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Digital Watermarking For Multimedia Security
Digital Watermarking For Multimedia Security
Digital Watermarking For Multimedia Security
Multimedia Security
R. Chandramouli
MSyNC:Multimedia Systems,
Networking, and Communications Lab
Stevens Institute of Technology
Example:LSB Encoding
Fingerprinting.
» Identify the source of an illegal copy.
» Unique watermark embedded in each copy.
» DiVX, a modified version of DVD.
Secret Communications.
» Hide information such that general public do not
know its presence.
» Bin Laden hides attack plans in images on the
web – USA Today, Feb. 26, 2001.
Requirements
Requirements vary with application. For
example:
» Perceptually transparent - must not perceptually
degrade original content.
» Robust - survive accidental or malicious attempts
at removal.
» Oblivious or Non-oblivious - Recoverable with or
without access to original.
» Capacity – Number of watermark bits embedded.
» Efficient encoding and/or decoding.
Contradicting Requirements
Perceptual Transparency
I(x,y) IW(x,y)
Multiply by gain
k factor k IW(x,y)= I(x,y)+ k W(x,y)
RI 'W ( x , y )W ( x , y ) T
W(x,y) detected
T
W(x,y): Pseudo Random Pattern {-1,0,1} No W(x,y) detected
Additive watermarks in transform
domain: Spread Spectrum
fv
fh
Watermark Attacks
Active Attacks.
» Hacker attempts to remove or destroy the
watermark.
» Watermark detector unable to detect watermark.
» Key issue in proof of ownership, fingerprinting,
copy control.
» Not serious for authentication or covert
communication.
Watermark Attacks
Passive Attacks.
» Hacker tries to find if a watermark is present.
» Removal of watermark is not an aim.
» Serious for covert communications.
Collusion Attacks.
» Hacker uses several copies of watermarked data
(images, video etc.) to construct a copy with no
watermark.
» Uses several copies to find the watermark.
» Serious for fingerprinting applications.
Watermark Attacks
Forgery Attacks.
» Hacker tries to embed a valid watermark.
» Serious in authentication.
» If hacker embeds a valid authentication
watermark, watermark detector can accept bogus
or modified media.
Example: Forging Photo I.D.
Millionaire with
Swiss bank
Bad
account
Forgery!
Thanks
Hong Man,
for this
picture!
Assistant
Professor
Content-based Watermarking
Original Watermark
JPEG Compression Attack
Watermarking Research
HVS
Noise/Attack Channel
Techniques Developed at
MSyNC Lab
(some results are in collaboration with
Iowa State U. and Polytechnic U.)
Information Theoretic
Formulation
A new watermark channel model.
» Multiplicative and additive attacks.
» Models geometric attacks (“killer” attack).
Attack parameters assumed imperfectly
known.
Lower and upper bounds on watermarking
capacity.
Many current capacity estimates are specific
cases of proposed estimates.
Capacity in the presence of multiple
watermarks using multiuser information
theory.
Multiple Description
Watermarking
A new framework for watermarking using
multiple description codes.
» Partition the source into multiple descriptions.
» Each description carries enough information.
» Allocate watermarking bits to descriptions subject
to distortion constraints.
» Experiments for secure wireless media
transmission is promising.
Rate-distortion theory formulation.
Decision Theoretic Formulation
How many pixels to watermark ?
» A new measure for watermarking capacity.
» Different from standard information theoretic
formulation.
» Perhaps a more practical measure.
Fast watermark detector.
» Computation reduction.
» Useful for hardware implementation.
Steganalysis
A distributed detection framework for
analyzing images for presence of
watermarks.
Theoretical formulation and practical
algorithm for steganalysis of LSB based
image watermarking.
A new watermarking capacity measure called
“steganographic capacity”.
Projected Applications of
Proposed Techniques