How to Settle on a Shared Intention

NASSP talk at Marquette 22 July 2011

What I want to argue*

We can best understand the social-normative content of shared intention by viewing it as formally parallel to the normative content of individual intention. Sharing an intention generates social normativity because agents settle on a shared intention by presuming to exercise over one anothers conduct the very species of executive rational authority that they exercise over their own conduct when acting on an individual intention.

The obligation on each side of the social relation amounts to a prohibition: not to influence the other as one would not attempt to influence oneself.

Bratman: we share an intention to iff the following is common knowledge

(i) we each intend that we ; (ii) we each intend the following: that we in part by way of the intention of the other that we ; (iii) we each intend the following: that we in part by way of sub-plans of each that mesh with each other; (iv) we each believe the following: that if and only if each of us continues to intend that we then, as a result, we will ; (v) we each believe the following: that the persistence of his own intention that we causally depends on his own continued knowledge that the other also so intends, and vice versa.

My run with Paul Faulkner last Thursday

My run with Paul

Three things Paul and I do together: (1) go for a run (2) begin the run now (3) cross the street here Of each of these, assume that its common knowledge between us that we both intend to do it, in part by way of the others intention to do it, via meshing sub-plans, and that we both believe that we will thereby succeed in doing it. That is, assume that conditions (i) through (iv) of Bratmans analysis are satisfied.

My run with Paul, contd

Now what of Bratmans condition (v)? Each of us does believe the following: the persistence of his own intention that we run together causally depends on his own continued knowledge that the other also so intends, and vice versa.

But now lets fill in the blank with the other actions: we begin the run now we cross the street here Do we satisfy condition (v) in either case? Lets take the cases one at a time...

Paul and I begin the run now

Does each of us believe that the persistence of his own intention that we begin the run now causally depends on his own continued knowledge that the other also so intends, and vice versa? Imagine I do believe that. Then I must believe two things: (1) that my intention that we begin now depends on my knowing that Paul intends that we begin now; (2) that Pauls intention that we begin now depends on his knowing that I intend that we begin now. We might wonder how a process of intending governed by condition (v) could ever get started.

Can we jointly settle when to begin?

Again, by condition (v) I must believe two things: (1) that my intention that we begin now depends on my knowing that Paul intends that we begin now; (2) that Pauls intention that we begin now depends on his knowing that I intend that we begin now. Imagine that the process gets started by my forming the intention that we begin now in a way that doesnt satisfy condition (v). And imagine Paul does likewise. Wont those intentions now be governed by condition (v)?

Its hard to answer because the now robs the intentions of a significant diachronic dimension. Lets turn to the other case.

Paul and I cross the street here

Does each of us believe that the persistence of his own intention that we cross the street here causally depends on his own continued knowledge that the other also so intends, & vv? Imagine I do believe that. Then I must believe two things: (1) that my intention that we cross here depends on my knowing that Paul intends that we cross here; (2) that Pauls intention that we cross here depends on his knowing that I intend that we cross here. But how could we ever jointly settle on such an intention?

Can we jointly settle how to proceed?

Again, by condition (v) I must believe two things: (1) that my intention that we cross here depends on my knowing that Paul intends that we cross here; (2) that Pauls intention that we cross here depends on his knowing that I intend that we cross here. Perhaps we neednt jointly settle how to proceed. Imagine we settle the matter by forming intentions that we cross here in a way that doesnt satisfy condition (v). Wont those intentions now once theyre formed be governed by condition (v)? Note that the intention that we cross here has the diachronic element characteristic of intentions: a

How we settle how to proceed

I report that Pauls intention and my intention that we cross here, for each of our many street crossings, did not satisfy Bratmans condition (v). Well, actually my intention did. I was following Pauls lead.

Pauls intention that we cross here did not satisfy condition (v).
Pauls attitude was this: if I see that Ted does not intend that we cross here, Ill get him to intend that we cross here. And his attitude was counterfactually robust.

Dont we actually do stuff together?

You might reply that Paul and I did not share an intention to cross here, for each of our crossings, though we did share an intention to continue on our run. The problem is that going for a run together may be how we proceed in a broader plan to talk philosophy, or to get exercise, or to sight-see Reading. It may itself be how we proceed. By the replys reasoning, well often only be in position to share the bare intention to spend some time together. Given the inevitability of consensual asymmetries of influence, we often wont be able to share an intention to do stuff together.

Should we drop condition (v)?

No. We need condition (v) to rule out Mild Mafia Intending.

Mafia Intending (You and me, were going for a little ride together) violates condition (ii), since the mafioso doesnt intend that they go for the ride by way of his victims intention that they go for a ride.
Mild Mafia Intending (I scratch your back, you scratch mine, capisce? Now ring up your buddy...) manifests a violation of condition (v) that is fundamentally coercive. Our problem: Pauls violation is, unlike the mafiosos, perfectly in

Where have we gone wrong?

My thesis is that cases like Mild Mafia Intending should not count as shared intentions simply because we do not actually share an intention, and that we do not share an intention precisely because what interdependence there is does not involve a trust relation. What we need to grasp, which Ill now develop, is the formal parallel between individual and shared intention. Heres my hypothesis: Both individual and shared intention invite and rest on a trust relation. Shared intention posits interpersonal trust; individual intention posits intrapersonal (or self-) trust.

Intention, individual & shared

Heres my account of individual intention: (IJill) Jill intends to at t iff Jill expects and desires that she will at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply through her recognition of that desire (in memory).

Now say Jill invites Jack to share her intention:

(SI) Jill intends that she and Jack at t iff Jill expects and desires that she and Jack will at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply through her and Jacks recognition of that desire. All (SI) adds to (IJill) is that Jack should also be rationally

What gets shared (part 1)

When Jill intends that she and Jack at t she (a) expects and desires that Jill will at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply through Jills recognition of that desire (in memory), and (b) expects and desires that Jack will at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply through Jacks recognition of that desire. Now say Jack (c) expects and desires that Jack will at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply through Jacks recognition of Jills (b)-desire. Here we have an intention to at t shared between Jill and

The role of trust (part 1)

When they go on to act together, Jack acts on his own intention, not on Jills. That is, Jack

(cJack) expects and desires that Jack will at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply through Jacks recognition of that desire. But Jacks intention to at t is informed by Jills intention that they at t in this respect: he expects and desires that hell at t be rationally authorized to at that time simply because Jill has that expectation and desire.
An alternative formulation: he trusts her when she

What gets shared (part 2)

If Jack has (c) because Jill has (b), and if he has (cJack) because he has (c), then we can say that Jack and Jill share an intention because they literally share an intention-like state. The only difference in the content of their intentions is that (b) refers to Jills desire and (cJack) refers to Jacks desire. But these desires otherwise have exactly the same content. And Jacks desire was caused by Jills. Jills (b) and Jacks (cJack) have isomorphic normative implications. Its as close as they could get to literally sharing a single

The role of trust (part 2)

Note the Gricean structure in the two intentions Jills (IJill) and Jacks (cJack) as well as in Jills invitation to share her intention codified by (b) and (c). In both individual and shared intention, X expects and desires that Y will gain a rational authorization simply on the basis of Ys recognition of that desire where Y is (in the individual case) Xs own later self or (in the shared case) another person. At the core of intention lies a species of rational executive authority that we may claim both over ourselves & over others.

Meanwhile, back in Reading...

When Paul manifests to me his intention that we cross here, he invites me into a trust relation that mirrors the trust relation that he invites from his own acting self in undertaking the practical commitment at the core of his individual intention to cross here. By contrast, when the mafioso manifests to me his intention that we recruit my friend, he posits a relation of influence over me that is strikingly unlike the self-trust relation at the core of his individual intention to recruit my friend. The difference between shared intention and sheer manipulation lies here: the former but not the latter