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Hazard Assessment Using Fuzzy Preference Relational Approach
Hazard Assessment Using Fuzzy Preference Relational Approach
Hazard Assessment Using Fuzzy Preference Relational Approach
Guided by,
Mr.Linjesh Sabastian
Presented by,
Ashi Sudhakar P.K
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INTRODUCTION
Theconstructionindustryfaceslotofhazardsituations.
Themainlyusedmethodsare
Preliminaryhazardanalysis(PHA),
Failuremode&effectanalysis,
Hazard&operabilityreview(HAZOP),
Faulttreeanalysis(FTA)and
Possibilityapproach(fuzzysettheory).
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Objectives:
Tounderstandthepossiblehazardsthatlikelyto
occurinaconstructionindustry
Hazardassessmentusingconsistentfuzzypreference
relationalapproach
FireandExplosionHazards
ChemicalHazards
ElectricalHazards
MechanicalHazards
FIRE HAZARDS
SOURCE OF FIRE HAZARDS
Combustibleandflammableliquid
Heatutilizationsequipments
Chemicalprocessequipment
Lighting
Ovenandfurnaces
Dehydratoranddryers
Reactors
Weldingandcutting
CHEMICAL HAZARDS
Class A:
compressedgas,dissolvedgasorliquefiedgas
Class B
flammablegases,flammableandcombustibleliquids,
flammablesolids,flammableaerosols,reactiveflammable
material
Class C
Oxidizingmaterials-oxidizer&organicperoxide
Oxidizer:chlorates,nitricacid,peroxides,permanganates,
nitrites,nitrates,easilyoxidizemetalpowder
Organicperoxide:tetrahydrofuran,diethylether,dioxane,
methylisobutylether
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Class D:
poisonous&infectiousmaterialse.g.,cyanides,tea
salts,asbestos
Class E:
corrosivematerialse.g.,inorganicacidsandbases,
hydrogenfluoride
Class F:
Dangerousreactivematerialse.g:ethylenedioxide,
organicazides,Na,Li,Ca
Pyrophosphoricmaterialse.g:whitephosphorus,
diethylaluminiumchloride,lithium
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ELECTRICAL HAZARDS
CAUSES
Contactingoverheadpowerlines;
Faultyinsulation
Impropergrounding
Looseconnections
Defectivepartsinequipment
Unguardedliveparts
Intentionaluseofobviouslydefectiveandunsafetools
Useoftoolsorequipmenttooclosetoenergizedparts
MECHANICAL HAZARDS
Insecurelyfixedmachines
FailureofStandardOperatingProcedure(SOP)
DangerousParts
Negligence
Impropermaintenanceofequipment.
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HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Ifhazardsareidentifiedchanceofoccurrenceof
accidentcanbeminimized
Safetyprogrammes&recordscanbeimproved
Hazardidentificationanalysishelpsto:
Detectproblems
Understandtherelationshipbetweenthesystemandthe
probleminordertoeliminatetheproblem&itspotential
consequences
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METHODS OF HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION
1) Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA)
Itservesasaguideformorein-depthanalysisas
moreinformationbecomesavailable
Focusesonwhatisalreadyknownaboutthe
product,processorchangetobemade
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Consistof:
Identifyingallpotentialhazardsandaccidental
eventsthatmayleadtoanaccident
Ranktheidentifiedaccidentaleventsaccordingto
theirseverity
Identifyrequiredhazardcontrolsandfollow-up
actions
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Environmentalconstraintsincludingoperatingenvironments
Safetyrelatedequipment,safeguards,andpossiblealternate
approaches
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Step-by-stepapproachforidentifyingallpossible
failuresinadesign.
Amanufacturingorassemblyprocess,oraproduct
orservice
Systemisbrokendownintoallitscomponents
Acriticalityratingforeachfailuremode
dependingondegreeofhazardposedbyfailure
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Itencouragescreativityindesignconceptevaluation.
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FTAisadeductivereasoninganalysisapproachfor
resolvinganundesiredeventintoitscauses
Proceeds in a logical manner to examine events
whichprecedeoccurrenceoftopevent
Logic diagrams and Boolean Algebra are used to
identifythecauseofthetopevent
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Faulttreeisthelogicalmodeloftherelationshipof
theundesiredeventtomorebasicevents
ThetopeventoftheFaulttreeistheundesiredevent
Themiddleeventsareintermediateeventsandthe
basiceventsareatthebottom.
Thelogicrelationshipofeventsareshownbylogic
symbolsorgates.
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Constructiontechnologyisbecomingmoreandmore
complicated.
Averyconvenientandmeaningfultool
Fuzzysettheoryisasupersetoftheclassicalbinaryor
Booleanconventionallogic.
Setoperationsarelogicalmathematicalformulations
thatguidetheinteractionbetweenelementsofaset.
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10hazardoustradesandtheir39attributestoassessthe
projecthazardlevel.
Mostoftheexistingstudiesassessthehazardsusingthe
probabilityapproach.
Fuzzysettheoryisusedtodeterminetheriskimpactof
attributes
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Ahighervalueimplieshigherriskimpact
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Traditionalassessmentmethodswerepurelysubjectivein
natureanddependedonhistoricaldata.
Reducesthenumberofpairwisecomparisonstobemade
among alternatives and always ensures consistency in
computing.
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Studyofammoniahazard
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Fuzzyriskassessmentmodelwithsamplesoffour
categories
People,environment,assetandreputation
Membershipfunctionsandrangeshavebeenassigned
for likelihood, severity of consequences and for total
risklevels.
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Theprocessesisfuzzification,inferenceengineand
defuzzification.
Risklevelscoremorepreciselyandaccurately
Reducetheriskrankingties
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CONCLUSIONS
Theconstructionindustryfaceslotofhazardsituations
Manymethodsavailableforhazardidentification.
Comparingwithothermethodsfuzzyissimple,speedy,
andmoreconsistentincomputingthehazardindexofa
project.
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REFERENCES
[1]. HOU Zhi-qiang, ZENG Ya-mei, ,Research on Risk
Assessment Technology of the Major Hazard in Harbour
Engineering,ProcediaEngineering137(2016)843848
[2].Pinto,A.,Ribeiro,R.A.,andNunes,I.L.(2012).Fuzzy
approachforreducingsubjectivityinestimatingoccupational
accidentseverity.Accid.Anal.Prev.,45(Mar),281290.
[4] Zhou,Z.,Goh,Y.M.,andLi,Q.(2015).Overview
and analysis of safety management studies in the
constructionindustry.Saf.Sci.,72(Feb),337350.
[5] Kuo, Y. C., and Lu, S. T. (2013). Using fuzzy
multiple criteria decision making approach to
enhance risk assessment for metropolitan
constructionprojects.Int.J.ProjectManage.,31(4),
602614.
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