Democratic Reform for

Hong Kong

Ming SING
Division of Social Science
HKUST

04/25 1
/17
 Outline

1. Overall Governance Problems result from lack of

democracy
2. Global democratization & Benefits of liberal democracy
3. Development of Democratization in HK
4. Is HK ready for having full democracy?
5. Costs of delay installing liberal democracy
6. Beijings Two Central Concerns on democracy
7. Development since 2003
8. Debate over 2 Strategies: Negotiation vs. Mass Mobilization

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1. Eight fundamental Problems Induced by Non-democratic
Structure
1. Needs Support of Business Sector and pro- government
parties - Slow to Launch Important & Urgent Reforms

2. Lack Electoral Legitimacy: Difficult to implement

controversial but important policies which are
beneficial for long term Development of Hong Kong

3. Worsening Cronyism

4. Friends and foes approach sap public support-

5. Rising Social Inequality

6. non-democratic Principal Officials Accountability

System
7. Distorted Political Structure: govt. lacks steady
legislative support
8. Success of Eco. Restructuring far from near: past
legitimacy formula cannot work!
The above problems reflect the
product of the absence of
democratic governance
The Danger of a Semi or Partial-
Democracy

-illiberal or partial democratic systems, which

have proven to be at best ineffective, and at
worst highly unstable
-A study concludes that political institutions are
the most important factor determining long-term
social stability.
-democratic institutions that promote fair and
open competition, avoid political polarization and
factionalism, and impose substantial constraints
on executive power are most crucial to stability
Semi-democracy leading to Instability

parochialism when major political forces, representing the interest

of close social groups, show favoritism towards insiders;
polarization when political competition becomes uncompromising
with winner-take-all struggles;
mobilization - when rival groups pursue narrow interests through
frequent collective and sometimes violent actions.
HK Increasing risk of instability

regimes that combine nominally democratic rule

with factionalized political competition and a
dominant chief executive faced odds of instability
more than two dozen times as high as the
democratic regime.
-HKSAR Govt. perceived to cater to an elite rather
than broad public interest since its narrowly
selected Chief Executive (CE) and Legislative
Council (LegCo) functional constituencies deprive
these offices of the claim to popular legitimacy.
HK Increasing risk of instability

-government opposition figures take on

uncompromising political reform
positions to garner attention.

-Increasingly popular notion that mass

political mobilization is the only way to
communicate the peoples true feeling
to the government -- a fact that
indicates a lack of popular confidence in
the official channels of representation.
2. Global Trend of Democratization -
Freedom House
The Democratic Boom
In 1974 there were only about 40 democracies in the world (27
percent of all independent states)
By 1984, there were 60 (36%)
By 1990 there were 76 (46%)
Then the Berlin Wall came crashing down:

1991: 91 democracies (50%

1995: 117 democracies (61%)
1999: 120 democracies (63%)
2. Benefits of liberal democracy
democracy promotes freedoms, rule of law, pol. Responsiveness, pol.
accountability, reduces corruption & eventually enhances political stability
Strengthens political parties & think-tanks: nurture leaders & deepen policy
research crucial to societal development
liberal democracy favors economic development, better quality of life, (Feng
2003) and need not lead to welfarism (esp. given Hong Kongs culture and
weak unions)

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Benefits of
Democracy
-Reduction of Famine
- Decrease of Wars
Improvement of Well-being or Quality
of Life: Democracies favor Higher
QualitySample
of sizeLifeOutcome
and duration
Wickrama, 96 88 countries; Demo.: a direct and statis. sig. effect on HDI (GDP per
person, life expectancy and adult literacy); variance
1980 and 90 as explained is large
DV
Przeworkski 141 countries; a. in dictatorships, birth rates higher caused by higher
et. al., 2000 fertility -- because of higher policy uncertainty, dictatorship
1950 to 1990 leads parents to "hoard parents"

b.infant mortality higher and life expectancy lower;

c. Women have more children, see more of them die, and

are themselves likely to die younger;

d. Because the difference in birth rates is larger than that

in death rates, population grows more slowly in
democracies. Therefore, per capita income grows faster in
democracies
Frey, 1999 87 countries in Democracy exerts strong causal effect on quality of life
1970, 80, and for all three periods (PQLI - Life expectancy, literacy rate
90
04/25
and infant mortality rate). /17 13
6 Governance Indicators
defined by World Bank
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability and Absence of Violence
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

04/25/1 14
7
 Rankings of Governance Scores (All 6 indicators)

Highly
democreati
c
Rankings of World Gov Indicator 2012 <descending order>
(with 5 indicators, excluding Voice and Accountability)

Country Country

Rankings of World Rankings of World

Gov Indicator 2012 Gov Indicator
2012
Finland Austria
Singapore Iceland
Sweden Germany
New Zealand Ireland
Norway Andorra
Switzerland United Kingdom
Denmark Belgium
Netherlands United States
Luxembourg Japan
Canada Chile
Australia Malta
Liechtenstein France
Hong Kong SAR, China Barbados
Cyprus
High democratic government leads to low level of
corruption
press freedom of electoral democratic government is
higher than that of non-electoral democratic government
 3. Development of Democratization
in HK
http://catalog.ust.hk/catalog/archives/669086
http://catalog.ust.hk/catalog/archives/588359:
14:00-end
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to maintain
one-party dictatorship, and worries that allowing full
democracy in HK will create demonstration effect for
Mainland, subverting the one-party dictatorship

Therefore, CCP opposes to democratic reform in HK

(e.g 1988 direct election for Legco; reverse Chris
Pattens democratic reform)
 Democratization Halted since 2004
Challenge for HK: need to fulfil promise in Basic
Law to move to full democracy:

Basic Law Article 45:

The method for selecting the Chief Executive
shall be specified in the light of the actual
situation in the HKSAR & in accordance with the
principle of gradual and orderly progress.

The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief

Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination
by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic
procedures.
 Democratization Halted since 2004

Article 68 of Basic Law:

The Legislative Council of the HKSAR shall be
constituted by election.
The method for forming the Legislative Council
shall be specified in the light of the actual
situation in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and in accordance with
the principle of gradual and orderly progress.
The ultimate aim is the election of all the
members of the Legislative Council by universal
suffrage.
Little progress in democratization since 1997
Basic Law: Annex 1
Annex 1: If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief
Executives for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments
must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the
members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive,
and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress for approval.
 Basic Law: Annex 2
Method for the formation of the Legislative
Council and its voting procedures subsequent to
the year 2007
With regard to the method for forming the
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and its procedures for
voting on bills and motions after 2007, if there is a
need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such
amendments must be made with the endorsement
of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the
Council and the consent of the Chief Executive,
and they shall be reported to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress for
the record.
 Beijing repeatedly tried to stop democratization

1. In 1984, warned against democratic reform.

2. In 1987, opposed to holding direct election for legislature in 1988.
3. 1992-97: Opposed to Chris Pattens reform and threatened with demolishing
it in 1997.
4. On July 1, 1997: reversal of Pattens reform.
5. in 2004: ruled out universal suffrage for 2007/2008

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 Beijing halted democratization in 2004

Since 2004, CCP pressurized three radio anchors to leave posts

universal suffrage not held for the 2007 CE and 2008 LegCo elections
CCP halted democratization by re-interpreting the Basic Law via the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) in Beijing in April 2004:
 Beijing halted democratization in 2004

In 2004, CCP ruled out universal suffrage for electing

HKs CE & entire legislature in 2007 and 2008
respectively & produced 2 more hurdles to
establishing democracy in HK

2 more hurdles: i) a report on HKs Constitutional

Development from the CE of HKSAR govt. to the NPCSC &
ii) a confirmation from the NPC for the real need for the
reform.

The NPCSC also stated the % between geographical

constituencies and the functional constituencies would remain
unchanged in the 2008 LegCo election, effectively ruling out
universal suffrage in the 2007/08 elections.
Beijing halted democratization
AGAIN in 2007
In 2007, the NPCSC ruled out universal
suffrage in 2012, stating that the earliest
possible time for electing the Chief Executive
and legislature would be 2017 and 2020
respectively
Beijings representative said in late 2007 that
FCs are consistent of practice of universal
suffrage, given the formers contribution to
HKs GDP.
Tsangs stance on HKs
democratization
Tsang in October 2007: democratic
development could affect social stability and
governance
People go to the extreme and you have a
cultural revolution, for instance, in China.
When people take everything into their hands,
then you cannot govern the place.
Maintain Functional constituencies to cater to
the reality of HK: still a part of universal
suffrage
not committed to further democratization in
the HKSAR
Beijing & CE tries to turn HKs Semi-
democracy into a Pseudo-Democracy

report to Beijing submitted by CE Donald Tsang on December 12,

2007
signaling that it may be at least 2020 before universal suffrage is
realized in the HKSAR
-Functional constituencies may persist and nomination of CE may be
controlled by Beijing, turning HKs semi-democracy into another
kind of semi-democracy
 Why does Hong Kong need democracy?

a.uphold Freedoms and human rights: freedom of

speech , of press etc:
-rising self-censorship among local media;
-avoid criticizing Chinese government: make it less
likely to improve under pressures;

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Why does Hong Kong need democracy?
b. Incompetent leadership, but People
Cannot Remove them rising political
discontent, disaffection, sense of
powerlessness.
c. Remove privileges created by FCs, which
have blocked passage of motions/bills
that favor improvement of livelihood
may improve income inequality,
economic competition
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 Why does Hong Kong need democracy?

d. Improve the worsening Rule-of-Law: lack of

respect for due process: e.g. Verdict on
Tungs personal assistant; Refusal of
prosecution of the former proprietor of Sing
Tao Newspaper, Anthony Cheung and Choy
So Yuk; selective prosecution of Szeto Wah;
government officials pressurized court to
review their judgment & consider asking
SCNPC to interpret the Bacic Law
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e. Enhance procedural legitimacy of Govt.
to launch reforms & Improve Governance

Raise electoral legitimacy for Govt. reduce

reluctance to launch controversial yet urgent policies
for HKs development (e.g competition law; medical
finance; expand of base of tax-payers; unlike Margaret
Thatchers policies of curbing excessive labor militancy)
f. Raise support for CE in
legislature
As long as the CEs political party becomes the majority
party, he/she gains more steady legislative support for
the passage of governments motions/bills and improve
governance.
4. Is HK now ready for liberal
democracy & full democracy?

When GDP per capita > USD 10,000

probability of breakdowns of
presidential democracies is virtually
zero (my study of 79 nations
between 1950 & 2000)
Hong Kongs level of GDP per capita
in 2003: US$28,800 (purchasing
power parity) (IMF, 2004) 36
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Is HK now ready for liberal
democracy & full democracy?
Threats for Populism?
HK peoples political tolerance & concern for stability
and prosperity is enormous
Lack severe and persistent conflicts along religious,
racial, ethnic cleavages
5. Costs of delaying liberal democracy and full
democracy

Lack of electoral legitimacy for Govt. Reluctance to launch

controversial yet urgent policies for HKs development
Cronyism, inequality, executive-legislative tensions, & rising
unwillingness to listen to consult and respect public opinions:
bad for stability, prosperity and social harmony.
HK: not a harmonious society:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=qPpCj6XlwZg&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-EF6D2ORZ0&feature=related
: 4:15-end
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2DzrfdPoJg&NR=1 : 3:45 end
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNUUCAZMiew&feature=related
: 0-end
Sluggish or pseudo democratic reform can undermine stability
& prosperity

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Support for full democracy persists
Surveys done from 2003 to 2007:
A steady majority of HK people (50% to 82%) support
implementation of liberal democracy for electing legislature and CE
ASAP.
Such support will escalate when economy turns sour and
mismanagement of policies are perceived posing incessant &
greater threats to stability

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 6. Two Central Concerns for Faster
Democratization
1. Some business leaders allegedly like to
keep functional constituencies for free
market and avoiding excessive welfare.
Narrow tax-base & populist stances of
some democrats do alarm some
capitalists and harden their rejection
of liberal democracy
http://evideo.lib.hku.hk/play.php?vid=4285951:
2nd half
2. Central Govt.s worries over HKs
subversion against PRC.04/25
40
/17
1st Concern:
Democracy excessive welfare?

Cross-national research shows strong

social democratic governments,
presence of strong labor unions and an
egalitarian culture favor emergence of
welfarism and welfare states.
How likely will such factors exist in
Hong Kong if liberal democracy is
implemented?

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1st Concern:
Democracy excessive welfare?
No consistent global evidence supporting
claim that greater democracy will bring
more social security.
In some non-democracies, their leaders
have increased social welfare spending to
justify and consolidate their rule.
A most rigorous research done on HK for
1980-2002 shows no relationship between
extent of HKs democracy since 1980s & rise
of welfare spending
04/25 42
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1st Concern:
Democracy excessive welfare?
Pan-democratic camp is internally divided on extent
of welfare & welfare policies. E.g.: Minimum Wage.

Can welfare expansion be financed by a rise in income

tax? Over 1 million of people of different classes need
to pay income tax i.e. families involving over 2
million people will be affected if income tax rises

HK: open economy open to keen competition limit

potential for parties to enormously increase profit tax
or else parties may get loss in votes.

Locallabor unions are divided: hard to be strong in

mass mobilization for welfarism; In terms of party
membership,
99.4% of the respondents identify themselves as non-
members of any political party,04/25
showing
43
a lack of
association between union membership
/17 and party
membership in Hong Kong
Hong Kong public: shown a clear self-reliant culture

-in January 2003, HKU estimated that at

least 150,000 old people were living almost
entirely on Old Age Allowance payments of
$705 a month, without claiming
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance
despite their entitlement because of the
label
in a representative sampled survey done in
2005, only 25.5% preferred to see Hong
Kong as a society with extensive social
welfare, but high tax rates, while 71.1% of
people desired to see Hong Kong as
society where taxes were low and
individuals take responsibility for
themselves.
04/25 44
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Hong Kong public: shown a clear self-reliant culture

another representative sampled survey done by

the CUHK in 2001, 72.7% of the public agreed that
Government should provide public housing only to
those who are economically disadvantaged; those
who have the ability should be responsible for
themselves.

82.5% agreed that Government should require the

unemployed to actively seek a job for
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA)
benefits.
74.5% of respondents agreed that Even if CSSA
benefits are not enough for a basic living, they
should not be more than the 04/25
income of those who
45
have jobs. /17
2nd Concern: Central Governments
worries
WillHK become independent or subvert
PRCs rule?
Surveys since 1984 consistently show HK
people agree HK belongs to China
A 2004 survey: 73% agree/strongly agree: I am
proud of being Chinese.
HK depends on Mainland China: water, food
and economic growth...
HK has no its own military
04/25 46
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2nd Concern: Institutional Safeguards

CPG continues to have power of approval over appointment of CE &

Principal Officials
Yet, Beijing wants to filter out some democrats via electoral
arrangements to avoid a confrontation with the public by rejecting
a popularly elected CE
Yet, chance for a radical democrat to enjoy huge popularity has
been small

04/25 47
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2nd Concern: Central govts worries

Beijingsinsistence of filtering out

democrats by pseudo-democratic means
will provoke HK people & exacerbate Sino-
HK tensions

CE thus produced lacks electoral

legitimacy, representativeness and strong
incentive to be accountable to the public

When economy turns sour &

mismanagement of policies recur, tensions
between HK people and Beijing will soar
arising from long-term frustration of HK
people with Beijings stifling
04/25
/17
of HKs
48
democratization
7. Chinese & HKSAR Govts
Political Platforms for HK

i/more overt interference with HKs

elections
ii./ CCP considered universal suffrage
as consistent with functional
constituencies.
-Based on International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which is
article 39 of Basic Law : universal
suffrage requires:
i./ equal right to vote;
 Chinese & HKSAR Govts Platforms for HK
ii./ enjoy right to be elected no unreasonable restriction on nomination
of candidates for CE /top govt. posts
iii./ weight/influence of every vote among all voters is roughly equal.

-Beijing demanded that for 2012 Legco. Elections, proportion of seats of

functional constituencies (FC) and geographical constituencies (GC) will
remain 1 to 1; separate voting in Legco. also remains unchanged for 2012
HKSAR Govts Proposal for Legco: for 2008
& 2012
Proposed in 2005 for 2008 Proposed in 2010 for
2012
No. of seats in From 60 seats to 70 seats From 60 seats to 70
LegCo seats
Ratio of GCs 1:1 (35 seats in each) 1:1 (35 seats in
and FCs in each)
LegCo

Electorate No. of seats returned by the No. of seats returned

base of the District Council to Functional by the District Council
functional Constituency increases from 1 to Functional
constituencies to 6 Constituency increases
from 1 to 6; yet ,
appointed District
Council members will
not take part in the
election.
Methods for selecting the HKSARs Chief Executive
Proposed in 2005 for
2008
Number of Rise from 800 to 1,600
members of
the Election
Committee
Composition of Increase no. of members of
the Election the 1 , 2nd & 3rd sectors of
st
Committee the Election Committee from
200 each to 300 each.
Raise the no. of members
of 4th Sector from 200 to
700, with the inclusion of all
District Council members.
The Maintain the current
arrangements for nomination threshold at the
nominating ratio of 1:8 of the total
candidates membership of the Election
for the office of Committee, i.e. 200
the Chief members.
Executive
Political the Chief Executive should
Proposed in 2010 for
2012
increase from 800 to 1,200
Increase no. of members of 4
sectors of Election Committee
by 100 each.
75 seats out of the 100 new
seats of the fourth sector plus
the existing 42 seats, will be
returned through election from
among elected District Council
members
The same as the current
nomination threshold at the
ratio of 1:8 of the total
membership of the Election
Committee, i.e. 150 members.
the Chief Executive should not
 Methods for selecting the HKSARs Chief Executive

First Sector : Industrial, commercial and

financial sectors;

Second Sector : the professions;

Third Sector : labor, social services, religious

and other sectors;

Fourth Sector : members of Legislative Council,

members of District Councils, representatives of
the Heung Yee Kuk, Hong Kong deputies to the
National People's Congress, and representatives
of Hong Kong members of the National
Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference
Problems of the proposal for legislative election and CE
election of 2012
Comparing 2012 reform proposal with the 2008 one , there is no
advancement:

no change in forming the LegCo except

withholding the right for election of the
Appointed District Council members for
the newly added seats in the FCs

Ratio between GCs and FCs remains 1 to

1, and allow FCs or vested interests to
veto majority through separate voting.
 Problems of the proposal for legislative
election and CE election of 2012

Composition of the Election Committee for CE elections adds only 400 instead of 800
members: seats from the 4th sector with wider popular electoral mandate were cut
PLUS

Using block-vote for District Council members to elect representatives into Election
Committee

Re-arranging other three sectors in Election Committee that may favor entry of pro-
Beijing forces (e.g Dentists).
 Problems of the Govts proposal for legislative election and CE election
of 2012
No time-line for abolishing all FCs; no roadmap leading to
universal suffrage

despite the agreement of HKSAR Govt.s letter to the United

Nations that FCs are an transitional arrangement in 1999 (In
2010, Stephen Lam said what counts more is to stick to the
Basic Law and that there is no consensus for abolishing FCs!)

No promise for abolishing appointed District Councilors SOON!

No promise of allowing future CE to belong to a political

party : this does not require any change in Basis Law.

It raises the chance for pro-Beijing parties to capture a

greater share of Legco. Seats, and therefore a bigger chance
to approve of a blueprint of pseudo-democracy in future.
 8. Debates over two strategies: negotiation vs.
mobilization
CCP is not a piece of steel it did concede in the past over
HKs democratization

1st interest: one-party dictatorship

2nd: national reunification

3rd: keep HKs economic value for PRC

Greatest challenge for democracy movement:

-have large-scale mass mobilization, without

threatening the survival of CCP.

57
 CCPs 3 concessions
1.. 1989:after two walk-outs of over a million people each:
a. 1991: increase from 10 to 18 directly elected seats

b. earliest timing for universal suffrage for CE & Legco. In 2007.

c. Steady progression from 1997 to 2007

2. Article 23;
3. Reformed model of District Board

04/25/17 58
 Bargaining Power of HK
1. Keep HKs Strategic Economic Value:
i. HK as an off-shore centre for RMB, help
internationalize RMB & enable the transfer of capital
from Mainland to overseas
ii. HK can enhance Mainlands financial centers to
create new financial instruments

iii.) HK can integrate with Shanghai to raise the

competitiveness of Chinas financial sector

iv. HK as a wealth management center: dilute the

issue of excessive capital in Mainland.
v. HKs financial companies: became targets for
merger and acquisition (M & A). Therefore, HK becomes
training
04/25/17
ground for M & A. 59
 Choice of Strategies: negotiation vs. mass
mobilization
1. Negotiation preceded democratization: Brazil, Poland &
S. Africa

2 Democracy movement and dictators need to have

roughly equal power, others hard to achieve
breakthroughs in democracy

Poland: strong labor union triggered robust democracy

movement

i. Use strong mobilization power to press for negotiation

ii. Under the consent of former USSR, solidarity movement

forced Polish Govt. to launch democratic reform
04/25/17 60
Choice of Strategies: negotiation
vs. mass mobilization

S. Africa: strong labor and anti-

racism movements: represent the
socially marginalized groups
Through decades-long efforts, the
movements managed to press
capitalists to prefer democracy
rather than political instability
Those capitalists helped South
Africas reformists to negotiate
with blacks representatives
 Mobilization rather than negotiation: key to
succesful democratization (McFaul, 2002)

04/25/17 62