Th e Q u e b

ec Bridge
A ug us t 2
Collapse
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Presented to- Dr Thanakorn

Contents
0 Location.
0 Purpose of the Bridge
0 History
0 Hierarchical Management Structure
0 Design
0 Cause of collapse
0 The aftermath
0 The second Bridge
0 Summary
0 Conclusions

Location

St. Lawrence River

Quebec Province

Quebec Bridge

Purpose for the bridge

Fig. St Lawrence River in winter

The river was approximately 1 km wide at its

narrowest section, 58 m deep at the middle, water

with velocity 13-14 km/hr. and tides as high as 5m.

The St. Lawrence River was the main channel of

trade for Quebec during summer while during winter

there were no trade due to frozen water.

The St. Lawrence River became a barrier to east-

west transportation.

5 River
St. Lawrence

History
0 In 1882 Quebec Bridge Company was granted the contract for

the bridge.
0 Due to short finance, nothing was done until 1887 when the
Quebec Bridge was incorporated with the Railway Company.
0 Now the new management demanded to get the project rolling
a.s.a.p. and Theodore Cooper, the most reputed engineer of
that time became the main consulting engineer of the project.
He was from the US
0 Cantilever type bridge was chosen to be superior to arch and
suspension bridge as suggested by Gustav Eiffel and other not
ed engineers.
0 Proposals were called for in Sep 1898.
0 Substructure- Davis Firm
0 Superstructure- Phoneix Bridge Company(PBC), which had never

constructed any bridge longer than 90 m

0 Initial design was produced by Peter Szlapka, which was

reviewed and approved by Cooper

Hierarchical Management
Structure
Quebec Bridge &
Railway
Company(Owner)

Theodore Cooper
(Consulting Eng.)

Norman McLure
(Onsite personal
assistant of
Cooper)

Phoenix Bridge
Company
(Contractor)

Edward
Hoare(Onsite
chief design eng.)

General workers
& others

Design
899.1 m
487.7 m
205.7 m

171.5 m

144 m
548.6 m

45.7 m

0 Cantilever superstructure with two main

supports placed 487.7 m apart and total length o

f 899.1m, however in May 1900 the span was inc
reased to 548.6 m
0 Weighed a total of 28,122 tons.
0 Cooper said that this would be the best and
cheapest plan and proposal.

With this design the construction was started on

2nd Oct 1900.

Erection of the superstructure

portion of the bridge begin on 22n
d
July, 1905

And the bridge

collapsed on 29th Aug,
1907
at 5:30 PM
19000 tons of steel fell into the river within 15
seconds
75 workers were killed, only 11 could survive.
Only the standing structure was the supporting
pier.

0 The bridge collapsed

due to the buckling of

the compression me
mber

Tension members
Fig. Bridge just before collapse

Compression members

Causes of Collapse
0 Design Aspects
0 Technical Aspects
0 Ethical Aspects
0 Procedural and

Professional Aspects

0 Financial Aspect

Design Aspect
A Balanced Cantilever Bridge

Central Span
Fig. Schematic diagram of the bridge

Cantilever arms

Anchor arms

Fig. The distribution of forces

is clear in this demonstration
using chairs, poles,
counterweights, and humans

Anchor Post AB in tension

Upper Chord BC, CD in tension
Central Tower CE in compression
Lower Chord BE, ED in compression

Design Aspects
487.7
548.6 m
m

Initially the span of the bridge

was designed for 487.7 m but

later Cooper increased the
span to 548.6m without recal
culating the stresses.

He increased the original

allowable stress for the

bridge.

He allowed 145 Mpa for

normal loading and 165 Mpa

under extreme loading conditi
on

His allowable

stresses were higher

than those in use tod
ay by 3.3-8.7%

These allowances

were questioned, ho
wever, they were ac
cepted solely on Coo
pers reputation

Design Aspects
P
At that time the knowledge

about the compression

members were less develop
ed and there was no metho
ds for testing the
compressive members.

x
y
P

Technical Aspects

Fig. Second Quebec Bridge

0 The top and bottom chords for the anchor a

nd cantilever arms were designed as straigh

t members,
but as shown in fig
they were slightly curved.

Fig. First Quebec Bridge

0 This reduced the

buckling capacity of the

compression members

Technical Aspects

0 The stressed were not

recalculated once
Cooper increased the
span from 487.7 m to 5
48.6 m.

0 The new stresses were

7% higher

0 The new weight was

10% higher

0 At the time this error

was discovered a
large portion of the f
abrication has been
completed and a con
siderable amount of
bridge erection was
finished.

Ethical Aspects
Amount of Deflection
Date of
Observation
Jun
e 15

Member

June

A3R & A4R

June

A7R & A8R

June

A8R & A9R

June

A8L & A9L

August 6

7L & 8L

August

8L & 9L

August 20

8R

August

9R & 10R

August 23

5R & 6R

August 27

A9L

mm

1.5 6.5
1.5
6.5
1.5
6.5
1.5
6.5
19
19
8
Bent
------13
57

inches

7L

1/16 to
1/16 to
1/16 to

8L

1/16 to 0 The workers had reported the

bending of members as early as

in June but the engineers did not

stop the work.

0 Coopers decision were not

5/16
questioned even when they see
Bent
med unusual because of his eng
ineering expertise.
------
2

Procedural and Professional

Aspects

0 Because of his ill health,

Cooper controlled the

project from New york a
nd never visited the site
once the construction of
superstructure started.

0 There was no one on the

job site qualified to

oversee this type of wor
k, or in position to make
a decision

Funding
0 Since from the beginning

the QBC had suffered a

serious financial problem.

0 The PBC offered to prepare

the plans for the bridge

free of charge and in return
the QBC would be obliged t
o give the contract for cons
truction to PBC. So there w
as doubt about the fair com
petition in the tendering.

The QBC did not have

enough fund to test for the
critical members.

The Compression Member

0 When the compression

member later tested,

the lattice system
failed explosively beca
use its rivets sheared l
eading to the immediat
e buckling of the chord

lattice

0 The results confirmed

that the chords were

inadequately designed.

Fig. Test of modal chord

The Aftermath
0 Of the 86 men who were still on

the bridge at the time of the colla

pse only 11 survived

0 The Royal Commission attributed

the failure to defective design and

errors in the judgment of Theodor
e Cooper

0 Coopers career ended, and as a

result he retired from public life an

d died in his home on August 24, 1
919, at the age of eighty.
23

Was Cooper
unaware
about the
deflection of
the member?

NO

0 He was reported by his

onsite inspector as early as

in mid June.
0 He thought the bents were
due to some reasons other
than over stressing and did
not stop the work.
0 However, later he accepted
the problem and ordered to
stop the work
0 But the bridge collapsed on
the same day.

0 During 1905, the member

A9L was dropped and bent

while erecting.
it was repaired and placed
in the structure.
Later it was found to be the
triggering cause of collapse.

The Second Bridge

After the collapse the

government took over the

design and construction.
The c/s area for the critical
compression member
were increased to 230% of
the original c/s area.
Old-543,000mm2
New-1,250,000

It also suffered collapse in

1916 when a casting in

lifting apparatus broke an
d the center span fall into
the water.

Centre span
13 workers lost their lives.
5000 tons of steel sank to

the bottom of the river to

rest beside the wreckage
of the first bridge, which
still remains there today.

Fig. Second bridge

0 The second bridge was finally completed

in 1917 and it weighed two and half times

as much as the first bridge

Summary
0 Worlds greatest bridge was under

construction with inadequate funds for bot

h engineering works the construction proc
ess itself.
0 Such constraints delayed engineering
analysis and led to the adoption of uncons
ervative specifications.
0 Every conflict between safety and

economy was resolved in favor of econom

y

0 The whole project was under control of a

single person. There was no other indepen

dent authority for the cross check.

Conclusions
(Lessons Learnt)

0 Modal testing should be done for every big and

important structures.
0 Always place public safety at the forefront of
your professional consciousness.
0 Maintain professional behavior and never let ego
get the better of you
0 Engineers and other in charge must be openminded to the ideas of the labors because many
labors have years of working experience
0 Always there should be a cross check. Even
experts can make mistakes.
0 All in all, have high standard of professional
conduct, be true to yourself in terms of your cap
abilities and follow the Code of Ethics.

Any Questi
on s ?

THANK YO
U

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