CCNA Security

Chapter Six
Securing the Local Area Network

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 1

Lesson Planning

This lesson should take 3-4 hours to present

The lesson should include lecture,
demonstrations, discussions and assessments
The lesson can be taught in person or using
remote instruction

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 2

Major Concepts

Describe endpoint vulnerabilities and protection

methods
Describe basic Catalyst switch vulnerabilities
Configure and verify switch security features,
including port security and storm control
Describe the fundamental security
considerations of Wireless, VoIP, and SANs

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 3

Lesson Objectives

Upon completion of this lesson, the successful participant will be

able to:
1. Describe endpoint security and the enabling technologies
2. Describe how Cisco IronPort is used to ensure endpoint security
3. Describe how Cisco NAC products are used to ensure endpoint
security
4. Describe how the Cisco Security Agent is used to ensure endpoint
security
5. Describe the primary considerations for securing the Layer 2
infrastructure
6. Describe MAC address spoofing attacks and MAC address spoofing
attack mitigation

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 4

Lesson Objectives

7. Describe MAC Address table overflow attacks and MAC Address table
overflow attack mitigation
8. Describe STP manipulation attacks and STP manipulation attack mitigation
9. Describe LAN Storm attacks and LAN Storm attack mitigation
10. Describe VLAN attacks and VLAN attack mitigation
11. Describe how to configure port security
12. Describe how to verify port security
13. Describe how to configure and verify BPDU Guard and Root Guard
14. Describe how to configure and verify storm control
15. Describe and configure Cisco SPAN
16. Describe and configure Cisco RSPAN

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Lesson Objectives

17. Describe the best practices for Layer 2

18. Describe the fundamental aspects of enterprise security for
advanced technologies
19. Describe the fundamental aspects of wireless security and the
enabling technologies
20. Describe wireless security solutions
21. Describe the fundamental aspects of VoIP security and the enabling
technologies Reference: CIAG course on VoIP security.
22. Describe VoIP security solutions
23. Describe the fundamental aspects of SAN security and the enabling
technologies
24. Describe SAN security solutions

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 6

Securing the LAN

Perimeter MARS
ACS

Areas of concentration:
Firewall
Securing endpoints
Securing network
Internet
VPN
IPS
infrastructure

Iron Port

Hosts
Web Email
Server Server DNS

LAN
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Addressing Endpoint Security

Policy
Compliance
Infection
Containment

Secure
Host

Based on three elements:

Threat Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC)
Protection Endpoint protection
Network infection containment
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Operating Systems
Basic Security Services

Trusted code and trusted path ensures that the integrity

of the operating system is not violated
Privileged context of execution provides identity
authentication and certain privileges based on the identity
Process memory protection and isolation provides
separation from other users and their data
Access control to resources ensures confidentiality and
integrity of data

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Types of Application Attacks

I have gained direct

Direct access to this
applications privileges

I have gained access to

this system which is
trusted by the other
system, allowing me to
Indirect access it.

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Cisco Systems Endpoint
Security Solutions
Cisco Security Agent IronPort

Cisco NAC

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Cisco IronPort Products

IronPort products include:

E-mail security appliances for virus
and spam control
Web security appliance for spyware
filtering, URL filtering, and anti-malware
Security management appliance

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IronPort C-Series

Before IronPort After IronPort

Internet Internet

Firewall Firewall

Encryption Platform DLP

MTA Scanner

Antispam

Antivirus
DLP Policy IronPort E-mail Security Appliance
Manager
Policy Enforcement

Mail Routing

Groupware Groupware

Users
Users

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IronPort S-Series

Before IronPort After IronPort

Internet Internet

Firewall Firewall

Web Proxy

Antispyware

Antivirus
IronPort S-
Series
Antiphishing

URL Filtering

Policy Management

Users
Users

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 14

Cisco NAC
The purpose of NAC:
Allow only authorized and compliant systems to
access the network
To enforce network security policy

NAC Framework Cisco NAC Appliance

Software module In-band Cisco NAC
embedded within NAC- Appliance solution can
enabled products be used on any switch or
Integrated framework router platform
leveraging multiple Cisco Self-contained, turnkey
and NAC-aware vendor solution
products

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The NAC Framework

Network
Access
Devices Policy Server
Hosts Attempting Enforcement Decision Points
Network Access and Remediation

AAA Vendor
Server Credentials Servers
Credentials
Credentials
EAP/UDP, HTTPS
RADIUS
EAP/802.1x
Cisco Access Rights
Trust Comply?
Notification
Agent

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 16

NAC Components

Cisco NAS Cisco NAA

Serves as an in-band or out-of- Optional lightweight client for
band device for network access device-based registry scans in
control unmanaged environments

Cisco NAM Rule-set updates

Centralizes management for Scheduled automatic updates
administrators, support for antivirus, critical hotfixes,
personnel, and operators and other applications

M
G
R

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Cisco NAC Appliance Process

THE GOAL
1. Host attempts to access a web page or uses
an optional client.
Network access is blocked until wired or wireless
host provides login information. Authentication
Server

M
G
R
Cisco NAM

2. Host is
Cisco NAS Intranet/
redirected to a login page.
Cisco NAC Appliance validates Network
username and password, also
performs device and network scans 3. The host is authenticated and optionally
to assess vulnerabilities on device. scanned for posture compliance

3b. Device is clean.

3a. Device is noncompliant Quarantine Machine gets on certified
or login is incorrect. Role devices list and is granted
Host is denied access and assigned access to network.
to a quarantine role with access to online
remediation resources.

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Access Windows

Scan is performed
(types of checks depend on user role)
Login
Screen
Scan fails
Remediate

4.

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CSA Architecture
Administration Server Protected by
Workstation Cisco Security Agent

Alerts Events

SSL Security
Policy

Management Center for

Cisco Security Agent
with Internal or External
Database
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CSA Overview
Application

Execution
File System Network Configuration
Space
Interceptor Interceptor Interceptor
Interceptor

Rules
Engine
State Rules and
Policies
Correlation
Engine
Allowed
Request
Blocked
Request

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 21

CSA Functionality

Execution
Network File System Configuration
Security Application Space
Interceptor Interceptor Interceptor
Interceptor

Distributed Firewall X

Host Intrusion
X X
Prevention

Application
X X X
Sandbox

Network Worm
X X
Prevention

File Integrity Monitor X X

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Attack Phases

Probe phase
Ping scans
Port scans
Penetrate phase
Transfer exploit Server
code to target Protected by
Cisco Security
Persist phase Agent
Install new code
Modify
configuration File system interceptor
Network interceptor
Propagate phase
Configuration interceptor
Attack other Execution space
targets interceptor
Paralyze phase
Erase files
Crash system
Steal data
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CSA Log Messages

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Layer 2 Security

Perimeter MARS
ACS

Firewall

Internet
VPN
IPS

Iron Port

Hosts
Web Email
Server Server DNS

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OSI Model

When it comes to networking, Layer 2 is often a very weak link.

Application Stream
Application Application

Presentation Presentation
Compromised
Session Session

Transport Protocols and Ports Transport

Network IP Addresses Network

Data Link Initial

MACCompromise
Addresses Data Link

Physical Links
Physical Physical

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 26

MAC Address Spoofing Attack
1 2
The switch keeps track of the
Switch Port AABBcc 12AbDd endpoints by maintaining a
MAC address table. In MAC
spoofing, the attacker poses
as another hostin this case,
MAC AABBcc
Address:
AABBcc
MAC
Port 1
Address:
12AbDd
Port 2
MAC Address: Attacker
AABBcc

I have associated Ports 1 and 2 with

the MAC addresses of the devices
attached. Traffic destined for each
device will be forwarded directly.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 27

MAC Address Spoofing Attack

I have changed the MAC 1 2

Switch Port address on my computer

to match the server. AABBcc
1 2
AABBcc
Attacker

MAC Address:
MAC AABBcc
Address: Port 1 Port 2
AABBcc

The device with MAC

address AABBcc has
changed locations to Port2.
I must adjust my MAC
address table accordingly.

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MAC Address Table Overflow Attack

The switch can forward frames between PC1 and PC2 without
flooding because the MAC address table contains port-to-MAC-
address mappings in the MAC address table for these PCs.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 29

MAC Address Table Overflow Attack

2
Bogus addresses are 1
added to the CAM Intruder runs macof
table. CAM table is full. to begin sending
unknown bogus MAC
MAC Port
addresses.
X 3/25
Y 3/25 3/25 MAC X
3/25 MAC Y
C 3/25 3/25 MAC Z

XYZ
3/25
Host C
VLAN 10 VLAN 10 VLAN 10
flood

3
The switch floods
the frames. 4
Attacker sees traffic
to servers B and D.
A B

C D
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STP Manipulation Attack

Spanning tree protocol

Root Bridge
Priority = 8192 operates by electing a
MAC Address=
0000.00C0.1234 root bridge
F F
STP builds a tree topology

F F STP manipulation
changes the topology of a
networkthe attacking
F B
host appears to be the
root bridge

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 31

STP Manipulation Attack

Root Bridge
Priority = 8192
F F B
F

F
F F F

F B F F
ST iority

ity DU
Pr

=0
PB =

Root
Pr P BP

Bridge
PD 0

ior
ST
U

Attacker The attacking host broadcasts out STP

configuration and topology change BPDUs.
This is an attempt to force spanning tree
recalculations.
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LAN Storm Attack
Broadcast Broadcast

Broadcast Broadcast

Broadcast Broadcast

t t

Br
as as

oa
c c

Br
ad ad

dc
oa
o o
Br Br

as
dc

t
as
t

Br

t
as

oa
c
ad

dc
o
Br

as
t
Broadcast, multicast, or unicast packets are flooded on all ports in the
same VLAN.
These storms can increase the CPU utilization on a switch to 100%,
reducing the performance of the network.

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Storm Control

Total
number of
broadcast
packets
or bytes

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VLAN Attacks

Segmentatio
n
Flexibility
Security

VLAN = Broadcast Domain = Logical Network (Subnet)

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VLAN Attacks

802.1Q VLAN
10
Trunk
ru nk
T
Q VLAN Server
0 2.1 20
8

Attacker sees traffic destined for servers Server

A VLAN hopping attack can be launched in two ways:

Spoofing DTP Messages from the attacking host to
cause the switch to enter trunking mode
Introducing a rogue switch and turning trunking on

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 36

Double-Tagging VLAN Attack
1 Attacker on
VLAN 10, but puts a 20
tag in the packet

The first switch strips off the first tag and

2 does not retag it (native traffic is not
80 20 retagged). It then forwards the packet to
2.
1Q ,1 0 switch 2.
, 80 The second switch
2. receives the packet, on
1Q
20 3 the native VLAN
802.1Q, Frame

Trunk Fra
(Native VLAN = 10) m e

4
The second switch
examines the packet, Victim
Note: This attack works only if the sees the VLAN 20 tag and (VLAN 20)
forwards it accordingly.
trunk has the same native
VLAN as the attacker.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 37

Port Security Overview
Port 0/1 allows MAC A
Port 0/2 allows MAC B
MAC A Port 0/3 allows MAC C

0/1

0/2
0/3
MAC A
MAC F

Attacker 1

Attacker 2
Allows an administrator to statically specify MAC
Addresses for a port or to permit the switch to
dynamically learn a limited number of MAC
addresses

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CLI Commands

Switch(config-if)#
switchport mode access
Sets the interface mode as access

Switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security
Enables port security on the interface

Switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security maximum value
Sets the maximum number of secure MAC addresses for
the interface (optional)

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 39

Switchport Port-Security Parameters
Parameter Description
mac-address mac-address (Optional) Specify a secure MAC address for the port by entering a 48-bit MAC aaddress. You can add additional
secure MAC addresses up to the maximum value configured.

vlan vlan-id (Optional) On a trunk port only, specify the VLAN ID and the MAC address. If no VLAN ID is specified, the native
VLAN is used.

vlan access (Optional) On an access port only, specify the VLAN as an access VLAN.
vlan voice (Optional) On an access port only, specify the VLAN as a voice VLAN
mac-address sticky (Optional) Enable the interface for sticky learning by entering only the mac-address sticky keywords. When sticky
[mac-address] learning is enabled, the interface adds all secure MAC addresses that are dynamically learned to the running
configuration and converts these addresses to sticky secure MAC addresses.
Specify a sticky secure MAC address by entering the mac-address sticky mac-address keywords..

maximum value (Optional) Set the maximum number of secure MAC addresses for the interface. The maximum number of secure
MAC addresses that you can configure on a switch is set by the maximum number of available MAC
addresses allowed in the system. The active Switch Database Management (SDM) template determines this
number. This number represents the total of available MAC addresses, including those used for other Layer 2
functions and any other secure MAC addresses configured on interfaces.
The default setting is 1.

vlan [vlan-list] (Optional) For trunk ports, you can set the maximum number of secure MAC addresses on a VLAN. If the vlan
keyword is not entered, the default value is used.
vlan: set a per-VLAN maximum value.
vlan vlan-list: set a per-VLAN maximum value on a range of VLANs separated by a hyphen or a series of
VLANs separated by commas. For nonspecified VLANs, the per-VLAN maximum value is used.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 40

Port Security Violation Configuration

Switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security violation {protect |
restrict | shutdown}
Sets the violation mode (optional)
Switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security mac-address mac-address
Enters a static secure MAC address for the interface
(optional)
Switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security mac-address sticky
Enables sticky learning on the interface (optional)

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 41

Switchport Port-Security Violation
Parameters
Parameter Description
protect (Optional) Set the security violation protect mode. When the number of secure MAC
addresses reaches the limit allowed on the port, packets with unknown source
addresses are dropped until you remove a sufficient number of secure MAC addresses
or increase the number of maximum allowable addresses. You are not notified that a
security violation has occurred.

restrict (Optional) Set the security violation restrict mode. When the number of secure MAC
addresses reaches the limit allowed on the port, packets with unknown source
addresses are dropped until you remove a sufficient number of secure MAC addresses
or increase the number of maximum allowable addresses. In this mode, you are notified
that a security violation has occurred.

shutdown (Optional) Set the security violation shutdown mode. In this mode, a port security
violation causes the interface to immediately become error-disabled and turns off the
port LED. It also sends an SNMP trap, logs a syslog message, and increments the
violation counter. When a secure port is in the error-disabled state, you can bring it out
of this state by entering the errdisable recovery cause psecure-violation global
configuration command, or you can manually re-enable it by entering the shutdown
and no shut down interface configuration commands.

shutdown Set the security violation mode to per-VLAN shutdown. In this mode, only the VLAN on
vlan which the violation occurred is error-disabled.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 42

Port Security Aging Configuration

Switch(config-if)#
switchport port-security aging {static | time time |
type {absolute | inactivity}}
Enables or disables static aging for the secure port or
sets the aging time or type

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 43

Switchport Port-Security
Aging Parameters

Parameter Description

static Enable aging for statically configured secure

addresses on this port.
time time Specify the aging time for this port. The range is 0 to
1440 minutes. If the time is 0, aging is disabled for
this port.
type absolute Set absolute aging type. All the secure addresses
on this port age out exactly after the time (minutes)
specified and are removed from the secure address
list.
type inactivity Set the inactivity aging type. The secure addresses
on this port age out only if there is no data traffic
from the secure source address for the specified
time period.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 44

Typical Configuration

S2

PC B
Switch(config-if)#
switchport mode access
switchport port-security
switchport port-security maximum 2
switchport port-security violation shutdown
switchport port-security mac-address sticky
switchport port-security aging time 120

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 45

CLI Commands
sw-class# show port-security
Secure Port MaxSecureAddr CurrentAddr SecurityViolation Security Action
(Count) (Count) (Count)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fa0/12 2 0 0 Shutdown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Addresses in System (excluding one mac per port) :0
Max Addresses limit in System (excluding one mac per port) : 1024

sw-class# show port-security interface f0/12

Port Security : Enabled
Port status : Secure-down
Violation mode : Shutdown
Maximum MAC Addresses : 2
Total MAC Addresses : 1
Configured MAC Addresses : 0
Aging time : 120 mins
Aging type : Absolute
SecureStatic address aging : Disabled
Security Violation Count : 0

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 46

View Secure MAC Addresses

sw-class# show port-security address

Secure Mac Address Table

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Vlan Mac Address Type Ports Remaining Age
(mins)
---- ----------- ---- ----- -------------
1 0000.ffff.aaaa SecureConfigured Fa0/12 -
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Addresses in System (excluding one mac per port) : 0
Max Addresses limit in System (excluding one mac per port) : 1024

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 47

MAC Address Notification

MAC B
SNMP traps sent to NMS
NMS when new MAC
addresses appear or
F1/2 when old ones time out.

F1/1
Switch CAM Table
F2/1
MAC A F1/1 = MAC A
F1/2 = MAC B
MAC D is away
F2/1 = MAC D from the
(address ages out) network.

MAC address notification allows monitoring of the MAC

addresses, at the module and port level, added by the switch
or removed from the CAM table for secure ports.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 48

Configure Portfast
Server
Command
Switch(config-if)# spanning-
tree portfast
Switch(config-if)# no
spanning-tree portfast
Switch(config)# spanning-tree
portfast default
Switch# show running-config
interface type slot/port
2009 Cisco Learning Institute.
Workstation
Description
Enables PortFast on a Layer 2 access port and forces it to
enter the forwarding stateimmediately.
Disables PortFast on a Layer 2 access port. PortFast is
disabled by default.
Globally enables the PortFast feature on all nontrunking
ports.
Indicates whether PortFast has been configured on a port.
49
BPDU Guard
Root
Bridge
F F

F
F

F B
BPDU
Guard
Enabled
STP
Attacker BPDU

Switch(config)#
spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default
Globally enables BPDU guard on all ports with PortFast
enabled
2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 50
Display the State of Spanning Tree

Switch# show spanning-tree summary totals

Root bridge for: none.
PortFast BPDU Guard is enabled
UplinkFast is disabled
BackboneFast is disabled
Spanning tree default pathcost method used is short
Name Blocking Listening Learning Forwarding STP Active
-------------------- -------- --------- -------- ---------- ----------
1 VLAN 0 0 0 1 1
<output omitted>

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 51

Root Guard
Root Bridge
Priority = 0
F F
MAC Address =
0000.0c45.1a5d

F F
Root
Guard
Enabled
F B
F

STP BPDU
Attacker Priority = 0
MAC Address = 0000.0c45.1234

Switch(config-if)#
spanning-tree guard root
Enables root guard on a per-interface basis

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 52

Verify Root Guard

Switch# show spanning-tree inconsistentports

Name Interface Inconsistency
-------------------- ---------------------- ------------------
VLAN0001 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN0001 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1002 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1002 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1003 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1003 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1004 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1004 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1005 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent
VLAN1005 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent

Number of inconsistent ports (segments) in the system :10

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 53

Storm Control Methods

Bandwidth as a percentage of the total available

bandwidth of the port that can be used by the broadcast,
multicast, or unicast traffic
Traffic rate in packets per second at which broadcast,
multicast, or unicast packets are received
Traffic rate in bits per second at which broadcast,
multicast, or unicast packets are received
Traffic rate in packets per second and for small frames.
This feature is enabled globally. The threshold for small
frames is configured for each interface.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 54

Storm Control Configuration

Switch(config-if)# storm-control broadcast level 75.5

Switch(config-if)# storm-control multicast level pps
2k 1k
Switch(config-if)# storm-control action shutdown

Enables storm control

Specifies the level at which it is enabled
Specifies the action that should take place when the
threshold (level) is reached, in addition to filtering traffic

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 55

Storm Control Parameters
Parameter
broadcast
multicast
unicast
level level [level-low]
level bps bps [bps-low]
level pps pps [pps-low]
action {shutdown|trap}
2009 Cisco Learning Institute.
Description
This parameter enables broadcast storm control on the interface.
This parameter enables multicast storm control on the interface.
This parameter enables unicast storm control on the interface.
Rising and falling suppression levels as a percentage of total bandwidth of the port.
level: Rising suppression level. The range is 0.00 to 100.00. Block the flooding of
storm packets when the value specified for level is reached.
level-low: (Optional) Falling suppression level, up to two decimal places. This
value must be less than or equal to the rising suppression value.
Specify the rising and falling suppression levels as a rate in bits per second at which
traffic is received on the port.
bps: Rising suppression level. The range is 0.0 to 10000000000.0. Block the
flooding of storm packets when the value specified for bps is reached.
bps-low: (Optional) Falling suppression level, up to one decimal place. This value
must be equal to or less than the rising suppression value.
Specify the rising and falling suppression levels as a rate in packets per second at
which traffic is received on the port.
pps: Rising suppression level. The range is 0.0 to 10000000000.0. Block the
flooding of storm packets when the value specified for pps is reached.
pps-low: (Optional) Falling suppression level, up to one decimal place. This value
must be equal to or less than the rising suppression value.
The action taken when a storm occurs on a port. The default action is to filter traffic
and to not send an SNMP trap.
The keywords have these meanings:
shutdown: Disables the port during a storm
trap: Sends an SNMP trap when a storm occurs
56
Verify Storm Control Settings

Switch# show storm-control

Interface Filter State Upper Lower Current
--------- ------------- ---------- ---------
---------Gi0/1 Forwarding 20 pps 10 pps
5 pps
Gi0/2 Forwarding 50.00% 40.00% 0.00%
<output omitted>

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 57

Mitigating VLAN Attacks

Trunk
(Native VLAN = 10)

1. Disable trunking on all access

ports.
2. Disable auto trunking and manually
enable trunking
3. Be sure that the native VLAN is
used only for trunk lines and no
where else

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 58

Controlling Trunking
Switch(config-if)#
switchport mode trunk
Specifies an interface as a trunk link
.
Switch(config-if)#
switchport nonegotiate
Prevents the generation of DTP frames.

Switch(config-if)#
switchport trunk native vlan vlan_number
Set the native VLAN on the trunk to an unused VLAN

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Traffic Analysis

IDS
RMON Probe
Protocol Analyzer

A SPAN port mirrors traffic to Intruder

Alert!
another port where a
monitoring device is
connected.
Without this, it can be difficult
to track hackers after they
have entered the network.

Attacker

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CLI Commands

Switch(config)#
monitor session session_number source {interface
interface-id [, | -] [both | rx | tx]} | {vlan vlan-
id [, | -] [both | rx | tx]}| {remote vlan vlan-id}

Switch(config)#

monitor session session_number destination

{interface interface-id [, | -] [encapsulation
replicate] [ingress {dot1q vlan vlan-id | isl |
untagged vlan vlan-id | vlan vlan-id}]} | {remote
vlan vlan-id}

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 61

Verify SPAN Configuration

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SPAN and IDS

IDS

F0/2
Use SPAN to
mirror traffic in
F0/1 and out of port
F0/1 to port
F0/2.

Attacker

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 63

Overview of RSPAN
Intruder
An RSPAN port mirrors traffic Alert!
to another port on another IDS
switch where a probe or IDS
sensor is connected.
This allows more switches to Source VLAN
be monitored with a single
RSPAN VLAN
probe or IDS.

Source VLAN

Attacker Source VLAN

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 64

 Configuring RSPAN
2960-1(config)# vlan 100
1. Configure the RPSAN VLAN 2960-1(config-vlan)# remote-span
2960-1(config-vlan)# exit
2960-1 2960-2

2. Configure the RSPAN source ports and VLANs

2960-1(config)# monitor session 1 source interface FastEthernet 0/1
2960-1(config)# monitor session 1 destination remote vlan 100
reflector-port FastEthernet 0/24
2960-1(config)# interface FastEthernet 0/2
2960-1(config-if)# switchport mode trunk

3. Configure the RSPAN traffic to be forwarded

2960-2(config)# monitor session 2 source remote vlan 100
2960-2(config)# monitor session 2 destination interface FastEthernet 0/3
2960-2(config)# interface FastEthernet 0/2
2960-2(config-if)# switchport mode trunk
2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 65
Verifying RSPAN Configuration

2960-1 2960-2

show monitor [session {session_number | all | local

| range list | remote} [detail]] [ | {begin | exclude
| include}expression]

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 66

Layer 2 Guidelines

Manage switches in as secure a manner as possible

(SSH, out-of-band management, ACLs, etc.)
Set all user ports to non-trunking mode (except if using
Cisco VoIP)
Use port security where possible for access ports
Enable STP attack mitigation (BPDU guard, root guard)
Use Cisco Discovery Protocol only where necessary
with phones it is useful
Configure PortFast on all non-trunking ports
Configure root guard on STP root ports
Configure BPDU guard on all non-trunking ports

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 67

VLAN Practices

Always use a dedicated, unused native VLAN ID for

trunk ports
Do not use VLAN 1 for anything
Disable all unused ports and put them in an unused
VLAN
Manually configure all trunk ports and disable DTP on
trunk ports
Configure all non-trunking ports with switchport mode
access

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Overview of Wireless, VoIP Security

Wireless VoIP
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Overview of SAN Security

SAN

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Infrastructure-Integrated Approach

Proactive threat and intrusion

detection capabilities that do
not simply detect wireless
attacks but prevent them
Comprehensive protection to
safeguard confidential data and
communications
Simplified user management
with a single user identity and
policy
Collaboration with wired
security systems

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Cisco IP Telephony Solutions

Single-site deployment
Centralized call
processing with remote
branches
Distributed call-
processing deployment
Clustering over the
IPWAN

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Storage Network Solutions

Investment
protection
Virtualization
Security
Consolidation
Availability

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Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers

Responsible for system-wide wireless LAN

functions
Work in conjunction with Aps and the Cisco
Wireless Control System (WCS) to support
wireless applications
Smoothly integrate into existing enterprise
networks

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 74

Wireless Hacking

War driving
A neighbor hacks into
another neighbors
wireless network to get
free Internet access or
access information
Free Wi-Fi provides an
opportunity to
compromise the data of
users

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Hacking Tools

Network Stumbler
Kismet
AirSnort
CoWPAtty
ASLEAP
Wireshark

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Safety Considerations

Wireless networks using WEP or WPA/TKIP are

not very secure and vulnerable to hacking attacks.
Wireless networks using WPA2/AES should have
a passphrase of at least 21 characters long.
If an IPsec VPN is available, use it on any public
wireless LAN.
If wireless access is not needed, disable the
wireless radio or wireless NIC.

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VoIP Business Advantages
PSTN
Gateway
Lower telecom call costs
Productivity increases
Lower costs to move, add, or
change
Lower ongoing service and
maintenance costs
2009 Cisco Learning Institute.
VoIP
Little or no training costs
Mo major set-up fees
Enables unified
messaging
Encryption of voice calls is
supported
Fewer administrative
personnel required
78
VoIP Components

PSTN
Cisco Unified
Communications
Manager
(Call Agent) IP
Backbone
MCU
PBX
Cisco Router/ Router/
Unity Gateway Gateway
Router/
IP Gateway
Phone
IP
Phone
Videoconference
Station

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 79

VoIP Protocols

VoIP Protocol Description

ITU standard protocol for interactive conferencing; evolved from H.320
H.323 ISDN standard; flexible, complex
MGCP Emerging IETF standard for PSTN gateway control; thin device control

Joint IETF and ITU standard for gateway control with support for multiple
Megaco/H.248 gateway types; evolved from MGCP standard
IETF protocol for interactive and noninteractive conferencing; simpler but
SIP less mature than H.323
ETF standard media-streaming protocol
RTP

IETF protocol that provides out-of-band control information for an RTP flow
RTCP

IETF protocol that encrypts RTP traffic as it leaves the

SRTP voice device
Cisco proprietary protocol used between Cisco Unified Communications
SCCP Manager and Cisco IP phones

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 80

Threats

Reconnaissance
Directed attacks such as spam over IP telephony (SPIT)
and spoofing
DoS attacks such as DHCP starvation, flooding, and
fuzzing
Eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 81

VoIP SPIT
If SPIT grows like spam, it could result in
regular DoS problems for network
administrators.
Antispam methods do not block SPIT.
Authenticated TLS stops most SPIT attacks
because TLS endpoints accept packets
only from trusted devices.

Youve just
won an all
expenses
paid vacation
to the U.S.
Virgin Islands
!!!

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 82

Fraud

Fraud takes several forms:

VishingA voice version of phishing that is used to compromise
confidentiality.
Theft and toll fraudThe stealing of telephone services.
Use features of Cisco Unified Communications Manager to protect
against fraud.
Partitions limit what parts of the dial plan certain phones have access to.
Dial plans filter control access to exploitive phone numbers.
FACs prevent unauthorized calls and provide a mechanism for tracking.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 83

SIP Vulnerabilities

Registration hijacking:
Allows a hacker to
intercept incoming calls
and reroute them. Registrar Registrar
Location
Database
SIP Servers/Services

Message tampering:
Allows a hacker to
modify data packets SIP Proxy

traveling between SIP

addresses.
SIP User Agents SIP User Agents
Session tear-down:
Allows a hacker to
terminate calls or carry
out VoIP-targeted DoS
attacks.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 84

Using VLANs

Voice VLAN = 110 Data VLAN = 10

5/1

IP phone Desktop PC
802.1Q Trunk 10.1.110.3 171.1.1.1

Creates a separate broadcast domain for voice traffic

Protects against eavesdropping and tampering
Renders packet-sniffing tools less effective
Makes it easier to implement VACLs that are specific to voice
traffic

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 85

Using Cisco ASA Adaptive
Security Appliances
Ensure SIP, SCCP, H.323, and
MGCP requests conform to
standards
Prevent inappropriate SIP
methods from being sent to Cisco
Unified Communications Manager
Rate limit SIP requests
Cisco Adaptive
Enforce policy of calls (whitelist, Security Appliance WAN
blacklist, caller/called party, SIP
URI) Cisco Adaptive
Security Appliance
Dynamically open ports for Cisco Internet
applications
Enable only registered phones to
make calls
Enable inspection of encrypted
phone calls
2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 86
Using VPNs

Use IPsec for authentication

Telephony
Use IPsec to protect Servers
all traffic, not just voice
Consider SLA with service provider
Terminate on a VPN concentrator
or large router inside of firewall to
gain these benefits: IP WAN

Performance
SRST
Reduced configuration complexity Router

Managed organizational
boundaries

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Using Cisco Unified Communications
Manager

Signed firmware
Signed
configuration files
Disable:
PC port
Setting button
Speakerphone
Web access

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SAN Security Considerations

IP
Network SAN

Specialized network that

enables fast, reliable access
among servers and external
storage resources

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SAN Transport Technologies

Fibre Channel the

primary SAN transport for
host-to-SAN connectivity
iSCSI maps SCSI over LAN
TCP/IP and is another
host-to-SAN connectivity
model
FCIP a popular SAN-to-
SAN connectivity model

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 90

World Wide Name

A 64-bit address that Fibre Channel networks

use to uniquely identify each element in a Fibre
Channel network
Zoning can utilize WWNs to assign security
permissions
The WWN of a device is a user-configurable
parameter.

Cisco MDS 9020 Fabric Switch

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Zoning Operation

Zone members see only other

members of the zone. SAN
Zones can be configured Disk2 Disk3

dynamically based on WWN. ZoneA Host1

Disk1

ZoneC
Devices can be members of
more than one zone.
Disk4 Host2
Switched fabric zoning can take ZoneB

place at the port or device

level: based on physical switch An example of Zoning. Note that
port or based on device WWN devices can be members of more
or based on LUN ID. than 1 zone.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 92

Virtual Storage Area Network (VSAN)
Cisco MDS 9000
Family with VSAN Service

Physical SAN islands

are virtualized onto
common SAN
infrastructure

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Security Focus

SAN Protocol Target Access

SAN Management
SAN Access
Fabric Access
Secure
SAN

IP Storage
access
Data Integrity and
Secrecy

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SAN Management

Three main areas of vulnerability:

1. Disruption of switch processing
2. Compromised fabric stability
3. Compromised data integrity and confidentiality

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 95

Fabric and Target Access

Three main areas of focus:

Application data integrity
LUN integrity
Application performance

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 96

VSANs

Relationship of VSANs to Zones

Physical Topology
VSAN 2 Two VSANs each with
Disk2 Disk3 multiple zones. Disks and
Host1 Disk1
ZoneA
ZoneC hosts are dedicated to
Host2
VSANs although both hosts
Disk4
ZoneB and disks can belong to
VSAN 3 ZoneD
multiple zones within a
Host4
single VSAN. They cannot,
ZoneA
however, span VSANs.
Host3 Disk5
Disk6

2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 97

iSCSI and FCIP

iSCSI leverages many of the security features inherent in

Ethernet and IP
ACLs are like Fibre Channel zones
VLANs are like Fibre Channel VSANs
802.1X port security is like Fibre Channel port security

FCIP security leverages many IP security features in Cisco

IOS-based routers:
IPsec VPN connections through public carriers
High-speed encryption services in specialized hardware
Can be run through a firewall

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 2009 Cisco Learning Institute. 99