Professional Documents
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Mutual Funds Presentation
Mutual Funds Presentation
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j World Com Scam
j LTCM Fiasco
j Mutual Funds
¬ ntroduction
¬ Structure
¬ Advantages
¬ Types
¬ Ratios
¬ NAV
¬ Taxation , Scheme Options
¬ nvestment Strategies
¬ Current Scenario
O
About the company
j Started in 1983 by Bill fields under the name
LDDS.
j Bernard Ebbers became CEO in 1985.
j Went public in 1989 and acquired Advantages
company nc.
j Acquired many cos throughout 1990¶s.
j MC acquisition was the biggest worth $40bn.
List of acquisitions
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ëenesis of the fraud
j U.S. economy went through the consolidation
phase.
j Share prices had a big role to play.
j Tough competition from mobile telephony and e-
mails.
j Changing business conditions and earning
pressures.
j Resorted to illegal measures.
What was the scam
j Operational day to day expenses termed as
capital expenditure.
j nflated earnings around $4 billion.
j Reserve account was also manipulated.
j EBTDA would have reduced by $6 billion in
2001.
Line cost expenses(in US$ Bn)
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Man behind the scam:
Bernard Ebbers
j Borrowed more than
$1 billion and Pledged
stocks as collateral.
j $400 million loans
authorized .
j Appropriated these
loans for personal
purposes.
j Citibank had
investor¶s interests.
Downfall
j March 2002,SEC sought information about the
fraud.
j April 2002,Ebbers resigned as CEO.
j Planned to cut 17000 jobs . S&P reduced ratings.
j Share prices fell and µsecurities fraud¶ case filed
by SEC in June.
j Filed for bankruptcy ,Ebbers prisoned for 25
years.
Aftermath
j Share and bond holders left with worthless
assets.
j Debt over $30 billion,creditors were unlikely to get
paid.
j 539 Mutual funds owned $400mn in outstanding
shares.
$
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Scholes +
,
Merton
'
Meriwether
Mullins
TRADNë STRATEëES
j Fixed ncome Arbitrage deals or convergence
trades.
j There were four main types of trade:
j Convergence among U.S., Japan, and
European sovereign bonds;
j Convergence among European sovereign
bonds;
j Convergence between on-the-run and off-the-
run U.S. government bonds;
j Long positions in emerging markets sovereigns,
hedged back to dollars.
TRADNë STRATEëES
j Differences in values were tiny
j Large and highly-leveraged positions
j 1998
j Equity of $5 billion
j Borrowed over $125 billion
j Leverage factor of roughly 30 : 1.
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j ëenerous financing agreements
j LTCM¶s secrecy
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j nitial two years till the end of 1997, returns running
close to 40%, the fund has some $7 billion under
management
j From 1998, it achieves only a 27% return ²
comparable with the return on US equities that year.
j Returned about $2.7 billion of the fund's capital back
to investors because "investment opportunities were
not large and attractive enough´
j The portfolio under LTCM's control amounts to well
over $100 billion, while net asset value stands at
some $4 billion; its swaps position is valued at some
$1.25 trillion notional, equal to 5% of the entire global
market.
j LTCM was active in mortgage-backed securities and
was dabbling in emerging markets such as Russia
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j Poor risk management
recapitalize
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j n May and June 1998 returns from the fund were -
6.42% and -10.14% respectively, reducing LTCM's
capital by $461 million.
j Exit of Salomon Brothers from the arbitrage business
in July 1998.
j By the end of August, the fund had lost $1.85 billion
in capital.
j Liquidate a number of its positions at a highly
unfavorable moment and suffer further losses.
j Experienced a flight-to-liquidity. n the first three
weeks of September, LTCM's equity tumbled from
$2.3 billion to $600 million without shrinking the
portfolio, leading to a significant elevation of the
(32,+ # ( 4
j $1.6 bn in swaps
j $1.3 bn in equity volatility
j $430 mn in Russia and other emerging markets
j $371 mn in directional trades in developed
countries
j $286 mn in equity pairs (such as VW, Shell)
j $215 mn in yield curve arbitrage
j $203 mn in S&P 500 stocks
j $100 mn in junk bond arbitrage
j no substantial losses in merger arbitrage
BaLOUT
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j After the bailout, LTCM continued
operations.
j n the year following the bailout, it
earned 10 percent.
j By early 2000, the fund had been
liquidated, and the consortium of banks
that financed the bailout had been paid
back; but the collapse was devastating
for many involved.
j ëoldman Sachs CEO Jon Corzine
forced out of the office in a boardroom
coup led by Henry Paulson.
j Mullins, once considered a possible successor
to Alan ëreenspan, saw his future with the
Reserve dashed.
j The theories of Merton and Scholes took a
public beating.
j n its annual reports, Merrill Lynch observed that
mathematical risk models "may provide a
greater sense of security than warranted;
therefore, reliance on these models should be
limited.´
CURRENT STATUS
j n 1999, LTCM, Meriwether launched JWM
Partners. Haghani, Hilibrand, Leahy, and
Rosenfeld all signed up as principals of the
new firm.
j By December 1999, JWM raised $250 million
for a fund that would continue many of
LTCM's strategies²this time, using less
leverage.
j Credit Crisis, JWM Partners LLC has been hit
with 44 percent loss since September 2007 to
February 2009 in its Relative Value
Opportunity fund.
j JWM Hedge Fund shut down in July 2009.
LESSONS LEARNT
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Equity Funds can be classified
on the basis of market
capitalisation
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On the basis of investment strategy the
scheme intends to have
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DEBT FUNDS
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TOP FUNDS As on Sep 1,2009
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The Treynor ratio is a measurement of the
returns earned in excess of that which could
have been earned on a riskless investment (i.e.
Treasury Bill) (per each unit of market risk
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taxation-need
j Different tax rates for dividend and capital
gains(short/long)
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Eg: You bought units at Rs. 10,000 and sold it at Rs. 11,500,
your Profit/Capital ëain is Rs. 1,500.
The tax paid on Capital ëain is called as Capital ëain Tax.
j Tax Treatment of capital gains are different for equity and debt
Capital ëains Tax - Equity
j Short term Capital ëain Tax: 15% for equity
oriented fund
j An equity oriented fund is one which has
investments of atleast 65% in equity or equity
related instruments
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j 2 most common mistakes
Comparing PRE-TAX returns
Example: Debt Fund dividend option attracts 14.1625% DDT
and Bank FD returns are taxable as per individuals
applicable tax slab (i.e. from 10.30% to 33.99%)
WRONë TENURE for rates.
Example: nvestors compare Debt Funds (8.00% p.a.) with 5
years FD (8.50% p.a.), 3 months FD just offer 5.00% p.a.
0 -!)
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Similar to dividend payout but the amount is re-
invested in the scheme at the prevailing NAV
STP
nitial investment - in debt funds then systematically
transferred to equity funds .
j SWP
Withdraw a specified sum of money each month
from his investments in the Scheme
RUPEE COST
AVERAëNë(strategy)
j Benefits
i)When market goes UP buy less units.
ii)When market goes down buy more units.
j reference-excel sheet
CURRENT SCENARO
£ No entry load
£ No advisory fees
£ No AMC fees