Hazop

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HAZOP Awareness
Rev. Sept. 2007
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Introduction
OBJECTIVES OF THE COURSE
The objective of this course is to develop the knowledge
and awareness of Hazard and Operability Studies
(HAZOP).
Following the course, team members should be fully
aware of the structure of the HAZOP process and its
contribution to the Hazards and Effects Management
Process.
They should also appreciate the need for the selection of
the appropriate team and the provision of adequate time
and manpower to undertake a successful HAZOP study.
In this context the HAZOP study also includes the full
minuting of the study sessions, the leaders report and
the completed resolution of all action recommendations
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Introduction
STRUCTURE OF THE COURSE
Main source of this course is a Shell Global Solution
training Course (that I suppose I covered by copyright)
That training has been customized considering Technip
specific activities and needs
A mandatory integration of this course shall include
participation to a real HAZOP session or at least the
execution of a HAZOP simulate session.
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Hazop Technique - WHAT IS HAZOP
WHAT IS HAZOP
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WHAT IS HAZOP
The primary objective of a HAZOP study is to identify
potential hazards and operating problems on a process
plant. This is achieved by assembling a multi-disciplined
team and applying the HAZOP structured brainstorming
technique lead by an experienced leader.
The approach is to divide the plant into manageable
sections (usually called nodes or lines) and then
systematically apply specific parameters and guide
words (which are designed to focus the teams thoughts
towards likely design issues), to each section of the plant
in turn. Once identified, potential problems (deviations)
may then be discussed and assessed by the team and
their recommendations for action or further consideration
minuted.
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WHAT IS HAZOP
HAZOP studies may be held at any time during the
design and operation of a plant and are most effective at
the conceptual design phase where recommendations
affecting the fundamental scope may be made.
The technique has been developed over the last twenty
years as a method of identifying potential hazards and
operability problems in industrial plant, and it is now
generally recognised as the foremost method for
identifying potential hazards in complex plant that may
include new technology.
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Team Approach
The use of a multi-disciplined team has an advantage
over individual specialists, working in isolation.
Individuals are unlikely to be able to identify all the
possible inter-disciplinary facility/facility and
facility/human interfaces.
The HAZOP technique allows personnel from all
professional groups to interact and question aspects of
the facilities beyond their immediate constrained
activities.
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Brainstorming
A unique feature of HAZOP is the systematic
brainstorming procedure for reviewing all processes
and facilities, as well as complex operations and
procedures, for potential hazards and operability
problems. Conventional review techniques are limited as
they tend to rely on verification of compliance with
standards or previous experience. For non standard
designs or a non standard line-up standard equipment or
procedures, conventional techniques are therefore of
limited use.
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Step by Step Methodology
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The team leader, who is experienced in the technique,
leads the team through the process systematically
applying combinations of parameters (flow, pressure and
temperatures) and guide words (no, more, less) to
produce deviations. These are defined from the design
intent of the line or node. The consequences arising are
then discussed, assessed and minuted with actions or
requests for further consideration by the project team.
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1. Select the appropriate node;
2. Apply the first/next parameter;
3. Apply the first/next guide word, which when combined
with the parameter will give the deviation;
4. Agree the credibility of the deviation;
5. Determine all the potential causes of the deviation;
6. Assess the consequences of the deviation;
7. Assess the protection provided against the deviation and
its consequences;
8. Agree a recommendation for action or further
consideration of the problem;

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9. Once all the causes and consequences for a given
deviation have been identified and the requirement for
action discussed, then the procedure returns to step 3,
to allow identification and discussion of the next
deviation, this process iterates until al the guide words
have been combined with the selected parameter.
10. Similarly, once the guide words have been exhausted
the next parameter is selected (step 2) and the process
repeated until all parameters have been exhausted.
11. The discussion the moves onto the next node of the
system and the whole process is repeated until all the
nodes are exhausted.
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Nodes (lines)
The division of the plant into appropriately sized nodes
containing process lines and equipment is usually done
by the leader prior to the study. Large, complex nodes
are more appropriate for conceptual HAZOP studies and
the number and complexity of the nodes is used for the
first estimate of the time required for the whole study.
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Nodes (lines)
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Parameters
The usual parameters applied to all nodes are flow,
pressure and temperature. Additional ones include level,
phase, composition, operation, etc may be applied as
required by the contents of the node.
Guide words
The usual guide words include no, more, and less.
Hence a deviation (from design intent) may be discussed
under the parameter/guide word combination no flow or
more pressure. Other guide words which may be applied
if appropriate include as well as, part of, reverse, and
other than.
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Deviations
The HAZOP technique involves the application of each
guide word (no, more, less) sequentially to one
parameter (say flow), in order to identify all the
deviations. Then starting again for the next parameter
and, at the end of all the parameters, the next node. This
ensures the full detailed coverage of the plant, but there
may be a significant overlap between the deviations
considered and there will also be a number of impossible
or very unlikely deviations. Both of these will be identified
and excluded during the team discussion by the leader.
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Causes
The team will discuss all the potential causes of the
deviation There is frequently more than one cause, for
example no flow would be caused by a blockage, but
there may be several different causes, e.g. closed
valves, solid deposits, or stuck pigs.
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Consequences & Protection
The potential consequences for each deviation will be
discussed and assessed within the limits of the
information available and the expertise of the team. It is
usual to refer complex consequences for consideration
outside the HAZOP study. There may be several
consequences for example a deviation may cause an
alarm and trip to operate, or there may be knock-on
effects to other pieces of equipment. The protection
against each of the identified deviations and
consequences is discussed in order to identify the
credible combined effect. If the protection is thought by
the team to be inadequate then recommendations are
made to rectify the situation.
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Recommendations
The recommendations can take the form of open or
closed actions. Open actions, calling for further work
outside the HAZOP study, will be made for those cases
where the situation is complex and the solution is not
obvious. Closed actions will be made when the team
agree the solution and it is within their level of
competency.
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Minutes
There are two main results from a HAZOP study. The
first is a set of detailed minutes, presented on
worksheets. These show the results of the team
discussions and recommendations, recorded
sequentially for each node. The minutes should be a
complete record of the meeting and include
recommendations for no action which are valid
because they show that the hazard was discussed and
the protection considered adequate.
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Leaders Report
The second deliverable is a report written by the leader
containing his appraisal of the success of the meeting,
and the main action points as well as the full worksheets
and supporting documentation.
Action
All the action points and team recommendations should
be extracted form the minutes, issued and the
responsibility for action transferred to the Project
Manager. He is responsible for the full consideration of
each recommendation and expediting the agreed action.
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Hazop Technique - The Importance of HAZOP
The Importance
of HAZOP
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REASONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HAZOP
Increased Focus on Safety
There has been an increasing awareness and focus on
safety throughout all industries over the last twenty years.
Individual engineers and operators working on their own
cannot be expected to address more than a part of the total
safety aspects of the plant.
Greater Complexity and Development
Process plant is getting more complex and there is
continuous development in the provisions of design codes
and standards. Existing plants need to be periodically
reviewed in the light of current standards.
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Role of Governments in the Assurance of Safety
International and National Safety directives are increasing
in their requirements for a structured approach to hazard
management.
The common thread is that all require demonstration of the
structured management of hazards within responsible
organisations.
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The Importance of Operational as well as Design Safety
HAZOP is more than just a hazard identification meeting, it
also concentrates on operability issues, such as simplifying
the plant to make it more safe.
Safety is not an altruistic objective.
Designing out problems early is cheaper than adding on
safety equipment and protection devices.
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Hazop Technique - Scope and limitations of HAZOP
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF HAZOP
HAZOP is not:
A Design Review It should not be regarded as a review to catch
bad engineering design.
A Check of the Quality of a Design This is the Q.A. function within
each department.
A Check of Compliance to Codes and Standards This is also a
departmental responisibility.
A Quantitative Risk Analysis HAZOP may identify the need for
QRA or other studies. Risk ranking by coarse probability and
consequence evaluation is the limit of the teams role.
An End in Itself In the past, some people have maintained that if
you have had a successful HAZOP study your responsibility for
operating safety is completed-
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HAZOP is not a Substitute for:
Good Engineering
Engineering Codes and Standards The plant should
be designed rigorously to the appropriate codes and
standards
Quality Control A departmental function.
Safety Reviews A Project Management function.
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What is HAZ and what is OP?
It is the intention to build plant which is both safe and
operable and the team will have to focus their minds
differently for the two aspects of the study.
Hazards Abnormal Operation
The HAZOP method looks at what happens when there is a
deviation from the normal value (design intent) of a
parameter.
Operability Normal Operation
Detailed analysis of the operation of the plant under normal
conditions will discover operability problems.
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STRENGHTS
HAZOP has been shown to be the most effective method
for reviewing a process plant with the active co-operation of
all disciplines, and ensuring that any design deficiencies
have been identified. It is particularly useful for discovering
the hazards at an early stage in the design process (coarse
HAZOP) when radical remedial action may be taken.

Although time consuming it has been shown to be cost
effective in reducing unnecessary equipment and
increasing plant operability.
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WEAKNESSES
The HAZOP procedure is totally dependent on the
technical knowledge and experience of the team and the
performance of the leader in his detailed application of the
technique.
The HAZOP team cannot identify hazards or foresee the
causes that are outside their knowledge or professional
experience.
Even when well lead, the quality of a study is dependent
on the rigorous application of the technique, particularly the
quality of the minutes and the leaders report. There can be
little confidence in the results of a poorly documented
HAZOP study.
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Technip Hazop
DEFINITIONS
Ref. 1000 PA 2002 TRA&EP Procedure
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HAZOP
Hazard and Operability study

Issued by process department
To identify process hazards and operability problems due to deviations
from intended process design
Use guidewords approach to identify every possible deviations and
relatives consequences
Scope of the document:
Recommend technological changes to improve safety or operability
Recommend procedural changes to improve safety or operability
During Start Up and Operations recommended procedural changes
shall be knew and respected
Start Up and Operation
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Document Reference Title:
Node 413.1 Description
Drawing n.
Meeting Date: See page 1 of document TPIT Signature: TAKREER Signature:
Revision: See page 1 of document
5 Feed line 6"-413-P022-
11051X-I
Malfunct ion of upst ream
hydrot reat er react or during
st art -up when sour napht ha
is fed t o it
Pot ent ial passage of
sulphur compounds t o
t he st ripper and CCR
react or n 1 wit h
cat alyst poisoning
Operat ing procedure
should be provided t o
manage t his st art -up
phase
3 2 R Ensure t hat operat ing
procedures include adequat e
recommendat ion t o manage
t his st art -up phase
S L R Response By
3 4 P
Stat-up Department
5601-413-PP-D-00104, 5601-402-PP-D-00111
Response
TPIT confirms that operating procedures will address point properly.
Final HAZOP Study Report
Hazop Action Sheet
Feedi ng Li ne from Heavy Naphtha Hydrotreati ng Uni t
to Charge Heater and Reactor N 1, i ncl udi ng strai ners
413-ME-003A/B and Combi ned Feed Exchanger 413-E-
001
Final Hazop Study Follow up Report (2137-413-ML 1900-05)
Start Up and Operation

Hazop

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