Can the Spread of Nuclear

Weapons be Stopped?

◘
Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
November 1, 2006
◘
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky

1
 During Cold War
• Deter with nuclear Triad: ICBM’s, Strategic
Bombers. SNBM’s
• Nuclear war fighting abandoned in plan

MAD
Mutual Assured Destruction

2
 The Cold War is over -- but…
Current Doctrine
• Deter, assure, dissuade, defeat
• Pre-empt, with nuclear weapons if necessary
• “all options” open
• “capabilities based,” not “threat based”
• Nuclear weapons play “smaller role”
• Adaptive planning
NUTS
Nuclear Use Target Selection

3
 Nuclear Weapons Risks
Remain
• US – Russia nuclear weapons release
• Regional Conflict (e.g. India and Pakistan)
• Acquisition of Nuclear
Not
Weapons by
Terrorists addressed in
this talk
This
• Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Talk

Risk = Probability x consequences

increased decreased
4
 Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear
Weapons Proliferation are
not the same
States can be deterred.
Terrorists can not.

No evidence that new proliferant states are

greater or lesser risks for transferring
nuclear weapons or the tools to make
them to terrorists.
5
 Nonproliferation – a nonpartisan
goal
Presidential Debate: September 30, 2004
Mr. Lehrer: “…so it is correct to say that if
somebody’s listening to this, that you agree…the
single most serious threat you believe –both of you
believe is nuclear proliferation.”

Mr. Bush: “I do –in the hands of a terrorist

enemy.”

Mr. Kerry: “Weapons of mass destruction,

nuclear proliferation.”

…but…
6
In the History of Mankind, all newly
developed technologies

• have been “dual purpose”

• have spread over entire globe
• This precedent must be broken for nuclear
weapons
• Knowledge is not a bar to proliferation
today

7
 Cornerstone of Nonproliferation
Regime is Nuclear NonProliferation
Treaty (NPT)
• Came into force 1970
• Signed and Ratified by all Nations except
– Israel
– India
– Pakistan
– North Korea withdrew
• Review Conferences every 5 years
• Made a Treaty of Indefinite Duration at
1995 Review Conference
8
 The NPT Bargain

1. Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and

Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS)
2. US, Russia, UK, China and France are
NWS
3. NWS do not give NW or NW tools to
NNWS
4. NNWS do not receive such material

9
 The NPT Bargain(continued)
1. NNWS have “inalienable right” to nuclear
power.
2. NWS work in good faith toward
prohibition of NWs and General
Disarmament (no specified timetable;
implication is to deemphasize role of NW
in international relations
3. NNWS must negotiate Safeguards with
IAEA
10
 Number of States with Nuclear Weapons
14 Rate of 1 new
Belarus NWS every 5 yrs
12 Kazakhstan

10 Ukraine
North Korea
Pakistan

8 South Africa
India Belarus, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and South
Israel
6 China
Africa became NNWS

France
4
United Kingdom
2 Soviet Union
United States
NPT in force
0
1970
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
“I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may
be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” John Kennedy, 1963

11
 Historical Summary of Military
Fissile Material & Nuclear Weapons Programs
Nuclear Weapons Programs begun Programs ended by 1970
before 1970 when NPT came •Sweden
into force, succeeded and are •Canada
still ongoing •Australia
•Egypt
• United States Programs ended after 1970
• Russia Argentina Brazil
• United Kingdom
RomaniaSouth Africa
• France
Spain South Korea
• China
• Spain Switzerland
Israel
• India Taiwan Libya
Yugoslavia

12
 Historical Summary (cont’d)

Intentions suspected but no Programs started after 1970

NW program identified Succeeded and ongoing
Pakistan North Korea
Algeria Are suspected to be actively
Syria seeking nuclear weapons
Iran

Factions within advocated Inherited NW, but now non-

for/sought NW, but NW State party to NPT
ceased by 1970 Belarus
Kazakhstan
Italy Japan
Germany Norway Ukraine

13
 The Bad News
• The Non-Parties to NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, North
Korea)
• Latency: Capability of NNWS versus Intent
• NW policies of NWS
– U.S. redesign efforts
– Only China proclaims “No First Use.”
– U.S. pre-emptive policies
The physical facts:
• Uranium Isotope enrichment & Plutonium reprocessing
can be part of peaceful power program --- but:
• Enrichment & Reprocessing can shorten lead time to
acquire NW after withdrawal from NPT
14
 The Fuel Cycle Under the NPT
NWS NNWS
Nuclear Nuclear
Uranium Ore Nuclear
Power Weapons Conversion Power

LEU HEU, PU Enrichment LEU

Spent HEU LEU Spent

Fuel Fuel
Pu
? ?
Reprocessing Reprocessing

IAEA Safeguards

15
 “L
INTENT at
en
cy”
orl
ike
lih
ood
of
acq
uir
ing
nu
clea
rw
ea
po
ns

IRAN BRAZIL JAPAN

TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF NNWS

16
 Brazil
1951 (Dual Purpose)
 Brazil establishes National Research
Council
 Swimming Pool Research Reactor fueled
by HEU
 Brazil bought 625 MWe “turnkey” reactor

17
 Brazil (continued)
Military
1970
 Brazil military government
 Six 1.3 GWe reactors by 1998
 Attempts to import European centrifuges

1980
 Three parallel military programs
 Air Force – laser enrichment
 Army – natural uranium graphite reactor Pu
 Navy – centrifuge program
18
 Brazil (continued)
Peaceful Program
1988
Brazil approves new Constitution: no nuclear
weapons
~1990
Argentina and Brazil elected civilian Presidents
1991
Argentina and Brazil terminate weapons programs
and signed mutual “peaceful uses” treaty,
establishing bilateral monitoring agency
19
 Brazil (continued)
1994
Quadrilateral Agreement: Argentina, Brazil,
bilateral agency, IAEA
But centrifuge program continues. Domestic
design more capable than P-1.
Claimed purpose: Prestige, Independence;
but large hydropower resources

20
 Iran
1957 – 1979
• 1957 US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation agreement
• 1968 Iran signs NPT; ratified in 1970
• Plans to construct 23 nuclear power plants by
2001!
• Starts Bushehr plant with German contractor
• Invests in European Nuclear Energy Consortium

21
 Iran (continued)
1 Iranian Revolution
1984 – 1988 Bushehr damaged by Iraqi
bombardment
1985? or Pakistan and China signed
2 yrs later nuclear cooperation agreements
with Iran. Tech transfers by
Khan Organization.
1995 Iran contracts with Russia to
finish Bushehr
22
 Iran (continued)
2002 Iranian dissidents reveal existence
of Natanz enrichment facility and
a heavy water production plant
2003 Iran suspends enrichment under
pressure from EU
2004 Iran breaks centrifuge seals
2005 Iran resumes conversion
April ‘06 Iran claims 3.5% enrichment; running
164 centrifuges
23
 IRAN (continued)
Intent?
• Iran not fully cooperative with IAEA
Safeguards
• No evidence of NW program
• Fatwa by Supreme Leader forbidding NW
• Inalienable right to Fuel Cycle
• Need for Independence?

24
 Japan
• Owns about 45 tons of reactor-grade
Plutonium
• Only about 10% of this is stored in Japan
• The designated purpose of this material is
for use in Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) and
breeder reactors. These uses have been
delayed or cancelled.
• Reactor-grade Plutonium is useable in NW
25
 North Korea (DPRK)
1985 DPRK joins NPT
1991 US withdraws NW from South Korea
1992 DPRK concludes Safeguards
Agreement with IAEA but IAEA
detected 90g diversion of plutonium
1993 DPRK announces intent to withdraw
from NPT. IAEA demands more
access to Yongbyon reactor.
Many US – DPRK diplomatic contacts
26
 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d
October, 1994:
US and DPRK sign “Agreed Framework”
• DPRK stop reprocessing
• Korean Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) to build two LWR’s and to supply
fuel oil

Many follow-on diplomatic moves

27
 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d
1998 South Korea “Sunshine Policy”

1998- 2000 Extensive diplomatic bilateral

contacts, including visit by
Secretary of State Albright to
Pyongyang

28
 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d
2001 Secretary of State Powell declares
to “pick up where President
Clinton left off,” but retracts and
diplomacy turns hostile.
2002 President Bush includes DPRK in
“axis of evil” in State of Union
speech.
Possible use of NW against DPRK
included in Nuclear Posture Review.

29
 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d
August 2002
KEDO groundbreaking for reactors
October 2002
Asst. Secretary of State James Kelly visits
Pyongyang. US claims that DPRK admitted to
Kelly that it had an HEU enrichment program.
DPRK denies this, stating they only claimed a
right to enrichment. Translation problem?
DPRK enrichment program has disappeared from
media.
30
 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d
November 2002
KEDO suspends fuel oil shipments in
response to US enrichment claims. IAEA
challenges enrichment.
December 2002
DPRK restarts reactor, removes IAEA seals,
expels inspectors.

31
 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d
January 2003
DPRK withdraws from NPT
2003
DPRK tells US and China it has NW
Six Nation Talks; US refuses bilateral talks
2006
DPRK tests NW

32
 The CTBT and Nonproliferation
• Long History: 1958 initiatives
• Partial Test ban: 1963 LTBT
• Reality versus Symbolism
CTBT cited in all NPT Review Conferences
• Reality
– Cost to National Security low
– Technical benefit to Nonproliferation low
– Cost-Benefit Ratio is Quotient of two small quantities
• The CTBT has been signed by most nations but is not in
force. The US Administration opposes ratification.
• The CTBT Monitoring system is in place and is
supported by the US.
33
 The CTBT Matrix
CTBT all
Options CTBT Complied countries cheat
No CTBT with by all to extent
NNWS possible without
countries
Countries detection
Highly
Developed
Developing
Least
Developed

•What type of NW can each country build?

•Conclusion: US interest served better with CTBT, obeyed
or not, than without CTBT. (NAS, 2002)
34
 Remedies to Proliferation
What won’t work in the long run
• Discriminatory “Coalition of the Willing”
• Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
• Selective enforcement
• Divide world into fissile materials suppliers
and receivers
• Military pre-emption of nascent nuclear
facilities (Israel v. OSIRAK, 1981)
35
 Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d)
What may work
• International fuel supply and return of
spent fuel to international control
• Strengthen IAEA; make Additional
Protocol mandatory
• Broaden negative and positive security
assurances
• Make withdrawal from NPT subject to U.N.
Security Council Action
36
 Positive & Negative Security
Assurances
NWS give assurances to

+ Come to the assistance of a NNWS

threatened or attacked with NW
– Not to attack a NNWS with NW unless
the NNWS is allied with a NWS

37
 Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d)
What will help
• Universal No First Use acceptance by all
NWS
• Drastic reduction of Nuclear Weapons
stockpiles by formal Treaty by NWS
• Lessened reliance on military options in
international relations
• US leadership in all of the above
…because…
38
 US leadership
US is strongest military power measured by
conventional military strength and economic
power
and
“You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool.”
…Rep. Ed Markey, 2006
And
“Never negotiate with the United States unless you
have a nuclear weapon.”
…Indian Deputy Minister of Defense

39
 Ultimately
Nuclear Nonproliferation Demands that
every Nation concludes that its security
and Well-Being are served better without
nuclear weapons than with them.

40