AVIATION

SECURITY
WHY SECURITY ?
WHY NOT SAFETY?
SECURITY
VS.
SAFETY
 THREATS TO
AVIATION INDUSTRY
• THREATS OF TERRORISTS ACTIVITIES
• THREATS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
• THREATS OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
• THREATS OF IMMORAL ACTIVITIES
• THREATS OF ANTIMORAL/MORAL-LOWERING
ACTIVITIES
• THREATS OF SOCIAL EVILS
 THREATS OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES
• HIJACKING OF AIRCRAFT
• SABOTAGE OF AIRCRAFT ON GROUND
• SABOTAGE OF AIRCRAFT IN AIR
• RAID ON AIRCRAFT ON GROUND
• SABOTAGE OF VULNERABLE POINTS
• FORCED BREAK THROUGH PERIMETER FENCE
• SURREPTITIOUS INFILTRATION THROUGH PERIMETER
• HOSTAGE TAKING OF PAXS AND OTHERS
• ATTACK ON LOUNGES FOR KILLING PEOPLE
• SABOTAGE IN PUBLIC /CARPARKING AREAS
• SABOTAGE OF AIRPORT ASSETS
• ATTACK ON VIPs AND VVIPs IN AIRPORT PREMISES
• MESSILE ATTACK ON AIRCRAFT,BUILDING,INSTALLATION
AND VULNERABLE POINTS.
 COMMON THREATS
1. WILLFUL DESTRUCTION/DAMAGE.
2. THEFTS & PILFERAGES.
3. TRESS PASSING.
4. ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.
5. MISUSE OF COMPANY/AIRLINES ASSETS.
6. CARELESS HANDLING OF FACILITIES.
7. ARSON.
8. WASTAGE,MISMANAGEMENT &
SURREPTITIOUS CARRIAGE OF ASSETS &
PRODUCTS,INDEPENDENTLYOR THROUGH
MANIPULATION.
 MORE THREATS
1. VIOLATION OF GENERAL DISCIPLINE.
2. MISCONDUCT.
3. NON-OBSERVANCE OF PUNCUALITY.
4. ILL-ATTITUDE TOWARDS WORKING.
5. IMMORAL ACTIVITIES.
6. RUMOUR SPREADING.
7. DISINFORMATION.
8. PROPAGANDA.
9. GROUPING.
10. DISLOYALTY AGAINST MANAGEMENT.
11. WRONGFUL ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMPANY
POLICIES.
12. BRIBERY & CORRUPTION.
13. FORGERY.
14. TRESS PASSING.
15. MALPRACTICE.
16. MONEY EXTORTION.
17. INVOLVEMENT IN DEMORALIZATION ACTIVITIES.
18. ROWDYISM
We all know well about the Fire Triangle.
We learned that in order for a fire to burn, three
things are required.
These are Heat, Fuel & Oxygen.
Remove any one of the three and a fire can’t
happen.

HEAT FUEL

OXYGEN
Crime, like fire, requires three components in order to
occur. .
These components are Inclination, Assets and
Opportunity.
As with fire, removal of one or more of the

components will prevent the crime from occurring.

INCLINATION ASSETS

OPPORTUNITY
 INCLINATION
This component describes the desire or motivation of an individual to
commit a crime. Examples are: financial gain, revenge, jealousy, anger and
hatred.
Because inclination involves a person and their mental processes, from
an airport management standpoint, it is the most difficult component to
remove. Inclination exists in the realm of psychologists, sociologists and
criminologists.
There is little that airport managers can do to
influence it.
 ASSETS
This component describes something to be gained by committing a
crime. Assets are usually thought of as tangible objects such as an
aircraft or avionics. However they may be intangible or abstract
objects.
In a murder, the victim is the asset. The bombing of a building could
involve multiple assets. These may include the property that is
destroyed. They might also include the symbol that the organization
projects and the employees working in the building. The World Trade
Center is an example of a symbolic asset.
While it may be theoretically possible in some instances to remove
assets to prevent crime, it is generally impractical or unrealistic.
 OPPORTUNITY
This component describes the circumstances and conditions that permit
a crime to occur. Every crime has its own unique set of opportunities,
but two conditions are usually present.
These are: (1) Access to the asset(s), and (2) An apparent likelihood
that the crime can be committed successfully with minimal risk to the
perpetrator.
Opportunity is the crime component that is most readily influenced by
security measures. When developing an airport security program, the
first priorities should be the recognition of criminal opportunities followed
immediately by the initiation of actions to remove those opportunities
The remainder of this manual and the accompanying assessment
checklist will explore in detail the tools available to eliminate the
opportunity for criminal activity at your airport.
AVIATION
SECURITY
 ICAO
International Civil
Aviation Organization
 ICAO Annexes
Annex 1 - Personnel Licensing
Annex 2 - Rules of the Air
Annex 3 - Meteorological Services
Annex 4 - Aeronautical Charts
Annex 5 - Units of Measurement
Annex 6 - Operation of Aircraft
Annex 7 - Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks
Annex 8 - Airworthiness of Aircraft
Annex 9 - Facilitation
Annex 10 - Aeronautical Telecommunications
Annex 11 - Air Traffic Services
Annex 12 - Search and Rescue
Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
Annex 14 - Volume I "Aerodrome Design and Operations"
Annex 15 - Aeronautical Information Services
Annex 16 - Environmental Protection
Annex 17 - Security
Annex 18 - The Safe Transportation of Dangerous Goods by Air
Annex 16 – Safety Management
 SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE
ICAO CONVENTIONS
• TOKYO 14 SEP,1963 CONVENTION ON OFFENCES
AND CRTAIN OTHER ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD
AIRCRAFT.
• HAGUE 16 DEC,1970 CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT
• MONTREAL 23 SEP 1971 CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE
SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION
 ANNEX-17
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR
SAFEGUARDING INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST
ACTS OF UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE
 ICAO SECURITY MANUAL
for
SAFEGUARDING CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE
BY
ICAO
DOCUMENT No.8973
 DEFINITION OF AVIATION
SECURITY IN ICAO

A COMBINATION OF MEASURES,
HUMAN & MATERIAL
RESOURCES, INTENDED TO
SAFEGUARD CIVIL AVIATION
AGAINST ACTS OF UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE.
CHANNELS OF ICAO IMLEMENTATION

ICAO

SIGNATORY SIGNATORY
PAKISTAN
COUNTRY COUNTRY

NATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION
COMMITTEE

AIRPORT
SECURITY
COMMITTEE

AIRPORT
SECURITY AUTHORITY
PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY
1-SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY
2-FORESIHTNESS
3-CO-OPERATION & CO-ORDINATION
4-PRIORITIES
5-MAINTENANCE OF MORALE
6-COMMAND & CONTROL
 OFFENDER
TERRORIST,
THIEF,ATTACKER,CRIMINAL,
LAW BREAKER
CRIME PERPETRATOR etc.
 OFFENDER`S
OBJECTIVES

TO ACHIEVE TO AVOID
TARGET ARREST
 FACTORS OF OFFENDER`S
SUCCESS

TIME • LESS TIME---------MORE SUCCESS

FACTOR
• MORE TIME------LESS SUCCESS

DISTANC • LESS DISTANCE-----MORE SUCCESS

E FACTOR
• MORE DISTANCE---LESS SUCCESS
 DEFENDER
SECURITY PERSON,
SECURITY AUTHORITIES.
DEFENDER`S OBJECTIVE

PROTECTION
(THROUGH)

HINDRENCE DETERRANCE
 SECURITY-CREATED
DETERRANCE
• FEAR OF LAW BREAKING
• FEAR OF PUNISHMENT
• FEAR OF INSULT
• FEAR OF HINDERING IN SMOOTH
FUNCTIONING
• FEAR OF TIME WASTAGE
• FEAR OF LOSS OF MATERIAL/ MONEY
• FEAR OF LOSS OF LIFE
• FEAR OF UNDERMINING SOCIAL STATUS
 FACTORS OF DEFENDER`S
SUCCESS

TIME • LESS TIME---------LESS SUCCESS

FACTOR
• MORE TIME------MORE SUCCESS

DISTANC • LESS DISTANCE-----LESS SUCCESS

E FACTOR
• MORE DISTANCE---MORE SUCCESS
SECURITY IMLEMENTATION

MODUS-
OPERANDI

HOW TO
THREAT AVALABLE
FOIL
ANALYSIS RESOURCES
THREATS

VOLUME INTENSITY PRIORITY EUIPMENT RULES UTILIZATION

IN-BUILT HUMAN SECURITY
OF OF OF AND AND OF
SECURITY RESOURCES PROGRAM
THREATS THREATS THREATS GADGETS REGULATION SKILL
SECURITY
BARRIERS
 SECURITY BARRIERS

1. NATURAL BARRIER
2. STRUCTURAL BARRIER
3. HUMAN BARRIER
4. ANIMAL BARRIER
5. ENERGY BARRIER
NATURAL
BARRIER
NATURAL BARRIERS

• MOUNTAINS
• HILLS
• SEA
• RIVERS
• STREAMS
• LAKES
STRUCTURAL
BARRIER
 QUALITIES OF
STRUCTURAL BARRIER
1. DIFFICULT TO CLIMB
2. DURABLE
3. NOT TO BEND
4. NO PENETRATION
STRUCTURAL BARRIERS
• MASONRY WALL
• MESH FENCING
• BARRICADES
• BUILDINGS (AS SECURITY
BARRIER)
• CONCERTINA
BARBED- WIRE/RAZOR-WIRE
 HUMAN BARRIERS
• TRAINED SECURITY STAFF
(OVERTLY & COVERTLY)
• ALLIED SECURITY AGENCIES
• ORGANIZATION`S EMPLOYEES
• GENERAL PUBLIC
 HUMAN BARRIER
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
• SENSIBILITY . FRAGILE LIFE
• MOVEABLE . CAN BE OVER-COME
• DECISION TAKER . NON-ECONOMICAL
• REGULATE MOVEMENT . HUMAN WEAKNESSES
• SCRUTINITY . ALL-TIME ALERTNESS
• REQUIREMENT NOT POSSIBLE
MANADATORY . USELESS AGAINST
. COMPETENCY . BIG FORCE
 ENERGY BARRIER
1. INTRUDER ALARM
SYSTEM
2. CURRENT FLOW
3. SECURITY LIGHTS
4. CCTV SYSTEM
 ANIMAL BARRIERS

• PARROT
• DUCK
• DOG
AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAMME

1-MODEL OUTLINE.
2-A COMPREHENSIVE WRITTEN
PROGRAMME.
3-STUDIED BY SECURITY AUTHORITIES.
4-CAREFULLY CO-ORDINATED WITH ALL
PRACTICE CONCERNED.[INTERNAL &
EXTERNAL]
5-AIRLINES SECURITY PROGRAMME.
6-RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECURITY OFFICER
OF AIRPORT SECURITY.
 AIRPORT SECURITY COMMITTEE
1 AIM TO ADVISE ON DEVELOPMENT & TO CO-
ORDINATE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY
MEASURES & PROCEDURES.
2.PERIODICAL CO-ORDINATION MEETING.
3.COMPOSITATION
• AIRPORT MANAGER (CHAIRMAN) CAA
• CHIEF OF AIRPORT SECURITY
• AIRLINE`S REPRESENTATIVE
• IMMIGRATION
• CUSTOM
• FIRE FIGHTING & RESCUE SERVICES.CAA
• AIRTRAFFIC CONTROL.CAA
• FACILITATION.CAA
• ADDITIONAL MEMBER AS REQUIRED
 AIRPORT SECURITY OFFICER
1. CRITERIA
• REPORT TO AIRPORT MANAGER
• TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE OF SECURITY
• AUTHORISED TO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL INSTALLATIONS
2. RESPONSIBILITIES
• SECURITY SURVEY & INSPECTIONS
• DEVELOPE & MODIFY SECURITY PROGRAM
• KEEP APPROVED SECURITY PROGRAM UPDATED
• ENSURE EFFECTIVE IMPLIMENTATION OF SECURITY MEASURES &
PROCEDURES AND MAINTAIN IT
• CO-ORDINATION AMONG SECURITY,FIRE & RESCUE STAFF
• EFFECTIVE LIAISON
• ENCOURAGE SECURITY AWARENESS & VIGILANCE
• ADEQUATE TRAINING TO SECURITY PERSONNEL
• EFFECTIVE THREAT/OCCURRENCE RESPONSE CAPABILITY
• INCORPORATION OF SECURITY PLAN IN NEW PROJECTS
• KNOW TO DEAL ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCES IN LIGHT OF
NATIONAL LAWS
• MAINTAIN RECORD OF ALL OCCURRENCES
• COLLECT & TRANSMIT PERTINENT INFORMATIONS TO APPROPRIATE
AUTHORITY
• CONDUCT INQUIRIES & TAKE ACTION PROMPTLY
 SECURITY IMLEMENTATION

MODUS-
OPERANDI

HOW TO
THREAT AVALABLE
FOIL
ANALYSIS RESOURCES
THREATS

VOLUME INTENSITY PRIORITY EUIPMENT RULES UTILIZATION

IN-BUILT HUMAN SECURITY
OF OF OF AND AND OF
SECURITY RESOURCES PROGRAM
THREATS THREATS THREATS GADGETS REGULATION SKILL
 COURSE OUTLINE
• Concept of security and threats.
• Theory of security in ICAO.
• Threats to aviation industry.
• Security channels at airports.
• Security status of airport premises.
• Security survey & inspection.
• Airport Security Committee.
• Airport Security Program.
• Inspection/Screening of passengers & baggage.
• Security devices & equipment.
• Prohibited items.
• Security barriers.
• Unaccompanied baggage, cargo, mail, store
and expedite or priority parcels.
• Identification system of functionaries, employees & visitors.
• Cargo security.
• Management during emergency situation.
• Management of response against acts of unlawful interference.
 CHANNELS OF SECURITY
AT AIRPORTS
RUNWAY AIRCRAFT APRON LOAUNGES CONCOURSE CAR PARK
CABIN HALL AREA

CHECKING
AND
SEARCH

AIRSIDE
NO ACCESS ------------------- CHECKING CHECKING SURVEILANCE SCRUTINY,
PROHIBITED PROHIBITED AND AND AND CHECKING
AREA AREA SEARCH SEARCH RANDOM AND SEARCH
CHECKING

NO ACCESS

LANDSIDE
AIRSIDE AIRSIDE AIRSIDE RESTRICTED LANDSIDE LANDSIDE
 INSPECTION/SCREENING OF
PASSENGERS & BAGGAGE
• ENSURE NO POSSIBILITY OF MIXING OR CONTACT BETWEEN
THE PASSENGERS ON ARRIVAL OR DEPARTURE.
• INSPECTION/SCREENING OF PAXs & CABIN BAGGAGE
THROUGH METAL DETECTION DEVICES AND X-RAY DEVICES
BY WELL TRAINED AND SKILLED SECURITY PERSONNEL.
• STERILITY SEARCH/SCANNING OF THE LOUNGE BE CARRIED
OUT FIRST BEFORE THE PAXs & THEIR CABIN BAGGAGE ARE
ALLOWED IN DEPARTURE LOUNGE AFTER
SEARCH,INSPECTION & SCREENING.
• ENTRANCES OF DEPARTURE LOUNGE WHICH ARE NOT
EQUIPPED WITH INSPECTION/SCREENING DEVICES SHOULD
PERMANENTLY BE KEPT CLOSED FOR ANY SORT OF ENTRY.
• ALL AIRPORT FUNCTIONARIES, AUTHORISED TO HAVE
ACCESS TO DEPARTURE LOUNGE, MUST BE PASSED
THROUGH PROPER SEARCH PROCESS.
 SECURITY STATUS OF
AIRPORT PREMISES

STERILE AREA

CONCOURSE HALL[CHECK-IN AREA],LOUNGES

APRON,RUNWAY

NON-STERILE AREA

CARPARK ARE,VERANDA
 AVIATION
SECURITY
(Security Survey)
DEFINITION OF SECURITY RISK

Assessment, expressed in terms of

predicted probability and severity, of
the consequence(s) of a hazard
taking as reference the worst
foreseeable situation.
 RISK TRILOGY

(For example)
1. Absence of standard fence around a
premises of a vulnerable establishment is a
hazard.
2. the potential for any illegal intrusion into the
premises for any nefarious design is one of the
consequences of the hazard;
3. the assessment of the consequences of a
damage of assets, killing of person(s), and loss
of interests expressed in terms of probability &
severity is the security risk.
SECURITY RISK PROBABILITY TABLE
SECURITY RISK SEVERITY TABLE
 THE FIVE FUNDAMENTALS
SECURITYTY RISK MANAGEMENT

• There is no such thing as absolute security–In aviation it is not possible to

eliminate all safety risks.

• Security risks must be managed to a level “as low as reasonably practicable”

• Security risk mitigation must be balanced against:

o time
o cost
o difficulty of taking measures to reduce or eliminate the security risk .

• Effective security risk management seeks to maximize the benefits of

accepting a security risk (most frequently, a reduction in either time and/or cost
in the delivery of the service) while minimizing the security
risk itself.

• Communicate the rationale for security risk decisions to gain acceptance by

stakeholders affected by them.
 PRE-FLIGHT PRECAUTIONS
1- EXTERIOR & INTERIOR INSPECTION OF AIRCRAFT ,AS
PER CHECK LIST,BEFOR BOARDING OF PAXs.

2-CORDONING OF A/C ON THE GROUND BY ARMED

SECURITY.

3-MONITORING OF A/C MAINTENANCE & SERVICING

OPERATION IN AND AROUND
THE AIRCRAFT.

4-AUTHORISED ACCESS OF GROUND STAFF INTO THE

A/C AFTER SEARCH ON “NEED TO ENTER” BASIS.

5-PREVENTION OF UNAUTHORISED ACCESS TO A/C.

PRE-FLIGHT PRECAUTIONS
•6- INSPECTION/SCREENING OF PAXs &
CABIN BAGGAGE.
• 7-SUPERVISION OF LOADING OF HOLD
BAGGAGE,CARGO,MAIL/STORE.
• 8-PILOT-IN-COMMAND SHOULD KNOW
SEAT ASSIGNMENT OF SKY
MARSHALS/PERSON-IN-CUSTODY & ITS
ESCORT.
• 9-VERIFICATION OF PROCEDURE TO PILOT-
IN-COMMAND FOR POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF SKY-
MARSHALS.
 SECURITY MEASURES
ABOARD AIRCRAFT
IN FLIGHT
 IN-FLIGHT VIGILANCE
• ALL FLIGHT CREW MUST FOLLOW LAWS,REGULATIOS AND
PROCEDURES OF STATE.
• PILOT-IN-COMMAND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATION AND
SAFETY OF A/C & PAXS ON-BOARD.
• PIC IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISCIPLINE AND TO ENSURE
EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES BY CREW.
• PRIOR TO DEPARTURE,PIC TO ENSURE THAT SECURITY
MEASURES ARE ADEQUATE FOR FLIGHT OPERATION.
• DURING FLIGHT, PIC MUST UTILIZE EVERY MEANS TO
RETAIN AUTHORITY OVER CREW,PAXS & A/C ACTING ON THE
INSTRUCTIONS AND ADVICE RECEIVED FROM GROUND
AUTHORITIES AND IN RESPONSETO THE DEMAND OF THE
OFFENDER.MAINTAIN PASSIVE CONTROL OVER THE
SITUATION.
 IN-FLIGHT VIGILANCE
• CREW MEMBER TO PAY ATTENTION OVER CHANGE OF SEAT
BY ANY PAX.
• CREW MEMBERS TO REMAIN ALERT FOR ANY SUSPICIOUS
OR UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUR OF PAX(S).IF AN, IMMEDIATELY
INFORM PILOT-IN-COMMAND.
• ATTEMPT TO GET THE A/C ON THE GROUND & KEEP THERE.
• COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE BY USING A/C
VOICE,VISUAL SIGNALS & AIR TRAFFIC FACILITIES.
• IMPLEMENT APPROPRIATE FLIGHT CREW PROCEDURES.
• TAKE PRECAUTIONS TO AVOID STARTLING THE OFFENDERS.
• AVOID TO USE FORCE OR UNUSUAL A/C MANOEUVERS TO
OVERCOME & SUBDUE THE OFFENDER.
• ON COMPLITION OF EMERGENCY,SUBMIT REPORT AS PER
PRESCRIBED FORMAT OF ICAO.
 QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED
TO THE CALLER
• WHAT TIME IS THE BOMB SET TO
EXPLODE?
• WHERE IS THE BOMB PLACED?
• WHAT KIND OF THE DEVICE IS IT?
• WHAT DOSE IT LOOK LIKE?
• WHY DID YOU PLACE THE BOMB?
 QUESTIONS
• WHAT EXPLOSIVE IS BEING USED?
• WHO AND WHERE ARE YOU?
• OF WHAT GROUP ARE YOU A MEMBER?
• ARE YOU SURE THAT YOUR BOMB WILL GO OFF AS YOU
EXPECT?
• DO YOU HAVE A FAMILY OF YOUR OWN? HOW WOULD THEY
FEEL IF THEY KNEW WHAT YOU HAVE DONE?
• WHY HAVE YOU CHOSEN THIS MEANS TO EXPRESS YOUR
FEELINGS?
• WHY DO YOU FEEL THAT BOMBING THIS
AIRCRAFT/BUILDING WILL HELP SOLVE ANY PROBLEMS OR
GRIEVANCES YOU MIGHT HAVE?
• DO NOT YOU REALIZE THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY GOING TO
DESTROY VALUABLE PROPERTY WHICH BELONGS TO
OTHERS?
 MORE QUESTIONS
• CAN YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA WHERE WE MIGHT LOCATE THE
BOMB?MAY BE YOU CAN GIVE US A CLUE-THIS WOULD GIVE
US A CHANCE TO ALERT PEOPLE WHO MIGHT BE ON THE
AIRCRAFT/IN THE BUILDING.
• WILL YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE THE TYPE OF DETONATING
MECHANISM?
• DOSE IT HAVE A PARTICULAR TIME DEVICE TO SET IT OFF?
• WHY DO YOU WISH TO INJURE OR KILL THE INNOCENT
PEOPLE ON THE AIRCRAFT/IN THE BUILDING?
• YOU KNOW THERE ARE MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE ON BOARD
THE AIRCRAFT WHO HAVE NOT DONE YOU ANY HARM.WHY
DO YOU FEEL IT WAS NECESSARY TO PLANT A BOMB?
• WHAT DO YOU HOPE TO ACCOMPLISH BY DAMAGEING OR
DESTROYING THIS AIRCRAFT/BUILDING?
• WHY HAVE YOU CHOSEN TO DAMAGE OR DESTROY THIS
AIRCRAFT/BUILDING?
 DANGEROUS GOODS
• After it has been determined that the
possession of an article such as one
of those prescribed in preceding slide
dose not constitute a breach of
national law, and if it is believed that
there is no criminal intend on the part
of passenger, the article should be
taken from passenger and
transported as checked/hold baggage
for which the passenger is issued a
standard claim tag. It will be
desirable to package such item in a
container made of opaque material.
In all such cases compliance with the
 PROHIBITED ITEMS
(NOT TO BE CARRIED ONTO AN AIRCRAFT)
• THOSE MADE OR INTENDED FOR OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE USE
SUCH AS FIREARMS AND POINTED,SHARP-EDGED OR BLUNT
WEAPONS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE TRUNCHEONS,AXES AND
LOADED OR SPIKED STICKS.
• GRENADES,EXPLOSIVES,AMMUNITION OR INCENDIARY MATERIAL.
• IMITATIONS/REPLICAS OF ANY ONE OF THE ARTICLES DESCRIBED
ABOVE.
• INFLAMMABLE,CORROSIVE OR TOXIC SUBSTANCES,INCLUDING
GASES,WHETHER OR NOT UNDER PRESSURE.
• ALL ORDINARY ARTICLES CABABLE OF BEING USED AS
OFFENSSIVE OR DEFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUCH AS ICE-
AXES,METAL-TIPPED WALKING STIKS,OPEN RAZORS,LONG-
POINTED SCISSORS, KNIVES,PROFESSIONAL TOOLS,AEROSOL
CONTAINERS.
• ANY OTHER ARTICLE WHICH GIVES RISE TO REASONABLE
SUSPICION.
 Cargo and Mail Handling Facilities
1-Security measures are required for cargo and
airmail items prior to transport by air:-
a) Either through the application of a regulated agent
system of cargo security.
b) Or through the application of other
security controls. Therefore, the activities of
consignors and freight forwarders may be as
significant as those of airports or air carriers.
 BAGGAGE IDENTIFICATION
IN CASE OF MISSING PASSENGER
1- Off load all hold-baggage from the aircraft.
2- Line up hold baggage in single line.
3-Off board the passengers to identify their hold baggage.
4- As soon as each piece of hold baggage is identified that may quickly be
separated from the line and taken to the aircraft for re-loading.
5- During the course of identification/reconciliation of hold baggage, no passenger
should be allowed to pick or add any item from/into hold baggage placed there.
6- Unidentified hold baggage piece(s) must not be reloaded into that aircraft under
any circumstances but taken to isolated bomb disposal ditch for cooling off period
of at least 24hours, straightaway.
7- After completion of baggage identification drill, aircraft may be allowed to depart.
8- After departure of the flight, the missing passenger if reappears may be detained
till the flight is safely landed at its destination.
 RESPONSE TO BOMB THREATS
AGAINST AIRCRAFT
.Disembark all passengers and crew with all cabin baggage by steps or jetties.
Escape slides should only be used in extreme emergencies;
• Move the aircraft to a remote location such as the isolated parking position;
• Isolate and re-screen all passengers and their cabin baggage and hold them in a
separate area until the crew members, hold baggage, cargo and catering
supplies have been inspected/screened, searched and declared safe;
• Unload all hold baggage and require passengers to identify their baggage, which
should then be screened or searched before it is re-loaded;
• Unload all cargo which should then be screened or searched before it is re-loaded;
• Unload and check the integrity of catering supplies;
• Search the aircraft.
. Consume the flight time on the ground.
. Unidentified baggage should straightaway be taken to isolated bomb disposal ditch
and keep it there for atleast 24hours for cooling off.
. Carry out re-boarding process as done normally
 AIRPORT SECURITY IDENTIFICATION
PERMIT SYSTEMS
1- INTRODUCTION
2- ESSENTIAL FEATURES
a) Permit administration
b) Background checks
c) Collection and briefing
d) Loss, theft or misuse of permits
e) Wearing and display of permits
f) Permit design
g) Vehicle permits
h) Permit production
j) Permit control
k) Administration of permits
• Security restricted areas;
• Airside areas; and
• Other controlled areas & installations.