PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and
WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET
INC, respondents.
 PROVISIONS OF LAW APPLIED IN THE CASE
PRESENTED

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court

Any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, together with damages and costs.

Sec. 1, par. (e), of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court

The pendency of another action between the same parties for the same
cause is a ground for dismissal of an action.
 PROVISIONS OF LAW APPLIED IN THE CASE
PRESENTEDcont.

Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court

That a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action.

Sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the other or others.

Art. 1654 of the New Civil Code

Requiring the lessor to maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Progressive Development Corporation LEASED to private respondent Westin
Seafood Market, Inc., a parcel of land with a commercial building thereon located
at Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City, for a period of nine (9) years and three (3)
months, (i.e., from 2 January 1989 to 30 April 1998), with a monthly rental of
approximately P600,000.00.

Private respondent failed to pay rentals despite several demands by petitioner.

19 October 1992 the arrearages amounted to P8,608,284.66.

31 October 1992
Admittedly, non-payment of rentals constituted breach of their contract; thus,
pursuant to the express authority granted petitioner under the above-quoted Secs.
25 and 26 of the lease agreement, Progressive Development Corporation
repossessed the leased premises, inventoried the movable properties found
within and owned by private respondent;

19 August 1993
Scheduled public auction for the sale of the movables with notice to private
respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASEcont,
26 November 1992
private respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint against petitioner for forcible entry with damages and a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

22 December 1992
at the continuation of the hearing on the issuance of a writ preliminary mandatory
injunction, the parties agreed, among others, on the following:
(a) private respondent would deposit with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank in the name of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, the amount
of P8,000,000.00 to guarantee the payment of its back rentals;

(b) petitioner would defer the sale of the personal properties of the Westin Seafood
Market, Inc., until a final settlement of the case had been arrived at;

(c) petitioner shall allow private respondent to retrieve all the perishable goods from
inside the leased premises like frozen meat, vegetables and fish, all properly
receipted for;

(d) petitioner shall allow three (3) maintenance personnel of private respondent to
enter the premises at reasonable working hours to maintain the restaurant
equipment;
FACTS OF THE CASEcont,

Private respondent did not comply with its undertaking to deposit with the designated
bank the amount representing its back rentals. Instead, with the forcible entry case
still pending with the MeTC, private respondent instituted on 9 June 1993 another
action for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the damage suit on the ground of litis
pendencia and forum shopping.
 ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether an action for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court by the
lessee against the lessor should be dismissed on the ground of
pendency of another action for forcible entry and damages earlier filed
by the same lessee against the same lessor before the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
 SUPREME COURT RULING

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court

Any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld, may bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, together with damages and costs.

The mandate under this rule is categorical: that all cases for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed before the Municipal Trial
Court which shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession
but also all claims for damages and costs arising therefrom. Otherwise
expressed, no claim for damages arising out of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer may be filed separately and independently of the claim for
restoration of possession.

Sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court is applicable

 SUPREME COURT RULING

Sec. 3 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that a party

may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. Under Sec. 4 of the same Rule, if two or more suits are instituted
on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
other or others.
 SUPREME COURT RULING
The foregoing discussions provide sufficient basis to petitioner's charge that
private respondent and its counsel in the trial courts committed forum shopping.

xxx By its admission of a pending forcible entry case, it is obvious that private
respondent was indulging in forum shopping. While private respondent
conveniently failed to inform the RTC that it had likewise sought damages in the
MTC on the basis of the same forcible entry, the fact remains that it precisely did
so, which stratagem was being duplicated in the second case. This is a
compelling reason to dismiss the second case.xxx

the Petition is GRANTED

CGR CORPORATION, et al.
vs.
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR.
 PROVISIONS OF LAW APPLIED IN THE CASE
PRESENTED
Article 539 of the New Civil Code which states:
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and
should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to
said possession by the means established by the laws and rules
of the Court.

Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of
the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of
rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are
not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his
costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment
for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as
justice requires.
 FACTS OF THE CASE:

CGR Corporation, owned by Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R.

Benedicto, LEASED several hectares of public land, mostly consisting of
fishponds, in Negros Occidental.

Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr., with his men, forcibly entered the leased properties
and barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence
along the road going to CRG Corporations fishponds, and harvested several
tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings.

CGR filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate
complaints for Forcible Entry with Temporary Restraining Order with
Preliminary Injunction and Damages and reserved a separate civil action.
The MTC found Treyes and his men guilty of forcible entry. CGR filed a
separate complaint to RTC Bacolod alleging therein that he suffered
damages for the actions of Treyes during and after the forcible entry. A
claim for additional damages which arose from incidents occurring after the
dispossession by Treyes of the premises was thereafter prayed for. The MTC
awarded the claims of CGR.
 ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether an action filed with the MTC Sagay be

dismissed on the ground of pendency of another
action filed against the same accused to Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod.
 SUPREME COURT DECISION:
Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of rightful
possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff
could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material
possession.

Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action. As reflected in the

allegations in the complaint for damages of CGR et al., it had to do with Treyes
alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other
marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and destroying of a chapel
built by CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even
decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had
occurred.
 SUPREME COURT DECISION:
Restated in its bare essentials, the forcible entry case has one cause of action,
namely, the alleged unlawful entry by petitioner into the leased premises out of
which three (3) reliefs arose:
(a) the restoration by the lessor of the possession of the leased premises to the
lessee,
(b) the claim for actual damages due to the losses suffered by private respondent
such as the deterioration of perishable foodstuffs stored inside the premises
and the deprivation of the use of the premises causing loss of expected profits;
and,
(c) the claim for attorneys fees and costs of suit.

CGR Corporations filing of an independent action for damages other than those
sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use
and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a
cause of action.
Rodrigo Enriquez, Aurea Soriano de
Dizon and Urbano Dizon, Jr., plaintiffs-
appellants,
Vs.
Socorro A. Ramos, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-23616 September 30, 1976
 PROVISIONS OF LAW APPLIED IN THE CASE
PRESENTED

Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. If

two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal
of the others. (4a)
 FACTS OF THE CASE:

Facts: On November 24, 1958 Enriquez and spouses Dizon sold to Ramos 20
subdivision lots in Quezon City for the sum of P235,056 of which only P35,056 had
been paid. The balance of P200,000 was to be liquidated within 2 years from the
date of the execution of the deed of sale, with interest at 6% for the 1st year and
12% thereafter until fully paid.

To secure the payment of that balance, Ramos executed in the same document a
deed of mortgage in favor of the vendors on several parcels of land variously
situated in Quezon City, Pampanga and Bulacan. The deed of mortgage embodies
certain stipulations which Ramos invoked. But according to the appellants the
defendant violated the terms of their agreement in the following respects:

The defendant refuse to pay the sum of P200,000 within the stipulated period.
The mortgage on Bulacan property was never registered and,

The realty tax for 1959 on the lots mortgage were not paid by the defendant.
 FACTS OF THE CASE:

Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the

mortgage, this action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-
mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959.
Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously
had filed action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24
February 1959 for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down
payment on the price of the mortgaged lands;
that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and
demandable;
that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and under
section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00
was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit.
Upon opposition by the plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied
the motion to dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special
defense in her answer but still, Ramos ordered to pay.
 ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether an action filed with the Regional Trial

Court Quezon City be dismissed on the ground of
pendency of another action filed by the same
lessee against the same lessor before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
 SUPREME COURT DECISION:
An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court
of First Instance of Manila shows that it was based on appellants'
having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500.00 she
had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present
action was for non-payment of the balance of P96,000.00
guaranteed by the mortgage.

The claim for P2,500.00 was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by
the security; and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in
Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila
courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does
not apply.

Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court is not applicable

 SUMMARY
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT Sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
CORPORATION, INC. is applicable because the action seeking
vs. damages to MTC is the same action brought
COURT OF APPEALS and in RTC, therefore, it is violative to the
WESTIN SEAFOOD MARKET INC provision

Sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court

CGR CORPORATION, et al. is not applicable because the action seeking
vs. damages to MTC Sagay is NOT the same
ERNESTO L. TREYES, JR. action brought claiming damage sought to
RTC Bacolod, therefore, it is not violative to
the provision

Sec. 4 of Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court

Rodrigo Enriquez, is not applicable because the action seeking
and Urbano Dizon, Jr., damages to RTC Manila is NOT the same
action brought in RTC QC, therefore, it is not
vs. violative to the provision
Socorro A. Ramos
 POSSIBLE BAR QUESTION

What are the questions to be resolved in an action for

forcible entry?

1. Who has actual possession over the real property;

2. Was the possessor ousted therefrom within one year
from the filing of the complaint by force, intimidation,
strategy, threat or stealth; and
3. Does the plaintiff ask for the restoration of his possession
 POSSIBLE BAR QUESTION

Who may institute the action?

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or
implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs (Sec. 1, Rule 70).