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A Brief and Incomplete History
A Brief and Incomplete History
A Brief and Incomplete History
Based largely on John Losee (1993) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Plato
Platos epistemology denigrated scientific knowledge (knowledge of natural and material regularities)such knowledge was not of the true reality, but merely of shadows in the cave Most important for Plato was knowledge of the Forms, the abstract entities which define the moral and metaphysical structure of the universe Knowledge of the Forms was to be gained not via observation and inference, but through pure reason and philosophical discourse
Aristotle
(384-322 BCE)
Inductive-Deductive Model:
General Principles
(1) Induction Deduction (2)
Observed Phenomena
From observations one proceeds by inductive inference (1) to General Principles which explain the observations in virtue of the fact that those same observations can be deduced (2) from the principles
The problem is that it is hard to see how we can get to necessary truths via induction
This can be seen as an outcropping of the problem of induction
Whereas now we focus primarily on a combination of the first three and often try to eliminate teleological explanation, Aristotle saw the final cause/teleological explanation as most important to understanding the nature of things
this raises the issue of the nature of laws and causation
Pythagoreanism
Pythagoreans revered numbers and mathematical relations to the point of mysticism The real is the mathematical patterns and harmonies discoverable in nature Describe the mathematical structure of a phenomena and you have knowledge of its essence This contrasts with Aristotelianism in that it focuses on the formal cause to the exclusion of the others, it especially neglects final causes
PythagoreanismProblems
Given their knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem, and the fact that they conceived of all numbers as ratios, certain quantities were thought to be mysterious and incommensurable (immeasurable or unable to be compared with known quantities, what we would call the irrational numbers), e.g.,
Of course, any good mysticism has to have mysteries A further problem is that the same phenomena can be described by various different, but observationally equivalent, mathematical models
This is the issue of underdetermination of theory by evidence
This puts in question the ideal that mathematical description gets at the true nature of things
Moving Eccentric
P c E
Heliocentric Circles
P E S
a E
deferent
Planet P revolves around point c, while c revolves around Earth, E When P passes through a and b, P will appear to move backwards against the night sky seen from E (retrograde motion of P)
Planet P revolves around point c, while c revolves around Earth, E When c and P are on opposite sides of E retrograde motion of P occurs
Planet P and Earth, E, both revolve around Sun, S When E passes P retrograde motion of P occurs
These models also account for variations in speed and distance relative to E. Further epicycles, eccentrics, deferents, and equants can be added for greater precision. Of course, none of these is correct
Saving Appearances
Especially in astronomy, a tradition evolved of not claiming reality for the mathematical modelsthe task for the astronomer is not to hypothesize about the unobservable nature of things, but to provide convenient and observationally adequate models
This is a form of anti-realism
This is very similar to naive positivism, operationalism, and current constructive empiricism
Ptolemy was inconsistent on this issue, usually stressing Pythagorean realism, but sometimes weakening his claims to saving the appearances (though he never considered heliocentrism plausible)
Yet each of the heliocentrists was advised to present his work as a mere saving of appearances to avoid persecution from the Church. Galileo did not take great pains to hide his commitment to the reality of heliocentrism. As a result, Galileo was brought before the Inquisition and forced to recant, spending the his last eight years under house arrest.
Again, the issues of rationality, revolutions, and social forces
Galileo
Kepler
Atomism
A further metaphysical/explanatory picture that can be contrasted to Pythagoreanism and Aristotelianism is Atomism Proponents included Leucippus (490-430 BCE) and Democritus (460-360 BCE) The general approach was to explain observed qualitative and quantitative changes by reference to quantitative changes at a more elementary level of organization This, too, neglects the Final Cause, and is thoroughly materialistic, thus it is antithetical both to Aristotelianism and to Platonism/Pythagoreanism One difficulty is to avoid simply attributing to the atoms the very property to be explained at the macro level. Doing so would create a circular explanation, which is to say, no explanation at all (e.g., day-old coffee is bitter because it has acquired large numbers of bitter atoms)
This raises the issue of the nature and quality of scientific explanation as well as the observation/theory distinction
Robert Grosseteste
(c. 1168-1253)
Roger Bacon
(1214-92)
These constitute advances over Aristotles simple inductive-deductive method, because it stresses systematic gathering of data, the extension of implications and tests to new phenomena, and a bridging of the gap between intellectual knowledge and craft knowledge
Method of Agreement
Case 1 2 3 4 Circumstances Effect ABCD ACE ABEF ACD e e e e A can be the cause of e Conclusion
Method of Difference
Case 1 Circumstances Effect ABC e Conclusion A can be the cause of e
BC
These two methods are often called the (first two) of Mills Methods, after J.S. Mill (1806-73), whose arguments in favor of inductivism were widely influential.
Ockhams Razor
William of OckhamOckhams Razor
A demand for simplicity, stated in various forms:
Assume nature takes the simplest path available assume the minimum number of (types of) objects necessary to the theory/explanation do not unnecessarily complicate theory eliminate superfluous concepts.
Ockham would not like the first formulation because it makes a metaphysical claim about nature (that it pursues the simplest path), and, Ockham would say, we cannot know how God has designed natureGod could complicate nature unnecessarily if he so chose Instead, Ockham cast his injunction so as to apply to our theories rather than to nature itselfkeep the theories as simple as possible
while in principle God could complicate things, we should not pretend to knowledge of Gods design we should make our theories as simple and tractable as possible, given the evidence
Aristotle, Scotus, and others had assumed that certain first principles of the special sciences could be known to be necessary, hence what counted as self-contradictory extended beyond just what could be reduced to a logical contradiction Nicolas of Autrecourt (c. 1300-1350+) had a much stricter notion of necessary truth, restricting it to claims whose denials are logical contradictions
Much like David Hume (1711-1776) four centuries later, Nicolas concluded that we can have no certain knowledge of causal relations (Hume also draws stronger conclusions)
Much unlike Hume, Nicolas used his critique to encourage faith in a Christian God
The issue of laws and causation
Ren Descartes
(1596-1650)
Observation has a role in determining under which circumstances regularities occur, but observation cannot support general laws
Isaac Newton
(1642-1727)
3. Attempt to confirm the observational implications of the system (e.g., specific predictions concerning planetary motion)
Newton recognized a form of imaginative, abstractive, and idealizing induction in formulating the axiom system in stage 1
David Hume
(1711-76)
Matters of Fact
Neither a MOF nor its denial is logically contradictory, so each is possible Based in knowledge of cause and effect, which is not certain In fact,
David Hume
(1711-76)
But then the fundamental principle of induction cannot be justifiedany attempt to do so would require presupposing that very principle
David Hume
(1711-76)
Hume concludes that our judgments concerning matters of fact (including causal relations) are not rationally grounded at all Rather there are (stronger or weaker) habits of expectation which evolve in us as a result of (i) our natural propensities and (ii) observation of constant conjunctions of events (fire then heat, fire then heat) This skeptical solution is a form of psychological naturalism description of what we do, how we cannot avoid it He is rejecting inductive justification (though not inductive practice), as well as intuition of necessary truth Indeed, we cannot know the hidden springs and principles underlying the world we observe, all we ever know of is the constant conjunctions of kinds of eventslaws and causation Except, perhaps, for Nicolas of Autrecourt, Hume is the first weve looked at to completely reject the ideal of somehow arriving at secure generalizations or certain First Principles of some sort Hume, unlike Nicolas, used these skeptical results to argue against metaphysics and religion
Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804)
Kant responds to Hume by distinguishing the form from the content of knowledge Form is not given in experience; rather the raw data of experience is structured in various ways by the rational human mind
Space and Time are the Forms of Sensory Intuition, all perception is structured by these forms Perceptions so structured are further organized and synthesized according to 12 Categories of Understanding (e.g., Unity, Substance, Causality, Contingency, etc.) Judgments are made and organized via the Regulative Principles of Reason
Since the structures/forms Kant posits are inherent in the human rational mind, they are open to philosophical investigation, they can be known via pure reason Since any knowledge (esp., empirical/scientific) presupposes the Forms, Categories, and Principles, we can (contra Hume) have knowledge of the general features of any possible scientific theory, including fundamental and general truths about causation, matter, motion, etc.
Immanuel Kant
Transcendental Idealism from a point of view which attempts to transcend our forms of cognition, we recognize how much our mind and its structure contributes to our knowledge of the world
Empirical Realism from a point of view which does not attempt the impossible transcendence, the structures imparted by the Forms, Categories, and Principles are fully real, and necessary truths regarding such things as causal relations and matter can be known Some problems with this ingenious and seductive picture:
What justifies saying this is what any theory or cognition must presuppose? How can we be sure weve correctly identified the most basic forms, categories, and principles? Must they be unique? Kant thought he had identified unique basic forms, but some of what he took as basic to science has since been changed and rejected by science
How can one coherently speak of the transcendental unreality of forms and categories, while maintaining that transcendence is impossible, and that the transcendental (noumenal) world is unknowable?
J.S. Mill
(1806-73)
Laws, General Principles, and theoretical claims are justified by inferences from experience which satisfy inductive schemas or formsthis is known as Inductivism
Much like the I-D model, but little import allowed to the D side, and Mill had very specific inductive methods in mind
Mill a bit unrealistic about how well inductive schemas can justify theoretical claims Deduction from hypotheses of successful prediction a requirement, but not a justifying factor unless all other possible hypotheses are eliminated Again, justification of theoretical claims is gained only by conformity of the data to inductive schemas supporting the theoretical claims
Mills Methods
Method of Agreement*
Case Circumstances Effect
Method of Difference*
Conclusion (occurrence of a is varying proportionally to occurrence of A) So either A causes a, or A and a have a common third cause
An BC
A0 BC A1/n BC
an b
a0 b a1/n b
Method of Residues
Case 1 Circumstances ABC Effect abc Conclusion
2
3
B
C
b
c
A is the cause of a
Hypothetico-Deductivism
William Whewell (1794-1866) and W.S. Jevons (1832-82) rejected Inductivism Rather than justified on the basis of inductions, a hypothesis is justified when it
Is consistent with other established hypotheses, and
Whewell
With its strong emphasis on predictive test, this is in the spirit of Aristotle, R. Bacon, Galileo, and Newton, but the view gives more priority to predictive test than these others (by giving much less importance to induction)
Jevons
Justification
Success of deduced predictions (thus a form of hypotheticodeductivism), especially
Extension of predictions to extreme cases Deduction of unexpected predictions and their successful testing Use of crucial experiments to decide between competing theories/hypotheses
Problem(s) of Induction
Two Issues:
The Descriptive Issue: we arrive at beliefs regarding unobserved matters of fact (future particulars, eternal generalizations)How do we do that? The Normative Issue: do we arrive at such beliefs the way in which we ought to arrive at them? I.e., are we justified in our practice? If not is there any practice we could adopt which is justified?
Underdetermination
The Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence Given any amount of observational evidence, there will be more than one (indeed infinitely many) theories compatible with that evidence A unique theory is never dictated by the evidence, not even if we had all possible evidence
This raises the question of how and if we can rationally decide between theories
WRONG and often WRONGLY ATTRIBUTED TO W.V. Quine version: a theory can be preserved in the face of any contrary evidence (what Quine says, in case youre interested, is that a hypothesis or statement can be preserved as long as others are given up, but this is a CHANGE IN THEORY, some hypotheses are preserved, others not)
This correct understanding of Quine implies that
There are no crucial experiments to rule out a hypothesis There are (near) crucial experiments to rule out whole theories
Observation/Theory Distinction
Intuitively, there seems to be a distinction between that which we can observethe observational; and that which we cannot observethe theoretical
Observable: people, stars, trees, rocks, grains of sand, a patch of red Theoretical: electrons, quarks, viruses, dark matter, the big bang, trees, people
The theoretical is posited or inferred to help predict and explain the observable Problems abound for this distinction:
Does the distinction concern observable vs. theoretical
Objects? Words and Sentences involved in scientific claims? Sense Data vs. Things in the World?
next slide
Social Forces
How and to what extent do religious, cultural, political, gender, racial biases and interests affect scientific theorizing? Can they be avoided? Ought they to be avoided? This has implications for the issue of the rationality of theory acceptance and change If theory acceptance and change are not rationally constrained there seems to be plenty of room for non-rational social forces to be in play Moreover, the apparent lack of rational constraint and the role of social forces raises the demarcation issue
Demarcation
How, if at all, is science different from other organized bodies of beliefs (religion, metaphysics, political structures, cultural tradition)? How can a difference be marked out?
Can good science be distinguished from bad science? Is pseudoscience a third thing, or just really bad bad science?
Does/should science have a privileged epistemological standing in relation to these others? This all relevant to revolutions and rationality, and social forces
Realism/Anti-realism
Given the various epistemological difficulties (underdetermination, problem of induction, rationality, social forces), and the lack of a consensus on these issues, why should we think that our theories are actually describing reality?
The apparently large gap between observational and theoretical knowledge inspires worry about realism
Metaphysical difficulties come into play here as wellwe do not have good understandings of the nature of laws and causation, explanation, so how can we claim that we are discovering the nature of the universe?
Explanation
Science is supposed to explain things to us But what does it mean to have a scientific explanation?
Does mere derivability of a description from more general truths constitute an explanation?
What sort of explanations can science provide? How can we tell good from bad explanations?
Analyticity
Statements which are analytic are supposed to be conceptual truthstrue in virtue of the meanings or concepts involved
This is contrasted with synthetic statements whose truth (or falsehood) is a matter of something beyond the meanings or concepts involved (the world, matters of fact)
E.g., all faculty are bachelors
Locke and Kant were the first to make use of this distinction, it played a prominent role for the logical positivists (as well soon see), Quine repudiated it Analyticity provides a way (though not the only way) of explaining how at least some truths are
Knowable a prioriwithout appeal to experiencevia linguistic analysis or merely understanding the language General principles, or frameworks, for theorizing Necessarily true A matter of linguistic convention Accepted or rejected on purely pragmatic considerations and thus lack metaphysical import
it all depends on who is making the distinction and to what use they are putting it