UNIVERSITY OF TRIPOLI

AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATION
AE555 AI (UNITED AIRLINES CRASH)

SUPERVISOUR :
PRESENTED BY STUDENT :
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT
FLIGHT 173FLIGHT
DISTINATION
1 2 3
YOURK DENVER PORTLAND

FLIGHT DATE : 28th DEC 1978

POISITON OF ACCIDENT :6nmi FROM PORTLAND
AIRPORT
CONSEQUENSES OF
ACCIDENT
1-INJURIES TO PERSONS

INJURIES CREW PASSANGERS

FATAL 2 8

SERIOUS 2 21

MINOR 4 152
1.1 CONSEQUENSES OF
ACCIDENT
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

1- THE AIRCRAFT WAS DESTROYED

OTHER DAMAGE

1- TWO UNOCCUPIED HOMES WERE DESTROYED.

2- TELEPHONE LINES WERE CUT.

3- HIGH-TENSION ELECTRICAL POWERLINES WERE DAMAGED.

TH CREW AND AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

A/C McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61 , Manufactured May

22,1968

NAME AGE TOTAL HOURS ON DC-8

FLY
Captain Maillburn 52 27638 hrs. 5517 hrs.
A.McBroom
First Officer Rodrick D.Beebe 45 5209 hrs. 247 hrs.

Flight Forrest 41 3895 hrs. 2263 hrs.

Engineer E.Mendenhall
ANALYSI
S
1.The first problem which faced the captain of Flight 173
was the unsafe landing gear.
2.There was enough fuel, and fuel was burned at a
normal rate between Denver and Portland.
3.The weather was good; the area was void of heavy
traffic.
4.The aircraft was certificated to flight and was no failure
in system of A/C except right landing gear.
5.The trees were the factor to destroy the A/C and human
losses.
HUMAN FACTOR

SHELL MODLE

Human errors:
Can be presented into two ways:
the personal approach
the system approach

Human factors Approach:

Were visible in:
Making Decision
Flight crew unintraction
Conclusion
1- The flight crew was properly certificated and qualified
for flight.

2- The aircraft was fully certificated accordance to FAA

(federal aviation regulations).

3- There was no failure in A\C system expect failure in

piston rod on the right main landing gear.
5-the captain failed to make decisive decision timely.

6-The captain failed to relate time, distance from the

airport and the A\C fuel.

7-Neither the first officer nor the flight engineer conveyed

and concern about fuel exhaustion to captain until the
accident was inevitable.

8- Fuel exhaustion was predictable .The crew failed to

Safety
Recommendation
1.Importance of training :on communication skills.

2.Training crew on the CRM (Cockpit Resource

Management) system.

3.Participative management for captains and

assertiveness training for cockpit crewmembers.

4.Periodic inspection and maintenances

 THANK YOU

FOR YOUR ATTENDANCE