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Chap 11
Chap 11
Chap 11
Chapter 11
"Monopoly"conjuresimagesofhugeprofits,great
wealth,andindiscriminatepower,labeledrobber
barons.
Butsomemonopoliesarenotveryprofitable
Othersdominatetheirindustry
StillothersareregulatedbyStatePublicServiceor
UtilityCommissions,andmayhaveverylowratesof
returnoninvestedcapital.
Regulatedmonopoliesareknownasutilities.
2008 Thomson * South-Western
Slide 1
Economiesofscaleallowlargerfirmstoproduceat
lowercostthansmallerfirms.
Increasingreturnsinnetworkbasedbusinesses
compatibilitiesincreasemarketpenetration.
Slide 2
An Unregulated Monopoly
Monopoly is a single seller
P = 100 - Q
1. FIRM = INDUSTRY
19
60
59
40 41
So. MR = 19
where MR < P
Slide 4
Proof: Max = TR TC
Find where d/dQ = 0
PM
4.
QM
Charge highest price
that the market will bear, PM
MR
Slide 5
If P = a - bQ, then
TR = aQ - bQ2
so
MR = a - 2bQ
This is twice as steep
Slide 6
A MONOPOLY
PROBLEM
Find the monopoly quantity if: P = 100 - Q, and where
MC = 20.
Answer this by starting where MR = MC
TR = PQ = 100Q - Q2
MR = 100 - 2Q = 20
80 = 2Q
QM = 40
P [ 1 + 1/ EP ] = MC
Equation 11.2
Marginal Revenue
Slide 8
Optimal Markups
The optimal markup can be found using this same formula.
P = [ED /( ED+1)]MC.
The optimal markup m is: (1+m) = [ED /( ED+1)]
Hence: m = - 1 / ( ED + 1)
For example, if ED = -3, the markup is 50%, since = [-1/( -3
+1)] = .50
If ED = -4, the markup is 33.3%, since his is where [-1/( -4
+1)] = .333.
If the price elasticity is infinite, the markup is zero. This
occurs in competition, where m = -1/(- + 1) = 0.
Slide 9
ANSWER
EP = - 3
& MC = 100
Whats PM ?
If
P[ 1 + 1/( - 3) ] = 100
P[ 2/3 ] = 100
So, P = $150.
If EP = -5, then optimal
monopoly price falls to
$125.
The more elastic is the
demand, the closer is
price to MC.
Slide 10
( 4. 5)
P = $47.36
Slide 11
Limit Pricing
An established firm considers the possibility
of new entrants with distaste.
Suppose a new entrant would have a Ushaped average cost curves.
Suppose also that the established firm has
created some brand loyalty, such that
entrants must under-price them to take away
their customers.
AC
Slide 13
Profit Profiles
ACPC
PL
II
D
ACestablished
DPC
I
time
Regulated Monopolies
Electric Power Companies
Natural Gas Companies
Communication Companies (telephone,
cable, radio, TV, etc.)
Natural Monopolies
Declining Cost
Industries
economies in
distribution
economies of scale
Without Regulation
they face Cyclical
Competition with
prices gyrating
between PM and PC.
railroad history includes
periods of huge profits then
bankruptcies
DEMAND
PM
AC
MC
PR = AC
PC = MC
QM
Q R QC
MR
Slide 16
Solutions to the
REGULATE, prevent
entry, & set P = AC
common in US for
subsidies require some form of
electricity, water
taxation, which will tend to distort
work effort.
FRANCHISE through
subsidies to AMTRAK
a bidding war, likely
P = AC
Cable T.V.
concessions at various
stadiums
Slide 17
Slide 18
price
Pp
Po
Off Peak
Demand
Q0 QP
Slide 19
General Solution
P(peak) = variable costs + capital costs
P(off-peak) = variable costs only
Some argue that off-peak users benefit from
capacity
Electrical Case: Less chance of a brown out
Amusement Park: Off peak users enjoy more space
Then off-peak users should pay for some part of the
capacity cost
Slide 20