Pep.

Bawah Air
 Under Water Warfare(UWW)
 Referensi

 ATP 1 (D) Vol I

 ATP 28 ASW

 EXTAC 1006
 Modul USW SWOS

 Modul CCO Opleiding

 Outline
•The S/M Threat
•ASW Principles
•ASW Assets
•ASW Sensors and Weapons
•Torpedo Defence
•ASW Tactics/Procedures
•Optask ASW
 S/M Threat (1)
RUSSIA

RUSSIA
NK CHINA
IRAN

PAK

Argentina, Algeria, China, INDIA

Fry, India, Iran, Israel, N.Korea,
Libya, Pakistan, Russia

Brazil. Egypt, Indonesia,

Malaysia, Singapore CAPABILITY
SIGNIFICANT
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,

Capability 2015
MODERATE
Japan, Myanmar,
S.Korea, Peru, S.Africa, DEVELOPING
S Arabia, Syria, Taiwan,
Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam
 S/M Threat (2)
•Operating Areas

•Blue Water (Open Ocean) ASW

•Predominantly Anti SSN

•Littoral Water ASW

•Predominantly Anti SSK
 S/M Threat (3)
•Generic SSK – Older
•Operational Tasks
•Sensors
•Quiet
•Capability similar as WW2 U-boat
 S/M Threat (4)
•Generic SSK - Modern
•Operational Tasks
•Sensors
•Quiet
•Capability arguably similar to SSN
 S/M Threat (5)
•Generic SSK – Now and Future
•Air Independent Propulsion
•German 212A/214 Class - Fuel Cell
•Swedish GOTLAND - Stirling Engine
•Soon?
•Pakistani AGOSTA 90B - MESMA
•Russian AMUR Class (export LADA) - electro chemical
AIP option (assessed as fuel cell type system)
•First customer likely to be India.
 The Submarine Threat (6)
•Now and Future SSK – AIP
•Fuel cell
Submarine threat (7)
 The Submarine Threat (6)
•Now and Future SSK – AIP
•Fuel cell
•Stirling
 The Submarine Threat (6)
•Now and Future SSK – AIP
•Fuel cell
•Stirling
•Mesma
 The Submarine Threat (6)
•Now and Future SSK – AIP
•Fuel cell
•Stirling
•Mesma
•Electro chemical
Threat Appreciation (7)
 Future Submarine Missiles
•Sub Surface to Air Missile Threat
•TRITON
 Diesel-Electric Submarines (SSK)
•Use diesel engines for surface propulsion and snorkeling
•Battery propulsion when submerged
•Torpedo is primary weapon

•Advantages
•Extremely quiet on battery
•Inexpensive/easy to train and operate
•Fewer crew requirements

•Disadvantages
•Loud when operating on engines
•Forced to surface periodically
•Reduced endurance compared to SSN
 Nuclear Submarines
•Propelled by nuclear energy
•Only Five Nations build and operate
•Much larger than conventional subs
•Types
•Fast attack
•Ballistic missile
•Guided missile
•Primary and secondary missions
 Nuclear Submarines
•Advantages
•High sustained speed (25-35 kts)
•Endurance
•Greater power for auxiliary systems

•Disadvantages
•Noisier than diesels operating on battery
•Rotating turbine blades, gears, fluid cavitation
•Expensive to build and train crew
•Difficult to operate and maintain
 Submarine Sensors
•Sonar
•Active or Passive
•Internally or externally mounted, or used as towed arrays
(tails)
•Radar
•Subs are equipped with navigation radar
•Must be on surface or have sail broached to use
•Periscope
•Used for visual search and attack
•Attack periscope has smaller radar cross-section and ranging
device
 Submarine Weapons
•Torpedoes
•Attack ships and subs
•Vary in guidance systems, depth capabilities, speed, homing,
fuze
•MK48, Tigerfish/Spearfish, Type 53, Type 65
•Cruise Missiles
•Attack surface ships or land targets
•Harpoon, Tomahawk
•Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
•Attack strategic land targets such as cities
•Trident, SSN-15/16
 SSBN - TYPHOON (Russia)

• Displ: 26,500 submerged

• Speed: 25 kts submerged
• Missiles: 20x SS-N-20
• Torps: Type 53/65
• Largest in world. Sustained, deep Arctic missions.
 SSBN - DELTA IV (Russia)
•Displ: 13,500 submerged
•Speed: 24 kts submerged
•Missiles: 16x SS-N-23
•Torps: 6x Type 53 or Type 65
•Sustained ops, Arctic missions
•Refitting remains a priority to
maintain long term sea-borne
strategic deterrent.
 SSBN - HMS Vanguard
(UK Royal Navy)
•Displ: 15,850 submerged
•Speed: 25 kts submerged
•Missiles: 16x Trident D5 (12 MIRV)
•Torps: 4x Tigerfish or Spearfish
 SSBN - XIA (China)

• Displ: 6,500 submerged

• Speed: 22 kts submerged
• Missiles: 12 CSS-N-3
• Torps: YU-3
• First SSBN built by PRC
• SSBN capabilities are suspect
 SSGN - OSCAR II (Russian)
• Displ: 18,300 submerged
• Speed: 28 kts sub, 15 surf
• Missiles: 24x SSN19 “Shiprweck”

• Torps: Type 53 and Type 65

• Largest, most heavily armed
attack sub in the world
 SSN - Seawolf (Fast Attack)
• Displ: 9,150 submerged
• Speed: 25+ kts submerged
• Missiles: Tomahawk, Harpoon
• Torps: MK 48 ADCAP, 8 tubes
 SSN- LOS ANGELES (U.S.)
• Displ: 6,900 submerged
• Speed: 20+ kts submerged
• Missiles: Tomahawk, Harpoon
• Torps: MK48 ADCAP, 4 tubes
• 751+ have acoustic tile cladding &
retractable planes
 SSN - AKULA (Russia)
• Displ: 9500 submerged
• Speed: 28 kts sub, 10 surf
• Torps: Type 53 and 65 torps
– 4x 53” & 4x 65” tubes
– Add’l 6x 53” tubes on upper bow
• Quietest Russian submarine
 SSN- Han Class (China)

• Displ: 5000 tons submerged

• Speed: 25 kts submerged, 12 surfaced
• Missiles: SSM-YJ-1 (Eagle Strike) (C-801)
• Torps: 6x 533 mm bow tubes
– Yu-3 torpedo (40 kts), Yu-1 (35 kts)
• Commisioned in Aug 74
 SSN - RUBIS (French)
• Displ: 2670 submerged
• Speed: 25 kts submerged
• Missiles: Exocet (SSM)
• Torps: L5 Mod3, F17 Mod2
• Smallest SSN ever
• Early ones noisy; retrofitting
 SSN - Trafalgar (UK)
• Displ: 6500 tons submerged
• Speed: 30 kts submerged
• Missiles: Tomahawk, Harpoon
• Torps: Spearfish torpedoes
– 5 Tubes (center tube canted
downward 10 degrees)
Diesel Submarines
 KILO (Russian)

• Displ: 3076 submerged

• Speed: 20 kts submerged
• Torps: 6 Type 53
• Only current Russian diesel
• Big export: Iran (877 EKM), China, India, Poland, Romania and Algeria
 COLLINS (Australian)
• Displ: 3353 submerged
• Speed: 20 kts submerged
• Missiles: Sub-Harpoon SSM
• Torps: 6 Mk 48
• Swedish design, built in Australia
 AGOSTA (French)
• Displ: 1760 submerged
• Speed: 20 kts submerged
• Missiles: SM39 Exocet SSM
• Torps: 4 tubes, up to 16 F17 Mod
2
• Also used by Spain and Pakistan
 Type 209
• Displ: 1285 submerged
• Speed: 21.5 kts sub, 11 surf
• Torps: 8x 21” torp tubes
• 14 AEG SUT Mod 0 torps (a/p/w
35kts)
• German design made exclusively
for export
• In service with 12 countries
 Type 212 (Germany & Italy)
• (AIP) Air Independent propulsion
& Diesel electric
• 9 PEM fuel cells (30-50 kw each)
• 6x DM2A4 Torpedoes
• 8 kts cruise speed with fuel cell
alone
• Fuel cell and battery for higher
speeds
 Type 214 Greece, S.Korea
• Displ: 1980 submerged
• Speed: 20 kts sub, 12 surf
• Torps: 8x 21” tubes (like Type 209
only 4 can fire Harpoon)
• 214 is the synthesis of proven 209
and AIP of 212
• 5-8 kts for two weeks
• 2 PEM (120 kw each)
• Increased diving depth
 Walrus (Netherlands)
• Displ: 2800 submerged
• Speed: 21 kts sub, 13 surf
• Missiles: Harpoon capable (but
not procured)
• Torps: MK-48 Mod 4
– (4 x 21” tubes)
• Depth: >300 meters
• Range: 10000 nm at 9 kts
(snorkeling)
 Sang-O Class (North Korea)
• Displ: 256 tons surfaced/ 277 tons submerged
• Speed: 8.8 kts submerged, 7.6 surf,
• Torps: 2 x 533mm torpedo tubes
• Depth: 500 f
• Used extensively for infiltration ops to insert
special ops
 GOTLAND (A19) - Sweden
• Displ: 1,240
• Torps:
– 4 x 533mm, 2 x 400mm torpedo
tubes
– A/S: 12 Type 613/62 533mm (w/p
45kts)
– Anti-sub: Bofor Type 62 (w/a/p 50
kts)
• 1st designed for AIP
• 19 days submerged at 5 kts
• “Most silent of conventional
submarines"
 ASW Principles
• Prevent from proceeding to sea.
• Avoid submarine already at sea.
• Disrupt the submarine C2.
• Make the submarine move.
• Optimise use of the environment
• Keep the SM at arm’s length.
• Keep the SM CO under pressure.
 ASW Assets (1)
• SSK/SSN
• MPA
• ASW Helos
• Surface Escorts - FF/DD
 ASW Asset (2)
Employment
• SSN
Deep Field
• MPA

• Passive Helos
Outer Screen
• Dipping helos

• Weapon carriers
• Surface Escorts Inner Screen
 Sensors & Weapons (1)
• Hull Mounted MFS - Sonar 2050
• Sonar 2031
• Stingray/Mk 11 DC
• Merlin
• Sonar 2087
 Sensors & Weapons (2)
• Sonar 2050
– 2050 major improvement on 2016
– Performance initially very poor
• Passive Update Mine Avoidance (PUMA)
 Sensors & Weapons (3)
• Sonar 2031Z - Caps/Lims TYPE 23
– 5 octave array
• Array 663 m (+100m rope tail)
• 1830 m tow cable
– Good NB low freq performance. Poor BB.
– TEA array - reduces SN
– Sonar 2031-E - non interfaced enhancement
– Operational speed: 5 - 16kts (3 - 18kts)
 Sensors & Weapons (4)
• Sonar 2031Z - Caps/Lims TYPE 23
– Narrowband
• 0 - 796 Hz in 5 octaves plus Verniers
– Wideband
– Broadband:
• 10 - 880 Hz (processed)
• 10 - 800 Hz (displayed)
– Sonar 2031-E
• All T23 FTR
 Sensors & Weapons (4)
• Stingray/Mk 11 DC
 Sensors & Weapons (5)
• Mk 11 DC
 Sensors & Weapons (6)
• MERLIN
 Sensors & Weapons (7)
• Sonar 2087 - LFAS

Detect and Track Submarine Threats

Outside Torpedo Danger Zone
Cue Helo (Merlin) / MPA to Prosecute
 Sensors & Weapons (8)
• Sonar 2087 System Overview
 Sensors & Weapons (9)
• Sonar 2087 - DMF Module
“Backbone” Structure
Triplets of Hydrophones in
Equilateral Triangles
Attitude & Heading Sensors

Sum outputs for:

Bearing
Ambiguity
Resolution
 Torpedo Defence
• Torpedo Threat
• Anti Ship Torpedo Defence
• Surface Ship Torpedo Defence
– Sonar 2170
• Torpedo Counter Measures
 Torpedo Threat
• Straight Running
 Torpedo Threat
• Straight Running
• Passive/Active Acoustic Homing
– Wire Guided
– Autonmous

• Wake Homing
 Torpedo Defence
• Torpedo Threat
• Anti Ship Torpedo Defence
• Surface Ship Torpedo Defence
• Torpedo Counter Measures
 ASTD (1)
• Doctrine/Tactics/Procedures:
– ASTD Doctrine e.g.
• Counter Surveillance
• Counter Targeting
• Counter Torpedo
– Distraction
– Seduction
– Manoeuvre
– Torpedo Threat Criteria
– Torpedo Threat Warning
– Pre-planned Responses
 ASTD (2)
TORPEDO THREAT CRITERIA TORPEDO DOCTRINE BREVITY
THREAT CODE-WORD
Refer by Line Number WARNING

LINE 1
TFU poses no threat to the force.
TFU assessed to be outside the Force Counter
Detection Range (FCDR) i.e. the
range at which it can detect friendly
forces on its own sensors.
(FCDR to be specified).
LINE 2
TFU may be in a posn to target the force.
TFU assessed to be within the FCDR. All
friendly units assessed to be outside the
YELLOW
Max Effective Torpedo Firing Range (METFR)
of the TFU (TFU posn known) or FOCs (TFU
posn unknown).
(METFR to be specified).
LINE 3
TFU poses an imminent threat to the force.
At least one unit of the force
assessed to be within the METFR.
LINE 4
Force under torpedo attack.
Torpedoes assessed or known to have been fired
OFFENSIVE ASW - Operational Level.
COUNTER SURVEILLANCE - Prevent TFU from
WHITE None
detecting own forces, reaching a firing position and
achieving a fire control solution (FCS).
COUNTER-TARGETING - Prevent TFU detecting
friendly units - however, if units are detected cause TADPOLE
maximum confusion to TFU tactical picture/FCS. CHARLIE
Prevent TFU from achieving target classification.
Assume that torpedo firing is imminent and conduct intense
DISTRACTION measures whilst continuing to conduct TADPOLE
RED limited COUNTER-TARGETING to confuse the TFU’s plus
Threat Identifer
tactical picture/FCS.
Minimise acoustic MI.
Torpedo Counter Measures – Counter torpedoes once fired TADPOLE
RED
i.e. DISTRACTION, SEDUCTION &MANOEUVRE ZULU
 Torpedo Defence
• Torpedo Threat
• Anti Ship Torpedo Defence
• Surface Ship Torpedo Defence
• Torpedo Counter Measures
 SSTD (1)
• Joint UK/US Torpedo Defence Equipment
Programme
• Combination of sensor and countermeasures
• TCM Manoeuvre (NATO Tactical Development)
 SSTD (2)
• Sonar 2170
Neutrally Buoyant Cable

Future SSTD Tow ? (<3,000ft)

Winch

MICM Fi
eld

Torpedo
Detection Towed
Flexible Array
Array
Towed Torpedo
Decoy
 TCM (1)
• NATO Standard TCM
– Extac 179(B)
 TCM (2)
• Consider counter-fire.
• Speed.
– Unknown/SR/WH - Max.
– PAH/WG - Optimal Quiet (15 kts).
• Turn hard away. (If under helm maintain turn).
• Continue turn to close wake no closer than
300yds.
 TCM (3) SH
• Reverse wheel - turn away
from wake by at least 90 deg -
steady up on course +/- 120 R60 ITB + 120 ITB - 120 G60
deg off the Initial Threat Brg
(ITB).

• Hold for 2 mins, then execute

a 90 deg turn every minute ITB - 120 ITB + 120
continuing to open from the
threat until end of torpedo
run time or no threat

NOTE: R/G 180

1. ITB unknown and turn was to Port -
Subtract 120 deg from the initial course.
2. ITB unknown and turn was to Stbd -
Add 120 deg to the initial course.
 TCM (4)
• CVS/LPH/RFA/FFTA (Array Streamed)
– Best speed available
– Turn hard away. (If under helm maintain turn).
– Continue turn until reaching reciprocal of ships
head at time of detection
– Thereafer as per standard NATO TCM
 TCM (5)
255
(1 Min)

345 255
(1 min) (2 mins) 180

ITB
135 (R45)

300 yds
 TCM (6)
• Under Helm
– Maintain the turn
– Increase wheel and speed as necessary
– Starting point for manoeuvre = ships head at torpedo
detection
– Guidelines for deciding heading o/c of initial manoeuvre:
• Avoid closing the submarine
• Maintain speed
• Avoid crossing the wake if possible
• Note: It is important to achieve the series of tight turns; a WH torpedo
will track round a single turn without difficulty
 TCM (7)
• Under Helm 255
Example
(2 mins)

090 180

255
(2 mins)
ITB
135 (R45)
 ASW Tactics/Procedures
• ASW Definitions
• Screen
• Evasive Steering
• Phases of ASW Action
• ASW SOP
 Screen (1)
• Screen design:-
– ATP 1D/ATP 28 Electronic Supp
• (FOTI 0106 gives further guidance)
• TDZ
– The area into which the SM must enter in order to
engage the MB/HVU.
 Screen (2)

+MB
position
uA

TDZ
S
LL

MLA
 OBO Spec 2006
03/27/19
 OBO Spec 2006
03/27/19
 Evasive steering (1)
• Stop the SM from achieving :-
– An attack position
– A valid FC solution
• Ref: ATP3B
 Evasive Steering (2)
• Anti Satellite:
• ULLZZ
 Evasive Steering (3)
• Anti Submarine:
– VLLZZ
 Evasive Steering (4)
• Tactical Torpedo Countermeasures:
– To deny the S/M a valid FC solution
– RZZ/SLZZ
• Leg length of about 10 mins
• May be superimposed on U/VLLZZ (Main body)
– Patrolling Stations
• What escorts do whilst MB ZZs
• Patrol allocated sector relative to MB whilst altering course and/or
speed frequently
 Phases of ASW Action
• Detection
• Classification
• Attack
• ASW Action Summary
• SAC Responsibilities
 Phases of ASW Action (1)
• Detection
– Report
• Maximum initial classification INVESTIGATING
– Consider Step Aside
• Alter 60 - 90 deg
• Place submarine on opposite bow/quarter
• Change speed by at least 3 kts
– Chart Check
– All units investigate
– OTC/ASWC, SAC ACTIONS
 Phases of ASW Action (2)
• Detection
• Classification
– Consider:
• Echo quality/definition
• SSP/tidal stream
• Course/speed/aspect
• Bottom features
• Tracking consistency
– NONSUB ??
• MAD, Sonobuoy, AIO System
– Level of Confidence
 Phases of ASW Action (3)
• Detection
• Classification
• Attack plans
– Red CORDON MEU
8 1
Y
7 Y 2

yds
3000
Zer 3
6
o

5 4
 Phases of ASW Action (3)
• Detection
• Classification
• Attack plans
– Red CORDON
– Red BEAR HVU

DS
0Y
900 10
0
YD 00
S
Y

Y 534
2
 Phases of ASW Action (3)
• Detection
• Classification
• Attack plans
• Support plans
• Attack
– Urgent Attack
• Speed overrides accuracy
– Deliberate Attack
• Accuracy overrides speed
 Phases of ASW Action (3)
• Detection
• Classification
• Attack plans
• Support plans
• Attack
– Weapon Delivery Methods
• HOVERTAC
• VECTAC
• INFOTAC
• SELFTAC
• MTLS (COBRA Attack)
– Self defence only
 Phases of ASW Action (3)
• Detection
• Classification
• Attack plans
• Support plans
• Attack
– Planning
• best weapon?
• best delivery platform?
• best delivery method?
• the best position, most quickly.
 ASW Action Summary
• Report
• Consider Step Aside
• Chart Check
• Classify
• Attack/Support Plan
• Attack
• OTC/ASWC/SC Manoeuvre MB
• Sitrep
 SAC RESPONSIBILITIES
• Promulgate plans RED/BLACK
• Designate attacking unit
• Designate ACU
• Order countermeasures
• Review EMCON within OTC’s policy
• Specify aircraf altitude separation
• Establish datums as necessary
• Promulgate SUB speed for FOC
• Enforce restrictions in vic of SM area
• INFORM OTC
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference:
– The Standing ASW Policy –
AKA The ASW SOP

EXTAC 188
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria (1)
– The attack criteria is normally set at POSSUB LO 2 for all
weapons to align it with the pre-planned responses.
– Dependant on the situation it can however, be set at a
higher level of classification than the automatic reactions.
– Must comply with ROE in force.
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria (2)
– All attacks should be DELIBERATE unless speed is priority,
then an URGENT attack should be conducted.
– Urgent attack for POSSUB LO 2 inside TDZ/TDA.
• TDZ 6,000 - 30,000 yds
• TDA 8,000 yds
– Inherent right of self defence remains.
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (1)
– Contact inside LASWC Area >30nm
• MPA prosecute, helo assistance may be ordered
– FFCH report TA contact at POSSUB LO 2
• Localising assets may be allocated
– Contact within LASWC Area, beyond close screen
• SAU/ASAU will be formalised
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (2)
– Contact gained by close
Y Screen.

Y
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (2)
– Contact gained by close Screen.
– Contact gained by screen Dipper.

Y
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (2)
– Contact gained by close Screen.
– Contact gained by screen Dipper.
– ESM report from MPA/Helo
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (3)
– ESM contact by a single ship

13 nm
3 nm
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (3)
– ESM contact by a single ship
– ESM by more ships

Datum
Err 1nm
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (3)
– ESM contact by a single ship
– ESM by more ships
– Detection of Torpedo
Datum
Err 3nm
5 nm
 ASW SOP (1)
• Reference
• Attack Criteria
• Pre Planned Responses (3)
– ESM contact by a single ship
– ESM by more ships
– Detection of Torpedo
– SM launched missile
 ASW SOP (2)
• OTC/ASWC’s Considerations
– Manoeuvre MB to place SM outside LLSuA
– If perceived that there is continued submarine threat
on new base course:
• Reorder Main Body - Zig Zag
• Adjust Screen if necessary during units absence on
ASAU/SAU duties
– Review threat warnings and ASTD
– Provision of assets
– Observance of the mission/ROE