Routing Protocol for Wireless

Sensor Network in Hostile

Environments

PhD Student : Kashif Saghar

Supervisors:
William Henderson
David Kendall
 Outline
• Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and
Routing
• Formal Modelling
• Challenges & Security Issues in WSN
• Research Aim
• Research Method
• Progress
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK
(WSN)
 WSN COMMUNICATION
ARCHITECTURE

Application Layer

Transport Layer

Routing Network Layer

Data Link (MAC) Layer

Physical Layer
WHY WSN ARE DIFFERENT?
• Fault Tolerance
• Scalability
• Density
• Hardware Constraints
• Cost
• Power Consumption
• WSN Topology
 ROUTING IN WSN
• Cost
• Energy-efficiency
• Latency
• Mobility
• Distribution density
• Scalability
• Quality of Service (QoS)
 SECURITY ISSUES IN WSN
• Broadcast Nature
• Limited Resources
• Unattended
• Hostile Environment
 AIM AND OBJECTIVES
• AIM/Purpose
– "Attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks, having limited resources,
can be successfully resisted at the Network Layer."
• Primary Assumptions
– Confidentiality and Authentication Scheme is present at Link
Layer
– Sink is a highly resourced node
– Nodes do not have any special hardware
– The approximate time to compromise a node is known in
advance
– Nodes can be placed by any means (Random, Regular)
– Attacker is very Powerful
WSN ATTACKS CONSIDERED

• Wormhole
– Two colluding nodes
– A node at one end of the wormhole advertises high quality link to the
base station
– Another node at the other end receives the attracted packets
– Two Laptops or Normal Nodes
• Black hole
– Selective Forwarding
– Fail Encryption or via Wormhole
• Sink hole
– Node attract all traffic around by making itself attractive to all nodes with
in range e.g. Laptop
– Fail Encryption or via Wormhole
• Insider Attack
– Get into network by node compromise or false node
 LIST OF SOME WSN ATTACKS
• Spoofing
• False Injection or Path-base Denial of Service
• Black hole or Selective forwarding
• Sinkhole attacks
• Sybil attacks
• Wormholes
• Jamming
• Eavesdropping
• Traffic Analysis Attack
• Insider Attack (Compromised Node)
• False Node and malicious data
• Rushing Attack
• Stealthy Attack
• Hello Flood Attack
 LITERATURE REVIEW ANALYSIS
0.4% 1.6%
2.4% 0.8% Spoofing

5.3% False Injection

Reward Protocols 4.0% Black hole

Sinkhole attacks

Sybil attacks
Specialized Hardware 5.9% 20.6%
Wormhole attack

Jamming

Traffic analysis Attack

Topology Mapping 2.5%
Rushing Attack
5.3% Stealthy Attack
eUsed

45.3% Hello Flood Attack

Overhear Neighbour 3.5% 4.9%
em

3.2% Insider Attack

4.0% 6.1%
Sch

Multiple-path 1.8% 1.8%

14.9% 2.7%
Protocols 1.8%
2.7% 1 A ttack

2 A ttack s
Cryptographic
69.3%
Techniques 3 A ttack s

4 A ttack s

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 5 A ttack s

88.5% 6 or M ore A ttack s

Percentage
DESIGN PHASES

SETUP PHASE

OPERATIONAL
PHASE

ATTACK
PREVENTION
 TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE
• Formal Modelling
• WSN Simulation
• Empirical Testing
 FORMAL MODELLING
• Assumptions become clear
• Can check Best cases and Worst Cases easily
• Inform about boundaries of protocol behaviour
• Liveliness and Safety properties
• Rarely used in analysis of previous protocols
• Main Advantages over Simulation and Empirical Testing:
– No need to build a prototype of the system
– Able to verify the system against every single execution trace (Hidden
Errors)
• Shortcomings
– High Resources Required for detailed model
– Scalability, Density, Topology
– Subset of Model can be checked
– Expertise Required
– Uncertainty
UPPAL MODEL OF DESIGN (SETUP)
 VERIFICATION USING UPPAAL
• Theorem1: Model never deadlocks
• Theorem2: All nodes get the correct level
• Theorem3: The levels of nodes are not
changed once all nodes get the correct
• Theorem4: A node in INIT mode means it
has not yet been assigned a level
• Theorem5: A node always gets a level
and gets out of INIT mode
MESSAGE SEQUENCE DIAGRAM

Sink Node1 Node2 Node3 Node4 Sink Node1 Node2 Node3 Node4
Node always
Node 3 has
sends ASK
detected an
beacon when
ASK ASK ASK ASK FORWARD FORWARD Event !!!
it starts
ACCEPT ACCEPT

ASK ASK SELECT Node 3 received

Node 1 has ACCEPT from both
ASSIGN
been assigned Neighbours
LOUD Level 2 by Sink DATA
LOUD DATA
FORWARD
Node 1 on FORWARD
Data is only Rec
ASK receiving ASK ACCEPT
ASK by Node2 which
sends ASSIGN
was selected
ASSIGN SELECT
Node 2 observes
neighbours for
LOUD some time and then As Node 1 is at
LOUD DATA
announce its level Level next to Sink
DATA it do not send
FORWARD
ASK ASK ACK

ASSIGN ACK

ACK Sink sends ACK

which is propagated
LOUD LOUD back to source node

ASK
ASSIGN

LOUD
 SIMULATION
• Level of simulator (High, Low, Bit Level)
• Usual Workability
• Scalability
• Effect of Topology
• Effect of Density
• Vary environment conditions
• Shortcomings
– Ideal cases are checked only
– Hidden Errors
 As k As s ign Loud
Average Number of Beacons per Node (100 Nodes)

A v e ra g e N u m b e r o f
B ea co n s /N o d e
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 All
Ask 5.7 3.4 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.7 4.6 5.6 8.0 9.2 10.2
Assign 2.3 4.9 11.3 13.7 16.6 18.7 23.0 29.6 34.8 43.2 46.2
Loud 2.1 2.5 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0

Range (m)

As k As s ign Loud
Average Number of Beacons per Node (500 Nodes)
A v e ra g e N u m b e r o f
B e a c o n s /N o d e

40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
100 200 300 400 500
Ask 11.6 6.3 4.8 4.5 4.7
Assign 2.6 7.2 16.5 26.0 26.6
Loud 2.1 3.0 3.7 4.3 3.8

Range (m)
 Average
Effect of Density on Setup Time (100 Node Network) Max
Min

T i m e (S e c o n d s )
40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 All
Average 14.6 11.4 11.8 12.2 12.2 13.6 14.2 16.8 20.6 23.8 27.3
Max 16.0 12.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 18.0 22.0 25.0 29.0
Min 14.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 13.0 16.0 20.0 22.0 26.0

Range (m)

Avera ge
Effect of D ensity on Setup Time (500 N ode N etw ork) Max
Min
T i m e (S e c o n d s )

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0
100 200 300 400 500
Average 28.2 22.2 17.6 20.4 18.6
Max 33.0 28.0 19.0 23.0 22.0
Min 26.0 16.0 17.0 18.0 17.0

Ra nge (m )

Average
Effect of Density on Setup Time (1000 Node Network) Max
Min
T i m e (S e c o n d s )

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0
100 200 300 400 500
Average 36.0 25.8 24.4 24.8 21.0
Max 36.0 32.0 26.0 26.0 22.0
Min 36.0 20.0 22.0 23.0 20.0

Range (m)
 CURRENT AND FUTURE WORK
• Current Work
– Formal specifications of design
• Future Work
– Formal Model and Verification
– Simulation of complete protocol
– Simulation of Attacks
• Additional/Optional Work
– Implementation in Real Hardware
Questions