MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Lieutenant Colonel Agha Masood Akram

operations depend correct decisionSuccessfulontacticalgood execumaking, followed by

tion of viable tactical plans. The focus of this paper is tactical decision-making, from corps to brigade levels, involving commanders and staff. The tactical appreciation, being a handy aid in decision-making, has matured over the years into a well-developed document. Every officer is made to write this voluminous paper, from the academy to Staff College. The questions that we must answer are: Does the good old appreciation ever leave the confines of training institutions? Is it used as a tried and tested process by field formations? Does it impact in any way on our exercises at formation level? We seem to have accepted this lengthy document as being fine for learning, but of no practical utility in the field. Why is it so? Are formation commanders and staff to be blamed for neglecting this process, or does it fail, in fact, to meet the requirements of tactical decision-making? Does it pro-

vide a procedure to be followed by commanders and staff, involving concurrent teamwork, before and during operations, to make and execute the best possible plans? Does it successfully tackle tangible as well as intangible factors and weld the two together into an integrated whole? What do other armies do? This paper aims at answering some of these questions. The writer makes use of his experience, while abroad, of the military decision-making process (MDMP), as it relates to the US Army doctrine. In ensuing paragraphs, certain weaknesses and disconnects in our decisionmaking process will be revealed, while highlighting the utility of MDMP in overcoming them. Aim. The aim of this paper therefore, is to explain how the MDMP can assist in overcoming weaknesses and disconnects in our existing decision-making process.
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Scope. This paper will study the MDMP applicable to formations in all operations of war. It will encompass the following aspects: Requirements of a good tactical decision-making process. Tactical decision-making in the Pakistan Armyits weaknesses and disconnects. Description of the MDMP, and conclusions regarding its applicability to the Pakistan Army. Recommendations. Requirements of a Good Tactical Decision-Making Process The writer has, based on his study of our existing decisionmaking methods and the MDMP, deduced the following requirements that should be met by a good process: General Requirements. It should be in consonance with current organisation and doctrine and it should be general enough to cater for the needs of all types of formations from corps to brigade level. It should reduce to the minimum possible all intangibles, remaining within the bounds of realism without making unreasonable assumptions. It should exploit the capabilities of the staff and the judgement and experience of the commander and it should be usable and convenient for commanders and staff, as far as time, form and contents are concerned. It should be so dy30 The Citadel No. 2/2000

namic that even after the staff have gone through the whole process, they remain updated during the course of the battle and continue to work in close harmony and make recommendations to the commander based on the development of battle with a minimum loss of time. It should, in fact, be an on-going process that continues to support decision-making by the commander till mission accomplishment. It should consist of logical and detailed steps from the receipt of mission till the issue of orders, without missing out any essential factor or step. Requirements Related to the Process. It should include welldefined actions by the commander and staff from the receipt of mission till the issue of orders and beyond into the conduct stage of the operation. It must have an abbreviated/telescoped version for time-constrained environments, including all essential elements of the full process. This will ensure that even if there is a time crunch, plans will not be haphazard or lopsided. Like the full version, it should include well-defined steps. The process should include a detailed analysis of the mission before proceeding further. The purpose of this is to completely understand the intent of the higher commander, tasks, constraints, risk, available assets, area of operations, concept of

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the operation including deception plan, the time by which mission is to be accomplished, the missions of adjacent formations and their relation to higher headquarters plan and, finally, the assigned area of operations. It should include a realistic and easily understood method of forming enemy capabilities. It should have a method of forming own courses of action that include the inputs of all staff sections. The process should include a well-defined and detailed method of war-gaming the developed courses of action with inputs from all above parties, possibly including the commander as well. This may take the form of a group discussion on a map, led by the head/chief of the staff. It should cater to refinements based on wargaming and new bits of information, as they get in. It should identify the likely places and time during the battle where the commander may be required to take decisions. It should institutionalise course of actions approval by the commander, followed by issue of orders. Requirements Related to the Commander Right at the beginning, once the mission/task has been received from the higher headquarters, the process should cater for the issue of the commanders own intent, his vision of how he wants to

fight the battle to achieve the desired end state. Based on these two pillars, the decision-making process would proceed. During various major steps, the process should cater for the commanders input in the form of guidance relevant to that step. In this manner, the commander and staff are functioning in harmony at all times; the staff is benefiting from the commanders judgement and experience and the commander is satisfied that the staff is working on the right lines. Requirements Related to the Staff. The hallmark of the process should be Concurrent Teamwork. Keeping in view the nature of battle and time constraints in general, the process should not depend on or require ponderous and voluminous documents to be prepared as final documents. Instead, it should rely on up-to-date notes maintained by the various staff sections as well as existing data (such as terrain folders and enemy order of battle (ORBAT) information) ready in the intelligence branch. It must earnestly avoid duplication of work by different staff sections so as to avoid waste of time and effort, for which there will be a much better use. It should facilitate concurrent brainstorming by all staff sections and the commander and a conThe Citadel No. 2/2000 31

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mander and a continuous interaction during the process. Being a closely integrated process from beginning to end, it must be led by the head of the staff, typically the Chief of Staff at the corps headquarters, Colonel Staff at the divisional headquarters and Brigade Major at the brigade headquarters. In this way, not only a section (operations branch in our case) but the whole team owns the plan. It should be characterised by all staff sections working together under their head, possibly on different tables in the same room/bunker, so as to avoid even the smallest disconnect. This would allow concurrent brainstorming. It should include inputs from all relevant parties, including operations, intelligence, personnel, logistics, fire support, air defence, engineers, communications etc. It should include brief coordination conferences among the staff, led by the head, at the culmination of various major steps in order to bring every one on the same frequency, clarify doubts and iron out irritants. The process should cater to inputs from all parties already mentioned. This would require each of them to prepare and update estimates on their particular subject. This estimate is really a brief appraisal of resources available, shortfalls and options open to support the plan. It would be in the form of notes maintained by various staff officers.
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Tactical Decision-Making in the Pakistan Army Weaknesses and Disconnects Existing Tactical DecisionMaking Process in the Pakistan Army. The writer studied various relevant General Staff Publications (GSPs) to ascertain if our Army has an institutionalised tactical decision-making process at all, and if it does what its elements are and how they are linked to form a cohesive and practicable whole. He discovered the following information: GSP 1355, Operations of War (Volume I) Defence, 1994 and GSP 1359 (Volume II), Offensive Operations, 1967. The first book makes a two-paragraph reference to the commanders thought process during the planning stage. The second book makes no mention of the appreciation in the one paragraph devoted to planning. The section devoted to planning for attack says that the commander must make an appreciation and enumerates the factors to be included. The section devoted to planning for the pursuit makes no mention of the appreciation or decision-making. GSP 1509, Field Service Regulations (Operations), 1972. Chapter 3 (Command) includes a page and a half on decisionmaking. This covers various general aspects relating to decision-making. Excerpts from Paragraphs 7 and 8 are interest-

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ing,the process by which the staff evaluates the pertinent factors in terms of the mission and courses of action and which culminates in recommendations to the commander is termed staff appreciation. The process by which the commander applies his own knowledge and considers the recommendation of his staff in arriving at a decision is termed the commanders appreciation of the situation. The decision must be re-evaluated constantly and changed as necessary in the light of new directions, additional information and other factors, which develop as the battle progresses. Thus the appreciation of the situation by both the commander and his staff is a continual process. This paragraph grasps the essentials of a wholesome decision-making process, but does not tell us the nitty-gritty of the commanders appreciation, how these two appreciations are meshed together to give a viable plan, what the mechanics of being re-evaluated constantly are and how will it be a continuing process. The writer accepts that the paragraph has laid down a correct broad concept for which a process for implementation has never been developed, other than some individual parts that we find today in our SD book. GSP 1549, Training for War, 1995. Chapter 10 (Training of

Leaders) is silent on tactical decision-making. GSP 1556, Military Leadership, 1975. Sections 5 and 6 offer advice on the importance of decisiveness and making sound and timely decisions. GSP 1620, Staff Duties in the Field, 1995. Chapter 1, Section 1, Paragraph 5 broadly describes the actions of a commander and his staff and makes a mention of mission analysis and commanders guidance. How this would be translated into action is neither given here nor elsewhere in this or any other book. This chapter, which defines the essence of staff work, makes no mention of a tactical decision-making process. Chapter 4, Section 22, describes various kinds of appreciations. Paragraph 1 describes an appreciation as a very valuable aid to commanders and staff in reaching sound decisions. Clearly then, this is an aid and not the comprehensive process we are looking for. The relationship of these appreciations to one another can only be assumed. There is also much overlapping of parts in these written products; each prepared by a different branch of the staff. Chapter 5, Section 28 relates to important aspects of concept of operation at Army and corps levels and, therefore, is neither relevant to us nor is a reliable guide to tactical decision-making. Other chapters cover the nitty-gritty of issuing
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various orders and instructions not parts but the products of a decision-making process. GSP 1794, Battle Intelligence, 1990. Section 39 describes the intelligence appreciation in isolation, in a greater detail than the SD book. GSP 1840, Glossary of Military Terms and Definitions, 1990. Surprisingly, the words decision and appreciation do not appear in this publication. Our Decision-Making Process Weaknesses and Disconnects. Clearly, the tactical appreciation is a good format that has matured over the years and has extensively been taught in our schools of instruction. Yet, as is generally observed, at brigade and division levels, the written appreciation process is not touched during exercises. How the staff, without peacetime training for them, is expected to carry out these appreciations in war as a part of a larger but as yet undefined decision-making process is unclear. Our commanders and staff seem to have reconciled to planning without the timeconsuming encumbrance of appreciations. Whether this appreciation format was used at all and at any level except perhaps the highest in any of our wars with India, is a matter open to discussion. In a nutshell, this existing process, which is shunned by all in peace and war except by training institutions, is considered a viable decision-making process
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at division and brigade levels! Clearly, the Army has not succeeded in selling it. We must ask why? A study of preceding paragraphs, in this backdrop, throws up certain weaknesses and disconnects: The task assigned by the higher headquarters forms the sole basis for the aim, which in turn sets the tone for the tactical appreciation. At this stage, there are no inputs from the commander to guide the staff as to how he intends to fight the battle, i.e., his intent. A concept of operation, if at all received from higher headquarters, gives the higher commanders mind, which is of interest to the commander and requires his interpretation of it before it is of use to the staff. As explained in Field Service Regulations (Operations), the two appreciations (those of the commander and staff) proceed concurrently. How and at what stage the staff gets concrete input from the commanders appreciation is not established. How, practically speaking, the staff benefits from the commanders superior judgement and valuable experience, after they have already arrived at a possible plan without his inputs, has become an openended enigma. The linkage between a concept of operation (if received from higher headquarters), analysis

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of area of operations, intelligence appreciation, tactical appreciation and administrative appreciation is not laid down. One logically follows the other or they are concurrent, are the unsatisfactory explanations generally offered. In particular, the big question is whether tactical or administrative appreciation should come first. It hardly makes sense to go through an exhaustive tactical appreciation, only to find during the ensuing administrative appreciation that the plans cannot be supported logistically. But again, an administrative appreciation cannot precede the tactical one to preclude this problem because logistic planners would not know what options to base their appreciation on, since tactical appreciation has still to be carried out. Ridiculous as this might sound, it is a real problem encountered with the present system of independent, formal and written appreciations carried out by different staff sections. We all understand that the appreciations are not harmonised till they are presented to the chief of staff/colonel staff. Is that not too late? How the concept of operation, if received from higher headquarters, dovetails into written products is not known. Analysis of area of operations, the first written product, in-

cludes effects of the characteristics of the area on own and enemy courses of action, which are still one or two appreciations away! Enemy capabilities come from a variety of sources. They are first listed in the analysis of area of operations (by implication, due to the mention of enemy courses of action), then, in the intelligence appreciation; then again, some thought process by the very same intelligence staff goes into this aspect in the tactical appreciation, though in a different form. If at all the leading hypothesis is received from the higher headquarters, enemy capabilities are also derived from that source. How these different enemy capabilities, all applying to the same enemy, are synthesised, is not laid down. Own courses of action appear initially in the intelligence appreciation prepared by the intelligence staff. Again, they are prepared in a different form by the operations staff in the tactical appreciation. Again, how these are synthesised is not known. Also, what purpose is served by laying down own capabilities in the intelligence appreciation is not clear. Enemy courses of action appear first in the intelligence appreciation, then again in the tactical appreciation. Why this duplication should take place
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once both the products are to be used in the same headquarters by the same team of staff officers working for the same commander to make the selfsame plan is not clear. Clearly, we should expect the plan that emerges from this decision-making process to last only till the first shot is fired. During the conduct stage, the commander will have to take many important decisions, only one of which is the employment of the reserve. How the staff appreciations are kept continually updated, and what form these acquire is all quite hazy. Though war-gaming (taken from the MDMP) is now taught at the Staff College, the process is not explained in the SD book, other than saying: Each course is visualised from its start to its completion. All possible enemy reactions to each course are considered, along with our possible counteractions to them (Section 25, Paragraph 11). War-gaming is not institutionalised, nor are its techniques, parameters or format given. Resultantly, they are not available to staff in our Army. Having gone through the requirements of a good tactical decision-making process, a study of our GSPs to ascertain what we have for such a process and a look into their weaknesses and
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disconnects, the following conclusions can be drawn: We possess most of the essential elements required for a decision-making process such as receipt of mission and various appreciations, formulation of plan and issue of orders. These parts are not welded together into a well-defined process. Our thought process is logical and gives due attention to whatever aspects are covered. It leaves too much as intangibles, which can safely be transformed into a system or process. It involves time-consuming and voluminous documents prepared in isolation by different staff sections. It misses out important inputs such as artillery, engineers, air defence, signals etc. It does not cater to institutionalised guidance by the commander at the time of receipt of mission from higher headquarters and during every major step of the process. It does not encourage concurrent working and has glaring overlapping and areas of doubt, as already pointed out. It is silent on how the appreciations are to be kept updated and how they support the commanders decision-making during the operation.

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Description of MDMP The MDMP has been in vogue in the US Army since before World War II. It is a well-defined process that has been tried, tested and refined over the years. It is followed not only in all types of operations from brigade to corps levels but also during all staff and collective training. It follows a sequence of command and staff actions from receipt of mission till issue of orders. It is a process that does not end at issuing of orders, but continues during operations, thus facilitating good, timely decision-making. As a result, fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) continue to be issued during operations to cater for changing situations. It also has an abbreviated but well-defined version for a time-constrained environment. Its hallmark is teamwork. It is described in some detail in FM 101-5, Staff Organisation and Operations, while FM 34-130 is devoted to IPB, which itself is a part of mission analysis (step 2 of MDMP). To quote from FM 101-5, Each step of the process begins with certain input that builds upon the previous steps. Each step, in turn, has its own output that drives subsequent steps. Estimates go on continuously to provide important inputs for the MDMP. The commander and each staff section do estimates. Estimates are revised when important new information is received or when the situation changes significantly. They are

conducted not only to support the planning process but also during mission execution. Unlike our formal tactical appreciations, these estimates are kept in note form by all staff sections and kept updated during all stages of the operation. They do not lead to a final plan, but serve to guide the staff officer about adequacy or shortfall of his concerned subject, along with options on how to support the plan that is emerging. These estimates do not lie in the files as finished and signed documents but provide inputs to the decision-making process at every major step. Incidentally, the British Army appears to be tilting towards MDMP. Intelligence Handbook issued by the British Joint Services Command and Staff College for 1998/99 Course admits to weaknesses in the written intelligence estimate and describes IPB as a dynamic process whereby integrated consideration of enemy, ground and friendly forces is possible via a series of graphical overlays. It devotes a chapter to IPB. MDMP consists of seven steps (The writer quotes liberally from FM 101-5 while describing each step). These steps are receipt of mission, mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, analysis, comparison, approval and orders production. Step 1 Receipt of Mission. This can either come from an order issued by higher headquarters or derive from an ongoing operaThe Citadel No. 2/2000 37

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tion. The Operations Section immediately issues a warning order to the staff, alerting them of the impending planning process. Staff officers constantly update estimates. The commander and staff do a quick initial assessment to arrive at an initial allocation of available time. The commander issues his initial guidance, to include how to abbreviate/telescope the MDMP if required, initial time allocation, liaison officers to be despatched, initial reconnaissance to begin, authorised movement in view of security requirements and additional tasks the commander wants the staff to accomplish. Finally, a warning order is issued to subordinate and supporting units. Step 2 Mission Analysis. An important step that sets the stage for COA development. It allows the commander to begin his battlefield visualisation. The result of mission analysis is defining the tactical problem and beginning the process of determining feasible solutions. It consists of seventeen steps, not necessarily sequential, and results in the staff formally briefing the commander. In addition to the staffs mission analysis, the commander conducts his own mission analysis so that he has a frame of reference to assess the staffs work. During mission analysis, estimates continue. The seventeen steps are: 38 The Citadel No. 2/2000

Analysis of the higher headquarters order. Conducting IPB. Determining specified, implied and essential tasks. Reviewing available assets. Determining constraints. Identifying critical facts and assumptions. Conducting risk assessment. Determining initial commanders critical information requirements or CCIR(equates to essential elements of information, i.e., EEI). Determining the initial reconnaissance annex. Planning use of available time. Writing the restated mission. Conducting a mission analysis briefing. Approving the restated mission. Developing the initial commanders intent. Issuing the commanders guidance. Issuing a warning order. Reviewing facts and assumptions. Since some steps run concurrently and involve different staff sections, this step does not take as long as it might appear. Step 3 COA Development. After receiving guidance, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander must involve the entire staff in

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their development. His guidance and intent focus the staffs creativity to produce a comprehensive, flexible plan within the time constraints. His direct participation helps the staff get quick, accurate answers to questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce). Each COA must meet the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability and completeness. There are normally six steps in COA development including: Analysis of relative combat power. Generating options. Arraying initial forces. Developing the scheme of manoeuvre. Assigning headquarters. Preparing COA statements and sketches. The step will end with an optional COA briefing to the commander, to include updated IPB, possible enemy COAs (event templates), the restated mission, the commander and higher commanders intent, the COA statement and sketch and the rationale for each COA. After the briefings, the commander gives any additional guidance. If he rejects all COAs, the staff begins again. If

he accepts one or more of the COAs, staff members begin the war-gaming process. Step 4 COA Analysis (Wargame). The COA analysis identifies the COA, which accomplishes the mission with minimum of casualties, while best positioning the force to retain the initiative for further operations. It helps the commander and staff to: Determine how to maximise combat power against the enemy while protecting friendly forces. Minimising collateral damage. To have as near an identical vision of the battle as possible, to anticipate battlefield events. Determine conditions and resources required for success. Determine when and where to apply the forces capabilities. Focus IPB on enemy strengths. Identify the co-ordination required to produce synchronised results. Determine the most flexible course of action. The war game is a disciplined process with rules and steps that attempt to visualise the flow of battle. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs and characteristics of the area of operations.
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It relies heavily on doctrinal foundation, tactical judgement and experience. It focuses the staffs attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction and counteraction. War-gaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with tactical possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. War-gaming is the most valuable step during COA analysis and comparison and should be allocated more time than any other step. During the war-gaming, the staff takes a COA and begins to develop a detailed plan, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. War-gaming tests a COA or improves a developed COA. The commander and his staff may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements or problems War-gaming steps are: Gathering the tools. Listing all friendly forces. Assumptions and known critical events. Decision points. Determining evaluation criteria. Selecting the war-gaming method.
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Selecting a method to record. Display results. War-gaming the battle. Assessing the results. Time permitting, a war-game briefing is conducted to ensure that the staff comprehends fully the results of the war-game. This briefing is not given to the commander but is the staffs means to review the war-game to ensure that the decision briefing to the commander covers all relevant points. It should normally be given to the head of the staff. The format includes:Higher headquarters mission. Commanders intent and deception plan. Updated IPB. Enemy COAs that were wargamed Friendly COAs that were wargamed. Assumptions and war-gaming technique used. For each COA war-gamed, it includes:- Critical events that were war-gamed - Possible enemy actions and reactions - Modifications to the COA - Strengths and weaknesses - Results of war-game.

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Step 5 COA Comparison. The COA comparison starts with each staff officer analysing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from his perspective. Each staff member presents his findings for others consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed earlier, the staff then outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the COAs helps identify their advantages and disadvantages with respect to each other. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one that has the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous COA. Commanders Decision Briefing. After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its preferred COA and makes a recommendation. If the staff cannot reach a decision, the designated chief decides which COA to recommend at the commanders decision briefing. The staff then briefs the commander. The staff briefing format includes:The intent of the higher headquarters. The restated mission. The status of own forces. Updated IPB. Own COAs including assumptions used in planning.

Results of staff estimates. Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA. Recommended COA. Step 6 COA Approval. After the decision briefing, the commander decides on the COA he believes to be the most advantageous. If he rejects all developed COAs, the staff will have to start the process all over again. If the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff must war-game the reviewed or new one to derive the products that result from the war-gaming process. Once the commander has selected a COA, he may refine his intent statement and CCIR (EEI) to support the selected COA. He then issues any additional guidance on priorities for the support of supporting arms and services, orders preparation, rehearsal and preparation for mission execution. Having already identified the risks associated with the selected COA, the commander decides what level of residual risk he will accept to accomplish the mission and approves control measures that will reduce the risks. If there is time, he discusses the acceptable risks with adjacent and senior commanders. However, he must obtain the higher commanders approval to accept any risk that might imperil the higher commanders intent. Based on the commanders decision, the staff
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immediately issues a warning order with essential information so that the subordinate units can refine their plans. Step 7 Orders Production. Based on the commanders decision and final guidance, the staff refines the COA, completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. The staff prepares the order or plan to implement the selected COA by turning it into a clear, concise concept of operations, a scheme of manoeuvre and the required fire support. The commander can use the COA statement as his concept of operations. The COA sketch can become the basis for the operation overlay. Orders and plans provide all necessary information that subordinates require for execution. At the same time, it is without unnecessary constraints that might inhibit subordinates initiative. The staff assists subordinate staffs in their planning and co-ordination. The concept of operation is the commanders clear, concise statement of where, when and how he intends to concentrate combat power to accomplish the mission in accordance with his higher commanders intent. It broadly outlines considerations necessary for developing a scheme of manoeuvre. It includes actions within the battlefield organisation, designation of the main effort, the commanders plan to defeat the enemy and specific command and support relationships. Finally, the
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commander reviews and approves orders before the staff reproduces and abridges them. The commander and staff should conduct confirmation briefings with subordinates immediately following the issue of orders. This ensures that the subordinates understand the commanders intent and concept. Conclusions. Some major conclusions are: The MDMP is not peculiar to US/NATO environment or any specific terrain. It may be applied to any army, doctrine, threat picture and terrain. The MDMP comprehensively tackles the tactical decisionmaking process from receipt of mission till issue of orders. It includes an abbreviated version for use in time-constrained environment. It is characterised by very close interaction between all staff sections throughout the process, under the close guidance of the head of the staff. As such, it does not belong to any particular section (such as operations), but to the whole team. It benefits from the guidance of the commander initially, and during every major step. Frequent briefings including the commander or the head of the staff ensure that minor problems are sorted out and that everyone is on board.

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Constant updating of estimates maintained in note form by various staff sections means the process benefits from any new input in real time. It also means that after the issue of orders, the staff continues to support the commanders decisionmaking, followed by issue of FRAGOs. It scrupulously avoids repetition, voluminous documents and overlapping functions by different staff officers. It includes a number of handy graphic products that facilitate comprehension and discussion by the staff team. It is fairly easy to use by trained staffs and conserves time due to concurrent activity by all staff sections and absence of voluminous documents. If practised, it would require understanding a few simple terms and concepts, which will enhance the final product without tampering with doctrine. These include commanders intent, specified, implied and essential tasks, constraints, critical facts and assumptions, risk assessment, restated mission commanders guidance etc. Finally, the US Army has successfully sold the MDMP to the officer corps, who firmly believe in its effectiveness and utility. Consequently, it forms part of all training at formation

level. Planning without it is unheard of, as far as the US officer corps is concerned. It is interesting to read the paragraph above, which describes weaknesses and disconnects in our tactical decisionmaking process. If a discerning reader were to suggest a common sense solution to each observation and if one were to list down all those solutions, it would look remarkably like the MDMP! This brings the writer to an important point, The writer does not wish to suggest discarding whatever elements we have, of the decision-making process, such as the tactical appreciation. These are logical and comprehensive, and have matured over the years. The writer is of the view that the MDMP if adopted, will retain these products, at the same time harmonising them and welding them into a cohesive whole. As such, staff officers will continue to exercise deliberate thought, logic and judgement and, to everybodys credit, the process would be without the disconnects pointed out. At the Staff College, elements of the MDMP have already crept into the syllabus, including the IPB and the war-gaming model that is clearly taken from FM 101-5. Both are significant steps in the MDMP. It may only be a matter of time before the whole process creeps in. In all profesThe Citadel No. 2/2000 43

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sional earnestness, the writer suggests that: It is better to study the system now, and if found appropriate, practicable and, above all, appealing to our officer corps, it should be embraced right away, instead of waiting for it to eventually creep in itself. It will hopefully give us a system that the officer corps buys and uses in training in formations and operations, unlike our tactical appreciation that is restricted to the hallowed halls of our training institutions. The writer foresees two major challenges if this process is adopted. First of all, the officers have always focused on the tactical appreciation as the sole means to arrive at a plan, to the exclusion of all else. They will need to reconcile to the fact that this is only one part of a larger process, i.e., they will have to enlarge their focus to the whole process, putting the tactical appreciation in the correct perspective as an input among other inputs. Secondly, an environment will need to be created to enable the process to put down roots. This requires no doctrinal changes, only an understanding of how the staff is envisaged to interact with each other and an understanding of certain concepts and terms as already mentioned. The point can be better illustrated by a rather crude example. Hav44 The Citadel No. 2/2000

ing been exposed to a computer, a person thinks that it can help him in his work. Yet before buying one, he has to create an environment, including a clean room, free of dust and direct sunlight, a controlled temperature, no direct sunlight, a stable power connection and a voltage stabiliser, a computer table and, of course, the required software. If he does not produce the environment, he will fail to benefit from his newly bought computer. The fault lies not with the computer but in his failure to create an environment conducive to enabling him to exploit it to its fullest potential. The same condition applies to the successful adoption of the MDMP. Recommendations The writer recommends that: A dispassionate analysis is carried out of our present system of tactical decision-making at formation level, so as to identify its weaknesses and disconnects. MDMP may be studied in detail, and if found appropriate, should be adopted in the Pakistan Army. Conclusion Tactical decision-making in the Pakistan Army urgently needs a review. It is too important a subject to be ignored for long. It must be pulled out of training

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institutions and pushed into the field where it belongs. It must be sold to our officer corps. The writer is positive that the MDMP is a very good system, which can be adopted by the army and that
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. GSP 1355, Operations of War(Volume I) Defence, 1994. GSP 1359, Operations of War (Volume II), Offensive Operations, 1967. GSP 1509, Field Service Regulations (Operations), 1972. GSP 1549, Training for War, 1995. GSP 1556, Military Leadership, 1975. GSP 1620, Staff Duties in the Field, 1995.

this would institutionalise and significantly improve our tactical decision-making at formation level. Let us give it a chance.

BIBLIOGRAPY GSP 1794, Battle Intelligence, 1990. 8. GSP 1840, Glossary of military Terms and Definitions, 1990. 9. FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 1994. 10. FM 101-5, Staff Organisations and Operations, 1997. 11. Intelligence Handbook, UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, 1998-99 Course. 7.

Lieutenant Colonel Agha Masood Akram was commissioned in a mechanised battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment in 1982. He has served as an instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy, and general staff officer grade-3 and brigade major of an infantry brigade. He has a years peacekeeping experience in Somalia. He is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Quetta and US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Having commanded his battalion, he is now on the faculty of Command and Staff College, Quetta.

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