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Process Hazard Analysis
Process Hazard Analysis
Analysis
Source: R.W. Johnson, Risk Management by Risk Magnitudes, Chemical Health & Safety 5(5), 1998
Risk
Constituents of risk:
Likelihood and
Severity
of Loss Events
storage?
Are cylinders stored away from standing water?
Are cylinders stored so that objects cannot fall on them or
strike them?
Are cylinders stored so that a leak will not enter a lower
place?
Hazard Identification
Methodologies
Many hazard identification methodologies
will be aided by piping and instrumentation
diagrams (P&ID) or process flow diagrams
(PFD)
P&ID and PFD present the nominal plant or
system layout
P&ID is at an equipment and component level
PFD is a simplified P&ID to present process level
Common P&ID Legend
Common P&ID Legend
Common P&ID Legend
Common P&ID Legend
Common P&ID Legend
Common P&ID Legend
Predictive studies
Scenario:
An unplanned event or incident sequence that results in a
loss event and its associated impacts, including the
success or failure of safeguards involved in the incident
sequence.
- CCPS 2008a
Scenario necessary ingredients:
Initiating cause
AND
Loss event or safe outcome
Example of a simple scenario:
While unloading a tankcar into a caustic storage tank, the
tank high level alarm sounded due to the person
unloading not paying close attention to the operation.
The operator noticed and responded to the alarm right
away, stopping the unloading operation. Normal
production was then resumed.
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at I
Wh
What-If Analysis
persons)
Process divided up into segments (e.g., unit
operations)
Review from input to output of process
2. A chlorine
main cylinder
valve develops
a leak while
the cylinder is
in operation?
3. The pressure
reducing valve
vent becomes
stuck in the
open position?
Hazard and Operability Study
O P
AZ
H
HAZOP Study
HAZOP study process was developed within the
process industries
Team-based approach
Needs well-defined system parameters
Used as hazard and/or operability study method
Safety issues dominate for existing process
Operability issues prevail for new designs
Many issues relate to both safety and operability
HAZOP Study
Assumptions:
No incidents when system operates as intended
(normal operation)
Failure scenarios occur when system deviates from
Level
Pressure (blanketed)
Material specifications
Flow rate
Fuel Pressure
Storage Temperature
Tank
Reactor
Residence time
Mixing
Level
Pressure
Design/operational INTENT
INTENT
Example:
The intent of a storage tank is to:
Maintain a working inventory of liquid RM-
12 which is supplied by tank (rail) cars from
outside suppliers. The node does not include
the tank loading systems.
HAZOP Guide Words
Guide WordMeaning
NONE Negation of intent
MORE OF Exceed intended upper limit
LESS OF Drop below intended lower limit
PART OF Achieve part of intent
AS WELL AS Something in addition to intent
REVERSE Logical opposite of intent occurs
OTHER THAN Something different from intent
Deviations from Intent
Deviation
Deviations
A deviation is an abnormal situation, outside defined
design or operational parameters.
Hazards
Deviation
No Flow
Low Temperature
High Pressure (exceed upper limit of normal range)
Less Material Added
Excess Impurities
Transfer to Wrong Tank
Loss of Containment
etc.
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Design Intent Example NO / NONE MORE OF LESS OF
Contain the working inventory Procedure started too late
Containment lost Procedure started too soon
of liquid RM-12
Procedure step skipped Procedure done too long Procedure stopped too
Too much [function] soon
No [function] Too much transferred Not enough [function]
No transfer Too much agitation Not enough transferred
No agitation High [controlled variable] Not enough agitation
No reaction High reaction rate Low [controlled variable]
High flow rate Low reaction rate
High pressure Low flow rate
High temperature Low pressure
Low temperature
PART OF AS WELL AS REVERSE OTHER THAN
Cause Deviation
Loss events
Determine cause and deviation consequences,
assuming failure of protection safeguards
Take scenario all the way to a loss consequence
Consequences can be anywhere and anytime
Deviation Mitigated
Loss Event
Impacts
Unmitigated
HAZOP Exercise
Work in Groups
Fill out the HAZOPS analysis sheet:
Guide
Finding/Rec
Word, Value Causes Consequences Safeguards
.#
Deviation
Comments
LEVEL High 1. High flow into T-100 1. Overflow could cause Inlet valve, level control Increase the
2. Failure of the T-100 level injury to operator in area. systems, and pumps are frequency of
control system. 2. Overflow would be inspected and replaced maintenanc
3. Pumps-101A and B both contained by secondary on a regular maintenance e
stop. containment system. schedule. inspections.
No environmental hazard
There is a redundant Test integrity
identified. level control system. of secondary
containment
Secondary containment .
system designed to
capture 50% overflow
LEVEL Low 1. Possible damage to Inlet valves, level control Increase the
Pump, P101A, impeller, systems, and pumps are frequency of
leading to vibration and inspected and replaced maintenanc
leak and personal injury. on a regular maintenance e
schedule. inspections.
between causes and between causes and between causes and between causes and between causes and
operations
Higher level of effort Lower level of effort Higher level of effort Highest level of effort Higher level of effort
Can analyze complex Mostly appropriate for Best analyzes Can analyze complex Can analyze complex
processes with simpler operations processes with single- processes with processes with
multiple safeguards point failures multiple safeguards multiple safeguards
safeguards safeguards
Distinguishes
safeguards safeguards
between causes and
Only looks at causes Only studies causes Looks at all failure Only studies causes Looks at all
that could lead to from checklist and modes of all and safeguards safeguards protecting
deviations what-if questioning components related to top event against cause
Hazard and Risk Analysis
PHA Team Review
The following are common to all PHA team reviews:
Team composition
Preparation
3 Methodology
Familiarize team members with methodology to
be used
Explain why selected methodology is appropriate
for reviewing this particular process
First team review meeting
5 Process overview
Prearrange for someone to give brief process
overview, covering such details as:
Process, controls
Equipment, buildings
Personnel, shift schedules
Hazardous materials, process chemistry
Safety systems, emergency equipment
Procedures
What is in general vicinity of process
Have plant layout drawings available
First team review meeting
6 Unit tour
Prearrange for tour through entire facility to be included
in team review
Follow all safety procedures and PPE requirements
Have team members look for items such as:
General plant condition
Possible previously unrecognized hazards
Human factors (valves, labeling, etc.)
Traffic and pedestrian patterns
Activities on operator rounds (gauges, etc.)
Emergency egress routes
First team review meeting
7 Review previous incidents
Review all incident and near-miss reports on file for the
process being studied
Also review sister-plant and industry-wide incidents for the
type of process being studied
Identify which incidents had potential for catastrophic on-
site or off-site / environmental consequences
Make sure detailed assessment (e.g., HAZOP Study)
covers all previous significant incidents
First team review meeting
Describing the concern as part of the finding will help ensure the actual
concern is addressed
Use of words such as these warrants follow-up to ensure the teams
concern was actually addressed:
CONSIDER
STUDY
INVESTIGATE..
PHA risk-control actions
4
2 - Present findings &
recommendations
PHA team Line management
4
3 - Line management response
Suggestions:
Use database or spreadsheet
HOW?
Train through plant training
WHAT?
Physical changes
WHY?
What are two or more reasons why it is
important to communicate PHA action
items to affected employees?
Final word