Causes of the problem in Bhopal:

There were a number of clearly identified causes that contributed to an end sooner or later inevitable: Since the choice of technology for the operation of the plant, until the final management of the impact of the accident and the role of government in all this. We can visualize the main triggers of the accident in the following order. Choice of technology There are alternative technologies for the production of carbaryl and other carbamates. For example, Bayer synthesized without storing the MIC at any step of the process. In the case of pesticides and other toxic materials, state regulators should involve consideration of alternative routes for their production, to evaluate a proposal for establishment of such industries. In India seems to have been the case, the government should have insisted on forcing extreme measures of security when grant the license for the use of MIC to prepare pesticides. This is particularly important in a country with low levels of education in the average population. Location in the industry The Bhopal pesticide factory was established in 1969near Bhopal. The plant was built close to densely populated areas. As seen in Figure, the train station, the bus, the administrative center (Old Secretariat) and the hospitals were all coming to UCI. The ake provides drinking water to Bhopal was also close to the plant. Bhopal was one of the cities that experienced a population growth of about 75% over the period 1971-1981. This growth resulted in the settlement of very poor neighborhoods, one of them very large in the vicinity of the plant UCI, which provided activities service (canteens, cafes, etc.) staff. The government's responsibility to have allowed the precarious urbanization (which in Argentina call "slums") in the vicinity of the plant is inescapable. The government had regularized the illegal status of these settlements in 1983. The filing of the industry in 1969 and the expansion of its production in 1979 were made possible by the absence of clear legislation and severe in these aspects.

Plant design We have seen in sufficient detail the security issues that a factory of this type must meet and what were the major flaws in ICU at this point. Obviously we will emphasize only the required safety factor in these processes can not be the same if the plant is in India (or other developing country) that if the plant in West Virginia in USA (UCC), training and education level of operators play a fundamental law in this case. UCC should have built-in backup system, used by Bayer. In the event of a leak, MIC is vented to a nearby area flooded with water, which can then be neutralized. Given that the total investment for the construction of the plant was U $ S 2 million, this system should not have added a significant overhead.

Information and training. The public, authorities and local health services should have known that MIC was highly toxic. It also should have disseminated primary measures to take in the event of a leak of MIC, the mere fact protect the face with a damp towel inactive most of the MIC to enter the body. Even that immediately after the accident, this information would saved many lives. The fact that more deaths occur even in the next night (at lower the temperature again) was mainly due to the lack of dissemination efficient meteorological information on wind direction. Both the company as the government had to use television and radio media to spread information and preventive measures. When a substance as toxic as MIC is stored in the middle of a city, local doctors cannot ignore the possible course of action in case of a leak. Or Union Carbide and the government did something about it. Even two months after the incident there was a lot of misinformation among doctors, which led to apply them essentially symptomatic treatments in the absence of an appropriate procedure.the delayed report to public authorities was another inexcusable failure communication. No plans were

prepared for emergency procedures: doctors learned of the accident only when patients began arriving at the hospital. Emergency management In India, while natural disasters are not uncommon, are not well operators, and then systems to respond to these events were notdeveloped. The main weak points are, in summary: a) Delay incomprehensible to alert the public They should have used the mass media and mobile. The organized evacuation transportation have reduced the magnitude of the tragedy. b) The pressure on the hospital system was also a key factor The largest public hospital had a capacity of 750 beds and the night of December 3 spent about 12,000 people with serious conditions. Over night the number of patients rose to 55,000. c) In large industrial settlements It is mandatory to have an emergency management plan, which must include the following: accurate identification of those responsible for the alert and immediate action, evacuation procedures, rehabilitation and remediation of the contaminated area. In the U.S., industrial firms who handle hazardous chemicals cannot get its operating license until the emergency plan is submitted and then reviewed and approved by a federal government agency with jurisdiction over the subject.

Let's see in brief as was the situation in India in these areas at the time of the accident, compared to other industrialized countries (Table I): Table I: Regulations 1 Classification of toxic substances Act Toxic Substan ces Control MIC storage Occupational health and safety Environmental audit Developed Countries Based on the degree of hazard / toxicity Report of toxic substances Prohibited Germany and Holland Catastrophic accidents (less than 5 people) need a detailed analysis EPA requires periodic enviro nmental audits of existing facilities. For big factories Obligatory for radiation Obligatory for EEUU Separate regulations for toxic materials India at the time of the accident There was no classification of toxic substances There was a report of pesticides, which did not include substances such as MIC No specific legislation There was no procedure to improve safety based on experience No specific law This is necessary for new industries to apply for the license of radiation No specific legislation No specific requirement Without disticion between toxic substances and toxic

3 4

Regulation for location of industries Regulation 7 of urban planning 8 Emergency plan Chemical factories 9 regulations 6 Conclusion:

In conclusion we can say that the analysis of what happened in Bhopal is no mystery. The accident was the inevitable consequence of all possible errors and negligence in the operation happen with toxic substances in industrial processes.

Recommendations: Principales Aspectos a tener en cuenta para la instalacin y operacin de una industria qumica.