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Group Liability or Joint Liablity
Group Liability or Joint Liablity
Group Liability or Joint Liablity
or
‘Joint Liability’
Sections under IPC
Section 34 to Section 38
Section 120A
Section 121A
Section 149
Section 396
Section 460
5 Categories of Group Liabilities
1. Where Criminal Act is done with the Common Intention of the
group. (S. 34 – S. 38)
2. Where the offence is committed with the common object of an
unlawful assembly. (S. 149)
3. Where persons are charge of Criminal Conspiracy. (S. 120A & S. 121A)
4. Where 5 or more persons conjointly in the commission of Dacoity
commits murder. (S. 396)
5. Where persons are jointly concerned in committing the offence of
lurking house-trespass / house-breaking by night. (S. 460)
Section 34- Acts done by several
persons in furtherance of
common intention
S. 34 was amended by 1870 amendment and the
words which were inserted was “in furtherance of the
common intention of all”
In this case, the Privy Council, very succinctly expounded the scope of the operation of Section 34 thus:
Under S.34 of IPC the essence of liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid of S.34
successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused
persons in furtherance of the common intention of all; if this is so then liability for the crime may be imposed
on any one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being the principle, it
is clear to their lordships that common intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan,
and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be proved that the criminal act was
done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan… Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar
intention with common intention; the partition which divides ‘their bonds’ is often very thin; nevertheless, the
distinction is real and substantial and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice. In their Lordships’ view,
the inference of common intention within the meaning of the term in S.34 should never be reached unless it is
a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case.
Common Intention: Guiding
Principles
1. Common intention should be pre-meditated i.e. prior meetings of mind. But there might be
instances where common intention may develop on the spot, after the offenders have
gathered.
[Ramaswami Ayyangar v State of Tamil Nadu 1976 (3) SCR 870;
Suresh v State of UP AIR 2001 SC 1344;
Kripal v State of UP AIR 1954 SC 706]
In this case, there was a long standing property dispute between members of an extended family. The
deceased, Jiraj, was walking towards his field along with two labourers who were walking in front. The
labourers were first accosted by the three accused near a well and threatened from going ahead. They were
also beaten up by the accused by the blunt part of a spear handle. When Jiraj, who reached the spot a few
minutes later, remonstrated with the accused, he was attacked by the three accused in the course of which
he was stabbed by one of the accused in his jaw, because of which he died. In the course of the some
incident, a brother of Jiraj was also murdered. Originally, 13 persons were accused of offences under section
304(1), IPC, but acquitted them of charge under S.302, IPC. On appeal filed by the state, the High Court of
Allahbad set aside the acquittal under S302. Two of the accused were sentenced to death and the third to life
imprisonment. On the issue of common intention, arising suddenly the Supreme Court held:
The common intention to bring a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of
persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Whether in a proved
situation all the individuals concerned therein have developed only simultaneous and independent intentions
or whether a simultaneous consensus of their minds to bring about a particular result can be said to have
developed and thereby intended by all of them, is a question that has to be determined on the facts.
1. Proof of Common Intention will rarely be found easily. It has to be culled
out from the facts & circumstances of the case.
2. There is a difference between Common Intention & Same or Similar
Intention
Each other must know about the consequence to be Common Intention.
In Similar Intention it is not the case.
[See- Dukhmochan Pandey v State of Bihar AIR 1998 SC 40]
6. Free fight
7. Participation in the Criminal Act
In Shreekantian R. Munipalli v. State of Bombay, it is said that it is
the essence of the section that the person must be physically present
at the actual commission of crime e.g. In physical violence cases.
However, in its ratio it was observed:
while participation in action is a necessary in all cases for
participation to be in forms of Physical Presence.
e.g. in cases of cheating, misappropriation.
2. Common Intention in S. 34 is undefined & therefore unlimited in operation. But, Common Object in S. 149 cannot go
beyond 5 objects indicated.
3. Common Intention requires prior meeting of mind & unity of intention but Common Object can be met without these 2
ingredients.
Therefore, Common Object of an unlawful assembly may be same but intention of the participants may differ.
◦ Chittarmahal with Moti v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 796
In this case the SC reiterating a set of thitherto settled propositions from its judicial pronouncements and articulating the
resemblances and differences between section 34 and section 149 IPC, offers a crystal principle of law governing the field.
When several persons numbering five or more, do an act and intend to do it, the court observes, both the sections, section
34 and section 149, come into play, through the principle of constructive liability mentioned therein is premised
respectively on common intention and common object. “If the common object does not necessarily involve a common
intention”, it stresses, “then the substitution of section 34 for section 149 might result in prejudice to the accused and
ought not, therefore, to be permitted”. “But if it does involve a common intention”, it points out, “then the substitution of
section 34 for section 149 must be held to be a formal matter”. “Whether such recourse can be had or not”, it cautions,
“must depend on the facts of each case”. And “the non-applicability of section 149”, it rules, “is no bar in convicting (the
accused persons) under section 302 read with section 34 of IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in
furtherance of common intention”.
◦ Rajnath v. State of UP AIR 2009 SC 1422.
4. S. 34 – Participation is important
S. 149 – Membership is important and no need of active participation
Important Distinction:
S. 34 – person himself must have done (participated) in commission of the act but
S. 149 – a person might be liable for the offence even though he himself did not actually join in perpetrating it, nor was the offence
committed in his presence.
Whereas section 34, does not take into account the fact of the participation of every individual offender in the
offence which is therein described as a “criminal act” as well as his mental state which is therein connoted by the
word ‘intention’.
Section 149 completely ignores both these factors.
SECTION 34 deals with the an offence from two aspects, the first of which may be described as the physical and
the second as the mental aspect. The physical aspect of which can be described here as the ‘criminal act’. This
criminal act must be done ‘by several persons’. Therefore , the emphasis is on the word done. This criminal act is
a joint act, everyone must be a sharer in the crime.
This sharply contrasts with s. 149, under which it is not at all necessary that every individual member of the
unlawful assembly should have himself participated in the commission of the criminal act which is termed as
offence. The result is that in 149, the person might be liable for the offence even though he himself did not
actually join in doing it, nor was the offence committed in his immediate presence.