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Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policy
Gaurav Khullar 244 Harshit Ajmera 238 Srishti Tekriwal 212 Shivani Khullar 243 Ashutosh Goel 263 Gaurav Joshi 219
Flow of presentation
Introduction Latest fiscal expenditure and revenue Major economic variables Classical theory New classical view of fiscal policy Keynesian view of fiscal policy Two cases
Budget
Budget is a financial plan and list of all planned and forecasted expenses and revenues.
Fiscal Deficit
When a governments total expenditure exceeds the revenue that it generates (excluding money from borrowings). Fiscal deficit was 5.9% of GDP for the year 2011-2012, and is expected to be 5.3% in 2012 - 2013
FDI and FII are said to be the expected reason for reduction in fiscal deficit as these are not just optional but imperative too.
Revenues
By 2009-10, direct taxes were contributing around 48 percent of revenues while the indirect taxes share was about 32 percent. In 2011-12, the share of direct taxes was about 47 percent while the indirect taxes contribution was around 37 percent.
2011-2012 Revenue
16%
47%
37%
Expenditures
In 2009-10, defence expenditures made up around 10 percent, subsidies 16 percent and interest 23 percent of revenue expenditures. The situation remained more or less the same in the Budget of 2011-12, revealing once again the largely slow changing nature of the composition of government expenditures. In 2011-12, defence constitutes 9 percent, subsidies 13 percent and interest 24 percent.
2011-2012 Expenditure
9% Defence 24% 54% Interest Subsides Other Revenue Expenditure 13%
Total expenditure is estimated to record an annual growth of 10.1% to Rs. 1,490,925 Cr. Non planned expenditures to be 65% and planned expenditure to be 35%
real interest rate is the interest rate in terms of goods and services
does take into account the effects of inflation
If more resources were employed in one industry, they were drawn away from other firm.
Thus, choice in classical theory was employment here and employment there, and not between employment and unemployment.
Thus, economy under consideration is two sector economy. There is circular flow of money from firms to households and from households to firms. National income= national spending.
Classical economists argued that amount invested will exactly equal the amount saved and thus, all income will be spent (partly on consumption goods and partly on investment goods).
debt financing merely substitutes higher future taxes for lower current taxes, and thus, budget deficits affect the timing of taxes, but not their magnitude.
New Classical economists argue that when debt is substituted for taxes:
people save the increased income so they will be able to pay the higher future taxes, thus, the budget deficit does not stimulate aggregate demand.
New Classical economists emphasize that budget deficits merely substitute future taxes for current taxes. If households did not anticipate the higher future taxes, aggregate demand would increase (from AD1 to AD2). However, when households fully anticipate the future taxes and save for them, demand remains unchanged at AD1.
To finance the budget deficit, the government borrows from the loanable funds market, increasing the demand (to D2). Under the new classical view, people save to pay expected higher future taxes (raising the supply of loanable funds to S2.) This permits the government to borrow the funds to finance the deficit without pushing up the interest rate.
Automatic Stabilizers
Automatic Stabilizers: Without any new legislative action, they tend to increase the budget deficit (or reduce the surplus) during a recession and increase the surplus (or reduce the deficit) during an economic boom. The major advantage of automatic stabilizers is that they institute counter-cyclical fiscal policy without the delays associated with legislative action. Examples of automatic stabilizers: Unemployment compensation Corporate profit tax A progressive income tax
At e1 (Y1), the economy is below its potential capacity YF . There are 2 routes to long-run full-employment equilibrium: Wait for lower wages and resource prices to reduce costs, increase supply to SRAS2 and restore equilibrium to E3, at YF. Alternatively, expansionary fiscal policy could stimulate AD (shift to AD2) and guide the economy back to E2, at YF .
Strong demand such as AD1 will temporarily lead to an output rate beyond the economys long-run potential YF. If maintained, the strong demand will lead to the long-run equilibrium E3 at a higher price level (SRAS shifts to SRAS2). Restrictive fiscal policy could reduce demand to AD2 (or keep AD from shifting to AD1 initially) and lead to equilibrium E2.
Indicates that the increased borrowing to finance a budget deficit will push real interest rates up and thereby retard private spending, reducing the stimulus effect of expansionary fiscal policy.
The implications of the crowding-out analysis are symmetrical.
Restrictive fiscal policy will reduce real interest rates and "crowd in" private spending.
Larger budget deficits and higher real interest rates lead to an inflow of capital, appreciation in the dollar, and a decline in net exports.
An increase in government borrowing to finance an enlarged budget deficit places upward pressure on real interest rates. This retards private investment and Aggregate Demand. In an open economy, high interest rates attract foreign capital. As foreigners buy more dollars to buy U.S. bonds and other financial assets, the dollar appreciates. The appreciation of the dollar causes net exports to fall. Thus, the larger deficits and higher interest rates trigger reductions in both private investment and net exports, which limit the expansionary impact of a budget deficit.
Case Study: Savings and Loan (S&L) Crisis in the US (1980s Case Study: Savings and 1990s)
The Situation
The Savings and Loans (S&L) Crisis of the 1980s and 1990s was a massive collapse of the thrift industry. S&Ls financed long-term fixed-rate residential mortgages with savings and time deposits at a restricted interest rate. When inflation rose in the 1970s, it exposed S&Ls to considerable interest rate risk and monetary policy was tightened.
However the recession was short lived and relatively mild as the position of households and non-financial corporations was strong compared to other countries.
Government Intervention
The government intervened to restore stability of the financial sector but no traditional fiscal stimulus was implemented as concerns about rapidly rising public debt prevailed:
The government introduced measures such as expanding assets and liabilities power of S&Ls and granting permission for acquiring troubled S&Ls.
These changes aggravated the problem because under-capitalized S&Ls had incentives to invest in very risky projects, betting for survival.
Final Solution
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) narrowed the role of S&Ls and made them subject to more stringent capital requirements and regulatory scrutiny. Net government cost was reduced by involving the private sector through equity partnerships which made them share the deficit after the S&Ls assets were sold off. The net fiscal cost of the S&L clean up, contributing to fiscal deficits, is estimated at $124 billion (2.4% of GDP).
KOREA
The economic crisis in 1997
Debt/Equity Ratio
153.5
193.2
85.17
396.3
303
25.6
33.1
26.2
54.2
50.8
In late 1997, Korean banks could not roll over short-term loans, despite the announced government guarantees for foreign debt. The Japanese banks, which were suffering from their growing NPLs, withdrew a large percentage of their loans. Foreign loans to Korea by Japanese financial institutions dropped from USD22 billion at the end of 1996 to USD9 billion by the end of 1997. The inability to roll over foreign loans triggered runs on the currency and the Korean won depreciated 25 percent in late November from its pre-crisis level. Currency market intervention left less than USD6 billion in usable foreign exchange reserves in December. By early 1998, most commercial banks and other financial institutions were technically in default due to the severe depreciation and high interest rates. The twin crisis (BOP and the financial sector) together with tight monetary policy led to a severe recession with real GDP shrinking by 8.4 percent in the third quarter of 1998 compared with the same quarter in the previous year.
1995 7.00
1996 4.65
1997 -6.85
1998 9.49
1999 8.49
-0.07
-1.66
-2.46
1.41
3.60
-0.37 0.81
-1.78 -0.06
-0.01 0.96
0.24 0.41
2.84 3.09
1.17
4.92
1.73
4.44
0.97
7.51 7.40
0.17
0.81 8.30
0.25
2.26 8.90
In order to facilitate the restructuring process of the corporate sector, some legislative changes were made -Including the liberalization of hostile takeover by foreigners -Removing the limit to foreign ownership -Provision of tax incentives -Measures to improve labor market flexibility. Fiscal support to the economy mostly focused on the financial sector. And despite the collapse of the real sector in 1998, little fiscal stimulus directly supporting aggregate demand was provided. Most of the financial (and institutional) resources that the government could mobilize were spent on stabilizing the financial sector and the balance sheet of the corporate sector. These efforts were followed by fast recovery of the economy in 19992000 (real growth at 9 and 8, respectively).