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The Internalism/Externalism Controversy Author(s): Richard Fumerton Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology (1988), pp. 443-459 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214084 . Accessed: 26/01/2011 22:34
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Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology, 2, 1988

THE INTERNALISM/EXTERNALISM CONTROVERSY*

Fumerton Richard of University Iowa

Muchofcontemporary epistemology place in theshadow takes oftheinternalism/externalism Itscurrent debate. placeon thecentrestageof epistemology seemsappropriate giventhe dramatic in revolution our thought about historical and contemporary that epistemological inquiry wouldseem to be forced certain by externalist views. although controversy But the seemsto paradigm strike of I deepat theheart fundamental epistemological issues, am notcertain thatit has been clearly defined. seemsto me that It are a sideswithout thorough philosophers choosing understanding ofwhattherespective viewsentail. I a Inthis to of paper want explore number different ofdefinways ing the technical distinction betweeninternalist externalist and As the epistemologies. is so often case with technical philosophical itis that is one distinctions, probably foolish insist there only "corto I am in a rect" wayto define distinction. interested developing the the way of understanding controversy thatit leaves many so internalists exterand as philosophers already recognized paradigm in nalists their is respective categories, this notmymaingoal. but while ultimate interIndeed, my suggestion tohowtounderstand as nalism include internalists inthehistory philosophy, will as of many itmaybe harder find who to contemporary epistemologists satisfy are the criteria. primary myinternalist My concerns to define conin it a troversy sucha waythat a) involves fundamentally important and dissatisfacthe of distinction, b) articulates source theunderlying

444 / Richard Fumerton feel externalist tionthatinternalists toward of paradigm analyses I At to this epistemic concepts. thevery least, want articulate interof mistake externalism. one who nalist's viewas to thecritical As that of are thinks externalist analyses epistemic concepts somehow irrelevant thetraditional appropriate to and philosophical interest I inknowledge justified and belief, am obviously interested conin to myownbrand internalism, theexof and verting philosophers treme version foundationalism itinvolves. hopeis that of that My when philosophers realize underlying the source their of unhappiness with externalist epistemology, willcomehometoa version they of foundationalism hasbeenneglected long. wayofachievthat too By ing thislast goal, I willalso examineand objectto one of the externalist methodological assumptions underlying epistemologies. Butletus begin trying define concepts internalism by to the of and externalism. Internalism and InternalStates The term "internalism" suggest viewthat knowing might the S's that or having justified P a that in in belief P, consists S being some internal state. might, understand externalistonewho We then, the as to is committed theviewthat twoindividuals couldbe in identical "internal" states mind of while one knows, hasevidence, has or or a justified while other the does not.Thisis surely belief, tempting, buteverything on "sameinternal state" hinges howwe understand and "samestateofmind". we include If the among properties that a define state mind of relational seemobthen properties, itwould an viousthat externalist andwould, that can, embrace thesis if the state mind identical yours of is to then know I'll what know, my you I'll be justified believing in whatyou are justified believing. in and to Goldman, Nozick, Armstrong, Dretske, consider a few just are to out relational externalists, allwilling pick a complex property thatmybelief in virtue which constitutes has of it or knowledge will belief.' relational The be justified property typically a complex of caused a procsuch nomological property, as thepropertybeing by it esswhich satisfiescertain a or suchthat would description, being nothaveoccurred notcertain had other obtained. One conditions all of on on gets sorts variations externalism depending howthereleIf vantnomological relations characterized. we are trying to are

/ 445 Controversy TheInternalism/Externalism we simply externalists reject, then, cannot these define viewthat a or that as internalism maintaining one knows hasa justified define of of in kind state mind whenwe in of belief virtue being a certain in properties. by relational kind lettherelevant be determinedpart its identifies and knowledge Shallwe thensay thatan internalist of states states mind, by belief internal meaning internal justified with The externalist, of cornonrelational properties a mind? ofmind, couldexonlythattwoindividuals wouldmaintain respondingly, while one knows has or properties the emplify samenonrelational doesnot.We could, then are but we and a justified belief theother to internalists. Certainly, to verymany going be hardpressed find of who holdsthata everyone on thisunderstandingexternalism, the can knowledge when justificaeven true justified belief constitute is with beingfalse committed compatible thebelief tionis logically A truth of toan externalist account knowledge.2non-redundant conof introduces a clearly analysis knowledge dition thetraditional in of the thatgoes beyondthe nonrelational properties condition to concept justified of our But we knower. evenif restrict attentionthe whowould idenfew there seemtobe precious philosophers belief, with exemplification the ofsome belief the of tify having a justified nonrelational (properties). property to approaches understanding One of the classicfoundationalist identifies leastone condition such at for noninferential knowledge with facts. havemoreto say I'll as acquaintance knowledge direct that at observe but nowI wouldmerely aboutthisviewlater, for of take to leastsomeexternalists suchpositions be paradigms the But they sortof internalist epistemologies are rejecting.3 clearly with when someone Russell like talked about being acquainted a fact, bearsto a he intended be referring a relation a subject to to that would a noninferentially belief, sucha view, on fact. justified Having and properties, a with nonrelational notbe identical exemplifying wouldnot arguethatiftwopeoplewerein thesame Russellean It beliefs. is states wouldhavethesamejustified they nonrelational favorite Descartes, notevenclearthat externalists' the internalist, ofan If, exthe would satisfy abovecharacterization internalist.for analysisof believing ample, Descartesaccepted a relational the an to something be thecase,orhaving ideaofsomething, states belief would and ofmind for constitute that him knowledge justified who The notbe nonrelational of philosophers properties a self. only who couldbe internaliststheabovesenseare philosophers emin

446 / Richard Fumerton of and some bracean adverbial theory consciousness identify ofthe ofwhich nonrelational properties, exemplification constitutes conwith and belief. one must If believe sciousness, knowledge justified in to not all that order be an internalist, verymany philosophers, wouldwantanypartoftheview. myself included, Philosophers have tried ground who to knowledge justified and in with havesometimes belief acquaintance facts construed facts the one as with which can be acquainted themselves "modifications" of in that themind. Thismight turn suggest one couldusefully define the internalist someonewho is committed the view that as to and belief be either nonrelaknowledge justified must identified with or relational tional of propertiesthemind with propertiesthemind of of where relata therelations themind itsnonrelational the are and properties. a definition Such would housemore analyses justified of beliefunderthe roofof internalism although any analysisof a truth would be still knowledge involvingnonredundant condition to that sucha definitioninof externalist. itis important realize But wouldstill leavephilosophers ground who belief ternalism justified withnonmental in acquaintance facts monist's (e.g.'s,theneutral sensedata,theepistemological direct realist's surfaces physical of forms their and the univerthe objects, Platonist's relations, realist's in salsand their think relations) theexternalist's camp.AndI don't theparadigm externalist wants their Moreimportantly, company. itlooks though aredefining internalism/externalism as we the debate in a peculiarway by putting opposite into campsfundamentally if the similar views.Itseemsto me that I am trying ground conto in with belief acquaintance nonrelational ceptofjustified properties ofthemind, youare trying ground concept justified and of to the belief acquaintance nonmental data, views funin with sense our are alike. will damentally Theinternalism/externalism controversy not be getting a significant ifone ofthese at issue viewsgetsdescribed of as a form internalism of whiletheother described a form is as externalism. and Iteration Internalism the There ofcourse, more than natural tounderstand one is, way that for or are suggestion conditions knowledge justification interWhen nal to thecognizer, are "in themind" thecognizer. or of

TheInternalism/Externalism Controversy / 447 "in talked philosophers about sensedatabeing themind," examfor to ple,at leastsometimes seemedto be pointing a feature they of in Sensedataare "inthemind" thesense ourknowledge them.4 of that one hasa kind privileged of Andthis accessto them. analogy to what suggests another oftrying understand is really issue way at between internalist the the At some and externalist.least philosophers wantto understand internalist someone the as whomaintains that thenecessary sufficient and conditions satisfying for epistemic conto are one cepts conditions which hasa privileged direct and access. it "Access," course, itself epistemic of an term. this On of analysis internalism, the then, internalist be thought as someone of might who is committed theviewthat to entails knowledge knowing (perhaps that a directly) one knows; having justified belief entails justifiably believing one has a justified that belief. The aboveinvolves very a ofhaving strong interpretation access to theconditions knowledge justified of A and belief. weaker conof accessas potential or ception accesscouldconstrue knowledge a belief. Thus weaker version internalism these of justified lines along that a to insist for person be justified believing proposiin might a tionP thatpersonmusthave "available"to hima method for whatthenature that discovering of justificationLetus consider is. both strong weakattempt understand this and to internalismthe as viewthat or having belief knowledge justified entails having epistemic access to theconditions knowledge justified for and belief. As someone whohasalways thought himself an internalist, of as one ofmyfirst concerns with strong the of requirement access is it that might saddletheinternalist a viewthat with requires imthe of possible knowledge justified and belief. I shallmakeclearin As I don't myconcluding careif, myanalysis epistemic on of remarks, it out terms, turns that dogs, computers, Aunt my Mary, eventhe or do nothavephilosophically philosophically sophisticated, relevant knowledge or justification believing, for whatthey of, think they knowor are justified believing. I do not wantto define in But in knowledge justified and belief sucha waythat having knowledge andjustified belief involves vicious a And regress. therequirements that must one know one knows inorder know justifiably that P to P; believe oneisjustifiedbelievinginorder justifiably that in P to believe seem to flirt with prospect a vicious the of P, certainly regress. Inelaborating point, might, this one however, usefully distinguish inferential I have justification noninferential from justification. defend-

448 / RichardFumerton that principle 2; ed elsewhere [6],Chapter and [7])theverystrong (in P in one another ifone is to be justified inferring proposition from E in in E one mustbe 1) justified believing and 2) justified believing have tradithatE makesepistemically probableP. Foundationalists the maintained ifone acceptssucha principle, onlyway that tionally numberof infinite regressesis to recognizethe to avoid an infinite beliefs(including, course, of existenceof noninferentially justified in of 'E beliefs propositions theform makes noninferentially justified requirement access, of withthestrong probableP'). Myreservations that justification all involves then,have to do withthegeneralthesis In of access to theconditions justification. his recentbook [2],Bonin defined termsof a jour seems to defenda versionof internalism that access and he argues, quiteplausibly, founrequirement strong of timeending are dationalists goingto have an exceedinglydifficult withinthe contextof thisstronginterthe regressof justification X If nalism.5 a beliefthatP has some feature in virtueof whichit internalism reBonjour's justified, is supposedto be noninferentially X believe thatthefeature is presentand that quiresus to justifiably to of itmakesprobablethetruth P. The regresswe were trying end is withnoninferential justification obviouslyabout to begin again. Ifone acceptsthisincredibly versionof internalism, seems it strong Inme thatone will not be able to escape Bonjour'sargument. to it is all too evidentthatBonjourcannotescape hisown argudeed to alternative foundamentas itmight applied to hiscoherentist be reTo Bonjourrecognizesthathis internalism tionalism. his credit, one justification, musthave quires thatin orderto have empirical relations coherence. of access to whatone believesand therelevant he Since theonlykindofepistemic access to empirical propositions one willhave to find beliefs which coherence, recognizesis through rearises coherewith beliefs aboutwhatone believes.Buttheproblem and with to access to thosebeliefs againwe encounter respect getting a viciousregress.Bonjourtriesto save his view withhis "doxastic presumption"(101-05) (you just take it for granted that your are but metabeliefs by and large right), it seems to me thatifone muchas admitsthathis view enreads the textclosely,Bonjouras to tailsthemostradicalofskepticisms respect empirical with justification (105). access for the of The onlyway one can satisfy requirement strong of is to allow the possibility a mindhavingan infinite justification states.If,forexample, numberof increasingly complex intentional

Controversy / 449 TheInternalism/Externalism I hold I do)that belief P isnoninferentially when justified (as my that that I amacquainted thefact P, thethought P, andtherelawith that that that tion correspondence of between thought P andthefact the P (calltheseconditions I am not,on theabove view,an interX) that order X to constitute in for nalist unless am willing assert I to P, be mynoninferential justification believing I must acquainted for that of withthefactthat thethought X, and therelation corX, that that (call X respondence between thought X and thefact the with fact the these1). AndI must also holdthatI am acquainted that viewis obviously thatY, andso on. NowI am notsaying this to impossible hold.One can supposethatpeoplehave an infinite number thoughts of and of (perhaps dispositional) onecan think the sheets like transparent "layers" acquaintance being perfectly of as want laid one on topofanother. do we, as internalists, to let But be into this where onlyescape the ourselves painted a corner tight is a viewthatmight evenbe intelligible? not vicious the of Whileit is notprecisely same problem a formal limitations themind of whenitcomesto conregress, possible the also facts complexity might makea prosidering ofeverexpanding of relucof justification ponent theacquaintance theory noninferential for eventheweaker of tant accept to requirementaccess.Speaking I whenI try to straight myself,am notsureI can evenkeepthings that that that form thought mythought mythought mythought the P to that that corresponds mythinking P corresponds P. Andthis to that the order thought P. is still onlya fewlevelsawayfrom first tobe sure, technical a butdo we want "Internalism" expression, is, or to the to puta viewlikeminethat refuses accepteither strong noninferential the weak requirement access,but thatdefines of in to of acquainjustificationpartby reference theconcept direct with on side tance facts, theexternalist oftheinternalist/externalist this is controversy? suspicion that is nothowtheissueis being My we And reinforce idea that are notgetthe understood. to further of at of by requirements ting theheart thecontroversy considering , a externalist reflect howeasily mischievous on "access" we should For can "playalong"with of accessrequirementsinternalism. purexternalist let posesofillustration us takeone oftheparadigmatic ofof the of analysis justification analyses epistemic terms, reliabilist article In that Goldman in fered Goldman [81.6 initially suggests by A belief justified thefollowing of is recursive analysis justification: ifitresults either from a belief-independent that unconprocess is 1)

450 / Richard Fumerton process is ditionally reliable, 2) a belief-dependent that conditionalor Beliefjustified. beliefs themselves are lyreliable, where "input" the and "input," what do as independent processes nothavebeliefs their are the beliefs reliable that "output" is makes them unconditionally at "input" least processes haveas their usually Belief-dependent true. the reliable that is makes them conditionally somebeliefs, what and are beliefs true. true whenthe"input" "output" beliefs usually are of proto the Qualifications having do with availability alternative use sugcessesandtheconsequences their of hypothetical arelater I wish us the gested, they but neednotconcern for point presently to discuss. extera of paradigmatic Nowit is obviously feature Goldman"s is nalism itdoesnotrequire a person that that whosebelief justified have epistemic accessto that of bybeingtheresult someprocess produced evenifI havenoreason process. beliefs be reliably My can And for are that produced. this whatsoever supposing they reliably of is feature externalism that might seemto suggest theimportant But for belief. suppose itsrejection accessrequirements justified of about complaining theexternalist tired hearing of internalists gets a with justificano thepossibility having justified belief of allowing a is useful ask whether to that tionforbelieving it is justified.71t and within spirit reliabilism atthesame the of reliabilist remain could beliefs time allowthat reliable onlywhen processes yield justified inbelieving theprocesses reliable. that are oneisjustified Certainly, our ofaccess-a reliabilist a reliabilist accept weakrequirement could a beliefs P1 allowthat reliable could only process generates justified for that ifthere availablea justification believing P1 is reliable. is this on model would Interpreting justification the relabilist's P2 could there being available process which a presumably require thebelief P1 is reliable. course, that Of the given requiregenerate P2 ment weakaccess, woulditself of beliefs only generate justified a ifthere wereavailable reliable P3 couldgenerate process which that is reliable, so on. Butit is notobvious P2 and thebelief that or all of thesereliableprocesses methods need be different (a as as for the reliabilist, far I can see, can allow, example, inductive ofinduction, of of perceptual justificationthereliability justification and need onlybe perception, so on) and in any eventsincethey available opposed actually to the used)itisnotclearthat regress (as is vicious. Coulda reliabilist of accepteven a strong requirement access?

TheInternalism/Externalism / 451 Controversy Coulda reliabilist allowthat process generates even a P1 justified beliefs ifthebeliever that only actually justifiably believes theprocess is reliable? is clearly This more problematic there for wouldacP2 the that tually havetobe somereliable process generating belief P1 isreliable, somereliable and process generating belief P3 the that P2 is reliable so on.Thecoherence sucha viewrests conand of on siderations concerning potential the complexity themind we of that havealready discussed thecontext wondering in of whether classical foundationalism copewith can strong accessrequirements. supBut pose,for sakeofargument, ourhypothetical the that reliabilist convinces that mind a kind infinite us the has of complexity renders that harmless this even regress. important The question askiswhether to thishypothetical reliabilist paying externalist service our his lip to requirements access would make the dissatisfied of internalist happy. AndI think answer thathe obviously the is wouldnot.As reliabilist/externalist longas thereliabilist/externalist offering keeps in accounts knowing one knows being of or that justified believing to that one hasa justified the isn't belief, internalist going feelthat to has this anything beenaccomplished getting reliabilist accept by theviewthat a knowing entails knowing one knows; that having in entails thatone has a belief justified beingjustified believing The moral drawis that fundamental to the belief. obvious justified between and is a internalists externalists notreally disagreement over as inferential disagreement such questions whether justification entails actualor potential belief thelegitimacy theinin of justified or whether entails actualor ference, moregenerally justification are potential access to thefactthattheconditions justification of satisfied. Internalism and Normativity for Oneofthemore nebulous criteria distinguishing and internalist externalist the that analyses involves suggestion externalists ignore the of normativityepistemic judgments. certainly, ofthe And, many levelled reliabilism, example, at for objections maketheclaimthat to one accesscannot unreliabilitywhich has no actualor potential decide questions about the rationality irrationality beliefs or of because chargesof irrationality relevant evaluations are to of and If beliefs produced unreliable are epistemic praise blame. my by

452 / Richard Fumerton processes whenthere no possible is me that wayfor to find out,in what senseamI tobe blamed having belief? inhabitants The for the ofdemon worlds no more are for demon inducblameworthy their ed falsebeliefs thanare theinhabitants non-demon on worlds.8 NowinonesenseI amperfectly prepared admit, internalist, to qua that whenone characterizesbelief irrational is criticizing a as one that belief, sinceI think externalist and are that accounts radically mistaken analyses philosophically of relevant epistemic I concepts, think obviously theyhave incorrectly the analyzed nature this of epistemic criticism. beinga kindof criticism a verybroad But is criterion being for We for normative. criticize beliefs being irrational, butwe also criticize knives being for too dull, carsfor being expensive,theories being for false. does that But makejudgments about thedullness knives, costofcars, thefalsehood theories, of the and of normative judgments? in Perhaps a sense a judgment aboutthe dullness knives relevant a normative of is to judgment aboutthe knife that usually goodness that of in we consider dullness be a to property makes knife that the ineffective achieving for certain ends to peculiar theuseofknives. this grist thereliabilist's But is for mill. Wecriticize processes the beliefs being for the producing unreliable, reliabilist might argue, becausesuchprocesses typically toprofail ducewhatwe wantfrom them-true beliefs. bothinternalists externalists agreethat some and will Surely in sensecharges irrationality be construed criticisms. it of can as But is important distinguish virtual to this a truism,truism isn't that gothe from ingto differentiate twoviews, so-called deontic analyses ofepistemic where deontic a terms, defines analyses epistemic convalue terms. Deontic ceptsusing of analyses epistemic terms may wellbe incompatible at leastparadigm with externalist views, but as an internalist I certainly don'twantto be stuck with defending a deontic of To a analysis epistemic concepts. critjcizeperson's belief isnottosuggest theperson morally that is for reprehensible having is that And belief. this so evenifwe successfully thestandard avoid duties" to that "conflicting objections deontic analyses wereraised the in (You'vegottheduty Chisholm against viewthat suggested [31 to believeyou will get well-it might help-even though your evidence indicates will I would you probably Specifically, die). argue that person's a belief be epistemically can criticized if decide even we that person so far the is is that gone, so irrational, we do notthink it evencausally for out possible himto figure whyhisbeliefs are

/ 453 TheInternalism/Externalism Controversy not for is irrational. a person presumably tobe blamed believSuch hecan with potenthe best the He inganything. maybe doing very in his still of tialhe has,eventhough besteffort results thehaving irrational beliefs. another Put way,we do not(should ethically not) an for beliefs we nevertheless that criticize irrational person holding I that criticize irrational. as Again, do notthink theexternalist has a plausibleunderstanding the conditions of underwhichwe a as but the criticizebelief being philosophically irrational, for reasons I I havetried indicate,do notthink isuseful try understand it to to to the internalist/externalist as one overthe normativity debate of In I that deontic epistemic judgments.fact,would argue pure analyses a ofepistemic terms involve mistake much themistake like very of externalism. Externalism and What's ReallyWrongwithit the Forsomeone whoseprimary interest indefining controveris seemunnecessarily contentious. But section sy,this heading might is the youwillrecallthat concern to understand internalist/exmy ternalist debatein sucha wayas to makeclearwhatI taketo be thesource theinternalist's of dissatisfaction theview, parwith and this with ticularly internalist's dissatisfaction theview. Old philosophical viewshave a way of resurfacing undernew labels. And the rootsof externalism back further thanthe go I think "naturalistic epistemology" encouraged Quine. by Rather, they lie withan old controversy concerning correct the analysisof While of clearly epistemic took epistemic probability. theRussell [15] to probabilitybe a suigeneris concept hisdiscussion theprin(see of the and cipleofinduction) Russell [16]was bound determined of to reduce epistemic probabilitya frequency to conception probabiliof A to of in ty.9 crude attempt define epistemic probability terms freone hold E another quency might that propositionmakes probable P when propositionwhenthepairis ofa kind suchthat e/p usually a propositionthefirst istrue, propositionthesecond of a of kind kind is true. ourpresent For we the purposes can ignore difficult questions the ofthe involving interpretation relevant frequencies, questions which to Russell devoted great a deal ofattention. Thereis, itseems me,an obvious to a connection between frequency analysis ofepistemic probability thefundamental and claims suchexterof

454 / Richard Fumerton nalist epistemologies reliabilism. are trying understand as Both to fundamental in epistemic of concepts terms nomological concepts. The externalist/naturalist in epistemology hiscounterpart (like in ethics) trying define is to away the concepts fundamental his to he to discipline; is trying analyzefundamental epistemic concepts in terms othernon-epistemic of Goldman's concepts. hardcore reliabilism wants explicate to justified belief terms either frein of a quency propensitythat anydifferent) or (if is of concept probability. Nozick wants define to epistemic concepts terms nomological in of connections between facts beliefs thesort and of expressed conby tingent subjunctive conditionals [14]). (in Armstrong appealsto this same conceptof nomological in necessity trying understand to knowledge [1]). And if externalism (in involvesa fundamental philosophical I error,would suggest itis analogous theallegthat to ed mistake naturalism ethics, moreaccurately, alleged of in or the mistake ethics trying define indefinable. in of to the I wouldurge youto consider suggestion itis a defining the that of characteristic an internalist that fundamental epistemology ittakes conepistemic cepts to be sui generis.No matter how muchlip serviceour reliabilist topaytoourinsistence justified tries hypothetical that belief entailsbeingactually potentially or aware of the conditions of he us justification,won't to the satisfy as longas hecontinues define terms with he which paysus lipservice hisnaturalistic in epistemic (nomological) Itis thenomological way. of analyses epistemic conthat leadsus to keepmoving a leveltoask theexternalist cepts up howheknows heknows, knows heknows heknows. that or that that The externalist be might able to givecorrect answers within the of framework hisview, we,as internalists, keepasking but will the until a questions hisanswer of invokes concept knowledge justified or belief captured terms nomological not in of connection. realinThe ternalist/externalist I would the controversy, concerns exsuggest, tent which generis to sui epistemic can concepts be analyzed employor as ing, evenbe viewed supervenient (where upon being supervenient a uponinvolves necessary connection then stronger causation), suchnonepistemic as universal and nomological concepts causation, probabilistic andcontingent law, conditionals. subjunctive Ironically, I neverhavebeenconvinced there a naturalistic definist that is or in As I am thatthereis fallacy ethics. an internalist, convinced in and of something analogous epistemology thatitis at theheart theinternalism/externalism debate.

/ 455 Controversy TheInternalism/Externalism

reduction conceptsthatdefy Whatare thesesui generisepistemic a or analysis?This is obviously questionabout whichthosewho reviewswillthemselves disagree. Perhapsthemost jecttheexternalists' associatedwithinternalism today famous contemporary philosopher and despiteperiodicflirtations withdeontic is RoderickChisholm I one take ultimately seriously analysesofepistemic terms, think must the his insistence thatwe take as primitive conceptof one proposition being more reasonable to believe than another(in,forexamsui locate thefundamental generisepistemic ple, [4]).I wouldmyself elsewhere. concepts I In rejecting externalism,have triedto be clear thatI rejectitonrelevantepistemicconcepts. ly as an analysis of philosophically in or belief, theexternalist's sense doesn't Knowing, have a justified our curiosity, doesn'tanswerour philosophical satisfy philosophical to we because qua philosophers trying be rational, want questions, I to withbeliefs. would morethanto be automataresponding stimuli factsabout whichpropositions argue thatwe wantfacts,including make probable others,beforeour consciousness.This notionof a an conis, factbeingbeforeconsciousness ofcourse,itself epistemic is sui cept,and mysuggestion thatone of the fundamental generis analysisor reductionis the concept of concepts thatdefyfurther the directacquaintancewitha factthatin part'0defines conceptof And in thecase ofinferential knowledge, noninferential knowledge. what one reallywantsas an internalist directacquaintancewith is thefactthatone's evidencemakesepistemically probableone's conwouldclearlybe clusion.Acquaintancewithevidential connections are in impossibleifevidentialconnections to be understood terms offrequencies othernomological or and connections, thatindicates thattheotherepistemic further analysisis the conceptwhichresists old Keyneseannotionof makingprobableas a sui generisrelation betweenpropositions, different enfrom, analogousto,butobviously I tailment.11 haven't the space to develop thisview here-I have done so elsewhere.'2Myonlyconcernis to sketchthekindofview, thatI wouldtake withitsrelianceon sui generisepistemic concepts, to be paradigmatically internalist. A Presupposition of Externalism I would like to concludeby briefly on commenting whatI take to

456 / Richard Fumerton motivationexternalist be a primary of of analyses epistemic concepts. I havesaidthat there a number different as to what are of views thesuigeneris epistemic which concepts might andtheease with be, on one can avoidskepticism much thedetails the of depends very But viewone accepts. certainly one accepts extreme if the version I recommend, with insistence its offoundationalism that complete for onemust havenoninferential justification believing propositions evidential is to that the asserting connections, externalistgoing think of The thetask avoiding skepticismimpossible. typical is externalist that be with And is convinced one simply cannot acquainted facts. eventheinternalist undoubtedly will admit that kinds facts the of with which can be directly we acquainted constitutetiny a fraction we we ofwhat think know. When comes inferential it to knowledge, one must take seriously Humean complaints about the ofthe phenomenological connecinaccessibility relevant probability tionevenifone ultimately thosecomplaints. one cannot If rejects find thought generis in sui relations between probability holding prowithin one welldespair resolving of positions, may skeptical problems theframework radical On of of foundationalism.theproblem justibelief propositions in the for world, examfying describing external whenhe sugto that ple,one might begin suspect Humewas right with to that gested respect whatmanendsup believing Nature notleft to hischoice, has this and has doubtless esteem'd an affair too great it of to to importance be trusted ouruncertain and reasonings speculations. ], p. 187). ([1I Hume's hypothesis, I suspect, accepted externalists, they is by but do notwant truth cheat outofknowledge justified its to us and belief. One ofthemost of attractive features most of versions externalism is that makesiteasyfor toknowwhat think know. is we us we As to has longas nature nowprefer talkaboutevolution) ensured (we that respond certain we of to stimuli correct with representations theworld, willknow we and havejustified exbelief. Indeed, given ternalist thereis no difficultyany creature in or epistemologies, and machine capableofrepresenting reality achieving knowledge belief. justified Itseems me,however, contemporary to that has epistemology too of terms driven be longletitsphilosophical analyses epistemic by thedesire avoidskepticism, thedesire accommodate to to "comby in monsense intuitions" what know arejustified believor about we

/ 457 TheInternalism/Externalism Controversy ourselves knowing great as a we ing.Itis true that describe many that the the is things. alsosaythat dogknows itsmaster home, We the ratknows itwill water that get when hears bell, thesalmon it and knows that must upstream layitseggs.Butitseemsclear it get to to me thatone neednottakeseriously love ofanthropomorour of and when the belief phizing analyzing concepts knowledge justified If and thatconcern philosophers. Wittgenstein his followers did else have successfully nothing theysurely arguedthatterms like of "know" usedina widevariety waysina widevariety conare of we texts. philosophers, As however, can andshould tofocus try on the philosophically relevantuse of epistemic terms.And the relevant are philosophically epistemic concepts those, satisfaction and I ofwhich, resolves philosophical curiosity doubt. remain conthat of a the vinced thekind knowledge philosopher wants, kind of that involves kind the knowledge willresolve philosophical doubt, with ofdirect confrontation reality of captured theconcept direct by While is nottheplaceto arguetheissue, this Hume acquaintance. in may have been right-itmay not be possibleto justify a philosophically satisfying muchof what we unreflectively way If should true, maystill believe. this be we of the satisfy, course, externalist's for and and criteria criteria knowledge justified belief, these clearand useful distinction between may even marka perfectly and of beliefs kind relations beartotheworld. they Internalists will continue feel,however, theexternalist redefined that has to funirrelevant tradito damental epistemic questions as tomakethem so tional concerns. philosophical
Notes *Iwould tothank like Richard FoleyandScott Macdonald their for helpful of comments a rough on draft thispaper. in 1. Goldman [8],[9],and [10];Nozick [14];Armstrong [1];and in in in Dretske (among others) [5]. 2. Thispoint madeby Luper-Foy [13]. is in 3. See Nozick [14],p. 281. in 4. Not always. Sometimes themind" "in meant logically dependent the on mind-themindwas thought as a necessary of condition their for existence. 5. Theargumentpresented p.32but discussed a number places is on is in of the throughout book. 6. I realize that a view Goldman presented more has sophisticated in his recent book[10]. itisa view But which strays rather from reliabilist far his

458 / RichardFumerton intuitions. idea thatjustification a function reliability The is of in normal worlds where normal worlds defined terms beliefs are in of about this world equivalent abandoning ideathat is to the justification involves beliefs which (actually) are reliably produced. Indeed viewseems the to me to comedoserto a version coherentism reliabilism. of than In anyevent, gather I from paperhe readat a conference honor a in of Roderick Chisholm, that isnowmore [9], he inclined gobackto"hard to for core"reliabilism at leastone fundamental concept justification. of 7. Itis interestingnotethat [9]and [10]Goldman to in comesvery close to accepting something leastanalogous. allowsthattheuse of at He a method generate strongly can a justified only themethod belief if has been acquired a suitable in fashion, acquired other by methods, or ultimately that or processes, are either reliable meta-reliable. does He notimpose requirementall processes, the on however, inanyevent and hisrequirement seemsto concern reliable the generation methods, of notbeliefs aboutmethods. 8. In [10], Goldman to himself seems be more concerned hooking with up onesenseofjustification, hecallsweakjustification, what toconsiderations blameworthiness praiseworthiness. aforementioned of The and retreat purereliabilism [9]waspresumably from in aimed achieving at thissameend. V 9. See particularly PartV, Chapters and Vl. [16], 10. Notice thatI have nowhere thatan internalist cannot argued make reference concepts to other the than suigeneris epistemic in concepts of analyses epistemic terms. 11. See Keynes's discussion this of issuein [121, Chapter 1. 12. See particularly 2 Chapter of[6]. References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] D. M.Armstrong, and Belief, Truth, Knowledge (London: Routledge and KeganPaul,1968). The of Laurence BonJour, StructureEmpirical Knowledge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1985). R. M. Chisholm, (Ithaca: Cornell Perceiving University Press,1957). of 2nd R.M.Chisholm, Theory Knowledge, Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977). FredDretske, and Seeingand Knowing Routledge Kegan (London: Paul,1969). Richard and Problems of Fumerton, Metaphysical Epistemological and of Perception (Lincoln London: UniversityNebraska Press, 1985). Richard "Inferential and Journal Justification Empiricism," Fumerton, ofPhilosophy, (1976),557-69. 73 Alvin in "What Justified is Goldman, Belief," Pappas, Justification ed., and Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979),1-23. Alvin a paper and Goldman, "Strong Weak Justification," readatBrown in of University, 1986,at a conference honor R. M. Chisholm. Fall,

/ Controversy 459 The Internalism/Externalism in volume. A version reprinted this is Harvard and (Cambridge: Epistemology Cognition [10]AlvinGoldman, 1986). University Press, of Nature, byL.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1111 DavidHume, Treatise Human A (LonPress,1888). don:Oxford University on M. Treatise Probability Macmillan, (London, 1921). [12]John Keynes, Belief," Monist, The "The Theory Rational of 13]Steven Luper-Foy, Reliabilist April, 1985,203-25. Harvard Univer14]Robert Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge: Nozick, sity Press, 1981). (Oxford; Oxford UniverThe of 15]Bertrand Russell, Problems Philosophy sityPress, 1959). (NewYork: Knowledge: ScopeandLimits 16]Bertrand Russell, Human Its Simon and Schuster, 1948).