BP Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill

Authors : Komal Totlani

Sarthak Shah

MACONDO FIELD

COUNTRY
REGION
LOCATION
BLOCK
OFFSHORE/ONSHORE
OPERATOR
PARTNERS

: UNITED STATES
: GULF OF MEXICO
: MISSISSIPPI CANYON
: 252
: OFFSHORE
: BRITISH PETROLEUM
: BP (65%)
ANADARKO (25%)
MOEX
OFFSHORE2007(10%)
DISCOVERY
: 2010
ESTIMATED OIL IN PLACE : 50 MILLIONS OF BARRELS
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The Fatal Incident

The Deepwater Horizon Drilling Rig was a 9-year old semisubmersible mobile offshore drilling unit, a massive floating that
could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet deep and drill down to
30,000 feet.

At approximately 9:45 pm on April 20, 2010, high pressure methane

gas from the well expanded into the drilling riser and was released
onto the drilling rig, where it ignited and exploded, engulfing the
drilling rig.

Efforts by multiple ships to douse the flames were unsuccessful.

After burning for approximately 36 hours, the Deepwater Horizon
sank on the morning of April 22, 2010.

The Fatal Incident

An oil leak was discovered on the afternoon of April 22 when a large
oil slick began to spread at the former rig site. According to the Flow
Rate Technical Group, the leak amounted to about 4.9 million
barrels (780,000 m3) of oil, exceeding the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil
spill as the largest ever to originate in U.S.-controlled waters and the
1979 Ixtoc I oil spill as the largest spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

EIGHT CATASTROPHIC FAILURES THAT

LED TO THE ACCIDENT

Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons

Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons

Negative pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not
been established

Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in riser

Well control response actions failed to regain control of well

Diversion to mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto rig

Fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition

Blowout preventer (BOP) emergency mode did not seal well

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Important failures from my perspective

THE CEMENT FAILED
Cement is supposed to protect the outside of the well pipe and is used to
seal off a well when needed.

PROBLEM:
Either the primary or secondary cementing failed, pushing a huge column of
natural gas in and through the casing.

Primary and Secondary Cementing Process.

The Negative Pressure Test was accepted

although well integrity had not been established

Prior to temporarily abandoning the well, a negativepressure test was conducted to verify the integrity of
the mechanical barriers.
The test involved replacing heavy drilling mud with
lighter seawater to place the well in a controlled
under balanced condition.
The Transoceanic rig crew and BP well site leaders
reached the incorrect view that the test was
successful and that well integrity had been
established.
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 THE BLOWOUT
PREVENTER FAILED
The BOP stack is a 450-ton
series of
valves developed to prevent a
gusher if the mud control is
overwhelmed.

PROBLEM:
With only seconds to react, rig
operators fired off the shear
ram, but it only partially
sheared the drill pipe. A joint
may have been in the way, or
the ram was fouled by pieces
of casing or cement from the
blowout. For days, remotely
operated robots tried to fire off
the ram manually, but failed.
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THE BOP EMERGENCY MODE DID NOT SEAL

THE WELL
Three methods for operating the BOP in the emergency mode were
unsuccessful in sealing the well.

The explosions and fire very likely disabled the emergency

disconnect sequence, the primary emergency method available to

the rig personnel, which was designed to seal the well bore and
disconnect the marine riser from the well.

The automatic mode function (AMF), which was designed to seal the

well without rig personnel intervention upon loss of hydraulic

pressure, electric power and communications from the rig to the
BOP .There was a fault in a critical solenoid valve and AMF batteries
had insufficient charge.

Evidence indicated that BSR closed 33 hours after the explosion

when a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) activated the auto shear

function.
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Source: BP Deepwater Investigation Report, 2010

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ECOSYSTEM DISTURBED/HEAVILY DAMAGED !!

Spreading Stain

Hermit crabs struggle to cross a patch

of oil from the the Deepwater Horizon
spill on a barrier island near East Grand
Terre Island, La, Sunday, June 6, 2010.
(AP Photo/Charlie Riedel)

The slick has spread from the

wetlands of Louisiana to the
beaches of Alabama, above, and as
far away as Florida.

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Many rescued birds fail to survive an

oiling, even if they get cleaned,
especially since they are returned to a
habitat that is still badly
contaminated.

Shoreline heavily eroded, with

the lush marsh grass and
mangrove trees mostly dead or
dying.

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STEPS TAKEN

Immediately after the Exxon Valdez blow in Alaska came up

the OIL PROTECTION ACT (OPA) in 1990 which got testified
by this disaster.
And as a result of the 4.4 million barrels of oil discharged the
government had estimated that BP had removed
1. A quarter by recovering of burning the oil.
2. Another quarter had evaporated.
3. The third quarter had dispersed in the water
column.
4. The last quarter remained as slicks on the surface
or had washed up on the shore.
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The long term concern for the scientists is the dispersed oil in water
which has adverse effects on the marine life.
Also the deep waters of the gulf show oxygen depleted zones
showed and hence a significant depletion of the plankton and
copepods which scientists attribute to the spill.

Hence Nano sponge

A nano wire membrane that sops up oil while repelling water could
be used for cleaning up oil spills. A thin membranes made from a
web of nano wires might become a promising tool for cleaning up oil
spills and removing toxic contaminants from groundwater. The new
membrane absorbs oil and solvents and is super hydrophobic, which
means it strongly repels water.

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Industrial Solutions
To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatory
oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production require
reforms even beyond those significant reforms already initiated
since the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

On January 11, 2011 The National Commission on the BP

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released the final
report on its investigation into the Deepwater Horizon Oil spill.

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Key Commission
Recommendations
Congress and the Administration should create an independent

safety agency within the Department of the Interior, headed by an

official shielded from political interference by a fixed term.

Spill response planning by both government and industry must

improve. Industry spill response plans must provide realistic

assessments of response capability, including well containment.
Government review of those plans must be rigorous and involve all
federal agencies with responsibilities for oil spill response.

The federal government must do a better job of integrating state and

local officials into spill planning and training exercises. Industry
needs to develop, and government needs to incentivize, the next
generation of more effective response technologies.

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Key Commission
Recommendations
Greater attention should be given to new tools, like coastal and

marine spatial planning and ocean observation systems, to improve

environmental protection, management of OCS activities, and
ecosystem restoration efforts in marine environments.

The oil and gas industry must adopt a culture of safety. Today, each

company has its own view of what constitutes safe operations. Much
as the aviation, chemical, and nuclear power industries have done in
response to disasters, the oil and gas industry must move towards
developing a notion of safety as a collective responsibility, with a
focused commitment to continuous improvement and a zero failure
rate.
The penalties paid by BP and other parties responsible for the oil
spill should be primarily devoted to Gulf restoration. The Gulf will
continue to be under stress as energy development continues.

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Other Possible Recommendations: Relief wells : We require drilling companies to drill their relief wells

first, before they strike oil. Then, if there is a problem with the main
well, the relief wells are already in place and can be activated in a
few hours rather than a few months. If there is some technological or
production reason that means you dont want relief wells penetrating
into the main well bore if no emergency arises, then there is an easy
solution. Drill 99% of the relief well, and leave the last bit undrilled.
Then, if there is an emergency, 99% of the work to create a relief
well is already complete. It takes days to finish the relief well rather
than months.

On September 19, 2010, the relief well process was successfully

completed by the Development driller III and the federal government

declared the well "effectively dead".

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How The Relief Well operates to intersect the faulty main well and stop the flow of20
hydrocarbons

The Development Driller III has increased the recovery of oil by drilling relief wells at the fatal accident site.

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Other Alternative :
A preferred alternative in high-pressure deepwater is a "liner" design in
which drillers install and then cement in place a short string of casing in the
lower reaches of the well before casing the rest of the well. This design
enables the driller to watch for leaks while the cement is setting.

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BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Cement design and testing should be done properly

Appropriate number of centralizers should be used

Well integrity should be monitored at all times

Care should be taken while performing simultaneous

activities
Conduct periodic assessments of competency that include
testing of knowledge and demonstration of the practical
application of skills

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 Developing a certification process to assure and maintain

proficiency.
Require hazard and operability (HAZOP) reviews of the surface gas
and drilling fluid systems
Develop a clear plan for ROV intervention (independent of the rigbased ROV) as part of the emergency BOP operations
Require drilling contractors to implement a qualification process to
verify that shearing performance capability of BSRs is compatible
with the inherent variations in wall thickness, material strength and
toughness of the rig drill pipe inventory.
Eliminate human judgment as much as possible where mistake could

have

huge consequences.

There should be proper communications among BP, Transocean, and

Halliburton employees regarding the risks associated with decisions
being made.
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Improved ROV Technologies as part of the emergency BOP operations.

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REFERENCES

Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, BP Investigation 2010,

BP Website:
www.bp.com/.../bp.../Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Rep
ort.pdf
The Gulf Oil Disaster National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Cheif Counsels Report (2011)
Macondo Well Incident Transocean Investigation Report, Volume 1, June
2011, Transocean website: http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/PublicReport-1076.html.
Sustainability Review 2010 BP website:bp.com/sustainability
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 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill
URL:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_spill

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