The Role of Verbs and

Verb-Endings in
Mimamsa Semantics

1
 Long before the modern languages of South Asia began to develop,
a tradition of linguistic studies originated in India.
An excessive preoccupation with language on one hand and with
philosophy on the other may indeed be regarded as a characteristic
of Indian civilization.
It is increasingly becoming an accepted theory that it is in India that
the science of linguistics originated, opening avenues for cross
fertilization between linguistics and philosophy.
The interdisciplinary exercises between language studies and
Philosophy, a recent Phenomenon in west, developed largely due to
the linguistic turn in western philosophy that defined philosophy as
a critique of language, has been practiced by ancient Indian scholars
2
centuries before.
 Ancient Indian linguists and grammarians were philosophers of first
order and a chapter on Indian Philosophy would never be complete
without accounting their views.
Also, perhaps due to the unique structure of Indian thought system
itself, all most all schools, of both orthodox and heterodox traditions
participated in the debates and discussions on issues in Philosophy
of language that continued for centuries together enriching the
discipline.

This primacy given to language get reflected in every stream of

Philosophy that emerged in this land, and of course the Grammar
school, Mimamsa school, certain streams of Buddhism and the
school of kavya mimamsa deserve special mention.
3
 Among them the place of Purvamimamsa is significant; it played
a dual role enriching the religious and secular language
simultaneously.
Ever since modern studies on Mimamsa system became
prevalent, it has drawn the attention of some of the finest minds
in the West.
The seminal contributions this philosophical system has made in
resolving the problem of the relation between words and
sentences has been marked as Indias original contribution to the
philosophy of language.
The present paper aims to explore some of the unique features of
Mimamsa theory of semantics and also to situate it in
contemporary semantics.
4
 The paper also aims at juxtaposing Mimamsa semantics to the non
propositional theories of meaning in the west, especially some of the
varieties of use theory of meaning, where linguistic assertions are
conceived as language acts.
A good exposure to this variety of non empirical study of language, it
is presumed, may provide an impetus to language theoreticians in the
west to march ahead in this direction bringing in fresh outlook in the
field.
Considering the fact that the west has already initiated its journey
towards non propositional semantics adds strength to this hypothesis.

5
 Quite different from other philosophical systems Mimamsa holds
that meaning of a sentence does not directly refer to a reality
which is established (siddha) but point to a possible reality
(sadhya).
Perhaps this can be marked as the most ancient model of a non
propositional theory of meaning and hence contemporary
linguists will surely have a lot to pick up from this basket.

6
 It is often pointed out that Mimamsa system intends to bring
credibility to Vedic injunctions and the Philosophy of Language they
propound is tailored to suite this purpose.

This robs it off the secular nature essential for participating in

scholarly discussions in academic platforms.

That apprehensions in this direction is uncalled for is visible from the

opening remark made by Sabara in his bhasya that the words
employed in sutras would carry the same sense as in mundane
conversational language.
7
 In fact, Jaimini himself by the sutra Prayoga codanabhavat
arthaikatvam avibhagat contends that both the Vedic and the
empirical words carry same sense.
This position is reaffirmed in the sutra sabdarthascapi lokavat-
the meaning of words is to be determined as per their usage among
people.
In correspondence with the eternality of Vedas (apouruseyatva),
Mimamsa attribute eternality (nityatva) to words, sentences and
their meanings as well.
Here the term nitya denotes two things: anadi (where beginning
cannot be fixed) and sahaja ( emerging together).
8
 Jaimini uses an interesting term autpattika to refer to the nityatva of
words and meaning, the term conveying that the word and its meaning
arise together.
The meaning of words can be divided into two: the primary meaning
(mukyartha) and the secondary meaning (lakhsyartha / gaunartha).
The primary meaning is conveyed by the primary denotative power
designated as abhidha.
The secondary meaning is conveyed by lakshyartha.
Mukhyartha can further be divided into four classes of words based
on the way their meaning is determined: 1) Yougika ( derivative) 2)
Rudha (conventional) 3)Yogarudha (both derivative and conventional)
4)
9 Yougikarudha (either derivation or conventional)
 Moving on to Mimamsa semantics, sentence here is defined as a group of
words that serve a common purpose (arthaikatvat ekam vakyam).
While exploring the relation between words and sentences Mimamsakas
point out that there may be two conditions for a word to work as part of a
sentence: 1) serving a common goal ( ekarthatva) 2) Being in need of each
other (sakanksatva).
Ekarthatva refers to the purpose of a group of words serving a common
end, one of the words among them has to play the central role.
This central word is called mukhya visaya, the chief substantive word, and
other words are adjectives to it.
The sequal requirement (sakanksatva), yet another requirement of a
sentence, is explained as seeking the counterpart word in a sentence
(pratiyogini
10
jijnasa).
 It is also explained as, incompleteness of the statement (abhidhana
aparyavasana). A word in a sentence stands in need of another, like in
the case of the word door (dvara), which is incomplete without the words
close or open.
Mimamsas contributions to the semantic relationship between words and
sentences is prestigious. According to abhihitanvayavada of Bhattas
words convey their meanings and these meanings duly associated
constitute the sentence meaning.
Prabhakaras anvitabhidhana theory maintains that words gain their
meanings in their association with the other words in the sentence.
Of the two theories the latter clearly stand closer to the basic Mimamsa
position that Vedas consists of vidhi and nisedha that do not directly refer
to a reality, which is established (siddha), but point to a possible reality
(sadhya).
11
 Accordingly, the words in the sentence need not carry individual
meaning other than in the context of a sentence or an injunction,
which pertains to a goal.
But lets note that this argument is valid only if the words in a
sentence are more basic than words themselves.
Interestingly anvitabhidhanavada permits a precedence of
language over epistemology. Many philosophers have viewed
that this theory account for the possibility of verbal meditations
quite like a ritual activity, totally freed from its routine
epistemological underpinnings.

12
 This, however, does not pass without criticism: Snkara
countering this Mimamsa position reiterates that meditation
depends on man, whereas knowledge is based on factual
discourses, or to be specific, sadhya is the object of meditation
while siddha is the object of knowledge.
This objection echoes the voice of a standard philosopher with
specific metaphysico epistemological preoccupations.
Mimamsakas have ruled out the possibility of such a criticism by
proving that metaphysical presuppositions are irrelevant for the
natural development of a system of thought, thus breathing in
fresh air into the world of philosophizing hitherto contaminated
by metaphysical and epistemological prejudices.
13
 For Mimamsa the Vedic injunctions (vidhi) are put in verbal
expressions in optative verbal form; for instance, take the
injunction svargakamo yajeta.
Here the verb yajeta can be divided into two parts: the root yaj
and the ending (e) ta.
Mimamsakas hold that since the ending part determines the
relationship with other words this part functions as the principal
element and the root depends on it.
Extending this linguistic principle, Mimamsakas argue that the
ending part is the heart of the injunctive verb
It is called the efficient force (bhavana/ prerana), which
impels one to undertake activity.
Bhavana expresses two things: general verbality (akhyatatva)
14 and specific optativeness (lingtva).
 While optativeness exhibits the principal force of the verb form,
the verb form in turn expresses the principal force of the
sentence. The other words in the sentence are essentially
compliments to the word. For instance,
Yajeta svargakamah (the one who desires
heaven shall sacrifice).
Here the arthi bhavana has as its end svargah and as its means
the verb yaj. Hence, the above sentence may be converted to the
following:
yagena svargam bhavayet. (One may attain
heaven by performing sacrifice).
15
 J.F.Staal highlighting the unique contributions of Mimamsa here
points out that contemporary semantic theory is only beginning to
describe the semantic relationship between such sentences.

Also note that quite like the contemporary relativist semantic theory,
Mimamsakas point out that the verbal termination also coveys the
time, number and the agency.

They point out that the verb functions are central even in
nominative case, here verbs like is get employed for the purpose.
(asti bhavanti parah aprayujyamanopi asti).
16
 Interestingly, Staal in his paper Sanskrit Philosophy of Language points out various
consequences of adopting Mimamsa theory of semantics: take for instance, the way negation
can be applied to vidhi (injunction). He formalizes the most obvious negation of an injunctive
statement thus:
If N stands for expressing optativeness and F(x) to represent an indicative sentence where F
expresses verbality, we can discern two kinds of bhavana thus:
If F(a) stands for The knot is tied,
N(F(a)) will stand for The knot should be tied or Tie the knot.
Now we can see that this injunction can have three possible negations:
First (~N) (F(a) the knot should not be tied
or dont tie the knot
Second N ((~F) (a)) - the knot should be untied
or untie the knot
Third N (F(~a)) a not-knot should be tied
17 or another knot should be tied.
 While in the second negation the verb is negated the third one negates
the particular act.
Both second and third are varieties of paryudasas, a type of negation
articulated by Mimamsa, are distinct in kind as well as scope.
The logical consequences such a theory of language opens up are
interesting: it promotes a theory of negation necessarily richer than the
Aristotelian theory, for the law of non contradiction need not be true for
each of these types of negation.
In the second paryudasa negation, it is intuitively clear that the law of
non contradiction does not hold, for one knot may be tied as well as
another.
Such discussions, in fact ushers Mimamsa system to the field of
18philosophical logic.
 Contextualizing Mimamsa theory of Meaning, yet another
objective of this paper, demand a peep into the contemporary
theories of semantics.
Most contemporary philosophers of language subscribe to
propositional semantic theories, and arguably, there are
commonalities one could strike between the two.
The paper, however, would high light only those ideas that each
tradition could borrow from the other in order to enrich their
respective individual theories.
While there are a host of issues to address under the propositional
semantics lets confine ourselves to the discussion of how
context go to determine the character of content since that
happens to be one of the major themes of discussion in Mimamsa
19
semantics.
 While being confronted with the indexicals like I, here etc,
whose reference depends on the contexts, we are tempted to ask
what the real meaning of such expressions is.
But soon we realize that it is an empty question, for expressions
with characters in a given a context determine content.
Are there other terms that are fully context dependent would be
a subsequent concern? Quite like Mimamsakas a group of
western thinkers argue that almost every expression is indexical.
They argue that reference of an expression gets relativized also
by the circumstances of evaluation.
This type of double indexing semantics subscribed by Kaplan,
Kemp and others could be resorted to contextualize Mimamsa
semantics.
20
 A general question that we need to address while evaluating
different semantic theories is this: to what extend contextualism can
be accommodated in a semantic theory?
Western theories of semantics have done detailed studies on indices.
If the meaning of a sentence depends on circumstances apart from
character and context, then p might have different truth values
depending on changing circumstances.
Therefore, before attempting to speculate a theory of meaning we
must specify the index of it.
The primary candidate for an index may be a world, for all most all
propositional semantics think that different truth values are possible
for p in different possible worlds.
Temporality is the next factor capable of altering the truth value of a
21
proposition.
 There are also non propositional theories of meaning, some of which
we could explore to see the implications, if any, to Mimamsa semantics.
A prime candidate for such study would be J.L.Austins Speech Act
theory, whereby Austine avows to credit prime role for illocutionary
function of language.
A resonance of Mimamsa semantics can also be heard in Robert
Brandoms recent defense of use theory.
According to Brandom, one must show how semantics can be
explained in terms of praxis.

22
 To conclude we may sum up that while western scholars have gone in
detail locating the empirical conditions to fix the extend of
contextualism permissible in semantic theories, Mimamsa seems to
provide an a priori thesis of semantics, which is more formal than
empirical.
Also the rich and divergent theories of meaning developed in India
for interpreting Vedic injunctions as well as for poetic meaning (
Anandavardhanas contributions towards this is tremendous) leaves a
message to the global linguists that he must include within his survey
all types of language behaviors.
From the above analysis it is visible that the scope of a sentence in
Mimamsa is far wider than a sentence as a grammatical construction;
as a result its nature also is quite distinct from that of a grammatical
sentence.
23
 While commenting on Indian semantics Emeneau in 1955 pronounced
thus: (in India) much was thought and written on the subject.
Of this the west is for all practical linguistic purposes innocent. The
Hindu treatises are in a difficult style and a few in the west will be
qualified to deal with them yet the results are likely to be worth the
effort; it is a subject that can be recommended to aspirants (
Emeneau:1955, 151).
Half a century passed yet Indian theories of semantics have not still
emerged as a full time participant in the discussions on contemporary
theories of meaning.
One may genuinely suspect that the stigma long attached to Indian
theories,
24 that they are necessarily tinged with religious orthodoxy and
 many schools of Indian thought have long achieved the sophistry
and formalism in this field of which the west has been boasting
for less than half a century!
Of course recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the
subject, nevertheless many fundamental problems both
conceptual and historical are yet to be addressed or at least
demand better attention.

25
 That philosophy of language is one of those fields where
India has bulk, variety, and depth, and at least as much to
offer as the west is now largely accepted by scholarly
community.
It is a general feeling among philosophers of language that
much remains to be done with regard to Mimamsa
philosophy of language, and that future research in this
area will yield unexpected results not merely with regard to
matters of detail, but also in matters of principles
26
 Thank you

27