Cas Seminar

Russia and Central Asia:
Multilateral Security Cooperation
Valdimir Paramonov & Oleg Stolpovski
Collective Security Through Different

Forums
Collective Security
 Collective security can be understood as a security

arrangement in which, all states cooperate
collectively to provide security for all, by the actions
of all against any states within or outside the groups,
which might challenge the existing order by using
sanctions and force
 Examples: League of Nations and UN
Collective Security
 Collective defense is an arrangement, usually

formalized by a treaty and an organization, among
participant states that commit support in defense of
a member state, if it is attacked by another state
outside the organization
 Example: NATO
Sequence
 Requirement of Security Cooperation

 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
 The Collective Security Treaty Organisation
(CSTO)
 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO)
 Conclusions
Requirement of Security Cooperation
 Based on needs, fears and desires of both Russia and CAS
 Russia
 Economic and military stability
 Reassert its influence
 Efforts for favourable balance of force and interests
 Interests of foreign powers in the wealth of natural
resources of CAS (vacuum to be filled by EU/US,
greater Balochistan by Ralph Peters)
 CAS
 Poor economic and security environment
 Need for strengthening regional security
 The main aim of this cooperation would be the formation
of an effective security system in the post-Soviet space
and its Central Asian sector 6
Fears of CAS
 Spill over effect of corruption, drugs and militancy from
Afghanistan
 In a number of CAS there is a real and growing threat
that their regional elites and corrupt representatives of
the security forces will be transformed into mere
protectors of the drugs business and the powerful drugs
syndicates
 Unresolved social and economic problems cause growth
of various religious extremist organisations
7
Fears of CAS
 Existing conflicts over borders areas, territory and
natural resources between the countries of Central Asia
resulting in strong disagreements
 Hope for a great deal of cooperation with USA and
Europe: disappointment
 Hopes from Russia to develop an effective system of
regional security
 Need for multilateral security cooperation
8
Multilateral cooperation between Russia and the CAS

 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
 The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)
 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
9
Multilateral cooperation takes the following forms
 Elaboration of common concepts and strategic

approaches to national and international security
 Carrying out multilateral training exercises by units of

the armed forces against real threat to national or
regional security
 Multilateral cooperation by the security structures in

existing international anti-terrorist organisations to
counter trans-national and non traditional threats
 Preserving and expanding multilateral cooperation for

10
manufacture of military hardware
Commonwealth of Independent States
Commonwealth of Independent
States
Inception
 The organization was founded on 8 December 1991 by
the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and
Ukraine
 The new alliance would be open to all republics of the
former Soviet Union, as well as other nations sharing
the same goals
 The CIS charter stated that all the members were
sovereign and independent nations and thereby
effectively abolished the Soviet Union

12
Inception
 On 21 December 1991, the leaders of eight additional
Soviet Republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan – agreed to join the CIS, thus bringing the
number of participating countries to 11
 Georgia joined two years later, in December 1993
 Three former Soviet Republics, the Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania chose not to join
13
Inception
 Non-employment of force or the threat of force in the
relationships between CIS member states was signed in
Kiev (Ukraine) on 20 March 1992
 Council of Ministers of Defence
 CIS united Armed Forces Military Command structure
was set up
14
Expansion
Collective Security Treaty
 Six of the CIS countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)
 This agreement provided for mutual security support in
the event of external threat
 Belarus, Azerbaijan and Georgia assented later
 This treaty was not signed by Ukraine, Moldova and
Turkmenistan 15
Expansion
 “Collective Peacekeeping Forces” were deployed in
Tajikistan during the civil war in 1992-1996
 The collective peacekeeping forces played an important
role in stabilising the situation and preventing the
conflict from spreading into neighbouring Central Asian
countries
16
Expansion
 The destruction of the once centralised USSR border
security system led to an increase in trans-border
criminal activities at the external borders of the CIS,
especially those parts bordering on Afghanistan
 Council of Border Troops Commanders
 Joint efforts
 Leading role of Russia
 Russia took on most of the responsibility for setting
up border protection structures for Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan 17

Expansion
Inter-state Commission for Military Economic Coop – 1993
 To maintain links with Industrial enterprises of the
former Soviet military-industrial complex
 Military hardware, joint integrated structures, transfer
of technology (mil to civ)
 This branch of multilateral cooperation was not
developed further
 Only six states participated (Russia, Belarus, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)
CIS Joint Air Defence System – 1995
 Airspace defence of the region
 To repel an airborne attack
 Comradeship-in-arms (AD ex) 18
Expansion
 Coop became a mere formality, consisting mostly of

official meetings and declarations of intent
 Commander in Chief of the united forces of CIS was
soon regarded as unnecessary supranational arm of
military control in many CIS states
 Post replaced by CIS “Military Cooperation Coordination
Headquarters”
 Treaty on ‘Cooperation by the member states of the CIS
in the fight against terrorism” was signed in 1999,
which was fairly successful in implementation
19
CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre – 2000
 Main roles of the organisation
 To develop plans for cooperation in the struggle

against international terrorism
 To coordinate cooperation of special security forces

and police forces
 To participate in the preparation and conduct of

anti-terrorist exercises
 Cooperation in carrying out search operations
 Creation of a specialised database
 Annual ‘South – Anti-terror exercise’ for coordinating

joint ante terrorist efforts 20
 In March 2007, the secretary of the Russian Security
Council, expressed his doubts concerning the usefulness of
CIS, and emphasizing that the
Eurasian Economic Community became a more competent
organization to unify the biggest countries of the CIS
 In May 2009 the six countries Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine joined the
Eastern Partnership, a project which was initiated by the
European Union (EU)

22
conclusion
 The CIS executive organs have not made progress in
establishing an active security system
 Many CIS organs may disappear like the CIS Council of
Ministers of Defence
 Central Asian branch of the ATC was successful
23
COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY
ORGANISATION
Collective Security Treaty Organisation
 “Collective Security Treaty” (CST), involving Russia and
the countries of Central Asia, was in force in the 1990
and proceeded, like most things in the CIS format,
mainly on the basis of declarations which were never
translated into practical action
 Unpopular
 Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from it in
1999 25
 Russia took the initiative to revive this treaty in 2002 to
convert it into a full-blown international organisation as
CSTO
 Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan ratified the treaty
 The organisation was granted observer status at the
United Nations General Assembly
 Uzbekistan joined the organisation in August 2006
26
Charter
Initial
 All participating states to abstain from the use or threat

of use of force
 Signatories would not be able to join other military

alliances or other groups of states
 Aggression against one signatory would be perceived as

an aggression against all
 Assurance of peace, preservation of territorial integrity

and sovereignty of the member states
27
Charter
Later
 Coordination of activities in the fight against

international terrorism and extremism, illicit drug
trafficking and the organized international crimes
 The member states are obliged to provide immediate

military assistance to a CSTO participant in case of
military threat
28
 Highest organ of the organisation is the ‘Collective
Security Council’
 It comprises heads of states of the CSTO countries
 ‘Standing Council’ for coordination and execution of
decisions which is composed of representatives
nominated by the member states
29
 The other main organs of the CSTO are:-
 The Council of Foreign Ministers: a consultative and
executive body concerned with cooperation between
member states on foreign policy matters
 The Council of Defence Ministers: Defence matters,
including manufacture of equipment and
cooperation in military technology
30
 Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils: Practical
security matters
 CSTO Joint Staff: Planning and executing CSTO decisions
on military matters
31
Expansion
Collective Rapid Deployment Force
 Collective Security Council took the decision to set up a

‘Collective Rapid Deployment Force’ for Central Asia
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan)
 In 2004, the Council of Defence Minister increased the

strength from 1500 to 4000 men
 The force is intended to
 Repulse military aggression
 Conduct anti-terrorist operations
 Fight transnational crime and drug trafficking

 Neutralize the effects of natural disasters 32
Expansion
Collective Rapid Deployment Force

 Annual exercise “Rubezh” (Frontier) in a Central Asian
country aimed at countering regional security threats is
held
33
Expansion
Anti-narcotics Operations
 Since 2003, forces and border troops of the CSTO
nations have also participated in regular anti-narcotics
operations (Op Kanal)
 2003-2006 as much as 48 tonnes of narcotics
 540 tonnes of drug precursor materials were confiscated
during these operations
34
Expansion
Intergovernmental Committee for Military and Economic
Cooperation (ICMEC)
 2004 Russia, with a view to strengthening cooperation
between CSTO member states, called for the abolition of
the CIS intergovernmental committee for military and
economic cooperation, proposing that the work of this
body should be organised under the auspices of the
CSTO
 More favourable conditions for improving military and
economic cooperation
 The CIS council of heads of government abolished the
ICMEC as a CIS organisation in 2004
35
Expansion
 October 2007, two documents, proposed by Russia,
were signed
 Principles of peacekeeping activities within the
CSTO framework
 Improvements in the regulatory and legal activities
of the ICMEC
 Principles of peacekeeping activities
 Peacekeeping brigades with international status
could be formed
 Concept of Russian leadership till 2003 met strong
opposition
 Minsk summit in June 2006 was not signed
38
Expansion
Improvements in the regulatory and legal activities of the
ICMEC
 Mechanisms for provision of military assistance to CSTO
member states in the event of aggressive action or the
threat of aggression
 Re-equipment of the Central Asian collective rapid
deployment force which would be provided at internal
Russian prices
39
Problem Areas
 Serious questions remained about the potential of CSTO

and CSTO rapid deployment force to be an effective
entity in the foreseeable future given the resource
constraints of all the member nations
 Failed to handle events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in
2005
40
Problem Areas
 CSTO lacks political components, ability to deal with
conflicts on the territory of its member states, carrying
out pre-conflict monitoring activities, developing conflict
preventing techniques and post conflict settlements
41
Problem Areas
 The only fully-trained military units in the ‘Collective
Rapid Reaction Forces’ are Russian
 Deterrence value of other states’ forces is psychological
rather than military
 The collective peacekeeping forces resolution passed in
October 2007 has so far not been given practical effect
42
SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANISATION
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
 The SCO was signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan (Shanghai
Five)
 Founded on the basis of
 Strengthening trust in the military sphere
 Mutual reductions of armed forces in border areas
 SCO was formally announced in Shanghai (China) on 15
June 2001 at a meeting of the heads of six governments
 (SCO) is an international organisation which includes
Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan
44
 SCO has had the status of an observer at the United

Nations General Assembly
 SCO is a wide-ranging cooperation organisation covering

regional security and countering trans-national threats
45
Cooperation on security
 The SCO primarily has security-related concerns, often
describing the main threats it confronts as being terrorism,
separatism and extremism. However evidence is growing
that its activities in the area of social development of its
member states is increasing fast
 At the June 16–17, 2004 SCO summit, the Regional
Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) was established. On April
21, 2006, the SCO announced plans to fight cross-border
drug crimes under the concept of counter-terrorism
 SCO has no plans to become a military bloc; nonetheless
the increased threats of "terrorism, extremism and
separatism" make necessary a full-scale involvement of
armed forces
Cooperation on security
 In October 2007, the SCO signed an agreement with the

CSTO to broaden cooperation on issues such as security,
crime, and drug trafficking
 The organization is also redefining cyber warfare, saying
that the dissemination of information "harmful to the
spiritual, moral and cultural spheres of other states" should
be considered a "security threat”
 An accord adopted in 2009 defined ‘information warfare’ in
part, as an effort by a state to undermine another's
political, economic, and social systems
Cultural cooperation
 Cultural cooperation also occurs in the SCO framework.

Culture Ministers of the SCO met for the first time in
2002, signing a joint statement for continued
cooperation
 An SCO Arts Festival and Exhibition was held for the first
time in 2005
 The third meeting of the Culture Ministers took place in
Uzbekistan, on April 27–28, 2006
 Kazakhstan also suggested an SCO Folk Dance Festival to
take place in 2008, in Astana
Current Observers
India
 currently has observer status in the SCO. Russia has
encouraged India to join the organisation as a full-time
member, being a crucial future strategic partner
 Major military presence in Central Asia
 Close military ties with several Central Asian countries
(especially Tajikistan and Russia)
Iran
 Currently has observer status in the organisation
 Applied for full membership on March 24, 2008
 However, because of ongoing sanctions levied by the United
Nations, it is blocked from admission as a new member
Current Observers
Mongolia
 Became the first country to receive observer status at the
2004 Tashkent Summit
Pakistan
 currently has observer status in the SCO
 Factors working against Pakistan's joining the SCO as a
member include its persistent military rivalry with fellow
SCO-observer India and strained relation with Russia
because of the latter's strong relations with India
 Pakistan and Iran have been lobbying for full membership
 India and Mongolia have not shown strong interest in
becoming official members
Dialogue Partner
 The position of Dialogue Partner was created in 2008 in
accordance with Article 14 of the SCO Charter of June 7, 2002.
This article regards Dialogue Partner as a state or an
organisation who shares the goals and principles of the SCO
and wishes to establish relations of equal mutually beneficial
partnership with the Organisation
Belarus
 Was granted dialogue partner status in 2009
 Belarus applied for observer status in the organisation and
was promised Kazakhstan's support towards that goal
 Russian Defence Minister voiced doubt on the probability of
Belarus' membership, saying that Belarus was a purely
European country
 Despite this, Belarus was accepted as a Dialogue Partner at
the 2009 SCO Summit
Dialogue Partner
Sri Lanka
 Was granted dialogue partner status in 2009
 Sri Lanka is located in an extremely strategically valued
location in the world
 China is currently building a harbor in the Sri Lankan town of
Hambantota, widely seen as a naval base Chinese ships re-
fueling and protecting its naval interests
 Sri Lanka recently defeated the separatist LTTE with the
cooperation of SCO Members (China and Russia)
Afghanistan
 while not an observer, is currently part of the SCO-
Afghanistan Contact Group
 The contact group was established in November 2005, and
serves as a mechanism for SCO member states to jointly
contribute to reconstruction and stability in Afghanistan
SCO Anti-terrorist Organisation (2004)
 To coordinate the efforts of security forces in countering
international terrorism
 HQ in Tashkent (Uzbekistan)
 HQ is manned by security departments of Russia, the
Central Asian countries and China
 The Council of this organisation meets bi-anually
54
 Practical cooperation between the defence departments
of the SCO member states is in the form of joint activities
 “Cooperation – 2003”: The first joint anti-terrorist
exercise in the border regions of Kazakhstan and China
(August 2003)
 Seminars were held in China between defence
departments of the SCO member states in 2004/05
 “Peace Mission 2007” on the Chebarkul involved about
7500 military personnel and more than 1200 vehicles;
the largest exercise so far held

55
Problem Areas
 Russia has an interest in developing the military and
political arms of the SCO
 Strengthening its own position in Central Asia and
bolstering security by involving the military potential of
China and other countries
 SCO remains clouded by a number of important issues
 Land locked CAS
 Lack of transportation infrastructure
 Internal differences between CAS like ethnicity,
border disputes and water issues
57
Problem Areas
 At the Dushanbe SCO summit in October 2007, none of
the delegations responded positively to the Russian
proposals on the military concept of the organisation
 Membership of the SCO has not stopped the states of the

region from developing military ties with the USA and
NATO
 CAS of SCO are balanced between Russia, China and the

West in search of more diplomatic room
58
Problem Areas
 Central Asian member states of the SCO are at the same
time members of the CSTO, so there is some duplication
of the mechanisms for military cooperation with Russia
 CSTO set-up excludes China and is therefore more
focused on the local “post-Soviet” problems, where
there is a certain level of trust between Russia and the
CAS
59
Problem Areas
 Leading position in the SCO is held by China
 Beijing is not about to relinquish this leadership to
Moscow
 China sees the role of the organisation as being
primarily in the trade and economic spheres and is
resistant to the idea of forming a military alliance
60
Countering Western Interests
 SCO’s growing cohesiveness has resulted in
 Russia – China cooperation
 Reduced role and influence of USA and NATO
 US applied for observer status in 2005, which was rejected
 In 2005 Astana Summit, SCO demanded for removal of all

US Bases in the region
 SCO’s concerns over ‘Colour Revolution’ supported by West
 Following the ‘Tulip Revolution’, Uzbekistan demanded

removal of US Bases, which materialized in 2005
61
 Iran wants an early entry in SCO to gain a measure

of protection against possible attack from US
and/or Israel
 SCO expanded from security to transportation,
economic and cultural relationship
62
 SCO’s sway towards regional energy policy
 PRC energy deal with Russia
 PRC energy deal with Kazakhstan
 International Organisation
 Observer status in UN
 MoU with ASEAN and CSTO
63
 Against whom would the military role of such an alliance

be directed: Against the USA and NATO?
 Russia’s generally westward-looking foreign policy
 Close economic interdependency between China and

the West
 Against trans-national threats (international

terrorism, extremism, the drugs business, etc)
where in SCO needs cooperation with the West, the
USA and NATO
 Perhaps to counter the conflicts which would allow US

intervention in the region 64
Conclusions
 Given the overlapping security mandates of the SCO and
CSTO, the question arises: Why does Moscow operate in
these two organizations rather than one or the other?
 Russia’s Central Asian security goals can be identified
primarily as:
 To position Moscow as a pole of power and influence in
the region
 To maintain the pro-Moscow regimes of the region
 To exclude or limit American and Chinese influence
from the region
 Through CSTO, Russia creates dependency in CAS due to
their reliance on heavy military equipment, planning
aspects as well as troops participation, on Russia 68
Conclusions
 Russia firmly contested the idea of Chinese forces being
stationed in Central Asia soon after the 2005 revolution in
Kyrgyzstan
 Russia continually stresses that SCO is not a military bloc
 At Peace Mission 2007, Moscow moved to block Chinese
aspirations and insisted that the number of troops would be
less than at Peace Mission 2005, and the Chinese request
for more tanks and other heavy equipment to be present
was denied on the grounds that this would undermine the
“antiterrorist” nature of the exercise
 SCO is the Chinese vehicle to penetrate Central Asia while
the CSTO is the obvious tool for Moscow to try and check
this penetration
69
Conclusions
 MoU between the CSTO and the SCO was signed in
October 2007
 Beijing did its best to ensure the document was as short
as possible (less than one page) with no details of what
cooperation would be like
 Still, the MoU is a significant victory for Moscow which is
now able to present itself as the chief security
coordinator in Central Asia and the representative of all
the Central Asian states vis-à-vis Beijing on security
70
Thank you

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Russia and Central Asia:

Multilateral Security Cooperation

Valdimir Paramonov & Oleg Stolpovski

Collective Security Through Different

 Collective security can be understood as a security

 Collective defense is an arrangement, usually

 Requirement of Security Cooperation

Multilateral cooperation between Russia and the CAS

 Elaboration of common concepts and strategic

 Carrying out multilateral training exercises by units of

 Multilateral cooperation by the security structures in

 Preserving and expanding multilateral cooperation for

the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and

 The new alliance would be open to all republics of the

former Soviet Union, as well as other nations sharing

the same goals

 The CIS charter stated that all the members were

sovereign and independent nations and thereby

effectively abolished the Soviet Union

Soviet Republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and

Uzbekistan – agreed to join the CIS, thus bringing the

number of participating countries to 11

 Georgia joined two years later, in December 1993

 Three former Soviet Republics, the Baltic states of

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania chose not to join

relationships between CIS member states was signed in

Kiev (Ukraine) on 20 March 1992

 Council of Ministers of Defence

 CIS united Armed Forces Military Command structure

Collective Security Treaty

 Six of the CIS countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)

 This agreement provided for mutual security support in

the event of external threat

 Belarus, Azerbaijan and Georgia assented later

 This treaty was not signed by Ukraine, Moldova and

 “Collective Peacekeeping Forces” were deployed in

Tajikistan during the civil war in 1992-1996

 The collective peacekeeping forces played an important

role in stabilising the situation and preventing the

conflict from spreading into neighbouring Central Asian

security system led to an increase in trans-border

criminal activities at the external borders of the CIS,

especially those parts bordering on Afghanistan

 Council of Border Troops Commanders

 Leading role of Russia

 Russia took on most of the responsibility for setting

up border protection structures for Tajikistan,

Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan 17

 Coop became a mere formality, consisting mostly of

 Main roles of the organisation

 To develop plans for cooperation in the struggle

 To coordinate cooperation of special security forces

 To participate in the preparation and conduct of

 Cooperation in carrying out search operations

 Creation of a specialised database

 Annual ‘South – Anti-terror exercise’ for coordinating

 In March 2007, the secretary of the Russian Security

Council, expressed his doubts concerning the usefulness of

CIS, and emphasizing that the

Eurasian Economic Community became a more competent

organization to unify the biggest countries of the CIS

 In May 2009 the six countries Armenia, Azerbaijan,