Howe Engineering Projects (India) Pvt. Ltd.

Benchmarking
Infrastructure
SAFETY IN DESIGN
Date : 23.10.2019

Services

Project Management • Master planning • Engineering • Construction • Procurement Support • Project Estimation • Comprehensive Survey • Consultancy
SAFETY | A Historical Timeline

2000 BC 1500 BC In 1567, Philippus Aureolus

Code of Hammurabi: It contained Ramses created an industrial produced a treatise on the
clauses dealing with injuries, medical service to care for the pulmonary diseases of
allowable fees for physicians, and workers. They were required miners. Titled ‘On the
monetary damages assessed to bathe daily in the Nile and Miners’ Sickness and Other
against those who injured others. were given regular medical Miners’ Diseases
examinations
1867
Factory
inspection 1877 1892 1911 1915
introduced in Massachusetts The first recorded Wisconsin passed National
Massachusetts legislature safety program was the first effective Council of
passed a law established in a workers’ Industrial
1869 requiring Joliet, Illinois, steel compensation Safety,
The Pennsylvania safeguards for plant law established in
legislature passed hazardous Chicago
a mine safety law machinery
requiring two
exits from all
mines
Examples of worker safety awareness in the thirties

1970
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)
SAFETY CYCLE | Basics

SAFETY

TEAM WORK

KNOW OPERATING
PROCEDURE

KNOW YOUR EQUIPMENT

Safety | Multiple Layers

Disaster COMMUNITY EMERGENCY

Management RESPONSE

Emergency Scenario PLANT EMERGENCY

Training RESPONSE
MITIGATION
Fire Protection SYSTEM

PSV’s PREVENTION
SIS SYSTEM

BPCS
Process
Alarms
PROCESS DESIGN
Operations
Supervision
PROCESS

Operating vs Design Verification

Building on past learning

The whole concept of safety is evolutionary, and a generation is actually reaping the
fruits of lessons learnt through failures and sufferings of the previous generations.
Although an infinite number of things can go wrong in safety, mistakes fall into two
broad categories: preventable & complexity-related
Preventable:
They usually involve deviations from spec in the closely defined processes of routine
operations. That means you have NOT built on past learning.
Complexity related:
These are due to inherent uncertainty of work: A particular combination of needs, people, and
problems may have never occurred before. That means ADD this to your learning.
To cut a long story short what we need is:

Building a Learning Culture Detecting Failure Analyzing Failure

Document in ‘Lessons Learnt’ and stick to it

PROCESS | Engineering
Basic Design and Layout
• Planned for design aspect including system capacity, operational and equipment requirements and
area available…

Freezing Technical • Safety aspect and clearance consideration for Road/Rail Crossing, HT lines and other hazardous
specification facilities for man machine interfaces…

• Standard Technical Specifications based on the industrial practice, IS, ISO, CEMA, DIN and BS shall
be developed and addressed which are already available for the system/equipment/ components.
Final Engineering and New specifications shall be developed for the non standard items and new applications, if any…
Layout with addressing
lesson learned.
• Operating instructions, process guidelines and safety manuals shall be prepared/asked to vendors
and put into the practice for safe and smooth system operations…

Safety and Design • Check list for safety in design (SID) shall be prepared and considered during whole engineering
Documentation and process to eliminate the risk of asset and human hazards…
Check List

Safety of plant is achieved by various means:-

Detail Engineering Based
on Final Engineering • Basic controls, alarms, and operator control
• Critical alarms, operator control, and manual intervention
• Automatic actions — emergency shutdown systems and safety interlock systems
• Physical protection equipment such as pressure relief devices
Execution as per • Physical mitigation systems such as spill containment dykes and area classification
Engineering.
• Emergency response systems — for example, fire fighting
• Community emergency response — for example, notification and evacuation

As Built Documents
PROCESS | Drawing Approval and As built

USER CHECKS (AS

APPLICABLE)

THIRD PARTY
INTER DISCIPLINARY INSPECTION FABRICATION
DRAWING LEAD ENGINEER CHECKS (AS CHECKS
APPLICABLE)
FROM OEM

FABRICATION
DESIGN CONSULTANT
REVIEW DRAWING AS-BUILT
DRG
SUBMISSION
YES NO
FEEDBACK / DRAWING
RESUBMISSION APPROVED
OBSERVATION
Model of Safety in Design (SID) and Drawing Review Check List
DESIGNER / REVIEWER COMPETENCY | Check List to Maintain Uniformity

Above stipulated are model check list for layout drawing. Similar check lists are used to review all the
following documents. Designer shall ensure compliance to all points or valid justification shall be
mentioned against non compliance.
• General Arrangement Drawings for conveyor and transfer tower.
• SID reports for conveyor and transfer tower.
• Take-up, other components general arrangement, discharge chute, etc.
• Bought out items / components for conveyor system.
SAFETY | Checks and Studies

Adequate Design suitable for operations:

 HAZID (Hazard Identification)  Surge Analysis / Stress Analysis

 HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study)  ERDMP

 QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment)  EIA

 SIL (Safety Integrity Level)  Fire Water network

 De-pressurization and relief study  Fire Fighting System and extinguishers

 Dispersion  Hazardous area classification

 EERA (Escape, Evacuation and Rescue  Layout as per recommended safety

Analysis) distances

 ESSA (Emergency Systems Survivability  3D Model Review for accessibility and

analysis) constructability
SAFETY | HAZID

• Hazard identification at various stages of project

• Brainstorming with the use of guidewords
• Prompt study team members to identify hazards
• HAZID typically focuses on plant layout drawing, as it aims to identify intrinsic hazards.
• HAZID is useful at an early stages of a new design so that all potential hazards can be
taken into account.
• HAZID is also the technique of choice for identifying hazards as the first stages of
demonstration of ALARP.
SAFETY | HAZOP

• The basic premise of HAZOPS is:

All hazardous material incidents are instigated by a deviation from the desired
operating state or condition.
• If we can predict all deviations and analyze them before we operate a new process
then we can head off the undesired consequences.

Forewarned is Forearmed
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS: System description

- Process hazard checklist

Hazard identification
- Hazard survey: DOW index
- HAZOP hazard & operability study Scenario
identification
- Safety review
Accident Accident
probabilit consequence
RISK ASSESSMENT: y s
- What can go wrong & how ? Risk determination
- What are the chances ?
- Consequences ? risk &
N
hazard Modify design
EXTREMES acceptable
- Low probability ? Y
Accept system
- Minimal consequences
Who needs a Hazard Review? (RRA)

If your work or process involves any of the following, you’ll need a Hazard Review:

• Use of pressure vessels or any equipment operating or potentially reaching pressures

exceeding 15 psig.
• Use of flammable, compressed gases not housed in an approved, ventilated gas cabinet.
• Use of pyrophoric liquids or solids
• Growth or use of dry nanoparticles
• Use of Class 3b or Class 4 lasers
• Use of toxic, corrosive or pyrophoric gases (e.g., anhydrous ammonia, fluorine, silane,
etc.)
• Work equipment designed or constructed “in house”
• Large scale use of hazardous chemicals (e.g., pilot plant scale as found in Pulp & Paper
pilot plant)
• Lab use of hazardous chemicals in excess of one gallon
• Bulk chemical storage and supply systems (e.g., bulk liquid nitrogen systems)
• Other work equipment or processes at the discretion of EHS
 Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

• Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a statistical representation of SIS when demand

occurs.
• But in its simplest form it assesses:
– How high is your risk of an “undesired event” ?
– What level of protection do you need?
– Do you have the required level of protection in your design?
• Typical Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS):
– ESD
– F&G Detection System
– Blowdown System
Escape, Evacuation & Rescue Analysis (EERA)

EERA comprises following two elements, with their objectives:

• A goal analysis – The objective of the goal analysis is to confirm the adequacy of the EER
facilities and arrangements, and identify any areas of weakness.
• An evacuation time analysis – The objective of the evacuation analysis is to assess if the
muster area and evacuation facilities are able to endure local fire events for the period
required for the POB to evacuate.
EERA Goals

• There are seven (7) EERA goals which will be assessed in the EERA report and these
goals are listed as below:
• Goal 1 (Alarm);
• Goal 2 (Escape);
• Goal 3 (Muster);
• Goal 4 (Decision to Evacuate);
• Goal 5 (Primary Means of Evacuation);
• Goal 6 (Secondary Means of Evacuation); and
• Goal 7 (Rescue)
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)

• To assess criticality of emergency systems

• To determine if emergency system sub-components are fail-safe;
• To determine whether emergency system sub-components are vulnerable to fire and
explosion events;
• To determine whether emergency system sub-components have redundancy; and
• To recommend risk reduction measures to increase the survivability of emergency
systems, which are vulnerable to Major Accident Events, and are neither fail-safe nor have
redundancy.
SAFETY | At Various Locations…

BELT CONVEYOR SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT

Head Office – Ahmedabad
Aravalli House, At Shantigram Township, Near Vaishnodevi Circle, SG Highway,
Ahmedabad - 382421, Gujarat, India

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