Nyaya

What is Nyaya?

• Lit. rule or method of reasoning

• One of the six Orthodox schools in Hinduism

The Goal of Nyaya
• Right reasoning

• Ultimately Liberation (Moksha)

• Its principal text is the Nyaya-sutras ascribed to Gautama (2nd century
B.C.E.)

• Old Nyaya (Prachina Nyaya) – The Nyaya system from Gautama

through his important early commentator Vatsyayana until
Udayanacharya became qualified as old Nyaya (450 C.E. – 10th
century)

• New Nyaya (Navya Nyaya) – Arose in the 11th century in Bengal. The
founder of this modern Indian school of logic is Gangesha.
Describing Nyaya
• Realism

• Epistemological and Inferential Logic

• Theistic
Realism
• Nyaya defends Realism

• Universals (samanya; jati) exist in this world insofar as they are

manifested in particulars.

• But a universal is not the set of all cows, but the property of cowness.

• “There is no further requirement that they exist inpedendently as an

abstract enity.”
Epistemology
• Success in right reasoning is necessary if we are to achieve liberation.

• Considers Knowledge (jnana) or cognition (buddhi) as apprehension

(upalabdhi) or consciousness (anubhava).

• Knowledge may be valid and invalid. Knowledge may only be valid if it is

brought about by right reasoning.

• Right reasoning can be done through an investigation of Knowledge

Sources (Pramanas)

• The best kind of demonstrative reasoning is when the Pramanas are

used to establish a fact.
4 Knowledge Source (Pramanas)
• Perception (pratyaksa)

• Inference (anumana)

• Analogical Reasoning (upamana)

• Testimony (sabda)
1st Pramana: Perception (pratyaksa)
Perception arises when there is

• (1) a connection between the senses and the object,

• (2)not dependent on words,
• (3)non-deviating,
• (4)and determinate
1 st Condition: 6 connections (sannakirsa)
• Conjuction(samyoga)
• Inherence in what is conjoined (Samyukta-samavaya)
• inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samaveta-
samavāya)
• Inherence (samavāya)
• inherence in what inheres (samaveta-samavāya)
• qualifier-qualified relation (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva)

• (against hypothetical reasoning - tarka)

Invalid Source: Hypothetical Reasoning
• Tarka is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the
validity of the conclusion of any reasoning (or of any judgment)
without perception.
• hypothetical reasoning is an intellectual act which contributes to the
ascertainment of truth by means of adducing logical grounds in
favour of one of the alternative possibilities when the reality is not
known in its actual character.
• It simply facilitates the operation of a relevant means of knowledge
but does not itself determine the desired characteristics of the
datum.
2 nd Condition: Independence from words

• Conceptual Deployment

• Suggests that perception of an object is often causally prior

to speech acts involving it.

• (Against memory- smriti)

Invalid Source: Memory (smriti)
• Memory is invalid cognition since its object is non existent at the time
of its remembrance.

• The objects which we remember once existed in the past but have
now ceased to exist. So they are no longer real and there is no
correspondence between the ceased objects and their memory-
images.
3 rd Condition: Non-Deviation
• Serves to block out false cognitions and misperceptions

• (against error -viparyaya)

Invalid source: Error/ Illusion
• The Nyaya, theory of illusion is known as anyathakhyativada.

• When an object is presented in a form which does not belong to it, it

is a case of illusion.
• An error/ illusion is a positive misapprehension in which the mistake
consists in identifying two different objects.
• According to the Naiyayikas, illusion is due to a wrong synthesis of the
presented and the represented objects. The represented object is
confused with a presented one. The presented object is perceived
otherwise and the represented object exists somewhere.
4 th condition: Determinate
• Blocks out doubtful cognitions

• (against doubt - sanśaya)

Invalid Source: Doubt
• In indefinite knowledge which characterizes an object in conficiting ways.
• 5 Forms of doubt
• The first form of doubt is the contradictory knowledge about the
same object due to the apprehension of common characteristics
(samana-dharma) and which depends on the remembrance of the
special characteristic of each
• The second form of doubt is due to the apprehension of the
unique characteristics of many (dissimilar in nature) objects.
• The third form of doubt may arise due to conflicting testimony.
• irregularity of perception, as when we doubt ifthe perceived water
really exists or not, since there is a perception ofwater both in a
tank and in a mirage.
• doubt springs from irregularity of non-perception, as when we are
not sure ifthe thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since
the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions.
3 kinds of Perception

• Ordinary (Sadharana)
• Extraordinary (Asadharana)
• Yogic
• perception of a universal through an individual which instantiates
it
• perception of an object’s properties as mediated by memory.
• Introspection
2 nd Pramana: Inference (anumana)
Inference is preceded by perception and is threefold
(1) From cause to effect
(2) From effect to cause
(3) From that which is commonly seen
Structure of inference
• There is fire on the hill (the pratijñā, thesis).
• Because there is smoke on the hill (the hetu, reason or probans).
• Wherever there is smoke, there is fire; like a kitchen hearth and unlike
a lake (the udāharaṇa, illustration of concomitance).
• This hill is likewise smoky (the upanaya, application of the rule).
• Thus, there is fire on the hill (the nigamana, conclusion).
The basic components of the argument are:
• the inferential subject (pakṣa), where the inferential sign is
located; the hill in our example. A subject for inference must be under
dispute or currently unknown, with no reports from other knowledge
sources available to definitively settle the issue.
• the “prover” or inferential sign (hetu); smoke (more
precisely, smokiness)
• the probandum (sādhya), the property to be proved by the
inference; fire (more precisely, fieriness)
• the “pervasion” or concomitance (vyāpti) that grounds the inference,
which is implicit in the step: “wherever there is smoke, there is fire”
• a corroborative instance (sapakṣa); acircumstance known to be
qualified by both the prover (hetu) and the probandum (sādhya); this
is a token of inductive support for the vyāpti; a kitchen hearth.
• The hill – minor term
• The fire – major term
• The smoke – reason
• The relationship between smoke and fire - middle term.
 Fallacies (hetvābhasa)
• (i) fallacies of deviation - when the hetu is not related with the
inferential target
• (ii) fallacies of contradiction – when the hetu proves the otherwise of
the thesis
• (iii) fallacies of unestablishment occur when a hetu is not actually the
property of the inferential subject.
• (iv) arguments are rebutted, when their conclusions are undermined
by information obtained by more secured sources
• (v) arguments are counterbalanced - when counterarguments of
equal or greater force are put forth in support of an opposing
conclusion.
3 rd Pramana Analogical Reasoning (upamana)
• Analogy makes an object known by similarity with something
already known
4 th Pramana: Testimony (sabda)
The assertion of a qualified speaker
• The qualified speaker is known as apta. His qualities must include
expertise, trustworthiness, and reliability.

• An apta possesses direct knowledge of something, and a willingness

to convey such knowledge without distortion.

• Testimony is thus thought of as a transmission of information or

content.