STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION

Presumption in Aid of Construction & Interpretation:

PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE
Group 2 | July 23, 2019
WHAT IS A PRESUMPTION?
 Cornell Law School Wex defines presumption as, “a legal inference that
must be made in light of certain facts; most presumptions are rebuttable,
meaning that they are rejected if proven to be false or at least thrown
into sufficient doubt by the evidence; other presumptions are conclusive,
meaning that they must be accepted to be true without any opportunity
for rebuttal.”
 In this definition, we can concur that presumptions are made when there are
certain facts that needed determination of the correctness in its
interpretation and the corresponding substantial decisions to be made in the
cases thereof. A conclusion must be reached on the basis of evidence and
reasoning, and thus, when making presumptions, the Courts’ duty is to put
forth material evidence and consequential events leading up to cause of
action in the case at bar when inferring especially appealed cases.
 Presumptions can either be conclusive, meaning generally accepted as truth
without any negation or contradiction, or rebuttable, meaning open to
refutation or counter-argument.
PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE
 First concern of the judge should be to discover the intent of the lawmaker in its
provisions.
 We presume the good motive of legislation to render justice.
 LAW & JUSTICE are INSEPARABLE, thus, interpreted in consonance with each other
 “Courts are apt to err by sticking closely to the words of a law where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them.” - Justice Holmes
 Though the courts have power to interpret the laws, they have, nevertheless the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment.

*2 Premises Illustrated in the Succeeding Cases:

 In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (ART. 10 NCV)
 A law should NOT be interpreted so as to cause an injustice.
G.R. No. 94723, 278 SCRA 27, August 21, 1997
Karen F. Salvacion vs Central Bank, China Banking Corporation, and Greg Bartelli

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. (ART. 10 NCV)

 Facts:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist coaxed and lured Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old,
to go with him to his apartment. He persuaded her by giving her a stuffed toy and telling her that he has a niece her age
and he wanted Karen to teach her Pilipino.
While inside the apartment, Greg Bartelli succeeded in raping Karen several times for three days until she found a way to
get help and was subsequently rescued by the police. During the arrest, the police recovered from Bartelli the following:
1) dollar checks, 2)COCOBANK bankbook for peso account, 3)China Banking Corp. bankbook for his dollar account,
4)ID-12230-8877, 5)Philippine Money, 6)Door Keys and 7)Stuffed Toy used to seduce complainant.
On February 16, 1989, a case was filed against Bartelli for serious illegal detention and four counts of rape. On
February 24, 1989, on his way to the bail hearing, Greg Bartelli managed to escape police custody.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal’s Ex-Parte motion for the issuance of the warrant of arrest and hold
departure order. Thus, pending his arrest, the criminal case against Bartelli was achieved. On the same date, a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment was issued for Civil Case No. 89-3214.
By the virtue of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment, a Notice of Garnishment was issued to China Banking
Corporation. The said bank invoked Republic Act No. 1405 ( BANK SECRECY LAW: AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR
INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR).

Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued
in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
‘Sec. 113 Exemption from attachment. – Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.’
 “The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426.
As amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
 ‘Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits
authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as
foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and,
except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such
foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or
legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that
said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever.’
 On April 10, 1989, the trial court ruled in favor of Karen Salvacion and ordered
Greg Bartelli to pay Karen and her parents damages, 25% of the total damages as
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. When the decision of the trial court
became final after the lapse of the 15-day publication, petitioners tried to
execute on Bartelli’s dollar account with China Banking Corp. The Bank invoked
Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960.
 A petition for declaratory relief was subsequently filed at the Supreme Court.
 Issues:
 Whether or not Sec 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of the
Republic Act No. 6426 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1246, otherwise
known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign
transient.
 Ruling:
The application of the law depends on the extent off its justice. Eventually, if
we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court.
Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10
of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de
otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
(Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377)
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960
would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
 In this case, the Court applied Article 10 of the New Civil Code (In case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail), and declared that:
“xxx…the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to
this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED
to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, “Karen Salvacion,
et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to
petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such
amount as would satisfy the judgment.”

NOTES:
 “ Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of
compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our
day.” - TORRES, JR., J
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

A law should NOT be interpreted so as to cause an injustice.

FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the
name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year later, on April 22, 1964,
Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees
subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo
Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.
 The trial court dismissed this complaint on the ground that the right had
lapsed (30 days within notice of the sale in 1963 and 1964). Although there was
no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared that the notice
required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not
suffice as substitute. Citing the same case of Conejew cs. CA applied by the trial
court, the respondent court held that the decision, interpreting a like rule in
Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form
was required.

ISSUE: Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be
written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid
notice although it was not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-
day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in
1977?
RULING:
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother
and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would
be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is
clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed,
although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such
sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976,
when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were
actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started
running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the
interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the
properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint,
the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its
exercise had already expired.
 We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the
strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is
adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances
of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day
period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and
the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this
exception.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
Presumption in Aid of Construction &
Interpretation

 In construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the

Courts will PRESUME that it was the intention of
Legislature to enact a VALID, SENSIBLE and JULST
LAW.

 However, if the language of the law is CLEAR,

Courts should NOT resort to presumptions.