7-

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.

Prepared : Deterrence Stability and Escalation

control system in South Asia
Group Members
 Sangeen Khan
 Abdul Sattar
 Arbab Waheed
 Arbab Salman

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 Pakistan’s Nuclear
Strategy and Deterrence
Stability

Written By : Michael Krepon

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 Sequence of topic

 Introduction

 Background

 Pakistan`s Nuclear strategy

 Pillar of Nuclear Strategy

 Detterence stability

 Conclusion

 Analysis

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 INTRODUCTION

 This essay is highly conjectural.

 The guardians of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are trained to keep

secrets.

 They publicize few details of their nuclear programs.

 The analysis below is therefore on a limited public record,

inferences.

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 A Rare Success Story

 Most Pakistanis proudly view their nuclear weapon programs as a rare success story.
 Their country is beset by many problems.
 Economic growth lags behind population growth. Pakistan’s relations with two of its
neighbors India and Afghanistan are strained, and a third border, with Iran, marks the
Sunni-Shia divide within Islam.
 Domestic social services are in decline.
 Governance is widely conceded to be poor at both the national and provincial level.
Many extremist groups have found shelter in Pakistan.
 Some fight the military; others have colluded with it. Over the past five years
 Pakistan ranks second (only to Iraq) in the incidence of mass-casualty deaths due to
sectarian and politically inspired domestic

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 A Rare Success Story

 Since the early years of its nuclear program, Pakistan has refused
to declare a no-first-use policy; the country retains the option of
using nuclear weapons first in the event of a war.

 This policy appears to have remained constant because of the

growing conventional weapons asymmetry in India’s favor.

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 Constant factors

 A unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is another constant.

Although missile testing occurs regularly, nuclear tests have not
been conducted since 1998.

 But if India were to decide to resume testing, Pakistan might break

this constant and follow suit

 A unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is another constant.

Although missile testing occurs regularly, nuclear tests have not
been conducted since 1998. But if India were to decide to resume
testing, Pakistan might break this constant and follow suit

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 Ramifications of Success

 Pakistan’s national security decisions are usually choreographed between senior

active- duty military officers in Rawalpindi and government officials in Islamabad. If
military leaders feel strongly about a particular policy or initiative, they can usually
count on the consent of government officials. Conversely, if political leaders do not
have military support, their favored initiatives are likely tofail.

 Pakistani government officials and senior military officers initially asserted that they
would not repeat the Soviet Union’s mistake by engaging in, or being bankrupted by,
an arms race. These messages were conveyed most strongly after Pakistan tested
nuclear devices in 1998. For example, speaking at a think-tank-sponsored seminar in
Islamabad in November 1999, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar emphasized that, “[W]e
shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race.”11 Similarly, at a May 2000
presentation at the National Defense College, Abdul Sattar declared that, “Our policy
of minimum credible deterrence will obviate any strategic arms race.”12

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 Ramifications of Success

A doctrine is meant to explain how material capabilities can be

used to achieve policy goals. The key policy goal of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability is to deter
Indian conventional as well as nuclear aggression. 7 Its secondary policy goal, if deterrence fails, is to
deny India victory in the event of a war.
As per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) annual nuclear forces data,
Pakistan is believed to have 110-130 nuclear warheads.

Since Pakistan tested its nuclear devices in May 1998, it has not formally
declared an official nuclear use doctrine. Pakistani officials maintain that ambiguity serves Pakistan’s
interests better, since ambiguity does not provide information about Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds
that an enemy would need to exploit gaps in the plans.

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 Ramifications of Success

 Of late, there are no signs that Pakistan’s nuclear requirements

might be curtailed. Indeed, Pakistani officials have begun to qualify
their certainty about avoiding an arms race, pointing to the US-
India civil nuclear agreement, the possibility of Indian ballistic
missile defense deployments, and growing Indian conventional
capabilities as especially worrisome developments.

 Zamir Akram, an accomplished Pakistani diplomat, contended

that these developments “have radically altered the strategic
environment in South

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 Ramifications of Success

 the 2001- 2002 “Twin Peaks” crisis, Gen. Pervez Musharraf declared that,
“We have defeated an enemy without fighting a war.17 Likewise,
Shamshad Ahmad, foreign secretary during the period of the 1998
nuclear tests, asserted that an overt capability “averted the risk of a
disastrous conflict that could have resulted from any misadventure by
India.”

 Given this widely heralded success story within Pakistan, it is hard for
skeptics to argue against expansive requirements for nuclear deterrence
— especially as these requirements are determined in private by very few
individuals, as is the case for almost all states with nuclear weapons.

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 Four Main Pillars of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine

 Nuclear doctrine, as Brig. (ret.) Naeem Salik has written, “is the principle of belief or
bedrock on which organizational and force structures are built.
Among the principles of nuclear doctrine affirmed by senior Pakistani government
officials and military officers four appear to be of overriding importance.
 First, they assert that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific.
 Second, Pakistan has embraced a doctrine of credible, minimum deterrence, as noted
above.
 Third, the requirements for credible, minimal deterrence are not fixed; instead, they
are determined by a dynamic threat environment
 fourth, given India’s conventional military advantages, Pakistan reserves the option to
use nuclear weapons first in

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 Characterizations of Red lines

 Pakistani nuclear weapons will be used, according to Lt. Gen. Kidwai, only “if
the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” As reported by the
Italian researchers, Lt. Gen. Kidwai offered the following explication: Nuclear
weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be
used if:
A India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space
threshold)
 B. India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold)
 C India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic
strangling)
D. India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a largescal
internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic

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 Development of Cold Start Doctrine

 Cold Start is the name given to a limited-war strategy designed to seize Pakistani territory swiftly without,
in theory, risking a nuclear conflict.
 A reaction by the Indian military to a series of violent crises with Pakistan, beginning with the Kargil
conflict of 1999, Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) envisions limited attacks on Pakistan territory as non-nuclear
retaliation against asymmetric and proxy attacks. Cold Start Doctrine and Pakistani responses show that
the South Asian region is still adjusting to the consequences of overt nuclearization in 1998. India and
Pakistan remain prone to arms racing and vulnerable to destablization. CSD is part of an action–reaction
process, increasing risks of war and the risk that nuclear weapons would be used should war occur. It
worsens the natural tension between India's desire for resolution through conventional conflict and
Pakistan's declared willingness to escalate to nuclear first use. For India, CSD increases incentives to
abandon its previous commitment to nuclear No First Use. Probable Pakistani responses include
development of tactical nuclear weapons, forward deployment of nuclear forces, and pre-delegation of
launch authority, increasing its problems of force protection, command and control, and escalation
control. This article concludes, based on reliable sources, that neither of these war-like strategies benefits
the two nuclear rivals as each state's policy options confront certain issues that invite strategic instability
in South Asian region and should be reconsidered.

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 Escalation Control and War Termination in Pakistan’s
Doctrinal Thinking

 Feroz Hasan Khan writes: “Neither India nor Pakistan have any
great ideas how to de-escalate or seek war termination except to
bring in the international community, especially the United States.
And in the case of Pakistan, there is little understanding of
‘consequence management’ after nuclear first use.
 However, two notions guide Pakistan’s thinking on nuclear use.
First, deterrence is infallible—it will stand the test of time. Second,
in the worst case scenario, if deterrence were to fail, all bets would
be off. Any failure of deterrence would mean an all-out war, with
little or no room for escalation control.

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Three factors are considered to have been crucial to crisis
management

 These include operational measures, such as the separation of

warheads from launchers; strategic realities, like deterrence; and
diplomatic factors, like the involvement of the international
community, particularly the United States. International
involvement is always treated as a crucial factor during war
games, but it is hard to discern whether Pakistan’s official policy
on escalation control counts at least partly on international
involvement or only sees it as a means to help strengthen
deterrence.68

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Three factors are considered to have been crucial to crisis
management

 These include operational measures, such as the separation of

warheads from launchers; strategic realities, like deterrence; and
diplomatic factors, like the involvement of the international
community, particularly the United States. International
involvement is always treated as a crucial factor during war
games, but it is hard to discern whether Pakistan’s official policy
on escalation control counts at least partly on international
involvement or only sees it as a means to help strengthen
deterrence.68

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Three factors are considered to have been crucial to crisis
management

 A doctrine is meant to explain how material capabilities can be

used to achieve policy goals. The key policy goal of Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons capability is to deter Indian conventional as well
as nuclear aggression.7 Its secondary policy goal, if deterrence
fails, is to deny India victory in the event of a war.

 A close examination of Pakistan’s doctrinal thinking on nuclear use

suggests that some of its features remain constant, some are
disputed, and others are constantly changing

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Three factors are considered to have been crucial to crisis
management

 Since the early years of its nuclear program, Pakistan has refused
to declare a no-first-use policy; the country retains the option of
using nuclear weapons first in the event of a war. This policy
appears to have remained constant because of the growing
conventional weapons asymmetry in India’s favor. Meanwhile, It
requires a high degree of efficiency, good military intelligence, and
a very effective early warning system.

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 Disputed Issues

 During the past seventeen years, there has been a consistent emphasis on the need
to prevent an arms race between India and Pakistan.15 Minimum credible deterrence
was made the cornerstone of Pakistan’s doctrinal thinking since the early years to
address this exact need.16 However, the conceptualization of minimum deterrence as
a “dynamic as opposed to static concept” inherently contains prospects of arms
buildup . A close look at Pakistan’s official statements shows this thinking. In the past
few years, for instance, several official statements have indicated the inevitability of an
arms race, spurred by India’s military modernization and development of what
Pakistan considers “destabilizing capabilities.”18 It took policy makers some time to
adjust their thinking about new requirements under the rubric of minimum deterrence.
This confusion was reflected first in the omission of “minimum” from credible minimum
deterrence,19 and later the replacement of credible minimum with full-spectrum
deterrence.20 More recently however, official statements have started using credible
minimum and full-spectrum deterrence in conjunction.21

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Evolving Threat Perception and Changes in Doctrinal
Thinking

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 Analysis

 Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine aims, first, to deter India from committing

aggression against Pakistan and, second, to prevent an Indian victory in
the event of a war.

 The discourse in Pakistan reveals a widely held belief that a large-scale

war between India and Pakistan is unlikely, as is the use of nuclear
weapons. However, several contingencies that may lead Pakistan to
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons cannot be entirely ruled out.
These include a failure of Pakistan’s conventional deterrence, India’s
growing military capabilities and the likelihood of preemption, a failure of
command and control, and the possibility of inadvertent war.

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 Therefore, it is best to consider this doctrine as it
has evolved and as it exists today—primarily based on Pakistan’s
perception of security threats eman

A close examination of Pakistan’s doctrinal thinking on nuclear use

suggests that some of its features remain constant, some are
disputed, and others are constantly changing. Below is a quick
review of the key features of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine as it
appears to exist today.ating from India.

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Critically analysis

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