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  • A Primer To The Prisoners' Dilemma

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    TH L
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    The document provides a primer on the Prisoner's Dilemma game by setting up a scenario with players Tom and Jerry who can either confess or remain silent. It presents the game in terms of possible strategies and payoffs to the players in different outcomes. It defines a Nash Equilibrium as a set of strategies where both players maximize their payoffs based on the other's actions. The document notes that in the Prisoner's Dilemma, confessing dominates remaining silent for both players, even though it is a socially suboptimal outcome.

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    A primer to the Prisoners' Dilemma

    Original Title

    Prisoners Dilemma

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    The document provides a primer on the Prisoner's Dilemma game by setting up a scenario with players Tom and Jerry who can either confess or remain silent. It presents the game in terms of possible strategies and payoffs to the players in different outcomes. It defines a Nash Equilibrium as a set of strategies where both players maximize their payoffs based on the other's actions. The document notes that in the Prisoner's Dilemma, confessing dominates remaining silent for both players, even though it is a socially suboptimal outcome.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
    14 views8 pages

    A Primer To The Prisoners' Dilemma

    Uploaded by

    TH L
    The document provides a primer on the Prisoner's Dilemma game by setting up a scenario with players Tom and Jerry who can either confess or remain silent. It presents the game in terms of possible strategies and payoffs to the players in different outcomes. It defines a Nash Equilibrium as a set of strategies where both players maximize their payoffs based on the other's actions. The document notes that in the Prisoner's Dilemma, confessing dominates remaining silent for both players, even though it is a socially suboptimal outcome.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pptx, pdf, or txt
    of 8

    A primer to the

    Prisoners’ Dilemma
    Let’s setup the game
    • Players: Tom & Jerry
    • Strategies: Confess & (Stay) Silent
    • Payoffs: What the players receive (e.g. in terms of happiness or
    money) from playing their respective strategies
    A simple representation of the game in English
    Tom

    Confess Silent

    Jerry receives immunity from prosecution; Tom is


    Confess Both are sentenced to 5 years in jail sentenced to 20 years in jail

    Jerry

    Silent Tom receives immunity from prosecution; Jerry is


    Both are sentenced to 1 year in jail
    sentenced to 20 years in jail
    Now in terms of payoffs
    Tom

    Confess Silent

    Confess
    -5 , -5 5 , -15
    Jerry

    Silent
    -15 , 5 -1 , -1
    Nash Equilibrium
    • A set of strategies where both players are best responding (their
    payoffs are maximised) to each another.
    Tom

    Confess Silent

    Confess
    -5 , -5 5 , -15
    Jerry

    Silent
    -15 , 5 -1 , -1
    What can we learn from the PD?
    • (Confess, Confess) is a Nash Equilibrium
    • Tom & Jerry will always choose to confess no matter what the other
    player does
    • It is socially optimal for both players to stay silent but they will never
    choose to do that in their pursuit of self-interest
    Let’s construct a PD matrix together
    Tom

    Confess Silent

    Confess
    , ,
    Jerry

    Silent
    , ,
    Real-life extension: Doping in sports
    Team A

    Dope Clean

    Dope -2 , -2 5 , -5
    Team B

    Clean
    -5 , 5 0,0

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