The Tragedy of the Commons: A Heuristic Model for Understanding the Problem

and Evaluating Educational and Regulatory Solutions

A Modeling Project by Greg Teves, Alyson Dame and Lyrica Hammann
Environmental Systems Modeling Spring 2004
 An Overview of Our Presentation
Our project is a heuristic model designed to help ENVS 101 students understand
the tragedy of the commons and examine two possible solutions.

• What is the “tragedy of the

commons?”
• Costanza’s Poker Game
• Education: Pros and Cons
• Government Regulation: A Tax.
• Alternatives?

Put on your cow hats everyone!!

 What is the “Tragedy of the Commons”?

• ARTICLE: published in 1968 by

Garrett Hardin.

• CONCEPT: a shared resource in which

any given user reaps the full benefit of
his/her personal use, while the losses are
distributed amongst all users. Result?
Tragedy all around.
 What is the “Tragedy of the Commons”?
• CLASSIC EXAMPLE: cows on
shared pasture.

• What are other examples of commons?

•Air
•Water
•Scenery
1:
In our model:
1: Cows on Commons
200.00
2: Grass on Commons 3
Each farmer decides1 whether or not to add1 a cow
2: 100.00
2 based on the marginal gain (1) vs. their share of
the marginal productivity loss (1/farmers).
Number of Farmers Real MPL Since their gain is always greater than personal
loss, the farmers never stop adding cows.
Marginal Returns on Additional Cow
MPL per Farmer 1
grass death rate 3

Farmer 1's Cows 2

Grass Regeneration Rate 3
Grass Death 3

1: 100.00 F1 Added Cows

2: 50.00 Grass on Commons 3
Farmer 2's Cows
Regeneration of Grass 3

Grass Eaten 3

F2 Added Cows

Farmer 3's Cows

Cows on Commons Grass K 3
Grass Eaten Per Cow 3
Meanwhile, the commons (a grass
F3 Added Cows
population that grows according to a
Farmer 4's Cows logistic growth curve) can only regenerate
1 so fast. It loses grass to death and cow
1: 0.00 F4 Added
2: 0.00
Cows
predation.2 If the farmers keep 2adding
Farmer 5's Cows 0.00 25.00 cows,
50.00 eventually the predation
75.00 rate 100.00
overwhelms the regeneration rate, and the
F5 Added Cows Graph 4 (Untitled) commons
Time is terminally
8:54 PMdepleted.
Wed, May 12, 2004
 Costanza’s Poker Game
• Robert Costanza characterizes
the “tragedy of the commons” as
a “collective social trap.”
He compares it to an experiment
done by Edney and Harper
(1978) that uses poker chips to
study resource use.
• We recreated this game in our
model to show the thinking
behind a farmer’s decision to
add additional cows.
 Costanza’s Poker Game
• In the poker chip game,
players can each take
between 1 and 3 chips a 3? 2? 1?
turn. Each round, the pot BLAST OFF!
is replenished in
proportion to the amount
of chips left. If there were
5 players and 15 chips,
how many chips would
you take?
 Costanza’s Poker Game
• Totally rational players take 3
each, because they know that if
everyone else takes 3, there will
be no chips left for them in the
future.
• However, the best long-term
solution is for all players to take
1 chip, because the pot will
continue to be replenished.
• The point? Our short-term
incentives do not serve our
long-term interests. To make
good long-term choices, all
players must cooperate.
And, the model: In this model, everyone
Play er 1a
contributes three chips
except for the user, who can
P1 Inf low
Play er 2a
choose how many to
contribute using a slider.
P2 Inf low What the user finds is that
the best strategy is to take
Play er 3a three chips. It is a dog eat
dog poker chip world.
P3 Inf low
Play er 4a Poker Chips

P4 Inf low Chip Renewal

Play er 5a

P5 Inf low

chips taken
 Would education help?
One solution might be
education. If everyone
knew the best long-term
strategy, would they act
accordingly and “take 1
chip”? Probably not. As Costanza
writes: “If any one player
consumes 3 chips per round,
the other players will do
individually worse by
restricting their consumption
to 1 chip per round.”
(Costanza, 409).
 More Conscious Farmers Get Less:
1: Grass on Commons 4 2: F1 Cows Added 3: F2 Cows Added 2 4: F3 Cows Added 3 5: F4 Cows Added 4

1: 100.00 1
2: 12.00 1
3: 1 1
4:
5: Farmer 1: 12 Cows
2

3
3
Farmer 2: 8 Cows
1: 50.00 2
2:
3: 6.00
4:
5:
3 4 4 4
2 Farmer 3: 4.5 Cows

4 5 5 5 5
1: 0.00 3
2: Farmer 4: 2 Cows
3: 2
4:
5: 0.00
0.00 3.00 6.00 9.00 12.00

Graph 2: p1 (Untitled) Time 7:51 PM Wed, May 12, 2004

 Hardin’s Suggestion:
Mutual Coercion, Mutually Agreed Upon
• A regulation accepted
by the majority of
those affected and
imposed upon all
involved.
• Examples?
– Speed limits
– Income tax
– Aesthetic standards in
a gated community
– “shotgun!”
 Hardin’s Suggestion:
Mutual Coercion, Mutually Agreed Upon

• Hardin admits there are drawbacks to strict

legislation, but believes:
– There is no perfect solution.
– Status quo is worse than a regulated situation
– He writes: “Who enjoys taxes? We all grumble
about them. But we accept compulsory taxes
because we recognize that voluntary taxes
would favor the conscienceless.” (Hardin, 338)
 grass death rate
Trust Fund Spent

Dollars to Regeneration Conv erter

Grass Death
Grass Regeneration Rate

Grass on Commons 2
Farmers
Regeneration of Grass

K stock
Grass Eaten Grass Eaten Per Cow

The Model With Tax Av erage Cows per Farmer

Cows Added Cows Destroy ed

Earnings Per Cow

Total Earnings with TAX
Trust Fund

Money Earned Taxes Paid Trust Fund Spent

~
Av erage Cows per Farmer Amount of Tax 2
Footnote: Another dimension of added
realism in this version of our model is a
degenerating K.
Grass on Commons 2

K stock

K Restoration K depletion

K Max
Advantages?
• “Conscienceless” farmers must participate
• Trust Fund
• Market Solution-y (as opposed to hard cap)

Disadvantages?
• Enforcement Costs
• Could be Abused by Big Business
 Alternatives?
Our model does not exhaust the possible
management strategies for the tragedy of
the commons. Others include:
• Community Norms
• Privatization
• Hard Cap
the end