PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN

POLICY

AYESHA ATIQUE
DANIA TARIQ GILL
HAFSAH JILANEE
ZUNAIRA MAIRAJ
CONTENTS

 Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

 Pakistan’s Relation with India
 The Future of Pak-Afghan Relations
 Pakistan and Iran
 Pakistan and GCC Countries
 Pakistan and USA
 Demystifying CPEC
 Pakistan and Russia
 Pakistan and China
 Punjab and Sindh
 Conclusion
Foreign policy

 Foreign policy, solely guided by a country’s national

interest, is used as a tool by a particular country for
dealing with the outside world in various areas such as
security, economy, trade, commerce, culture and
technology.
Guiding principles of Pakistan’s foreign
policy
1. The primary objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to safeguard the national
security, territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the country.
2. To protect Pakistan’s economic interests abroad.
3. To project the image of Pakistan as a progressive, modern and democratic
Islamic country.
4. To promote peace, stability and friendly relations with Afghanistan.
5. To find the resolution of all disputes with India including the issue of Kashmir.
Raise the Kashmir issue on international forums.
6. To forge cordial and friendly relations with all neighbours, Muslim countries and
the larger international community.
7. To fulfil its responsibilities as a responsible member of the international
community.
8. To prevent and respond to threats and capitalize on opportunities.
9. To safeguard the interests of Pakistani diaspora.
PAKISTAN’S RELATION WITH INDIA

 This article suggests that Pakistan and India’s relations can be better understood when looked at
in a cyclic manner that has its three different phases of connect, disconnect and reconnect.
 This article suggests that Pakistan and India’s relations can be better understood when looked at
in a cyclic manner that has its three different phases of connect, disconnect and reconnect.
 diplomacy has been successful in bringing momentary thaw in relations, but has proved unable
to bring about a solution of the core disputes between the two countries.
 Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India will remain directed by the security concerns emanating
from across its eastern and western borders.
 Diplomacy plays a significant role in resolving long standing disputes.
 India will try to use pressure tactics in order to take concessions from Pakistan on Kashmir and
other issues.
 With Narendra Modi occupying the office of the Prime Minister of India,
relations should not be expected to take a turn towards normalcy any times
soon.
 Pakistan’s internal problems as well as the conflict in Baluchistan and Fata
should give enough reason to India for becoming more offensive.
 Thanks to operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan has made significant gains against
extremism.
 Pakistan’s military and nation as a whole have proved its mettle and resilience.
 And if economic turnaround is also made — the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor be the case in point — then Pakistan will be even more stronger and
different.
THE FUTURE OF PAK-AFGHAN
RELATIONS:

 Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been hostage to security.

 The past 35 years have proven the fact that any foreign policy towards
Afghanistan will have great social, economic and political fallout on Pakistan.
 Stability in Afghanistan is in the utmost security, political, economic and social
interest of Pakistan.
 This time Afghanistan must understand that blaming Pakistan for everything
that goes wrong in Afghanistan will achieve no end. Therefore, the
government in Kabul should look to their own incompetence, discrepancies,
governmental and institutional problems rather than blaming Pakistan for every
wrongdoing that takes place in Afghanistan.
 Certainly, economics can play a vital role to bring the two countries closer to
each other.
 Pakistan has the opportunity to develop an economic depth in
Afghanistan, because, Afghanistan is a landlocked country.
 It is industrially and economically underdeveloped and depends on
Pakistan for transit and supply.
 People cross the Pak-Afghan border daily with a big majority of them
being Afghans crossing into Pakistan for treatment, business or meeting
families. Therefore, one can say that Pakistan has every chance of
developing a huge constituency in Afghanistan.
 Economic integration between Pakistan and Afghanistan will also help
both countries to reduce militancy in the bordering regions.
PAKISTAN AND IRAN

 Overall friendly relation

 Iran is emerging as broker (dealer) in Middle Eastern politics.
 Pakistan and Iran have stakes in Afghanistan as well as in the wider region.
 The nuclear deal between Iran and the world will give an opportunity to
Pakistan to benefit from trade and commerce with Tehran.
 Iran also provides Pakistan an opportunity to fulfil its energy requirements.
PAKISTAN AND GCC COUNTRIES

 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), political and economic alliance of six Middle
Eastern countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Bahrain, and Oman.
 As Iran, the GCC and the wider Middle East comprises of Islamic countries, the
concept of Muslim brotherhood will naturally resonate across the width and
breadth of Pakistan. Our relations with the GCC, Afghanistan and Iran involve
societal, religious and cultural factors that come under the broad umbrella of
ideology.
 One of the most outstanding challenges for Pakistan’s foreign policy viz-a-viz
the gulf countries will be to wash away the impact of Pakistan’s decision on
Yemen. It will take some time to undo the effects of Pakistan’s decision on
Yemen, but again Yemen should serve as an example for Pakistan so in the
future it should not opt for indulging in any regional conflict.
PAKISTAN AND USA

 One of the most important relations of the outside world.

 Geopolitics, security and economy are the main factors driving Pakistan’s relations with
the United States.
 Despite 70 years-long history of relationship, United States and Pakistan have not been
able to develop solid, long-term and strategic relations with each other
 Pakistan has looked at its relations with the United States through the prism of security.
 Alongside security, economy has also been a major factor in shaping foreign policy
decisions in Pakistan viz-a-viz the United States.
 As we move along the road to the future, three areas of interest are expected to be
dominating the future of Pakistan’s relations with the United States. These include
militancy, Afghanistan and nuclear weapons.
 One-sided economic dependency, as commonly seen in Pak-US relations is a major
cause that has inhibited continuity and depth in our relations with the United States. In the
future, therefore, Pakistan needs to end its economic dependency on the United States.
 PAKISTAN AND RUSSIA

 The changing regional dynamics is bringing a change in Pakistan’s relations with Russia
 Although Pakistan has a long history of alignment with the United States and the Western world,
yet terrorism, militancy, Afghanistan, and the changing dynamics of the region raise hope and
interest in a renewed cooperation between Pakistan and Russia.
 Pakistan and Russia have had a considerable degree of economic cooperation and a high
level of diplomatic engagement during 1960s and 1970s.
PAKISTAN AND CHINA

INTRODUCTION
 Since 2015, the ties defining Pakistan’s relationship with China have assumed
new significance through CPEC

 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – A set of projects that are part of Beijing’s

Belt and Road Initiative
 Pakistan’s political leadership calls CPEC a “game changer” that would bring
prosperity by revitalising a fragile economy.
 Military perceives closer ties with China as an opportunity to offset rising
tensions with the US over Pakistan’s support for Afghanistan and India oriented
militant groups
THE BEIJING CONNECTION

 BALANCING GEOPOLITICS AND

ECONOMICS
 THE JIHAIDST FACTOR
 SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR CHINESE
NATIONALS AND PROJECTS
DEMYSTIFYING CPEC

 The Planning Commission of Pakistan, in its latest statement, has dismissed

myths surrounding Pakistan’s CPEC-related debts and repayments while
apparently also addressing the uncertainty factor, currently prevailing in
the economy
 According to the statement, outflows under China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) will begin in 2021 and peak over the next three years
without creating a debt trap. Starting in 2021, these repayments will about
$300-400 million annually and gradually peak to about $3.5 billion by fiscal
year 2024-25, before tapering off with total repayments to be completed
in 25 years.
 The statement categorically dismissed the fears surrounding the loans and
repayments, stating that “CPEC is not imposing any immediate burden
with respect to loans repayment and energy sector outflows”, arguing all
debt related outflows will be outweighed by the resultant benefits of the
investments to the Pakistan economy. The Commission reiterated that
CPEC was a “flagship” project and most active project of Belt and Road
Initiative where 22 projects worth a total of $28 billion have been
actualized over the past four years. “The project could not be compared
with Chinese overseas investment in Sri Lanka or Malaysia as frameworks
and financial modes of CPEC are altogether different in nature” the
statement continued.
CPEC finances are divided in government to government loans, investment
and grants. Infrastructure sector is being developed through interest free or
government concessional loans. Gwadar Port is grant-based investment
which means the Government of Pakistan does not have to pay back the
invested amount for the development of the port. Energy projects are being
executed under Independent Power Producers (IPPs) mode and finances are
mainly taken by the private companies from China Development Bank and
China Exim Bank against their own balance sheets, therefore, any debt would
be borne by the Chinese investors instead of any obligation on part of the
Pakistani government. Pakistan has, thus, pragmatically opted for Chinese
investment under CPEC due to the favorable financing arrangements,
keeping the national interests impregnable.
END TO END

 Strains on the Federation:

 CPEC was originally meant to pass through and thus help develop
impoverished areas of Baluchistan as well as southern Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.
 With renegotiations and new Chinese conditions on the western corridor,
CPEC’s immediate focus is on using and upgrading the existing eastern
route before eventually turning to new western routes.
 CPEC’s Exit Point: Gilgit-Baltistan:
 All three prospective CPEC routes cross from Pakistan into China from
Gilgit-Baltistan, which Pakistan considers part of disputed Kashmir.
 Locals in Gilgit-Baltistan are already resentful of what they see as their
region’s political and economic isolation.
 Locals are also sceptical of government claims that CPEC will reduce high
rates of unemployment, suspecting that most jobs will go to outsiders from
Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
 Officials accuse Indian intelligence agencies of trying to stir up anti-state
sentiment in the region, implying that dissidents and protesters are Indian spies,
contributing to a generally restrictive environment where criticism of CPEC is
especially fraught.
 Tensions with Islamabad have also risen as the result of the May 2018
promulgation of the Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018.
 While the last government’s hasty, flawed reforms, with limited local buy-in,
have aggravated longstanding grievances in Gilgit-Baltistan, anti-Chinese
sentiment also is on the rise.
 CPEC’s Gilgit-Baltistan component also has geopolitical implications. India
claims the region as part of its Jammu and Kashmir territory, rejecting Pakistan’s
cession of part of the region to China.
 CPEC’s Entry Point: Gwadar
1. Developing Gwadar
 Gwadar is a fishing town on the Arabian Sea not far from the Iranian border.
 General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime (1999-2008) sought assistance from China and
other countries to develop the town into a modern deep-sea port, along with a master
plan for refineries, power plants and industrial estates.
 Pakistan transferred leasing rights from the Port of Singapore Authority to the China
Overseas Port Holding Company-Pakistan.76 Gwadar subsequently became integral to
CPEC.
 Briefing to the Senate, the federal minister for ports and fisheries, confirmed that China
would receive 91 per cent of Gwadar port-generated profits over 40 years and the
Gwadar Port Authority, controlled by the federal government, the remaining 9 per cent;
Baluchistan’s provincial government will get nothing.
 Gwadar suffers from acute water and electricity shortages, major challenges to
transforming it into a commercial hub.
 Iran exports electricity to Gwadar.
 Attacks on tankers carrying water from the dam to Gwadar have provoked strikes by
owners and drivers and strikes in thirsty Gwadar’s markets and businesses.
 Two desalination plants have been built with Chinese support in Gwadar, and the military
intends to build another.
 Yet several local officials complained that the existing plants benefit the port, not the city’s
residents.
 Gwadar’s apparently limited commercial potential is raising suspicions about China’s real
intentions. Some Pakistani security analysts believe that China is less interested in
developing a road and logistical network that would enable access to the Arabian Sea
and Persian Gulf from Xinjiang via Gwadar than in using the port for military purposes.
 2. Leaving Gwadar’s Communities Behind
 According to several Gwadar officials, the federal government plans to expropriate land,
bulldoze the old city and resettle residents.
 A federal government directive to the development authority to stop approving new
housing and commercial developments until the master plan is finalised.
 The navy has launched its housing scheme on some of the most attractive land
overlooking Gwadar’s east and west bays, and speculators and developers are pushing
property prices out of reach for locals.
 Instead of improving the lives of locals, CPEC’s presence is depriving them of their
livelihoods.
 Fisher folk, whose daily catch provides them just enough to feed their families, already
have been denied access to the sea for days on end on security grounds.
 Locals also resent exclusion from employment in the port and in construction.
 Gwadar and the Baloch Insurgency

 During Musharraf’s regime (1999-2008), the military and paramilitary Frontier Corps attempted to
suppress Baloch dissent, abducting, torturing and killing hundreds, if not thousands, of Baloch
nationalists and sympathisers.
 The state has made few attempts to address Baloch calls for greater political and economic
autonomy, which underpin the insurgency
 As groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaatud-Dawa expand their presence,
Chinese nationals could soon become high-value targets, as demonstrated by the 2017 abduction
and killing of two Chinese Christian missionaries in Quetta.
 Baloch militants have killed scores of Pakistani workers employed on CPEC projects
 Frequent killings of police and paramilitary personnel – by both Baloch insurgents and jihadist groups
– including in normally safe areas such as the provincial capital Quetta, have raised questions about
whether the state, even with a heavy military and paramilitary presence, can maintain security.
 CPEC’s Exit Point: Gilgit-Baltistan:
 All three prospective CPEC routes cross from Pakistan into China from Gilgit-Baltistan, which Pakistan considers part of
disputed Kashmir.
 Locals in Gilgit-Baltistan are already resentful of what they see as their region’s political and economic isolation.
 Locals are also sceptical of government claims that CPEC will reduce high rates of unemployment, suspecting that most
jobs will go to outsiders from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
 Officials accuse Indian intelligence agencies of trying to stir up anti-state sentiment in the region, implying that dissidents
and protesters are Indian spies, contributing to a generally restrictive environment where criticism of CPEC is especially
fraught.
 Tensions with Islamabad have also risen as the result of the May 2018 promulgation of the Gilgit-Baltistan Order 2018.
 While the last government’s hasty, flawed reforms, with limited local buy-in, have aggravated longstanding grievances in
Gilgit-Baltistan, anti-Chinese sentiment also is on the rise.
 CPEC’s Gilgit-Baltistan component also has geopolitical implications. India claims the region as part of its Jammu and
Kashmir territory, rejecting Pakistan’s cession of part of the region to China.
PUNJAB AND SINDH: Land grab in the
heartland

 The CPEC Long-Term Plan outlined a focus on

agricultural modernisation, setting as goals, among
others, “to strengthen agricultural construction” and “to
promote the systematic, large-scale, standardised and
intensified construction of agricultural industry”.
A. Agricultural Cooperation: Punjab’s
Challenges

 Landowners risk losing political influence should they sell

up
 CPEC agricultural projects can not force small farmers
to sell their land
 Landownership is not complete officially
B. CPEC and Sindh’s Tharparkar District

 Tharparkar is Pakistan’s largest coal mining and power

project
 One component of the Tharparkar power project is to
reduce the disruptive effects of such developments by
giving local stakes in the enterprise
 The next mine will be managed by Chinese company.
There’s no guarantee that locals will be employed
SOLUTION

 Create a legal framework

 This should include
1. Employment guarantees for locals, including women
2. Reduction of environmental damage
3. Protection of local culture
VI. Conclusion

 If properly carried out, CPEC could promote economic

development and growth and thus have a profound
impact on Pakistan and its citizens.
 Policy should have the well- being of Pakistani citizens at
its heart