Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Process Safety Management Fundamentals
Process Safety Management Fundamentals
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Personal safety hazards can sometimes be easy
to spot, but major hazards are often not obvious
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But what about this?
Why and how defences fail
• People often assume systems work as
intended, despite warning signs
• Examples of good performance are cited as
representing the whole, while poor ones are
overlooked or soon forgotten
• Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
should include human and organizational
aspects as well as equipment, physical and
IT systems
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Avonmouth, UK 1996
• Although not
recent, it is a
classic example
of a latent failure
• Hazard of
material known,
but lack of
awareness of
potential system
failure mode
leads to defective
procedure design 5
Ghent, WV 2007
• Hazards well known
and supposedly
covered by
equipment and
procedure design
• Latent errors in
procedure execution
allow actual practice
to deviate from
assumed
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Danvers, MA 2006
• Hazards known,
but defences
compromised by
apparently benign
change
• Latent error in
procedure design
creates
vulnerability to
likely execution
error
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Port Wentworth, GA 2007
• Hazard of material
not obvious (despite
history)
• Latent error allowed
Scottsbluff, NE 1996
dust to accumulate,
creating conditions
for subsequent
events
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Port Wentworth, GA 2007
The ‘Swiss cheese’ model of
SSAP organisational accidents 2
• Summarizes CCPS
approach in handy, short
booklet
• Website:
http://psm.chemeng.ca
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Self-assessment of Current Status
Process Safety Management
Requirements to Achieve the ESSENTIAL Level
For each survey question, indicate the level of awareness and use at the site by marking the appropriate box, based
on the following:
B Moderate use, but coverage is uneven from unit to unit or not comprehensive in view of potential
hazards.
C Appropriate personnel are aware of this item and its application, but little or no actual use.
Mark the box labeled "Help" if this is an item where you are in urgent need of guidance. We’ll have a team member
available on the PSM (a) Are responsibilities clearly defined and communicated, with those
responsible held accountable?
Division website (b) Is there a system for control of contractor operations?
http://psm.chemeng.ca 2. Process Knowledge and Documentation
(a) Are the safety, health and environmental hazards of materials on site
clearly defined?
(b) Is there current comprehensive documentation covering the process
operating basis, including both normal and abnormal conditions?
3. Process Safety Review Procedures for Capital Projects
(a) Are all project proposals for new or modified facilities subjected to
documented hazard reviews before approval to proceed?
(b) Are systems established to ensure that the facility is built as designed?
(c) Is there an effective link between design modifications and operating
procedures?
4. Process Risk Management
(a) Is there a system, conducted by competent personnel, to identify and
assess the process hazards from materials present at this site?
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(b) Are corrective actions defined and implementation followed up?
(c) Are the above items formally documented?
Understanding and sizing up the hazards
• The US Chemical Safety Board
website www.csb.gov has case
studies and videos – great for
understanding and “Could it happen
here?”
www.aiche.org/ccps
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When communicating, remember
the New Product Introduction Curve
adoption
Percent
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