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Lec 14 - Game Theory & Oligopoly
Lec 14 - Game Theory & Oligopoly
Terminology and
Assumptions
Strategies
Rationality
Payoffs
Equilibrium
Common knowledge
Assumptions
Rationality
Complete knowledge of ones interests
Flawless calculation of what actions best
serve those interests
Does not imply players are selfish, short
sighted
Applies to repeated interactions
Common Knowledge
Common understanding of the key
elements of the game
List of players
Strategies
Payoffs
Assumption that each player is a rational
maximizer
Game NC1
P(U,L)>P(D,L) &
P(U, R) > P(D, R)
Similarly denoting payoff to player 2 by Q,
R is a dominant strategy for Player 2 because
Q(U, R) > Q( U, L) &
Q(D, R) > Q( D, L)
NC2
Nash Equilibrium
Nash Equilibrium
Firm 2
P= 100 q1-q2
TC = 40q2
Equilibrium
S1 = (100-q1-q2)q1
dS1/dq1 = 60-2q1-q2
S2 = (100-q1-q2)q2
dS2/dq2 = 60-2q2-q1
Solving (1) and (2)
Q1* =q2* = 20
P* = 60
S1*=S2* = 400
40q1
=0 (1)
40q2
=0 (2)
Firm 1
Best response
30
Firm 2
Best response
20
20
30
q1
20
20
30
35
q1
Lets play!
The Incentive!
The members of the best group will
get a kit kat each!
Cartel
Both decide to produce a lower
output to achieve monopoly profit
and divide the profit equally
Both agree that they will produce 15
units each
Suppose one firm breaks the
agreement?
Firm 2
15
20
15
Cartel
20
Firm 1:450,
Firm 2: 450
F1: 375
F2: 500
F1:500,
F2: 375
F1: 400
F2: 400
Firm 1
Both firms will produce 20