This document discusses the agency problem in corporate governance. The agency theory suggests that a firm can be viewed as a contract between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). An agency problem occurs when principals hire agents to make decisions but the agents may not always act in the principals' best interests. Some specific issues that can arise are managers preferring diversification over dividends, opportunistic behavior by managers to increase their compensation, and principals relying too heavily on agents' expertise and trusting them without proper oversight.
This document discusses the agency problem in corporate governance. The agency theory suggests that a firm can be viewed as a contract between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). An agency problem occurs when principals hire agents to make decisions but the agents may not always act in the principals' best interests. Some specific issues that can arise are managers preferring diversification over dividends, opportunistic behavior by managers to increase their compensation, and principals relying too heavily on agents' expertise and trusting them without proper oversight.
This document discusses the agency problem in corporate governance. The agency theory suggests that a firm can be viewed as a contract between principals (shareholders) and agents (managers). An agency problem occurs when principals hire agents to make decisions but the agents may not always act in the principals' best interests. Some specific issues that can arise are managers preferring diversification over dividends, opportunistic behavior by managers to increase their compensation, and principals relying too heavily on agents' expertise and trusting them without proper oversight.
defined contract between resource providers and resource controllers.
Occurs when one or more individuals called
principals employ one or more individuals called agents, to carry out some service and then entrust decision-making to the agents. Principal-Agent Specific Issues I. Diversification vs. Dividends
- This is a issue about how to manage free cash
flows, because managers want this funds to be invested in additional product diversification while shareholders prefer this funds to be declared as dividends so long as it is backed by income. II. Managerial Opportunism
- Occurs when agents chose to use funds to
unrelated diversification and growth which leads to increase in compensation income of managers while decrease the dividends declared to shareholders. III. Power Supremacy vs. Technical Expertise
- Some of the corporate investors, most
especially institutional investors, are just putting their money with expectation of dividend at a certain time. The nature of their intention made them rely only on expertise of the agents. It is a clear picture of agents doing the real things and principals waiting for the ultimate result. IV. Trust
- Shareholders have more trust than doubts
to the agents and they are entrusting everything as far as operation including the charting of the corporations future to its directors and officers. This is another issue because the trusts given to the agents will make them comfortable and make them lose their balance. Which is also an essential component of managerial opportunism
Differentiate Between The Internal and External Audit and Demonstrate How Both Roles Can Assist Management To Achieve The Objectives of The Organisation