Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Security Basics
Security Basics
Security Basics
Learning Objectives
Clarifyneedforsecurity(whatarewe
tryingtoprotect?)
Identifyfundamentalsecurityobjectives
Reviewbasicnetworkattacks
Classifytypicalattackers
Examinetechnicalsafeguards
Explorefirewalloptions
What do we Need to
Protect?
Data
Informationwekeeponcomputers(product
design,financialrecords,personneldata)
Losttime,lostsales,lostconfidence
Resources
Unauthorizeduseofcomputertime&space
Reputation
Misrepresentation,forgery,negativepublicity
Fundamental Security
Objectives
FourfundamentalobjectivesofInfoSecurity
ConfidentialityProtectionfromunauthorized
persons
Integrityconsistencyofdata;nounauthorized
creation,alterationordestruction
Availabilityensuringaccesstolegitimateusers
Legitimateuseensuringappropriateuseby
authorizedusers
Informationtheftnetworktaps,databaseaccess,
hackingintositestogiveoutmoreinfoorto
wrongparties
Technical Safeguards
SecurityServices
Authentication(entity,dataorigin)
Accesscontrol(preventunauthorizedaccess)
Confidentiality(disclosure,encryption)
Dataintegrity(valueofdataitem)
Nonrepudiation(falselydenyingatransaction)
Tanenbaum, Modern Operating Systems 3 e, (c) 2008 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved. 0-13-6006639
Security Models
NoSecuritynotanoption
SecuritythruObscuritydonttellanyone
whereyoursiteis
HostSecurityenforcedsecurityoneachhost;
progressivelydifficulttomanageasnumberof
hostsincrease
NetworkSecuritycontrolnetworkaccessto
hostsandservices;firewalls,strong
authentication,andencryption
Firewall Solutions
Definitionhardware&/orsoftwarecomponents
thatrestrictaccessbetweenarestrictednetwork&
theInternetorbetweennetworks
Logicallyaseparator,restricter,analyzer
Rarelyasingleobject
Restrictspeopletoenteringatacontrolledpoint
Preventsattackersfromgettingclosetootherdefenses
(hostcontrols)
Restrictspeopletoleavingatacontrolledpoint
Firewall Capabilities
Focussecuritydecisionssinglepointto
leveragecontrol
Enforcesecuritypolicyminimize
exceptions
LogInternetactivityanalysis
Limitexposureseparatesensitiveareasof
onenetworkfromanotheroroutsideworld
Firewall Limitations
Cantprotectagainst
maliciousinsiders
connectionsthatdontgothroughit
newthreats
viruses
scansforsource&destinationaddresses&
portnumbers,notdetailsofdata
Types of Firewalls
Simpletrafficloggingsystems
auditlogfileoffilesaccessed(HTTPD)
siteusage/demandhours/links/browsersused
IPPacketScreeningRouters(packetfiltering
gateway)
notonlylooksatcanitroute,butshouldit
selectivelyroutesorblockspacketsbasedonrules
basedonprotocols,destination(port80),knownsource
IPaddresses
ProxyServer(software)
Dealswithexternalserverrequestsonbehalfof
internalclients
MaylimitcertainHTTPmethods(CGIorJava
applets)
Common Solutions
ScreenedHost
Hostattachedtointernalnetworkusingseparaterouter
Internalhostisonlyinternalsystemthatnethostscanconnectto
Packetfilteringconfigurationdeterminesifinternalhostsmay
connecttootherexternalhosts
Internet
Firewall
Screening Router
Internal Network
Internet
Real Server
Dual-homed Host
Proxy
Server
External Router
(access router)
Internal Router/
(choke router)
Internal Network
Other Variations
MultipleBastionHosts
Performance,redundancy,needtoseparatedata&servers
Usenet,SMNP/DNS,FTP/WWW
MergeInterior&ExteriorRouters
Sufficientcapabilitytospecifyinbound&outboundfilters
Usuallyontheperimeternetwork
MergeBastionHost&ExteriorRouter
UseMultipleExteriorRouters
MultipleconnectionstoInternetorInternet+othersites
MultiplePerimeterNets
Redundancy,privacy
Not Recommended
MergingBastionHost&InteriorRouter
Breachofhostleavesaccesstointernalnet
UsingMultipleInteriorRouters
Routingsoftwarecoulddecidefastestwaytoanotherinternal
systemisviatheperimeternet
Difficulttokeepmultipleinteriorroutersconfiguredcorrectly
Mostimportant&complexsetofpacketfilters
Mayneedtousemultiplestoresolveperformancebottlenecks
orseparateinternalnetworks
Futures
ThirdgenerationFirewalls
combinedfeaturesofpacketfiltering&proxysystems
Client&serverapplicationswithnativesupport
forproxiedenvironments
Dynamicpacketfiltering
Packetrulesmodifiedontheflyinresponseto
triggers
UnderlyingInternetprotocolundergoingrevisions
IPv6
Cryptography Basics
Learning Objectives
Identifyrequirementsforsecure
communication
Discusscryptographictechniques
Definecryptosystems&evaluatecurrent
encryptionmethods
Reviewdigitalsignaturestandards
Discusschallengesofkeymanagement
Reviewothersecurityoptions&trust
Secure EC requirements
Foranynetworktransaction:
1.Privacy2.Confidentiality3.Integrity
Forreliable,securecommunication:
1.Authenticationwearewhowesayweare
2.Certificationguaranteeby3rdpartythatwawwswa
3.Confirmationdigitalreceiptoftransaction
4.Nonrepudiationbindingagreement,digitalproofof
transaction
5.Encryptionforalloftheabove,encodedpassageof
informationoveropennetworks
Cryptographic Techniques
Secretwritingorcrypticsymbolization
Techniqueencryptionalgorithmor
cryptosystem
definesapairofdatatransformations
encryptionanddecryption
encryption=plaintexttociphertext
bothusekeysseeminglyrandomstring
keylength(numberofbits)dependentupon
cryptosystem
Encryption Cryptosystems
Symmetricprivatekeysystems(samekey)
DESDataEncryptionStandard/56bitkey
Vulnerabletoexhaustivekeysearch(2 56possibilities)
Newstandardinprocess
Plaintext
Encrypt
Ciphertext
Decrypt
Plaintext
1978RSAreversiblecryptosystem
baseduponmultiplicationoftwoprimenumbers
possibletocrackvialargecomputerresource
1994429bitcodecrackedbyscientificcollaboration
after17years
requirescontinualupdatingofmodulustoprotect
JawsTech,Inc.4,096bit(100years)
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext
Sign
Verify
Verifies?
Signature
Senders Private key
Generation®istration(randomnumbers)
Distribution&Availability
Keybackup/recovery/keyescrow
Replacementorupdate
Protectionagainstdisclosure
Terminationorarchival(confidentiallyarchived
informationmustbeaccessibleafterkeyretirement)
transformedpassword(onewayfunction)
challengeresponse(randomvaluerecd/sent)
timestamp(synchronizedclocks)
onetimepassword(differentvarianteachlogin)
zeroknowledgetechnique(interactiveproof)
AddressbasedAuthentication(networkaddress)
PersonalTokens(hardware&pw/smartcards)
Biometrics(fingerprint,voiceprint,handwriting)
Kerberos
CompleteauthenticationsystemMIT
DESsymmetriccryptography
Onlineauthenticationservers
Hostserver&clientssharesymmetrickeys
Clientrequestsaticket/sendstoserver
Ticketinterpretedonlybycorrectserver
Sessionkeyisgeneratedbyauthenticationserverafter
successfulexchange
Authenticationservice(AS)/Ticketgranting
Service(TGS)/Client/Server(CS)authentication
exchange
Internet Security
Threelevels(Network,application,system)
Networkdatapacketintegrityintransit
(Authentication/confidentiality/accesscontrols)
IPlayer/headers+data=IPdatagram
Notinherentlysecure(IPSpoofingattacksw/false
sourceaddresses)
Authenticationheadersintegritycheckvaluesto
indicatesource&transitintegrityofdatagram
SecurityAssociation/SecurityParameterIndex
KeyManagementnosinglestandard
Hostorientedalluserssharesameassociation&key
Potentialfordecryptanothersmessages
Userorienteduserhas1ormoreassociation&keys
Lowerrisk/Superiormethod
Firewallsscreeningrouters/proxyservers,perimeternetworks
Messagingspecialsecurityneedsabovenetwork
measures
Email/mailenabledapplications
Writertoreaderprotectionviauseragent
MessageTransferAgents(MTAs)=message
transferbackbone(originating&delivering)
Internet Security
(Messaging)
BasicMessageProtectionServices
Messageoriginauthentication/content
integrity/contentconfidentiality/non
repudiationoforigin
EnhancedMessageProtectionServices
Confirmationservices(proofofdelivery&
submission,nonrepudiationofdelivery&
submission)
OtherI.e.securitylabelingservice
Internet Security
(Messaging)
SecureMessagingProtocols
PEMPrivacyEnhancedMail(basicservices)
Wrapsitselfaroundstandardmailmessage
MIMESecurityMultiparts
MultipurposeInternetExtensionssupportsstructuringof
messagebody
Differentbodypartstext,image,audio,etc
1995specifications:
SecurityMultipartsforMIME
MIMEObjectSecurityServices(MOSS)
Transformsmessagesintostandardrepresentationfortransport
Internet Security
(Messaging)
S/MIMERSAalternativetoMOSSspec
builtuponPublicKeyCryptographyStds(PKCS)
ProtectsMIMEbodyparts,w/newdatastructurethat
becomesMIMEcontent
Signed,envelopedorboth
MailermustbeS/Mcomplianttoread
PGP(PrettyGoodPrivacy)freeappusingdigital
signatures&encryption
Definesownpublickeypairmgmtsystem
Casualemail,notwidescaleecommerce
Internet Security
(Messaging)
X.400Security
1984/1988internationalstdsformailgateways
SecurityfeaturesspecifictoX.400protocols
X.400securedmailcannotbeconveyedover
Inet
MessageSecurityProtocol(MSP)
US/DOSprotocolsimilartoS/MIME,PKCS
Encapsulatesmessageforbasic&some
enhancedservices
Message Protocol
Comparison
S/MIMEstrongestcommercialacceptance
PGPfree;notcompatiblew/publickeyinfrastructure;
scalabilityquestionable
MSPmostcomprehensivefeatureset;notcommercially
widespread
MOSScompatibilityissuesw/publickey;weak
commercialvendoracceptance
PEMnotcompatiblewithMIME/outdated
X.400mostcomprehensivefeatures;notcompatiblewith
Inetmessaging
Web Security
WebRisksservercontent/communications
SolutionsSSL/SHTTP/SET(evolvingstds)
SSL(SecureSocketsLayer)sessionprotection
DevelopedbyNetscapetoaddcommunicationprotection
NewlayerprotocoloperatingaboveTCPprotocol
Protectsanyapplicationprotocolnormallyoperating
overTCP(HTTP,FTP,TELNET)
HTTPsrepresentsSSLcommunicationhandling
Services:serverauthentication/clientauthentication/
integrity(checkvalues)/confidentiality(encryption)
SSLHandshakeProtocolcoordination
Negotiatesprotectionalgorithmsbetweenclientandserverfor
authentication,transmissionofkeycertificates,establish
sessionkeysforuseinintegritycheckandencryption
Domestic(128bit)andinternl(40bit)
ActiveXreusablesoftwarecomponents
SourceAuthenticationProgramsreadsignedcode
Digital Certificates
Learning Objectives
Differentiatedigitalsignatures&certificates
Definecertificateauthority&keymethods
Reviewcertificateapplicationprocess
EvaluateX.500certificateformats
Examinecertificaterevocation&suspension
Reviewcertificateinfrastructures
ExamineSETandDODMISSI
certificates
Eachrequiresaregistrationprocess
3rdParty(Open)feebasedkeydistribution
Internaltoorgorgroup(Closed)selfcontained
keydistribution&authentication
Certificateisselfprotecting
CAsdigitalsignatureisinsidethecertificate
CAssignaturewouldnotverifyiftamperedwith
Certificatesdistributedoverunsecuredchannels
DownsideismultipleCAs(certificationpath)
Certificate Issues
ValidityPeriodRestrictedlifetimes
Limitcryptanalysis&vulnerability
Scheduledstart&expiretimes
Legalaspectofclosedvs.openCAs
Openmayprovidebetterevidence
Similarroletothatofnotary
UtahDigitalSignatureLaw
Reliabilityofanydigitalsignaturedependsuponreliabilityof
aCAassociationofthekeyw/aperson
Key Management
Keypairgeneration&transfer
Keypairholdersystem
Generatedinusersystemwhereprivatekeystored
Supportsnonrepudiation/privatekeyneverleaves
Centralsystem
GeneratedinothersystemorCA
Greaterresource&controls,higherquality,backupor
archivefunctions
Mixedmethodsfortypesofkeypairs
DigitalsignatureatkeyholderencryptionatCA
Storageintamperresistantdevice(smartcard)
Storageinencryptedfile
PasswordorPINforpersonalauthentication
Softwarecontrol/digitalwallet
KeypairUpdate/policy
DifferentTypes/DifferentRequirements
RSAcanperformencryption&signatures
Digitalsigkeysshouldbecreated&remainonsystem
(ANSIX9.57);recreatedasneeded;noarchivalrequired
Encryptionkeysbackup&archivalneeded
Certificate Application
Process
RegistrationwithCertificateAuthority
Establishrelationship&providesubscriberinfo
Explicitlyapply&acceptcertificate
Authentication
Personalpresence,IDdocuments
Useofintermediariesaslocalregistrationauthorities
Distribution
Accompanyingdigitalsignature
DirectoryService(X.500standards)
Certificate Distribution
Protocols
InternationalTelecomUnion(ITU)&ISO
198488X.509forpublickeydistribution
Slowacceptanceduetocompetitiveissues
Proprietaryalternatives
MSExchange,Notesdirectory,NovellNDS,Banyan
StreetTalk
LDAP(InternetLightweightDirectoryAccess)
accessprotocolratherthandbtechnology
S/MIMEorspecializedWebServers
Issuer Unique ID
Subject Unique ID
CA Digital Signature
Version 1, 2, or 3
Unique for this certificate
Used by CA (DSS w/SHA hash *)
Issuing CA name
Start & expiry date
Holder of private key
Value of holders public key &
algorithm (RSA w/MD5 hash *)
Optional unique ID for CA
Optional unique ID for holder
* Object identifier
Certificate Extensions
X.509V.3extensionsclarifyowners&use
Key&policyinformation
Authority&SubjectkeyID,Keyuse,period,policy
Subject&issuerattributes
Alternativenames(email),Company,address,etc
Certificationpathconstraints
LinkstoCAviaroot&directoryinfrastructures
Certificaterevocationlists(CRL)
Limitedlifetime(validityperiod)
Suspectedcompromiseofprivatekey
Nameorattributechanges
RevokedbyCA,subscriber,employer
CRLcertificaterevocationlist(X.509)
Timestamped,signed,anddistributed
PostedtoWebsiteorviaX.500directory
Realtimerevocationchecking(resources)
CRL Format
Standardformatforcertificaterevocation
CRLNumber
ReasonCode
Keycompromise,CAcompromise,Affiliationchange,
superceded,cessationofoperation
InvalidityDate
DistributionPoints
Filesizecontrolentryremoval,differentCRLbyreason,
CAcontrol
CRLholdlistforsuspension
Validity Periods
EncryptionKeyPairs
Publickeyusedonlywhilecertificateisvalid
Privatekeyfordecryptionpartoflocalpolicy
DigitalSignatureKeyPairs
Historicvalidation(nonrepudiation)
Allcertificates,CRLsorstatusasitexisted
Realtime(validcertificateexistsnow)
Softwarepub,CAsignonapublickey,timestamp
CASignatureKeyPairs
Bothrealtime&historicvalidation/impactsallcertificates
signed
Certificate of Authorization
Properuse(i.e.purchasingauthority)
Commitcorporation,authorizedofficial,guaranteeing
authenticity(i.e.software)
Authorizationinformation
Certificatecanconvey(BasicConstraintsfield)
CAcertifyingidentitymaynotknow/corp.security
Authoritymaychangepriortovalidityperiod
AttributeCertificates(boundtocertificatesubject)
ANSIX9fromfinancialindustry/attributeauthority
PrivilegeAttributeCertificate(passedtoapplicationserver&
attachedtosession)
Certificate Infrastructures
SDSI(SimpleDistributedSecurityInfrastructure)
1996SubsetofX.509functionality/omitscomplexity
Specifieslocallinkednaming(personcompany)
Addssimpletypesofauthorization(groupdefinition,
delegationcertificate)
SPKI(SimplePublicKeyInfrastructure)
UnderdevelopmentinIETF
Assignsauthorizationstoapublickeyw/obindingidentityto
companionprivatekey
Simplerencodingscheme/closedgrouppotential
Scalability
MultipleApplications
InteroperabilityamongInfrastructures
MultiplePolicies&Paths
SimpleRiskManagement
LimitationofCALiability
Standards/StructuringConventions(TrustModels)
Infrastructure Evolution
GeneralHierarchies
TopdownHierarchies(PrivacyEnhanced
MailPEM)
InternetPolicyRegistrationAuthority(IPRA)
OperatedbyMITunderInternetSociety
PolicyCertificationAuthorities(PCA)
MustregisterwithIPRA/specializedorclosed
LowerLevelCertificateAuthorities
Representorganizationsordepartments
Evolution (cont.)
ForestofHierarchies
Trustissueofasingleauthority
Internationalconsiderations
DODproposingw/defenseorgsofalliednations
Complexityincreasesasitgrows
PGPsWebofTrust(EachuserisownCA)
Usercollectskeysonakeyringanddesignatestowhat
extentthekeyistrusted
Certificate Policies
ProgressiveConstraintTrustModel
AnyCAspecifiesconditionsorlimitationson
subject
CertificatePoliciesExtension
X.509V.3addsfieldforconveyingcertificate
policyreferences
Usersystemsarepreprogrammedtoacceptan
appropriatelevelofpolicyreferences
Criticalornoncriticalflags(musthavev.like)
Certificate Management
Legislation
SpottyinUSandglobal
Utah,California,Denmark,Germany,Italy
UNModelLaw/UNCITRALplannedstudy
Technologyneutralorspecific
Minimalistapproachforflexibility
Validity&enforceabilitytoelectronicmessages
Quality,Standards,&Liability
SET Infrastructure
Visa/MasterCardjointventure
Comprehensiveprotocol&infrastructure
Publickeytechnology
Encryptionofpaymentinstructions
Authenticationofcardholders&merchants
Authenticationofacquirers(processorbanks)
Integrityprotectionoftransactioninfo
Topdownhierarchyinfrastructure
RootCA,BrandCA,CardholderCA,Merchant
CA
PolicyApprovingAuthority
PolicyCreatingAuthority
AdministrativeCA
OrganizationalRegistrationAuthority