Problems from Chapter 3

Find Strategies for Simon

 Imagine that you are Simon
You are really tough and like to fight.
Mugger is a puny little guy
But you dont want to mess with him if hes
armed
 The Mugger Problem

How many different strategies are there for

Simon? (Remember a strategy specifies what
you will do at every information set.)
A) 2
B) 3
C) 4
D) 8
 Why does it matter.
If you say there are only two strategies, resist
and not resist, you are telling Simon that he
has to do the same thing whether he sees a
gun or not.
If Simon can act differently depending on
whether he sees a gun or not, he has 4
strategies.
 Strategic form
Simon

Resist/Resist Resist/Give Give/Resist Give/Give

Show Gun 3,2 3,2 4,5 4,5

Hide Gun 3,2 5,4 3,2 5,4

Mugger

No Gun 2,6 6,3 2,6 6,3

Simons Strategy x/y means Do x if you see a gun,

Do y if you dont see a gun.
 The Stop Light Game
Light

Red Green
Pedestrian Pedestrian

Walk Wait Walk Wait

 Strategies in Stop Light Game
How many strategies are there for
Pedestrian?
What are they?
 Stop light game

What strategy does this show?

What strategy does this show?
What strategy does this show?
 Stop light game

What strategy does this show?

What strategy does this show?
What if you cant see the light?
Light

Red Green

Walk Wait Walk Wait

 Problem 4

A) If both are rational, are there any strategies that wont be played?

Figure PR3.4
Harrington: Games, Strategies, and
 Problem 4

If both are rational, Player 1 wont play a and 2 wont play z

B) If each knows that the other is rational, what can be eliminated?

Figure PR3.4
Harrington: Games, Strategies, and
 Problem 4

If Player 1 knows that 2 is rational, he knows that 2 wont play z.

If 2 wont play z, payer 1 is always better off with b than with c.
So he wont play c.
What if Player 2 knows that Player 1 knows that Player 2 is
rational?
 Problem 5

a) If both are rational, neither will play strictly dominated strategy

What strategies are strictly dominated?

Figure PR3.5
Harrington: Games, Strategies, and
 Problem 5

a) If both are rational, neither will play stricltly dominated strategy

What strategies are dominated?

Figure PR3.5
Harrington: Games, Strategies, and
 Problem 5

a) If each believes other is rational , each knows that z and d are not
possible. Reduced game is above. Are there any strictly
dominated strategies now?

Figure PR3.5
Harrington: Games, Strategies, and