PROCESS SAFETY

MASTER CLASS [PART 1]

Sreejith Pillai
Pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
 3 Day PSM I. Getting ‘Process Safety-Mechanical Integrity’ fundamentals
right [Slide Set I]

Master Class II. Asset Integrity / Mechanical Integrity MI & Reliability

Management [Slide Set II]

contents III. Managing KPIs & Independent Assurance [Slide Set III]

IV. SCE Management – Managing Operationalization Challenges

[Slide Set IV]

V. Achieving AI-PSM Global Best Practices [Slide Set V]

I. How to go beyond PSM dashboards and aiming for Process

Safety Excellence [Slide Set VI]

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“GETTING THE PROCESS SAFETY FUNDAMENTALS
RIGHT”

pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
Process Safety Incidents
Three MAH truths:
1. “Little things can lead
to big incidents”
2. “Low Probability
events can do occur”
3. Most MAHs are
characterized by
uninteresting
similarities

Source:
AIChE / SAChE Faculty Workshop
August 18-20, 2014

Picture sources: internet

Identifying Major
Accident Hazards
 MAHs are typically identified in HAZID using Risk
Assessment Matrix

 Considering the typical MAH characteristics [previous

slide], a pure risk based approach will not be appropriate

 Consider all high risk cells + high severity row cells for MAH
identification

pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
OSHA PSM Definitions

■ Major Incident:
– Unexpected releases of toxic, reactive, or flammable liquids and gases in processes involving
highly hazardous chemicals that are toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive
■ Process:
– Process means any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical including using, storing,
manufacturing, handling, or moving such chemicals at the site, or any combination of these
activities.
■ Process Safety Management:
– Requirements for the management of hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous
chemicals to help assure safe and healthful workplaces.

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OSHA Mechanical Integrity
■ PSM mechanical integrity requirements apply to the following equipment:
– Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
– Piping systems (including piping components such as valves);
– Relief and vent systems and devices;
– Emergency shutdown systems;
– Controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks); and
– Pumps.

■ Written procedures to inspect and test MI equipment periodically by competent personnel, managing
deviations with a ‘total life cycle’ approach

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Extended OSHA Mechanical Integrity Concept

OSHA MI scope

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CCPS RBPS Definitions

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CCPS RBPS Asset Integrity & Reliability

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IOGP Definitions

Source: Internet

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Barrier Approach to PSM

1. Process Containment 6. Protection system

2. Structural Integrity 7. Emergency Response

5. ESD & EDP

3. Ignition Control
4. Detection Source: Internet

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Global PSM Models

OGP: Barrier + element model with a asset life cycle approach; Element-based models: Shell, DuPont, OSHA, CCPS RBPS
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Shell Integrity Petals

Design, procure, construct & Management of Hardware barriers/SCE

commission barriers right

IOW Exceedance Management;

Safe Shift HO; MOC; Alarm
Management; Override
Management; Statement of Fitness Source: Internet

pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
Barrier-centric approach to PSM

Exclusive elements related to personal safety In order to bring clarity, keep process safety critical
and process safety are distinct and clear. What element in the center and then consider the PSM
about the elements in common? elements. PSM expectations become very clear!!

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pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
Are we learning enough?
■ Are audit findings ignored?
■ Are safety critical equipment maintenance taken seriously? [do we know what are the SCEs?]
■ Are early warnings ignored? [are we getting them, what do we do with them?]
■ Do we have temporary buildings within process areas?
■ Do we have ‘cheque book’ mentality even for process safety activities?
■ Trips and alarms are tested periodically?
■ Are we risk averse?
■ Do we have IOW exceedences? Do we know them? What do we do about them?
■ How do we manage alarms?
■ Is PSSR process effective?
■ Is Asset Integrity performance monitored as part of PSM KPIs?
■ Do we realize that MAHs are low probability events?

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Setting Effective Process Safety KPIs

■ Mix of leading & lagging KPIs

■ Tier 3 KPIs are difficult to report but their predictive Relationship is strong

■ To monitor Process Safety performance, establish both KPIs & dashboard

■ PSM implementation with KPIs in mind

Source: API 754

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“CHRONIC UNEASE – THE HIDDEN INGRIEDENT TO SUCCESSFUL
PROCESS SAFETY ”

AIChE CCPS RBPS: “maintain a sense of vulnerability’

Note: Chronic Unease = Alertness to Weak Signals and to Mind Traps

Courtesy: Internet

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Process Safety - Focus Areas

Factual Reporting – encourage critical Train and certify – the right person for the
test/inspection reporting right job

Analyze – challenge greens and support

reds; Strongly react to weak signals – spot
‘no problem’ could be a problem and act on ‘not so sure’ reactions

Leaders welcome bad news

– ignoring early warnings can be Trust but verify – audit the process
dangerous

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“Less Revenue means Less Investment”

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pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com