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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
FULL POWER AND SHUTDOWN LEVEL 2 PSA STUDY FOR
UNIT 1
OF J. BOHUNICE V1 NPP
by
Zoltan Koa!" an# H$l$na Noa%oa
RELKO Lt#& En'(n$$)(n' an# Con"*lt(n' S$)(!$"
B)at("laa& Sloa% R$+*,l(!
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONTENTS

Introduction and overview of the Level 2 PS !ethodology

"escri#tion of the Confine!ent

$he interface between the level % and 2 PS

"escri#tion of the accident #rogression analyses

Evaluation of the confine!ent failure !odes and construction of the confine!ent

event trees

"efinition of release categories

"iscussion of the source ter! analysis

$he results and sensitivity studies

Conclusions
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
INTRODUCTION

&ithin the gradual reconstruction of '. (ohunice )% *PP the u#grading

of the confine!ent was #erfor!ed and new accident localisation syste!
was installed.

$he level 2 PS +for full #ower, low #ower and shutdown o#erating
!odes- was develo#ed with the following ob.ectives/
to identify the ways in which radioactive releases fro! the #lant can occur
following the core da!age,
to calculate the !agnitudes and fre0uency of the release,
to #rovide insights into the #lant behaviour during a severe accident,
to #rovide a fra!ewor1 for understanding contain!ent failure !odes, the i!#act
of the #heno!ena that could occur during and following core da!age and have
the #otential to challenge the integrity of the confine!ent,
to su##ort the severe accident !anage!ent and develo#!ent of S23s.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
INTRODUCTION

$he level 2 PS !odel of the '. (ohunice )% *PP was develo#ed in the RISK SPEC$R42
Professional code.

$his !odel calculates the fre0uency of the individual release categories generating !ini!al
cut sets which involve the initiating event of the accident, co!#onent failures and hu!an
errors.

$he !agnitudes of release categories are calculated using/ the 2P56))ER for reactor
o#eration and shutdown !ode with closed reactor vessel and the 2ELCOR code for
shutdown !ode with o#en reactor vessel.

lthough the level % PS !ission ti!e is 25 h, the level 2 PS si!ulated accident se0uences
57 h to #rovide greater understanding of confine!ent #erfor!ance during the later stages of a
scenario. So, both the level 2 PS !ission ti!e and the deter!inistic analyses ti!e are 57 h.

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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
OVERVIEW OF THE LEVEL 2 PSA -ETHODOLO.Y

P)o/$!t 0ana'$0$nt1"efinition of ob.ectives and sco#e of level 2 PS

study, #ro.ect !anage!ent, tea! selection and organisation, 0uality
assurance of the #ro.ect.

Fa0(l(a)("at(on 2(t3 t3$ +lant1 8a!iliarisation with the #lant and

identification of design as#ects i!#ortance to severe accidents,
descri#tion of the confine!ent and accident localisation syste! of the
#lant after the safety u#grading.

Int$)4a!(n' o4 l$$l 1 an# 2 PSA1 "evelo#!ent of e9tended event trees,

definition of #lant da!age states as initiating events for CE$s.

A!!(#$nt +)o')$""(on anal5"$"1 nalyses of #rogression of severe

accidents, co!#uter codes used for the analyses, treat!ent of the accident
#heno!ena, in#ut data, calculation results.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
OVERVIEW OF THE LEVEL 2 PSA -ETHODOLO.Y

Con4(n$0$nt +$)4o)0an!$ anal5"$"1 Structural res#onse, confine!ent

by#ass and confine!ent isolation analyses.

Con"t)*!t(on o4 CET"1 Construction of confine!ent event trees,

0uantification of confine!ent event tree events, uncertainties in the event
#robability 0uantification.

So*)!$ t$)0 anal5"$"1 "efinition of release categories +sources ter!s-,

grou#ing of fission #roducts, fission #roduct release calculations, treat!ent
of uncertainties in the esti!ated source ter!s.

6*ant(4(!at(on o4 4)$7*$n!($" 4o) )$l$a"$ !at$'o)($"1 Calculation of

fre0uencies of release categories using the integrated full #ower and
shutdown !odel develo#ed in RISK SPEC$R42 Professional code.

P)$"$ntat(on an# (nt$)+)$tat(on o4 t3$ )$"*lt"

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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
OVERVIEW OF THE LEVEL 2 PSA -ETHODOLO.Y
80a(n $$nt" o4 t3$ "$$)$ a!!(#$nt
Core
Damage
(PDS)
In-Vessel Phase
Reactor
Vessel
Melt-through
Radioactive
release
(RC)
Radioactive
release
(RC)
Radioactive
release
(RC)
Late Ex-Vessel Phase
Radioactive
release
(RC)
Intact
Coninement
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT DESCRIPTION
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/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT DESCRIPTION 8 t3$ 0a(n (""*$" o4 t3$
!on4(n$0$nt

$he confine!ent lea1:tightness

$he accident localisation syste!

$he confine!ent s#ray syste!

$he confine!ent isolation

$he confine!ent data as in#ut to the deter!inistic codes

Structural analyses of the confine!ent

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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT DESCRIPTION
L$a%a'$ 4)o0 t3$ !on4(n$0$nt1 ol*0$ 9 : 2; 3
;
% ; ;
2 ; ;
< ; ;
5 ; ;
= ; ;
> ; ;
% ? ? < % ? ? 5 % ? ? = % ? ? > % ? ? @ % ? ? 7 % ? ? ? 2 ; ; ; 2 ; ; % 4nit
%
4nit
2
YEAR
4nit % 4nit 2
+ear
,nit 1 ,nit 2
1$ 5$"#$$ )1)"# $$
1" 4$"# ( 5(5#$$
14 255# $( 21#"$
15 1"2# $$ "#$$
1( *(#$ )$#(*
1) (*#1* 51#$4
1* 5#5* 45#*
1 5*#1( 4",1(
2$$$ 54#5( 42#14
2$$1 4*#5 4$#))
Le ak age f r om
conf ne m e nt
[ % / 24 hour s ]
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT DESCRIPTION
#2@1Pa
# <;1Pa
59"*7;;
29"*2=;
%1Pa
# =;1Pa
R%;2
R;57
R;;2
R<;2 R<;%
ECCS SS
29"*=%; 59"*=%;
%2 9 "*%%<;
R%;5
(&S$
#%=1Pa
"*>;; "*%2;;
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
THE INTERFACE F LE!EL " AN# 2 $%A

"evelo#!ent of the level 2 #robabilistic !odel is started with the

construction of the e9tended event trees +EE$s-.

$his is co!#le!entary level % !odelling before the #lant da!age state

grou#ing +P"Ss-.

It allows credit for the core da!age recovery. Construction of EE$ is

#erfor!ed for each core da!age se0uences of the level % PS !odel.

$he ne9t ste# is a definition of P"Ss and assign!ent to conse0uences of

the EE$s.

$hen, the confine!ent event tree +CE$- is develo#ed for each P"S as
#art of level 2 #robabilistic !odel.

Conse0uences of the CE$s are the release categories. $heir fre0uency

re#resents the results of the level 2 PS.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
THE INTERFACE F LE!EL " AN# 2 $%A
I!I"I#"I!$
EVE!"S
LEVEL % EVE!" "REES
I-1
I-2
I-"
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
I-.
E&"E!DED
LEVEL % EVE!" "REES
C'!(I!EME!" EVE!" "REES
(CE")
RELE#SE C#"E$'RIES
(RC)
-!ominal lea)age
-Scru**er release
-Coninement ru+ture
-,asemat melt through
-Core damage recover-
(CDR) .ith lea)age
OK
CD
OK
CDR
1
2
3
.
.
.
.
.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
THE INTERFACE F LE!EL " AN# 2 $%A

In sa!e cases the level % event trees are changed before starting of EE$
construction. $he reason is in the definition of the event tree to# events.

$he following e9a!#le clarifies the #roble!. 3iven loss of the #ri!ary
to secondary side heat re!oval, failure of the #ri!ary bleed and feed
+to# event in the level % event trees- via the #ressuriAer safety valve
leads to the core da!age.

$he reason of a failure +o#erator error or hardware failure- is evaluated

in the fault tree under the to# event. Bowever, different #lant da!age
states occurs if o#erator fails to initiate bleed or bleed and feed is
initiated but the losses are not co!#ensated by at least a BPSI #u!#.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
THE INTERFACE F LE!EL " AN# 2 $%A

"evelo#!ent of the level 2 !odel of the (ohunice )% #lant was

#erfor!ed using the RISK SPEC$R42 PS Professional code. $he
level % PS !odel was develo#ed also in this code.

fter an evaluation of the software ca#abilities for level 2

a##lications, it was decided to strea!line the se0uence 0uantification
#rocess by/ 1) adding the EET top events directly to the core
damage sequences of the level 1 event trees,
2) defining the PDSs as the initiating events of the CETs and
) assign the release categories to the CET sequences!

In #rinci#le, this allows the e9#licit consideration also of all level %

events in the overall !odel. $he level 2 calculation !ay therefore be
based on the !o0+l$t$ +lant 0o#$l 2(t3o*t an5 (nt$)0$#(at$
)$"*lt".
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
THE INTERFACE F LE!EL " AN# 2 $%A

$he to# events of the e9tended event trees/

confine!ent isolation

BPSI

LPSI

Confine!ent s#ray syste!

Other events
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
THE INTERFACE F LE!EL " AN# 2 $%A& $#%

$he #lant da!age states +P"S- re#resent a functional grou#ings of level

% core da!age se0uences.

$he criteria for binning the level % se0uences into the #lant da!age states
are based on the following five characteristics of each se0uence/

Initiator +Large LOC, S!all LOC, $ransient, Confine!ent by#ass-

$i!e to core !elt +early C % h, late D % h-

ECCS status + : water in.ected into the RP) or reactor cavity, core da!age
recovery #ossible, " : no water in.ected-

Confine!ent s#ray syste! +E : available, * :unavailable-

Confine!ent status +I : isolated, : not isolated, ( : by#assed-

E9a!#le of P"S/ TLDNI 8 t)an"($nt& lat$ CD& no CD )$!o$)5& no "+)a5
"5"t$0& !on4(n$0$nt ("olat$#
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
ACCIDENT PRO.RESSION ANALYSES

$he '. (ohunice )% level 2 PS is acco!#lished by cou#ling a #robabilistic

!odel of the confine!ent res#onse to the #ostulated initiating events with a
deter!inistic #hysical !odel to e9a!ine the #lant res#onse.

$his #rocess also incor#orates the evaluation of the i!#act of the

#heno!enological uncertainties.

$he #robabilistic !odel is e!bodied in EE$s and CE$s develo#ed in the

RISK SPEC$R42 PS code. $he #lant #hysical !odel is defined in the
2P56))ER and 2ELCOR #ara!eter files +!ore detailed descri#tion
is in #resentation of 2r. 2. Cvan fro! )4'E-.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
ACCIDENT PRO.RESSION ANALYSES
F
$he deter!inistic codes #rovide infor!ation re0uired to #erfor! the
calculations of the #lant s#ecific fission #roduct trans#ort and ther!al
hydraulic res#onse to the #ostulated accident se0uences.
F
$hey are also used to study the sensitivity of the source ter! to the
#heno!enological uncertainties.
F
$he source ter! analysis used a default values for the !odel
#ara!eters. $he sensitivity analysis identifies any variations fro! this
a##roach.
F
$he deter!inistic analyses are su##le!ented with the
#heno!enological evaluation su!!aries to #rovide a co!#lete
#hysical re#resentation of the #lant.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES
F
Pheno!enological evaluations have been #erfor!ed in su##ort of
the #lant level 2 PS #ro.ect to deter!ine the li1elihood of all
#ostulated confine!ent failure !odes and !echanis!s.
F
$hese evaluations were #erfor!ed syste!atically to address the
controlling #hysical #rocesses or events s#ecific to the #lant
configuration. $he confine!ent failure !odes of the #lant considered
*nl(%$l5 are/ over:#ressure, direct confine!ent heating, stea!
e9#losions, ther!al attac1 of the confine!ent #enetrations, vessel
thrust forces and !elt through the induced failure of the reactor cavity
floor.
F
8ailure !odes 0o)$ l(%$l5 to occur are/ hydrogen co!bustion,
confine!ent isolation failure, and confine!ent by#ass.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 Co4(n$0$nt "t)*!t*)al
anal5"$"
F
#lant s#ecific structural analysis of the '. (ohunice )%
confine!ent +S3 co!#art!ent- has been #erfor!ed to
deter!ine the ulti!ate internal te!#erature and #ressure
ca#acity and the !ost li1ely failure locations for ("( +brea1
of the cold leg of a RCS loo# with double ended discharge of #ri!ary
coolantG no ECCS and no s#ray syste! is considered-.
F
$he ("( #resent the !a9i!u! te!#erature and #ressure
load for the confine!ent. 8or all initiators within the "(
lower values of these #ara!eters were calculated by the
2P56))ER code.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 Co4(n$0$nt "t)*!t*)al
anal5"$"
8 T$0+$)at*)$ loa#(n'1
$he te!#erature in the her!etic Aone did not increase during the LOC %>;HC in
accordance to 2P56))ER analysis.
$he effect of this te!#erature on the confine!ent integrity is !ini!al during the
accident.
$he results of analyses of the concrete structures under the accident te!#erature
loads #resent that the structure resistance is sufficient for the ("( loads
condition.
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2"/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 Co4(n$0$nt "t)*!t*)al
anal5"$"
8 P)$""*)$ loa#(n'1
$he structural analysis carried out for ("( under the high internal over:
#ressure corres#onding to the !ean strengths and non:linearity behaviour of the
concrete structures.
$he evaluation of the structural integrity was #erfor!ed for the critical #laces,
which were defined fro! the #revious non:linear analysis for various loads of
("( and "(.
$he non:linear analysis ta1es into account the concrete crac1ing and crushing,
layered a##ro9i!ation of the shell ele!ents with various !aterial #ro#erties,
etc.
$he !a9i!u! #ressure in the confine!ent in case of large LOC is 22< 1Pa.
Probability of loss of confine!ent integrity for this #ressure is less than ;.;;;%.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8*nl(%$l5 4a(l*)$ 0o#$"

D()$!t !on4(n$0$nt 3$at(n' <DCH= is the #rocess of directly heating the

confine!ent at!os#here by the !olten core debris should it be hydro:
dyna!ically forced out of the reactor cavity due to the #ri!ary syste!
blowdown. #heno!enological evaluation was #erfor!ed to e9a!ine the
li1elihood of the #lant confine!ent failure due to "CB. $he evaluation e9cluded
this event.

T3$)0al atta!% o4 !on4(n$0$nt +$n$t)at(on". $he !echanical and electrical

#enetrations or seals are not susce#tible to ther!al degradation due to the
confine!ent gas te!#eratures. $hose #enetrations can withstand the
confine!ent te!#eratures u# to and beyond =;; C. Bowever, such elevated
te!#eratures are not #redicted for the confine!ent for sustained #eriods of ti!e.

E>8$""$l "t$a0 $>+lo"(on. 4nli1ely event because the reactor cavity is dry.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 *nl(%$l5 4a(l*)$ 0o#$"

V$""$l t3)*"t 4o)!$1 $he !a9i!u! .et thrust force could not lift the
vessel and its internals, even without considering the ability of the vessel
su##ort structure to withstand the thrust load.

If the coolant loo# #i#ing and shield wall are considered, a !uch larger
force would be re0uired to dislodge the reactor vessel. Even if the vessel
could shirt, the confine!ent is configured in such a !anner that the
reaction forces cannot be trans!itted to the confine!ent wall.
$herefore, this #ostulated failure !ode is #revented by the #lant design.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 *nl(%$l5 4a(l*)$ 0o#$"

Con4(n$0$nt 4a(l*)$ ,5 0$lt t3)o*'31 If the base!at !elt through

occurs, the at!os#heric release will be li!ited to that resulting fro! the
design:basis lea1age and a filtered release of radionuclides through the
soil.
(ecause of the #resence of the water on the confine!ent floor, it was our
.udge!ent that this event is #recluded. Bowever, if all water #athways
are #lugged, a !elt through could eventually occur after tens of hours.
#robability of %;
: 5
with an error factor of %; was assigned to this event
for all P"S and se0uences on the basis of engineering .udge!ent. Later it
was re!oved fro! the CE$s because the ris1 associated with this event
would not affect the total ris1.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 H5#)o'$n #$tonat(on
<!on"(#$)$# $$nt=

F)o0 t3$ anal5"$" (t 2a" !on"(#$)$# t3at t3$ 0a(n !ont)(,*to) to t3$
4a(l*)$ o4 t3$ !on4(n$0$nt (" 4)o0 t3$ ('n(t(on o4 t3$ !o0,*"t(,l$ 'a"
0(>t*)$".

best:esti!ate assess!ent of the in:vessel and e9:vessel hydrogen

#roduction is #ossible using the 2P56))ER code. $he code calculates
the hydrogen, o9ygen and stea! inventory in the confine!ent and identifies
the ti!e #eriods when the hydrogen is co!bustible or invent.

$he #otential confine!ent #ressuriAation resulting fro! the hydrogen

co!bustion is bounded by the calculating the adiabatic isochoric co!#lete
co!bustion +ICC- of this assu!ed hydrogen inventory. It is hand
calculated on the basis of the out#uts fro! the 2P56))ER code.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 H5#)o'$n #$tonat(on
<!on"(#$)$# $$nt=
F $he analyses identified three #hases of #ossible hydrogen burn/
before the reactor vessel failure, at the reactor vessel failure and
after the reactor vessel failure.
F
Bowever, hydrogen detonation is #recluded if the confine!ent
is not isolated.
F In the level 2 PS of western #lants the li1elihood
of hydrogen detonation is set ; for P"S with the confine!ent s#ray
syste! fails to o#erate for reduce the stea! concentrations.
Bowever, for the '. (ohunice )% #lant the 2P56))ER
analyses have shown that the hydrogen detonation is #ossible
also if the s#ray syste! fails to o#erate.
F $his hydrogen detonation concentration e9ists
in the (&S$ which is #art of the confine!ent boundary
+the stea! is condensated but the hydrogen is accu!ulated above the
water level-. In other areas of the confine!ent +in the S3 bo9es-
the hydrogen detonation is not #ossible if the s#ray syste! fails to
o#erate.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 Con4(n$0$nt ("olat(on
4a(l*)$ <!on"(#$)$# $$nt=

$he confine!ent isolation syste! is designed to #reserve the ability of

the confine!ent boundary to #revent or li!it the esca#e of fission
#roducts that !ay result fro! #ostulated accidents.

In the event of a #ossible radiation release fro! the confine!ent through

the #rocess lines, the confine!ent isolation syste! auto!atically isolates
all lines #enetrating the confine!ent which do not serve an accident
!itigating function.

8or the (ohunice )% #lant the confine!ent ventilation syste! and the
(&S$ blow: down line !ust be isolated in case of the accident. 8ault
tree was develo#ed and involved into the level 2 PS !odel.
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"$/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONFINE-ENT FAILURE -ODES 8 Con4(n$0$nt ,5+a""
<!on"(#$)$# $$nt=

Confine!ent by#ass is considered as an accident initiator that can lead to

the core da!age because the loss of cooling fluid to a location outside the
confine!ent disables the ECCS for long:ter! core cooling.

$he !ost li1ely !echanis!s for this failure !ode, identified for the #lant
as being significant in ter!s of the #otential conse0uences, are S3
collector ru#ture +S3$2-, S3 tube ru#ture +S3$R- or interfacing
LOC.

*ote, however, that the S3$2 se0uences during the full #ower o#eration
contribute about <>I to the total core da!age fre0uency. Contribution to
the full #ower core da!age fre0uency fro! S3$R is <.5I and fro!
interfacing LOC is less than %I. $hese initiators are not do!inant fro!
the ris1 #oint of view during the reactor shutdown.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CET"
$he general guidelines used for the develo#!ent of the CE$s are
su!!arised below/
: the initiating event of a CE$ is a P"S,
: the CE$ to# events and structure #rovide the details necessary to
characterise the fission #roduct source ter! releases,
: the CE$ considers factors which do!inate the confine!ent res#onseG
thus, the to# events consider broad categories of the confine!ent
behaviour,
: the CE$ considers early confine!ent failure ti!ing +i.e., confine!ent
failure at or shortly after vessel failure- and late confine!ent failureG
the results indicate significant i!#act fro! early and late hydrogen
detonation.
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"2/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CET" 8 -a(n a""*0+t(on"

$he following !ain assu!#tions are used in the CE$ construction/

.8or core da!age recovery only the BPSI and LPSI #u!#s of unit % are
consideredG BPSI #u!#s of unit 2 are not ta1en into consideration due to the
li!ited water sourcesG e9ternal water sources are also not considered for this
#ur#ose.

It is #ossibility to su##ly the RCS also by the s#ray syste! #u!#s. Bowever,
using a s#ray syste! #u!# for the core da!age recovery is not considered in
the !odel because these #u!#s !ust #erfor! other safety functions.

If the core da!age recovery for P"S with early C" is not #erfor!ed before
the vessel failure, recovery after the vessel failure is considered not to be
#ossible.

.fter successful core da!age recovery no hydrogen detonation is

considered.
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""/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CET1 La)'$ LOCA& $a)l5 !o)$ #a0a'$& ECCS aa(la,l$& "+)a5
"5"t$0 aa(la,l$& !on4(n$0$nt ("olat$#
/-01A 1SS2S3/4$$ -/56!1A -75 L75
/on8inement event tree 1 !
L-A+I!A
/9.:I.-M-.0 SP6A+ A.5
/99LI.& 9: 07- 0A.%
A;AILA<L-
/ore damage recover'
=e8ore reactor vessel 8ail>re
7'drogen detonation at
reactor vessel 8ail>re
7'drogen detonation a8ter
reactor vessel 8ail>re
.o#
1
2
"
4
5
(
)
/onse?#
.6
6/1
6/4#2
6/"
6/2
6/4#2
6/"
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
"4/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RELEASE CATE.ORIES

8our general classes of the contain!ent:failure !odes were involved into

the RC/

Isolation failure

Bydrogen detonation

"esign lea1age

Confine!ent by#ass +S3$2, S3$R, interfacing LOC-

$hese general classes re#resent different source ter! !agnitudes because

they re#resent different lea1age rates/ lea1age via not isolated #i#ing,
gross structural failure, low gradual release via confine!ent nor!al
lea1age and confine!ent by#ass with different rates.
RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
"5/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RELEASE CATE.ORIES 8 l$a%a'$ )at$

$he blow:off line of % 2;; !! dia!eter +installed fro! the borated water
storage tan1 to the reactor hall- is the !ost do!inant lea1age #ath, if it is
not isolated.

Bydrogen detonation in the confine!ent is defined as increased lea1age

with gross structural failure leading to a #uff release of radionuclides
followed by lea1age through an o#en #ath to the environ!ent.

$he design lea1age involves releases via CO8s and nor!al lea1age of the
confine!ent +the lea1age rate is 57 volu!e #ercent #er day-.

$he confine!ent by#ass occurs after S3$2, S3$R and interfacing

LOC
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"(/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RELEASE CATE.ORIES

In a##(t(on& t3$ 4ollo2(n' (""*$" 2$)$ (nt$')at$# (nto t3$ RC"1

R$l$a"$ 0$!3an("0 <!o)$ o$)3$at(n'& (n8$""$l an# $>8$""$l !o)$

#a0a'$ )$!o$)5=

E44$!t" o4 t3$ "+)a5 "5"t$0 o+$)at(on

T(0$ to !o)$ #a0a'$ an# t(0$ to $""$l 4a(l*)$

T(0$ to !on4(n$0$nt 4a(l*)$

Plant o+$)at(n' 0o#$"

RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
")/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RELEASE CATE.ORIES 8 t(0$" to !o)$ #a0a'$ an# $""$l
4a(l*)$
Initiating event P"S $i!e to core da!age
JhK
$i!e to vessel failure
JhK
LOC =;; !! LEEI, LE"*I, LE"**,
LE"E*, LE"EI
;.22 %.7;
LOC %;; !! SEEI, SE"*I, SE"**,
SE"E*, SE"EI
;.5= <.;;
LOC <2 !! SLEI, SL"*I, SL"**,
SL"E*, SL"EI
2.%7 =.%7
Loss of secondary
heat re!oval, no
bleed and feed
$LEI, $L"*I, $L"**,
$L"E*, $L"EI
5.2; >.;;
Loss of RBR, o#en
reactor vessel
$L"**, $L"E*
SL"**, SL"E*
>.?; 2%.=;
RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
"*/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RELEASE CATE.ORIES

*R : no release

RC;.% : confine!ent survives with s#ray, in:vessel core da!age recovery

RC;.2 : confine!ent survives with s#ray, e9:vessel core da!age recovery

RC% : confine!ent survives with s#ray, no core da!age recovery

RC2 : confine!ent survives with s#ray, no core da!age recovery

RC< : early confine!ent failure at vessel failure

RC5.% : late confine!ent failure at vessel failure

RC5.2 : late confine!ent failure after vessel failure

RC=.% : confine!ent isolation failure with s#ray, reactor vessel closed

RC=.2 : confine!ent isolation failure with s#ray, reactor vessel o#en

RC>.% : confine!ent isolation failure without s#ray, reactor vessel closed

RC>.2 : confine!ent isolation failure without s#ray, reactor vessel o#en

RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
"/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RELEASE CATE.ORIES

RC@.% : confine!ent by#ass after S3$2, stea! du!# station to the at!os#here
re:closed

RC@.2 : confine!ent by#ass after S3$2, stea! du!# station to the at!os#here
fails to re:close

RC7.% : confine!ent by#ass after S3$R, stea! du!# station to the at!os#here
re:closed

RC7.2 : confine!ent by#ass after S3$R, stea! du!# station to the at!os#here
fails to re:close

RC? : confine!ent by#ass after interfacing LOC

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4$/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
SOURCE TER-S CHARACTERISATION

$he #ur#ose of the source ter! analysis is to 0uantitatively describe the

!agnitude and co!#osition of radionuclide releases to the environ!ent
resulting fro! the core da!age accidents.

(efore the source ter! calculations were actually #erfor!ed, the

se0uences with si!ilar source ter! characteristics were grou#ed into the
release categories to reduce the total nu!ber of the se0uences to be
analysed.

Source ter! 0uantification was then #erfor!ed by the analysing a single,

re#resentative accident se0uence for each release category by the
2P56 ))ER code res#. 2ELCOR code.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
SOURCE TER-S CHARACTERISATION 8 "$7*$n!$
"$l$!t(on

re#resentative syste!ic se0uence for each release category was

selected for the source ter! analysis.

$he analysed se0uence was chosen because it had the 3('3$"t 4)$7*$n!5
of occurrence of any se0uence within the release category or because it
was e9#ected to bound all other se0uences of these category.

Selection of a se0uence other than that with the highest fre0uency

occurred when that se0uence could result in earlier core da!age and
vessel failure or it was not a full #ower se0uence. $o be conservative,
always a full #ower se0uence is selected for the #lant o#erating !odes
with the closed reactor vessel.
RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RESULTS 8 +o2$) o+$)at(on 8 !on#(t(onal +)o,a,(l(t($" o4 RC
Release
category
8re0uency "efinition Conditional
#robability
RC@.% 7.<?E:;> Confine!ent by#ass after S3$2, D %;I volatiles released ;.<;
RC5.% >.;=E:;> Late confine!ent failure at vessel failure, D %;I volatiles released ;.22
*R >.;<E:;> Success, no confine!ent failure within 57 h, C ;.%I volatiles
released
;.22
RC2 %.<7E:;> Confine!ent survives with s#rays, D %;I volatiles released ;.;=
RC>.% %.<>E:;> Confine!ent isolation failure without s#ray, D %;I volatiles
released
;.;=
RC< %.%=E:;> Early confine!ent failure at vessel failure, D %;I volatiles
released
;.;5
RC7.% ?.=?E:;@ Confine!ent by#ass after S3$R, D %;I volatiles released ;.;5
RC;.2 >.>%E:;@ Confine!ent survives without s#ray, late core da!age recovery,
%I volatiles released
;.;<
RC? 2.@<E:;@ Confine!ent by#ass after interfacing LOC, D %;I volatiles
released
;.;%
RC5.2 %.5>E:;@ Late confine!ent failure after vessel failure, D %;I volatiles
released
;.;%
RC=.% %.%=E:;@ Confine!ent isolation failure with s#ray, 5 volatiles released ;.;%
RC;.% >.@7E:;? Confine!ent survives with s#ray, early core da!age recovery,
C %I volatiles released
;
RC% 7.>=E:%% Confine!ent survives with s#ray, =I volatiles released ;
RC7.2 @.52E:%% Confine!ent by#ass after S3$R, stuc1 o#en stea! du!# station
to the at!os#here, D %;I volatiles released
;
RC@.2 %.25E:%% Confine!ent by#ass after S3$2, stuc1 o#en stea! du!# station
to the at!os#here, D %;I volatiles released
;
RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
4"/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RESULTS 8 +o2$) o+$)at(on 8 LERF

$he large early release fre0uency is calculated fro! the release

categories, where !ore than %;I volatiles is released and the release is
initiated within 2 h after initiating events. So, the large early release
fre0uency +LER8- is given as a su! of the following fre0uencies/

LER8 L RC< M RC=.% M RC>.% M RC@.% M RC@.2 M RC7.% M RC7.2 M

RC? L %.22E:=6y

Conditional #robability of large early release given core da!age is ;.55.

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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RESULTS 8 "3*t#o2n
POS6RC *R RC;.% RC;.2 RC% RC2 RC< RC5.% RC5.2
POS% : 7.=>E:%2 %.?=E:;? 2.<7E:%< %.5%E:;? 2.;?E:;? %.@%E:;7 2.2?E:%;
POS2 : : %.%=E:;? >.@>E:%< ?.7?E:%; : %.;5E:;7 2.5%E:%%
POS< : : : : : : : :
POS5 : : : : : : : :
POS=L : : : : : : : :
POS=S : : : : : : : :
POS> : : : : : : : :
POS@ : : : : : : : :
POS7 : : <.?%E:;7 %.2>E:%2 %.=@E:;? : <.=2E:;@ @.<>E:%;
POS? : 2.2;E:%% <.@;E:;? <.%?E:%< 2.@2E:;? 5.%<E:;? <.2@E:;7 5.=?E:%;
POS%; >.%;E:;7 >.>7E:%% 2.@?E:;7 %.>2E:%2 @.57E:;? %.2>E:;7 2.=5E:;@ %.@7E:;?
SB4$"O&*
$otal
>.%;E:;7 %.@>E:%; @.<2E:;7 5.;<E:%2 %.52E:;7 %.77E:;7 >.>>E:;@ <.2<E:;?
POS6RC RC=.% RC=.2 RC>.% RC>.2 RC@.% RC@.2 RC7.% RC7.2 RC?
POS% >.;<E:%% : >.<@E:%; : %.?;E:;7 2.@7E:%5 %.>;E:;? %.@2E:%< =.>>E:%;
POS2 <.;7E:%% : 5.>>E:%; : %.<7E:;7 2.;<E:%5 %.;7E:;? %.2>E:%< <.@7E:%;
POS< <.5=E:;> : 2.7>E:;@ : : : : : :
POS5 : %.%@E:;= : =.@@E:;> : : : : :
POS=L : : : %.<%E:;> : : : : :
POS=S : %.<>E:;> : 2.7;E:;> : : : : :
POS> : %.=@E:;= : >.@>E:;> : : : : :
POS@ >.?%E:;> : =.=2E:;@ : : : : : :
POS7 %.2@E:;? : ?.2?E:%; : 2.%<E:;7 <.%%E:%5 %.7?E:;? %.?2E:%< =.?2E:%;
POS? %.52E:%; : 2.72E:;? : <.>;E:;7 =.22E:%5 <.%>E:;? <.22E:%< %.;7E:;?
POS%; >.<2E:%; : %.%>E:;7 : ?.==E:;7 %.<7E:%< ?.=%E:;? 7.>7E:%< 2.<=E:;?
SB4$"O&*
$otal
%.;5E:;= 2.77E:;= 7.=5E:;@ %.>@E:;= %.7>E:;@ 2.>>E:%< %.@2E:;7 %.>7E:%2 <.@<E:;?
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
RESULTS 8 "3*t#o2n 8 LERF

So, the large early release fre0uency +LER8- is given as a su! of the
following fre0uencies/
LER8 L RC< M RC=.% M RC>.% M RC@.% M RC@.2 M RC7.% M RC7.2 M
RC? L %.%=E:=6y

Conditional #robability of large early release given core da!age is ;.2%.

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4(/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
S$n"(t((t5 anal5"$"

Sensitivity analyses were #erfor!ed to address the factors which can

have i!#act on the release category fre0uency and !agnitude. Sensitivity
analyses were also #erfor!ed to address the 0uestions concerning
e0ui#!ent o#eration during a severe accident.

$he factors/
: Large confine!ent by#ass +recovery action-
: Bydrogen reco!biners

fter i!#le!entation of changes the large early release fre0uency will be

<.@=E:>6y for #ower o#eration.

*o i!#act of changes on the shutdown ris1, due to the high C"8

+sy!#to! based #rocedures have to be i!#le!ented-
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4)/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
S$n"(t((t5 anal5"$" 8$7*(+0$nt "*)(a,(l(t5 (n"(#$
!on4(n$0$nt

fter reviewing the environ!ental #ara!eters of a severe accident and

the critical co!#onents located inside the confine!ent, it is concluded
that the issues associated with the e0ui#!ent o#erability inside the
confine!ent are/ aerosol accu!ulation on the s#ray noAAles and high
te!#erature, #lugging and radiation.

$he engineered safety features are e9#ected to survive the #ressure,

te!#erature, radiation, debris and stea! conditions e9#ected during a
severe accident. $his evaluation covers critical e0ui#!ent located inside
the confine!ent and the safety e0ui#!ent building.
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4*/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
S$n"(t((t5 anal5"$" 8$7*(+0$nt "*)(a,(l(t5 o*t"(#$
!on4(n$0$nt

If the BPSI, LPSI #u!#s and confine!ent s#ray #u!#s are not lost in a
severe accident, then the critical co!#onents of these #u!#s can be
ade0uately cooled and !aintain o#erability in the recirculation !ode.

$his conclusion is based on a review of the (&S$ water te!#erature,

te!#erature of critical #u!# co!#onents and the #u!# !otor cooling.

In addition, a review of environ!ental 0ualification results of the #u!#

#ower cables indicated that these cables will re!ain o#erable at the
elevated roo! te!#erature. #u!# roo! e0ui#!ent inventory survey
shows that there is no other heat sensitive e0ui#!ent inside the roo!.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONCLUSIONS

8or the 4*ll +o2$) o+$)at(on it can be concluded that/

$he results indicate that, given core da!age, there is an 2=I #robability that the
confine!ent will successfully !aintain its integrity and #revent an uncontrolled
fission #roduct release. fter the i!#le!entation of the recovery actions for S3$2
and installation of hydrogen reco!biners in the confine!ent this #robability will be
increased to @5I. 8or co!#arison/ a western P&R #lant has the #robability of 75I.

$he !ost li1ely !ode of release fro! the confine!ent is a confine!ent by#ass after
S3$2 with conditional #robability of <;I. Late confine!ent failure +after > h- at
the vessel failure, with a conditional #robability of 22I, is the ne9t !ost li1ely !ode
of the fission #roduct release. 8inally, the confine!ent survives with the s#ray is
e9#ected to occur with a conditional #robability of =I #er core da!age event. $he
conditional #robability for the confine!ent isolation failure #robability without s#ray
is =I, for early confine!ent failure at the vessel failure is 5I, for other categories
%I or less.
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5$/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONCLUSIONS

.$he overall conditional confine!ent failure #robability of @=I by the #ro#osed

!odifications can be decreased to 2>I. 8or a western #lant this value is %>I.

$he results of the level 2 PS indicate that there are vulnerabilities in the area of the
#rotection against hydrogen detonation. It re0uires i!!ediate attention to i!#rove the
#lant ris1 #rofile. In addition, attention !ust be #aid to develo#!ent of S23s in
coincidence with the conclusions of this study.

)ulnerability screening was #erfor!ed based on the screening criteria #rovided for 4S
#lants in NCriteria for Selecting I!#ortant Severe ccident Se0uencesO. $he criteria
states as follows/ Any functional sequence that has a core damage frequency greater
than or equal to 1.0E-6 per year and that leads to containment failure which results in a
radioactive release magnitude greater than or equal to P!-" release category of
A#$-1"00%. $he P&R:5 release category was esti!ated as %;I of the volatile fission
#roducts. 8or the full #ower o#eration two such release se0uences e9its for category
RC5.%, one se0uence for RC>.% and one se0uence for RC@.%. Bowever, the #ro#osed
!odifications will re!ove the se0uences fro! the list of the i!#ortant se0uences in
case of RC5.% and RC@.%.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONCLUSIONS

8or the shutdown o+$)at(n' 0o#$" it can be concluded that/

$he shutdown ris1 is high for the o#en reactor vessel and o#en confine!ent. $he
reason is the high core da!age fre0uency in the shutdown o#erating !odes.
fter i!#le!entation of the reco!!ended shutdown sy!#to!:based e!ergency
#rocedures significant decrease of the shutdown ris1 is #ossible.

Installation of filtered venting syste! in the reactor hall with long ter! o#eration
could significantly decrease the release !agnitudes during the shutdown
o#erating !odes.

.I!#ortant severe accident se0uences based on the above !entioned definition

e9ists for release categories/ RC=.%, RC=.2 and RC>.2.
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International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONCLUSIONS

nu!ber of features were identified through the course of the level 2

PS which contribute to the #erfor!ance of the confine!ent/

$he !ost i!#ortant feature of the confine!ent with res#ect to the fission #roduct
retention is its ability to re!ain intact in case of the stea! over:#ressurisation.
$his construction allows natural de#osition !echanis!s to re!ove the airborne
fission #roducts fro! the confine!ent at!os#here, and #rovides ade0uate ti!e
for the additional accident !itigation activities to be i!#le!ented.

.Installation of hydrogen reco!biners are e9tre!ely i!#ortant for the severe

accident conditions. $he confine!ent can not withstand hydrogen detonation.

.$he inability to get the water into the reactor cavity #revents the e9ternal cooling
of the intact reactor vessel.

$he absence of any #enetration in the lower vessel head cou#led with the natural
circulation in the #ri!ary syste! during a high #ressure core !elt is e9#ected to
induce cree# ru#ture failure in the hot leg #i#e #rior to the vessel failure.
RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services RELKO Ltd. Engineering and Consulting Services
5"/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONCLUSIONS

."e#ressuriAation of the #ri!ary syste! #rior to the vessel failure, as a result of

the cree# ru#ture failure of a hot leg #i#e, should #reclude concerns about the
high #ressure severe accident #heno!ena +i.e., e9:vessel stea! e9#losion, direct
confine!ent heating and vessel thrust forces-.

Retention of the core debris in a dry cavity !ay induce 2CCI !elt through the
cavity floor if the core debris cannot be cooled by the water.

In.ecting water through the failed reactor vessel, in an atte!#t to cool the core
debris in the cavity, is advisable and it does not de#end on the status of the
confine!ent cooling. In.ecting water into a cavity filled with the hot core debris
results in the for!ation of the hot stea!. If the confine!ent cooling is available
this stea! is condensed. If no confine!ent cooling is available stea!ing fro!
the cavity can eventually over:#ressurise the confine!ent but the CO8s #revent
the confine!ent failure. $he radiological release conse0uences of inducing a
CO8 o#ening are e9#ected to be lower than those associated with 2CCI failure
of the cavity floor.
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54/54
International Workshop on Level 2 PSA and Severe Accident Management, 2!"1#"#2$$4 %oln, &erman'
CONCLUSIONS

Stea! inerting of the confine!ent during a severe accident can not #revent
hydrogen detonation in the (&S$.

$he insights gained through the analysis of the severe accident #rogression and
the detailed study of the related #heno!ena has #rovided a detailed
understanding of the #lant behaviour under the severe accident conditions. $he
1nowledge develo#ed can for! the basis for the future develo#!ents of S23s.