Loss Prevention

Loss prevention in chemical industries involve:

–Identification and assessment of major hazards

–Control of hazards by containment, substitution,

improved maintenance

–Control of process by utilizing automatic control, relief

system , interlock, alarm

–Limitation of loss when accident happens

 Loss Prevention

The major formalized techniques are:

– Hazards and Operability (HAZOP)

– Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

– Failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA)

– Safety indexes

– Safety audit
 What is HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard
and OPerating problems

• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help

provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the
intended operating conditions can lead to hazardous
situations or operability problems

• HAZOP is basically for safety

• Considerable engineering insight is involved

 HAZOP Study

HAZOP study are applied during :

• Normal operation

• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced output,

plant start-up and shut-down

• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation

• Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam, electricity, cooling

water

• Provision for maintenance.

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 HAZOP Team
HAZOP studies are carried out using a `brainstorming' approach
by a team, chaired and coordinated by a qualified person
experienced in HAZOPs:
• Team Leader
• Team Secretary
• Process Engineer
• Mechanical Engineer
• Commissioning/Operations
• Engineer/Manager
• Instrument Engineer
 Strength of HAZOP

• HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive and

flexible.

• It gives good identification of cause and excellent

identification of critical deviations.

• The use of keywords is effective and the whole group is

able to participate.

• HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for studying

large plant in a specific manner.

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 Weakness of HAZOP

• HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a

tendency for boredom for analysts.

• It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although

the technique should be amenable to human error application.

• HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore

omits many scenarios.

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 Guide Words
NONE /No e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure;
valve closed or jammed :
REVERSE Opposite, e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump
failure
MORE Quantitative increase, e.g., MORE FLOW, Temp,

LESS Quantitative increase, e.g., LESS FLOW, Temp,

As Well As Qualitative increase, e.g. impurity.

PART OF Qualitative decrease, Change in composition high or

low concentration of mixture; additional reactions in
reactor or other location ; feed change.
Other than Nothing of the intent happen, completely different
occurs
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 HAZOP Steps
• These guide words are applied to flow, temperature,
pressure, liquid level and composition.
• Deviation of these variables from normal operation is
considered
• The consequences of these deviations on the process is
then assessed.
• The measures needed to correct these consequences are
then established

This process enables a comprehensive evaluation of

Hazard control systems and produces recommendations for any
necessary modifications. The overall result is a reduction in both
hazards and potential operational problems
HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
HAZOP Study Form
TITLE :
Sheet 1 of
LINE 1 :

CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING PROVISIONS ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR

DEVIATION RECOMMENDATIONS

10
 Storage Tank

To
atmosphere
Nitrogen To flare
H
RV-1
Equipment & Valve
PV-2 PICA FV Flow control valve
PV-1
T Tank
V-8
P Pump
V-7 PV Pressure control valve
RV Relief valve
V Valve
V-5
H
TIA
From tank
trucks Storage
Instrument
Tank LIA
H
L Level
L T Temperature
V-1 P Pressure
F Flow
I Indicator
V-2 FICA
PI C Controller
L
To process A Alarm
V-4 FV-1

V-3
 HAZOP Table - level
Cause Deviation Consequences Safe guard Action
Level
Less 1. Rupture Reagent release Potential fire LIA Estimate release quantity
discharge line
2. V3 open or Reagent release Potential fire LIA Estimate release quantity
broken
3. V1 open or Reagent release Potential fire LIA V1 protection
broken
4. Tank rupture Reagent release Potential fire LIA What external event
cause tank rupture

More 5. Too much truck Overfill Reagent release via LIA Does RV1 allow for
unload RV1 liquid release?
Consider high level alarm
shutoff
6. Reverse flow Overfill Reagent release via LIA Consider check valve at
from process RV1 pump discharge
Consider high level alarm
shutoff at feed

NO Same as less
 HAZOP Table - pressure
Pressure
Less 9. Break in nitrogen Reagent release Potential fire PICA Consider independent
or flare line PLA
10. Lose nitrogen Tank implode Reagent release PICA Consider vacuum break
valve
11. PV2 fails closed Tank implodes Reagent release PICA Consider PAL
12. PICA fails, Tank implodes Reagent release Tank not designed for
closing PV2 vacuum

More 13. PICA fails, Reagent release via Tank rupture if RV1 PICA What PV1 and RV1
closing PV1 RV1 fails capacity
14. PV1 fails closed Reagent release via Tank rupture if RV1 PICA Consider independent
RV1 fails PAH
15. V7 closed Reagent release via Tank rupture if RV1 PICA Is V7 locked open
RV1 fails
16. Overfill tank Truck unload Tank rupture if RV1 PICA Consider second high
fails level shutoff
17. Temperature of Reagent release in Tank rupture if RV1 PICA What prevent high temp
inlet higher RV1 fails of feed
than normal Consider PAH
18. Volatile Reagent release in Tank rupture if RV1 PICA Consider PAH
impurities in RV1 fails Consider sampling before
feed unloading
 Hazop Table - composition
Cause Deviation Consequences Safe guard Action

Composition

Other than 7. Wrong reagent Possible reaction Tank rupture Consider sampling before
unload

As well as 8. Impurities in Problem in reactor Are other material

reagent delivered in tank
Are unloading connection
different
 HAZOP Table - Temperature
Temperature

Less 19. Temperature of Possible vacuum Thermal stress on tank What are temp limits of
inlet cooler tank
than usual
20. Low tank See 9-12 Thermal stress on tank What are pressure limits
pressure of tank

High 21. temperature of See 17 Thermal stress on tank What are temp limits on
inlet is higher tank
than usual

22. external fire Tank fails Reagent release What could cause
external fire
What are fire protection
capabilities
Is fire protection
adequate
 Preliminary HAZOP Example
Cooling Coils

Monomer
Feed Refer to reactor system shown.

Cooling Water to Sewer The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is

provided to remove the excess energy of reaction.
In the event of cooling function is lost, the
Cooling temperature of reactor would increase. This would
Water In lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to
additional energy release.

The result could be a runaway reaction with

pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the
reactor. The temperature within the reactor is
measured and is used to control the cooling water
flow rate by a valve.

Perform HAZOP Study

T
C Thermocouple

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 Preliminary HAZOP on Reactor
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NO No cooling Cooling water valve Temperature increase in Install high temperature

malfunction reactor alarm (TAH)

REVERSE Reverse cooling Failure of water source Less cooling, possible runaway Install check valve
flow resulting in backward reaction
flow

MORE More cooling flow Control valve failure, Too much cooling, reactor cool Instruct operators
operator fails to take action on procedures
on alarm

AS WELL AS Reactor product More pressure in reactor Off-spec product Check maintenance
in coils procedures and
schedules

OTHER THAN Another material Water source May be cooling inefffective If less cooling, TAH will
besides cooling contaminated and effect on the reaction detect. If detected, isolate
water water source. Back up
water source?

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 Case Study – Shell & Tube Heat
Exchanger
• Using relevant guide works, perform HAZOP study on shell & tube
heat exchanger

Process
fluid

Cooling water

18
 HAZOP on Heat Exchanger
Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

NONE No cooling water flow Failure of inlet cooling Process fluid temperature is Install Temperature
water valve to open not lowered accordingly indicator before and after
the process fluid line
Install TAH

MORE More cooling water Failure of inlet cooling Output of Process fluid Install Temperature
flow water valve to close temperature too low indicator before and after
process fluid line
Install TAL

LESS Less cooling water Pipe leakage Process fluid temperature too Installation of flow meter
low

REVERSE Reverse process fluid Failure of process fluid inlet Product off set Install check valve (whether
flow valve it is crucial have to check?)

CONTAMINATION Process fluid Contamination in cooling Outlet temperature too low Proper maintenance and
contamination water operator alert

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 Documents needed for HAZOP Study

• For Preliminary HAZOP

– Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
– Description of the Process
• For Detailed HAZOP
– Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
– Process Calculations
– Process Data Sheets
– Instrument Data Sheets
– Interlock Schedules
– Layout Requirements
– Hazardous Area Classification
– Description of the Process
 Planning for HAZOP

Additional required information:

• Safety procedures documents

• Relief/venting philosophy
• Chemical involved
• Piping specifications
• Previous HAZOP report
 Planning for HAZOP
• Carry out the study
• Record the results (may need a secretary)
• Follow-up of actions noted
– final report contain resolution of all recommended
actions
– must appoint someone as leader to check progress of
action
– team may meet again if answers to questions do not
simply lead to an action
– team may meet again if significant design changes in
interim report
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members

HAZOP leader
• Plan sessions and timetable
• Control discussion
• Limit discussion
• Encourage team to draw conclusion
• Ensure secretary has time for taking note
• Keep team in focus
• Encourage imagination of team members
• Motivate members
• Discourage recriminations
• Judge importance issues
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members

HAZOP Secretary
• Take adequate notes
• Record documentations
• Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
• If unclear, check wording before writing
• Produce interim lists of recommendations
• Produce draft report of study
• Check progress of chase action
• Produce final report
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members

Process Engineer
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design
conditions
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design
conditions
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members

Mechanical Design Engineer

• Provide specification details
• Provide vendor package details
• Provide equipment and piping layout information
Instrument Engineer
• Provide details of control philosophy
• Provide interlock and alarm details
• Provide info on shutdown, safety features
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members
Plant Engineer or Manager
• Provide information on compatibility with any existing
adjacent plant
• Provide details of site utilities and services
• Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on
maintenance access and modifications
Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor
• Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from an
operating experience view point
• Provide (for study on existing plant) information on plant
stability at the specified control parameters
• Provide information on experienced operability deviations of
hazard potential
 Responsibility of HAZOP Team
Members

Chemist
• Provide details of process chemistry
• Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations,
byproducts, corrosion etc)
Project Engineer
• Provide details of cost and time estimation and also
budget constraints.
• Ensure rapid approval if required