This document discusses strategy games and provides examples using a game about advertising budgets between two firms, A and B. Strategy games involve decision making that impacts outcomes. They differ from tactics which refer to execution rather than general schemes. All games have players, strategies, and payoffs. Players choose actions and seek to maximize payoffs. Strategies are available courses of action. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can benefit from changing strategies given an opponent's strategy. The example advertising game is presented in extensive and normal form, showing the firms' budget choices and resulting payoffs.
This document discusses strategy games and provides examples using a game about advertising budgets between two firms, A and B. Strategy games involve decision making that impacts outcomes. They differ from tactics which refer to execution rather than general schemes. All games have players, strategies, and payoffs. Players choose actions and seek to maximize payoffs. Strategies are available courses of action. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can benefit from changing strategies given an opponent's strategy. The example advertising game is presented in extensive and normal form, showing the firms' budget choices and resulting payoffs.
This document discusses strategy games and provides examples using a game about advertising budgets between two firms, A and B. Strategy games involve decision making that impacts outcomes. They differ from tactics which refer to execution rather than general schemes. All games have players, strategies, and payoffs. Players choose actions and seek to maximize payoffs. Strategies are available courses of action. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can benefit from changing strategies given an opponent's strategy. The example advertising game is presented in extensive and normal form, showing the firms' budget choices and resulting payoffs.
This document discusses strategy games and provides examples using a game about advertising budgets between two firms, A and B. Strategy games involve decision making that impacts outcomes. They differ from tactics which refer to execution rather than general schemes. All games have players, strategies, and payoffs. Players choose actions and seek to maximize payoffs. Strategies are available courses of action. A Nash equilibrium exists when no player can benefit from changing strategies given an opponent's strategy. The example advertising game is presented in extensive and normal form, showing the firms' budget choices and resulting payoffs.
S-46 2 Chess is one of the most well-known and frequently played strategy games. 3 4 Strategy game
A strategy game or strategic game is a game,
not necessarily played for fun, in which the players' autonomous decision-making skills have a high significance in determining the outcome. Almost all strategy games require internal decision tree style thinking, and typically very high situational awareness. 5 Basic Concepts
The term "strategy" comes ultimately from
Greek, !"#$"%&'$ or strategia( meaning generalship. )t differs from "tactics" in that it refers to the general scheme of things, whereas "tactics" refers to organi*ation and e+ecution. 6 Basic Concepts
All games have three ,asic elements-
. /layers . 0trategies . /ayoffs
/layers can make ,inding agreements in
cooperative games, ,ut can not in noncooperative games, which are studied in this chapter. 7 Payers
A player is a decision maker and can ,e
anything from individuals to entire nations.
/layers have the a,ility to choose among a
set of possi,le actions.
Games are often characteri*ed ,y the fi+ed
num,er of players.
Generally, the specific identity of a play is not
important to the game. ! Strategies
A strategy is a course of action availa,le to a
player.
0trategies may ,e simple or comple+.
)n noncooperative games each player is
uncertain a,out what the other will do since players can not reach agreements among themselves. " Payo##s
/ayoffs are the final returns to the players at
the conclusion of the game.
/ayoffs are usually measure in utility although
sometimes measure monetarily.
)n general, players are a,le to rank the payoffs
from most preferred to least preferred.
/layers seek the highest payoff availa,le.
$% &'(ii)ri(m Concepts
)n the theory of markets an equili,rium
occurred when all parties to the market had no incentive to change his or her ,ehavior.
1hen strategies are chosen, an equili,rium
would also provide no incentives for the players to alter their ,ehavior further.
The most frequently used equili,rium concept
is a Nash e'(ii)ri(m* $$ Nash &'(ii)ri(m
A Nash e'(ii)ri(m is a pair of strategies
a2,,2( in a two-player game such that a2 is an optimal strategy for A against ,2 and ,2 is an optimal strategy for 3 against A2. . /layers can not ,enefit from knowing the equili,rium strategy of their opponents.
4ot every game has a 4ash equili,rium, and
some games may have several. $2 +n ,(strative +dvertising Game
Two firms A and 3( must decide how much to
spend on advertising
5ach firm may adopt either a higher 6( ,udget
or a low 7( ,udget.
The game is shown in e+tensive tree( form in
8igure 9:.9 $3 +n ,(strative +dvertising Game
A makes the first move ,y choosing either 6 or
7 at the first decision ;node.<
4e+t, 3 chooses either 6 or 7, ,ut the large
oval surrounding 3=s two decision nodes indicates that 3 does not know what choice A made. $4 7,5 L L H L H H B B A 5,4 6,4 6,3 -,G./& $2*$0 1he +dvertising Game in &2tensive -orm $5 +n ,(strative +dvertising Game
The num,ers at the end of each ,ranch,
measured in thousand or millions of dollars, are the payoffs. . 8or e+ample, if A chooses 6 and 3 chooses 7, profits will ,e > for firm A and ? for firm 3.
The game in normal ta,ular( form is shown
where A=s strategies are the rows and 3=s strategies are the columns. $6 1he +dvertising Game in Norma -orm
Bs Strategies L H L 7, 5 5, 4 As Strategies H 6, 4 6, 3