromthe time I left my old home in the Northeastto the time I returned. Duringthose fifteenlong years, so as to fight in resistanceto the Japanese,I carriedout nationwideNew the Life activitiesfor JiangJieshi. So as to support Warof Resistance,I tasks in the GMD government, undertookmanyimportant doing them all to my utmostability,and completingmy tasks. After the victory in the Warof Resistance,so as to strivefor nationwidepeace anddemocracy, and for peace and democracyin our Northeast,I opposed civil war, advocating a negotiated settlement to all the nation's and the Northeast'sproblems.... The GMD's reactionary clique, selfish and out for its own profit ... violated the demands of the people of the whole country,and the aspirationsof our Northeasterncompatriots, destroyedthe cease-fire agreementand the resolutionof the political negotiation conference, and implementedtheir misguided policy of dictatorship,civil war,and treachery.[YanBaohang, 1947: 272] Yan concluded his summary with what was, considering his record, probably the harshest condemnation he could make of the Nationalist recapture of Manchuria: "By making Xiong Shihui the Northeast Chief Executive, the [GMD] has taken control of Northeastern politics, economy, communications, culture, education, and everything else.... There is no difference between this and the former enemy's system of having a 'Governor of Taiwan' or 'Governor of Korea'" (Yan Baohang, 1947: 272).2 Yan's activities certainly caught the GMD's attention. But as far as the Nationalists were concerned, Yan's affiliation with the CCP had placed him on the wrong side of the divide: his motivation was irrelevant, and so they gave no thought to whether he and his supporters
what was left of the Northeastern Army . . . was sent far away to the

Mitter/ YAN BAOHANG AND CENTRIPETAL NATIONALISM65

might be lured back into the Nationalistfold. Instead, hired toughs were sent to intimidateandassaultYanBaohangandhis allies, just as CCP bruisersin the Northeastwere sent to murderpeople associated with the GMD (Gillin and Myers, 1989: 223). Incidentssuch as the one with which this articlebeganwere commonplaceon both sides in the febrile atmosphereof the civil war years. The crisis was only resolved in the autumnof 1949, when the Communistssucceeded in drivingthe Nationalistsfrom the mainland. After 1949, Yan had even less scope for the free expression of his views than he had had underthe GMD, and it is difficult to obtain a clear pictureof what he thoughtof the sideliningof the Northeastern cadresafterChinahadbeen reunified.However,thereare clues in his the post-1949 writings.A 1964 essay writtento commemorate activities of the NNSS showed how Yan'sconceptionof the Northeasterners' place withina unifiednation,havingbeen forcedinto a centripetal nationalistframework beforethe war,hadnow insteadbeen cut to suit a Marxistframework.Describingthe makeupof the NNSS 35 years after its foundation,Yan wrote,
Dividing up the membersof the NNSS from a class point of view, the capitalistsmadeup a minority,with the majoritybeing pettybourgeois intellectualsandyouths andstudents.Froma partypoint of view, there were GMD members... and membersof the Reorganization Clique like Qian Gonglai, and members of the Youth Party such as Wang Jiexia and Cui Weizhou. There were [some] who were CCP undergroundmembers,andprogressiveyouthunderCCPinfluence.... Yan Baohang, Lu Guangji, Wang Huayi, Che Xiangchen, and others belonged to the majoritywho were not of any partyor faction. [Yan Baohang, 1964: 396]

The latterstatementwas untrue:Yanandhis friendshad also been GMD members. Yan went on to state that he, Lu Guangji, Wang Huayi, and Gao Chongminwere all "leaningtowardthe CCP,or leftists" (p. 397). Nonetheless,Yanstill insistedthat"theprincipalpower of the NNSS was based on its being progressiveandnon-partisan." In this last statement,Yanimpliedthatthe CCP,rather the GMD, had like missed the point aboutthe NNSS. It was not meantto be an anti-Jiang group or a pro-CCP group. It was supposed to be a Northeastern group.

66 MODERNCHINA /JANUARY1999

CONCLUSION

Much recent theoreticalwork on nationalismhas dealt with the constructionof the nation as a struggle between competing voices. First, this discussion has pointed out thatthe victory of one position over anothercan be the resultof complicityrather thanforce. Second, it cautions against any tendency to valorize repressedvoices, as if repressionin itself confersnobility.The vision of the nationandof the Northeast'splace withinit, as espousedby YanBaohangandhis assonationalistideology forcedon ciates, was subsumedby the centripetal them by the war:yet, theirown version of the nationseemed to have little space for those whose ethnic or provincial identities did not matchtheirs.All visions of the nation,it seems, arein permanent flux, and today's repressedcan become tomorrow'srepressor. NOTES
1. The occupationof the ChannelIslandsduringthe Second WorldWarpresentsa parallel. The ChannelIslandershad historicallyregardedthemselves as separatefrom the English, linthe guisticallyandculturally: islandswerenot andarenot partof the UnitedKingdom.Yet,when at resentment having the the islandswere occupiedby Germany, islandersexpressedwidespread been "abandoned" Britain(see Bunting, 1995). by 2. In retrospect,the last criticismhas a particular poignancyfor being writtenin 1947, the of the 28 Februaryuprisingin Taiwan,when native Taiwaneserose up againstthe quasiyear colonial behaviorof the new Nationalistgovernor,ChenYi (Lai Tse-han,Myers,andWei Wou, 1991).

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68 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY 1999 ZHAOJIE(1993) "LuGuangji" Guangji),pp. 297-309 in Song Li, ZhangXuelianghe ta de (Lu jiangjunmen(ZhangXueliang and his generals).Shenyang:Liaoningrenminchubanshe.

RanaMitterisjunior lecturerin modernChinesepolitics and society at the Universityof Oxford.He receiveda Ph.D.from the Universityof Cambridgein 1996 and is currently Resistance,and Collaborationduringthe Manrevisinghis dissertation, "Nationalism, churian Crisis, 1931-33,"for publication.