Investigation of Primary User Emulation Attack in Cognitive Radio Networks PHD Proposal

Phd Proposal
Investigation of Primary User

Emulation Attack in Cognitive
Radio Networks
Chao Chen
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
Stevens Institute of Technology
Hoboken, NJ 07030
10/17/2019 1
Outline
 Background
 Cognitive radio technology
 Security issues in cognitive radios
 Spectrum sensing in cognitive radios
 Primary user emulation attack
 Cooperative sensing in the presence of primary user
emulation attack
 Cooperative sensing in the presence of PUEA with channel
estimation error
 Cooperative sensing with multiple PUE attackers
 Cooperative Sensing with multiple antennas in the
presence of PUEA
 Conclusion and future work
10/17/2019 2
Background
 Wireless communication system design

requires higher data rate and larger channel
capacity as well as better quality of service
and spectrum utilization efficiency to meet the
needs of wireless users.
 Security issues have drawn much research
attention in wireless communications due to
its “open air” nature.
10/17/2019 3
Cognitive Radio Technology
 Motivation
1. Frequency spectrum —— a scarce resource
Figure 1. Frequency allocation chart in US as of 2003
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 Motivation
2. Spectrum access is a more significant problem than
spectrum scarcity.
Figure 2. Measurements of spectrum utilization in downtown Berkeley
10/17/2019 5
 Definition
Cognitive radio [1] is a technology of wireless
communications in which a network or a user
flexibly changes its transmitting or receiving
parameters to achieve more efficient
communication performance without interfering with
licensed or unlicensed users.
1. J. Mitola and G. Maguire, “Cognitive radio: Making software radios more

personal,” IEEE Communication Magazine, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 13–18, Aug. 1999.
10/17/2019 6
 Spectrum holes
Figure 3. Illustration of spectrum holes
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 Advances of cognitive radios

 J. Mitola
 I. Akyildiz
 S. Haykin
 Q. Zhao
10/17/2019 8
 Main functions
Cognitive
Radios
Spectrum Spectrum Spectrum Spectrum

Sensing Management Sharing Mobility
10/17/2019 9
 Cognitive cycle
10/17/2019 10
Security Issues in CR Networks
 Challenges
The intrinsic properties of cognitive radio
paradigm produce new threats and
challenges to wireless communications [2].
Spectrum occupancy failures; Policy failures; Location failures; Sensor
Failures; Transmitter/Receiver failures; Operating system disconnect;
Compromised cooperative CR; Common control channel attacks.
2. T. Brown and A. Sethi, “Potential cognitive radio denial-of-service vulnerabilities and protection
countermeasures: A multidimensional analysis and assessment,” IEEE International Conference on
Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications (CrownCom), Aug. 2007, pp. 456-464.
10/17/2019 11
Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radios
 Definition
Spectrum sensing is to obtain awareness
about the spectrum usage and existence of
primary users in a geographical area.
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 Spectrum opportunity
Figure 4. Multiple dimensional spectrum opportunity
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 Spectrum sensing ——
A classical signal detection problem
n(t ) H0
x(t )  
hs(t )  n(t ) H1
channel gain
noise
primary signal
10/17/2019 14
 Spectrum sensing methods
Spectrum
sensing
Interference
Transmitter Cooperative
temperature
detection detection
detection
Matched Cyclostationary
Energy
filter
detection detection
detection
10/17/2019 15
 Transmitter detection
1) Matched filter detection
Advantages: Better detection performance and less time to achieve

processing gain
Disadvantages: Priori knowledge of primary signal is required (such as
pilots, preambles or synchronized messages).
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2) Energy detection
Decision statistic Y follows Chi-square distribution

  22M H0
Y  2
  2 M ( ) H1
10/17/2019 17
2) Energy detection
False alarm probability and detection probability
( M , T / 2)
Pf  Pr (Y  T | H 0 ) 
( M )
Pd  Pr (Y  T | H1 )  Qm ( 2 , 2T )
T is decision threshold
10/17/2019 18
3) Cyclostationary detection
Exploits built-in periodicity of modulated signals
couple with sine wave carriers, hopping sequences,
cyclic prefixes and etc.
Advantages: better performance than energy detection
Disadvantages: more computational complexity and
longer observation time.
10/17/2019 19
 Cooperative detection
Figure 5. Transmitter detection problem
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Figure 6. Cooperative detection model
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Fusion rules:
 Hard combination (1 bit): AND rule, OR rule, majority
rule …
 Soft combination (n bits): soft sensing information

(e.g., signal energy) [3].
3. J. Ma, G. Zhao, and Y. Li, “Soft combination and detection for cooperative spectrum
sensing in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 7, no. 11, pp. 4502 – 4507, Nov. 2008.
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 Interference temperature detection
Figure 7. Interference temperature detection
10/17/2019 23
 Challenges
 Hardware requirement
 Hidden primary user problem
 Primary users detection in spread spectrum
 Detection capability
 Decision fusion in cooperative detection
 Security issues
10/17/2019 24
Primary User Emulation Attack
 Definition
An attacker occupies the unused channels
by emitting a signal with similar form as the
primary user’s signal so as to prevent other
secondary users from accessing the vacant
frequency bands [4].
4. R. Chen, J. Park, and J. Reed, “Defense against primary user emulation attacks
in cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 25–37, Jan. 2008.
10/17/2019 25
 Detection of PUEA
 Distance ratio test & distance difference test
 Wald’s sequential probability ratio test
10/17/2019 26
 Defense against PUEA
 Localization based transmitter verification

procedure
 Channel identification
 Dogfight and blind dogfight
10/17/2019 27
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the
Presence of PUEA
 System model
PUE attacker Primary user
Primary user
Secondary user
…...
SU1 SU2 SU3 SUN PUE attacker
…...
Channel between primary
and secondary user
Channel between attacker
Fusion Center
and secondary user
10/17/2019 28
Presence of PUEA
 System model
The signal received by the ith secondary user
at the kth time instant is
yi (k )   Pp hpi (k ) x p (k )   Pm hmi (k ) xm (k )  ni (k ), i  1, 2,..., N
x p (k ) : primary user’s signal with power Pp
xm (k ) : attacker’s signal with power Pm
h pi ( k ) : channel gain between primary and ith secondary user

hmi (k ) : channel gain between attacker and ith secondary user
10/17/2019 29
Presence of PUEA
 System model
The combined signal in the fusion center at the
kth time instant is,
10/17/2019 30
Presence of PUEA
 System model
When there is a PUEA, i.e., β = 1, the detection
problem is reformulated as,
After energy detector,
10/17/2019 31
Presence of PUEA
 Optimal combining scheme
Objective: To design optimal weights to
maximize the detection probability under the
constraint of a prefixed false alarm probability
wopt  arg max{Pd | Pf   }
w
where
w  [w1 , w2 ,..., wN ]
wopt  [w1opt , w2opt ,..., wNopt ]
10/17/2019 32
Presence of PUEA
Assumption: Block fading k is omitted in hpi (k ) and hmi (k )
For given hpi and hmi , the combined signal y (k ) is also a
complex Gaussian distributed random variable,
where,
10/17/2019 33
Presence of PUEA
Decision statistic Y is compliant with central chi
square distribution for both H0 and H1,
And Pd and Pf are expressed as,
10/17/2019 34
Presence of PUEA
Optimization objective:
where
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max

Presence of PUEA
Optimal solution:
max is the largest eigenvalue of  1
10/17/2019 36
Presence of PUEA
Remarks:
1) if Pm = 0,
wopt  Pp  n2 hpH MRC
2) virtual antenna array
3) average detection probability over fading
channel
Pd    Pd ( wopt ) f (hp ) f (hm )dhp dhm
10/17/2019 37
Presence of PUEA
Remarks:
4) acquisition of channel information
a. priori knowledge such as pilots,
synchronization messages, preambles...
b. blind channel estimation
10/17/2019 38
Presence of PUEA
 Simulation results
1 1
Conventional MRC,no attack,N=2 Conventional MRC, no attack, N=4
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=2 Proposed combining scheme, attack, N=4
0.9 0.9
Conventional MRC, attack, N=4
Conventional MRC,attack,N=2
No cooperation, no attack No cooperation, no attack
0.8 0.8 No cooperation, attack
No cooperation, attack
0.7 0.7
d
d
Detection probability P
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0 0
-3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f False alarm probability P f
(a) N = 2 (b) N = 4
N is the number of secondary user
10/17/2019 39
Presence of PUEA
1 1
Conventional MRC,no attack,N=2
0.9 0.9 Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=2
Conventional MRC,attack,N=2
No cooperation, no attack
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
d
d
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 Conv entional MRC, no attack, N=6 0.2

Proposed combining scheme, attack, N=6
Conv entional MRC, attack, N=6
0.1 No cooperation, no attack 0.1
0 0
-3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Flase alarm probability P f False alarm probability P f
(c) N = 6 (d) N = 8
10/17/2019 40
Presence of PUEA
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Pm
d

0.6
0.5 Proposed combining scheme, =0.1 Pp

Proposed combining scheme, =1
0.4 Proposed combining scheme, =10
Conventional MRC, =0.1
0.3
Conventional MRC, =1
Conventional MRC, =10
0.2
0.1
0
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
SNR between primary and secondary user p (dB)
10/17/2019 41
Presence of PUEA
 Different network scenarios of PUEA for two
users case
PUE attacker Primary user Primary user
SU2
SU2
SU1 SU1
PUE attacker
(a) (b)

Primary user
PUE attacker
SU2
SU2
SU1 PUE attacker SU1
(c) (d)
10/17/2019 42
Presence of PUEA
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
d
0.6
0.5
0.4
case a,def ense

0.3
case a,attack
case b,def ense
0.2 case b,attack
case c,def ense
case c,attack
0.1 case d,def ense
case d,attack
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f
10/17/2019 43
Presence of PUEA with Channel
Estimation Error
 System model
estimation error Primary user
Secondary user
…...
…...
and secondary user
Fusion Center
and secondary user
10/17/2019 44
Estimation Error
 System model
hˆ p  h p  e p
hˆm  hm  em
hˆ : estimated channel gain
h : actual channel gain
e : estimation error
10/17/2019 45
Estimation Error
 Average detection probability
Pd   Pd ( wˆ opt ) f (h p ) f (hm ) f (e p ) f (em )dh p dhm de p dem
10/17/2019 46
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the Presence
of PUEA with Channel Estimation Error
1
 2ep = -15dB,  2em = -15dB, simulation
0.9
 2ep = -15dB,  2em = -15dB, numerical
0.8  2ep = -15dB,  2em = -10dB, simulation

0.7
d
0.6  2ep = -15dB,  2em = -5dB, numerical
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
10/17/2019 47
1
0.9
0.8  2ep = -10dB,  2em = -15dB, simulation

0.7
d
0.6  2ep = -5dB,  2em = -15dB, numerical
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
10/17/2019 48
1
0.9
0.8
Proposed combining scheme
0.7
d
0.6
0.5
0.4 Conventional MRC
0.3
Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -15dB

0.2
Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -10dB
0.1 Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -5dB

Conventional MRC
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
10/17/2019 49
1
2
Proposed combining scheme, ep = -15dB
0.9 2
2
0.8
Conventional MRC, 2 = -15dB
ep
0.7 Conventional MRC, 2 = -10dB

ep
d
Conventional MRC, 2 = -5dB

ep
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3 Proposed combining scheme Conventional MRC
0.2
0.1
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
10/17/2019 50
Presence of Multiple PUE Attackers
 System model
Primary user
PUE attacker 1
PUE attacker 2
Primary user
Secondary user
…...
…...
PUE attacker 3 PUE attacker K and secondary user
Fusion Center
and secondary user
10/17/2019 51
 System model
The signal received by the ith secondary user
at the kth time instant is
K
yi (k )   Pp h pi (k ) x p (k )    Pmj hmij (k ) xmj (k )  ni (k )
j 1
i  1,2,..., N
10/17/2019 52
 Optimal weights
10/17/2019 53
1 1
Conventional MRC, no attack Conventional MRC, no attack
0.9 Proposed combining scheme, tw o attackers 0.9 Proposed combining scheme, four attackers
Conventional MRC, tw o attackers Conventional MRC, four attackers
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
d
d
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0 0
-3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
False alarm probability P f False alarm probaility P f
(a) K = 2 (a) K = 4
10/17/2019 54
1 1
Conventional MRC, no attack Conventional MRC, no attack
0.9 Proposed combinging scheme, six attackers 0.9
Proposed combining scheme, eight attackers
Conventional MRC, attack
0.8 0.8
0.7 0.7
d
d
0.6 0.6
0.5 0.5
0.4 0.4
0.3 0.3
0.2 0.2
0.1 0.1
0 0
-3 -2 -1 0 -3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
False alarm probaility P f False alarm probaility P f
(c) K = 6 (d) K = 8
10/17/2019 55
 Normalized attacking power
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
d
0.6
0.5
0.4
Proposed combing scheme, two attackers
0.3 Proposed combing scheme, four attackers
Proposed combing scheme, six attackers
Proposed combing scheme, eight attackers
0.2
Conventional MRC, two attackers
Conventional MRC, four attackers
0.1 Conventional MRC, six attackers
Conventional MRC, eight attackers
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
False alarm probaility P f
10/17/2019 56
Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with
Multiple Antennas in the Presence of PUEA
 Multiple antenna technology
10/17/2019 57
 System model
PUE Primary
Attacker User
…...
... ...
Secondary …... Secondary
User 1 User N
…...
Fusion Center
10/17/2019 58
 System model
The received signal at ith user at the kth detection
instant is,
 
M
yi (k )   wij  Pp hpi (k ) x p (k )   Pm hmi (k ) xm (k )  ni (k ) , i  1,2,..., N
j 1
the final combined signal at the fusion center

is given as,
 
N M
y(k )   wi wij  Pp hpi (k ) x p (k )   Pm hmi (k ) xm (k )  ni (k )
i 1 j 1
10/17/2019 59
10/17/2019 60
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
d
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
Conventional MRC,no attack, N=4, 1 antenna
0.2 Conventional MRC,no attack, N=2, 2 antennas
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=4, 1 antenna
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=2, 2 antennas
0.1
Conventional MRC,attack, N=4, 1 antenna
Conventional MRC,attack, N=2, 2 antennas
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
(a) 2 antenna case
10/17/2019 61
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
d
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2 Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=6,1 antenna
Proposed combining scheme,attack,N=2,3 antenna
0.1
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
(b) 3 antenna case
10/17/2019 62
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
d
0.6
0.5
0.4
Conventional MRC,no attack, N=8, 1 antennas

0.3
Conventional MRC,no attack, N=2, 4 antennas
0.2 Proposed combining scheme,attack, N=8, 1 antenna

Proposed combining scheme,attack, N=2, 4 antennas
0.1 Conventional MRC,attack, N=8, 1 antenna
Conventional MRC,attack, N=2, 4 antennas
0
-3 -2 -1 0
10 10 10 10
(c) 4 antenna case
10/17/2019 63
Conclusion
 Conclusion
 We have studied the cooperative spectrum
sensing in CR network in the presence of primary
user emulation attack. Through the proposed
optimal combination scheme, the detection
probability of the spectrum hole is optimized under
the constraint of a required false alarm probability.
Simulation results show the detection performance
improvement of the proposed optimal combining
scheme over the conventional MRC method.
10/17/2019 64
Conclusion
 Conclusion
 Investigation of the detection performance when
the channel estimation error is considered in the
proposed scheme.
 Investigation of the detection performance when
multiple PUE attackers are considered in the
network scenario.
10/17/2019 65
Publication
 Chao Chen, Hongbing Cheng, Yu-Dong Yao,

“Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the Presence
of Primary User Emulation Attack in Cognitive
Radio Networks”, under 2nd round review of
IEEE transactions on wireless communications.
10/17/2019 66
10/17/2019 67

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Phd Proposal

Investigation of Primary User

 Wireless communication system design

Figure 1. Frequency allocation chart in US as of 2003

Figure 2. Measurements of spectrum utilization in downtown Berkeley

1. J. Mitola and G. Maguire, “Cognitive radio: Making software radios more

Figure 3. Illustration of spectrum holes

 Advances of cognitive radios

Spectrum Spectrum Spectrum Spectrum

Figure 4. Multiple dimensional spectrum opportunity

 Spectrum sensing methods

Advantages: Better detection performance and less time to achieve

Decision statistic Y follows Chi-square distribution

Figure 5. Transmitter detection problem

Figure 6. Cooperative detection model

 Soft combination (n bits): soft sensing information

 Interference temperature detection

Figure 7. Interference temperature detection

 Distance ratio test & distance difference test

 Wald’s sequential probability ratio test

 Defense against PUEA

 Localization based transmitter verification

 Dogfight and blind dogfight

x p (k ) : primary user’s signal with power Pp

xm (k ) : attacker’s signal with power Pm

h pi ( k ) : channel gain between primary and ith secondary user

After energy detector,

wopt  [w1opt , w2opt ,..., wNopt ]

And Pd and Pf are expressed as,

Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in the

max is the largest eigenvalue of  1

0.2 Conv entional MRC, no attack, N=6 0.2

0.5 Proposed combining scheme, =0.1 Pp

PUE attacker Primary user

case a,def ense

estimation error Primary user

Pd   Pd ( wˆ opt ) f (h p ) f (hm ) f (e p ) f (em )dh p dhm de p dem

0.8  2ep = -15dB,  2em = -10dB, simulation

 2ep = -15dB,  2em = -10dB, numerical

0.6  2ep = -15dB,  2em = -5dB, numerical

0.8  2ep = -10dB,  2em = -15dB, simulation

 2ep = -10dB,  2em = -15dB, numerical

0.6  2ep = -5dB,  2em = -15dB, numerical

0.4 Conventional MRC

Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -15dB

0.1 Proposed combining scheme,  2em = -5dB

0.7 Conventional MRC, 2 = -10dB

Conventional MRC, 2 = -5dB

0.3 Proposed combining scheme Conventional MRC

the final combined signal at the fusion center

(a) 2 antenna case

(b) 3 antenna case

Conventional MRC,no attack, N=8, 1 antennas

0.2 Proposed combining scheme,attack, N=8, 1 antenna

(c) 4 antenna case

 Chao Chen, Hongbing Cheng, Yu-Dong Yao,

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