Week 4-Pogge 2018

You might also like

Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 59

Global Justice and Citizenship

Week 4
Justice and Global Poverty
In this lecture
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
2. ‘Radical Inequality’
3. Global Resources Dividend (GRD)
4. Moral argument for GRD
5. Objections to argument
6. Is GRD proposal realistic?
7. Evaluating GRD proposal
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
We may be failing to fulfil our positive duty to
help persons in acute distress. (as Singer says)
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
We may be failing to fulfil our positive duty to
help persons in acute distress. 
And we may be failing our more stringent
negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to
contribute to or profit from the unjust
impoverishment of others.
To show this, Pogge introduces the idea of
‘radical inequality’…
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
We may be failing to fulfil our positive duty to
help persons in acute distress. 
And we may be failing our more stringent
negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to
contribute to or profit from the unjust
impoverishment of others.
To show this, Pogge introduces the idea of
‘radical inequality’…
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
We may be failing to fulfil our positive duty to
help persons in acute distress. 
And we may be failing our more stringent
negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to
contribute to or profit from the unjust
impoverishment of others.
To show this, Thomas Pogge introduces
Nagel’s idea of ‘radical inequality’…
‘Radical Inequality’
‘Radical Inequality’
(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute
terms.
‘Radical Inequality’
(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute
terms.
(2) They are also very badly off in relative terms.
‘Radical Inequality’
(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute
terms.
(2) They are also very badly off in relative terms.
(3) The inequality is impervious.
‘Radical Inequality’
(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute
terms.
(2) They are also very badly off in relative terms.
(3) The inequality is impervious.
(4) The inequality is pervasive.
‘Radical Inequality’
(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute
terms.
(2) They are also very badly off in relative terms.
(3) The inequality is impervious.
(4) The inequality is pervasive.
(5) The inequality is avoidable.
‘Radical Inequality’
(1) The worse-off are very badly off in absolute
terms.
(2) They are also very badly off in relative terms.
(3) The inequality is impervious.
(4) The inequality is pervasive.
(5) The inequality is avoidable.
These first five conditions together generate a
positive duty of assistance.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
‘Radical Inequality’ contd.
THE EFFECTS OF SHARED INSTITUTIONS
6) Institutions imposed on poor by better-off...
7) … and there is a feasible alternative.
8) Inequality not traced to extra-social factors.
UNCOMPENSATED EXCLUSION FROM NATURAL RESOURCES
9) Better-off advantaged; poor uncompensated.
THE EFFECTS OF A COMMON AND VIOLENT HISTORY
10) History pervaded by grievous wrongs.
Pogge develops GRD argument on basis of (9)
Global Resources Dividend
Global Resources Dividend
GRD Proposed in light of (9) The better-off
enjoy significant advantages in the use of a
single natural resource base from whose
benefits the worse-off are largely, and without
compensation, excluded.
Global Resources Dividend contd.
States shall not have full libertarian property
rights in the natural resources in their territory;
they must share a small part of the value of
resources they use or sell. 
This payment (‘dividend’) due because global
poor own stake in all limited natural resources.
No rights over decisions about natural resource
use (so respects sovereignty), but right to share
of economic value of resource if used.
Global Resources Dividend contd.
States shall not have full libertarian property
rights in the natural resources in their territory;
they must share a small part of the value of
resources they use or sell. 
This payment (‘dividend’) due because global
poor own stake in all limited natural resources.
No rights over decisions about natural resource
use (so respects sovereignty), but right to share
of economic value of resource if used.
Global Resources Dividend contd.
States shall not have full libertarian property
rights in the natural resources in their territory;
they must share a small part of the value of
resources they use or sell. 
This payment (‘dividend’) due because global
poor own stake in all limited natural resources.
No rights over decisions about natural resource
use (so respects sovereignty), but right to share
of economic value of resource if used.
Global Resources Dividend contd.
States shall not have full libertarian property
rights in the natural resources in their territory;
they must share a small part of the value of
resources they use or sell. 
This payment (‘dividend’) due because global
poor own stake in all limited natural resources.
No rights over decisions about natural resource
use (so respects sovereignty), but right to share
of economic value of resource if used.
Global Resources Dividend contd.
States shall not have full libertarian property
rights in the natural resources in their territory;
they must share a small part of the value of
resources they use or sell. 
This payment (‘dividend’) due because global
poor own stake in all limited natural resources.
No rights over decisions about natural resource
use transferred (so respects sovereignty), but
right to share of economic value of resource if
used.
Global Resources Dividend contd.
States shall not have full libertarian property
rights in the natural resources in their territory;
they must share a small part of the value of
resources they use or sell. 
This payment (‘dividend’) due because global
poor own stake in all limited natural resources.
No rights over decisions about natural resource
use transferred (so respects sovereignty) - but
right to share of economic value of resource if
used.
Moral Argument for GRD
Moral Argument for GRD
• If the world is accurately described by the ten
conditions of radical inequality (as outlined
above) then the existing global order cannot
be justified.
Moral Argument for GRD
• If the world is accurately described by the ten
conditions of radical inequality (as outlined
above) then the existing global order cannot
be justified.
• GRD is a feasible alternative and therefore
should be instituted.
Objections to argument I
• Deny (6) that there is a shared institutional
order shaped by the better-off and imposed
on the worse-off.
(Recall related criticisms of Beitz on this score
but note that Pogge is not making Rawlsian
argument here.)
Objections to argument I
• Deny (6) that there is a shared institutional
order shaped by the better-off and imposed
on the worse-off.
(Recall related criticisms of Beitz on this score
but note that Pogge is not making Rawlsian
argument here.)
Objections to argument I
• Deny (6) that there is a shared institutional
order shaped by the better-off and imposed
on the worse-off.
(Recall related criticisms of Beitz on this score
but note that Pogge is not making Rawlsian
argument here.)
Objections to argument II
• Deny that (10) ‘common violent history’
makes present inequalities unjust.
(e.g. David Miller against running
counterfactual histories)
Objections to argument III
• Deny (8) that radical inequality cannot be
traced to extra-social factors - such as natural
disasters.
Objections to argument IV
• Deny (9) that there is a causal relation of
natural resource inequalities to radical
inequalities (see e.g. Risse, 'What Do We
Owe?')
Objections to argument V
• Deny (7) that there is a feasible institutional
alternative under which such severe and
extensive poverty would not persist.
[This issue is discussed in Pogge’s final
section.]
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? I
• Support of US and EU essential: can it be
motivated? 
Need to recognize moral obligation: we are
causally implicated in global poverty.
Moral convictions can have real effects even
in international politics (e.g. abolition of slave
trade.)
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? I
• Support of US and EU essential: can it be
motivated? 
Pogge:
Need to recognize moral obligation: we are
causally implicated in global poverty.
Moral convictions can have real effects even
in international politics (e.g. abolition of slave
trade.)
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? I
• Support of US and EU essential: can it be
motivated? 
Pogge:
Need to recognize moral obligation: we are
causally implicated in global poverty.
Moral convictions can have real effects even
in international politics (e.g. abolition of slave
trade.)
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? I
• Support of US and EU essential: can it be
motivated? 
Pogge:
Need to recognize moral obligation: we are
causally implicated in global poverty.
Moral convictions can have real effects even
in international politics (e.g. abolition of slave
trade.)
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? II
 
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? II
• GRD proposal is 'anchored in the dominant
strands of western normative political
thought’. (This is part of the point of insisting
on ‘negative’ character of our obligation.) 
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? III
• The proposal is more robust than
conventional aid measures, with their
tendency to succumb to 'compassion fatigue'
and the feeling that small contributions are
essentially futile.  It would not require
continual renegotiation. 
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? IV
• Argument from prudence - i.e. the self-
interest of the affluent - to stave off various
threats from the poor and desperate (p.73). 
Is GRD reform proposal realistic? IV
• Argument from prudence - i.e. the self-
interest of the affluent - to stave off various
threats from the poor and desperate (p.73). 
The prudential concern also has the moral
dimension - to preserve not only our future
security but also our moral values.
Evaluating GRD proposal
• Is incidence of the taxation just?
• Would distribution of funds be effective?
[Note Pogge’s qualifications on who would
receive it.]
• Note that moral argument and practical
proposal could be assessed independently.
• Is the, secondary, environmental aim taken
seriously enough?
Evaluating GRD proposal
• Is incidence of the taxation just?
• Would distribution of funds be effective?
[Note Pogge’s qualifications on who would
receive it.]
• Note that moral argument and practical
proposal could be assessed independently.
• Is the, secondary, environmental aim taken
seriously enough?
Evaluating GRD proposal
• Is incidence of the taxation just?
• Would distribution of funds be effective?
[Note Pogge’s qualifications on who would
receive it.]
• Note that moral argument and practical
proposal could be assessed independently.
• Is the, secondary, environmental aim taken
seriously enough?
Evaluating GRD proposal
• Is incidence of the taxation just?
• Would distribution of funds be effective?
[Note Pogge’s qualifications on who would
receive it.]
• Note that moral argument and practical
proposal could be assessed independently.
• Is the, secondary, environmental aim taken
seriously enough?
Evaluating GRD proposal
• Is incidence of the taxation just?
• Would distribution of funds be effective?
[Note Pogge’s qualifications on who would
receive it.]
• Note that moral argument and practical
proposal could be assessed independently.
• Is the, secondary, environmental aim taken
seriously enough?
Possible alternative taxes
• Straightforward global income tax based on
GDP (Brian Barry)
• Tobin tax (receipts distributed to poor)
• Land value tax (Hillel Steiner)
• Ecological space/footprint tax
SUMMARY
• Pogge’s moral argument: similar but not
identical to Beitz’s (not Rawlsian)
• Used to support GRD – but does it?
• Is GRD in principle a good idea?
• Is GRD really feasible?
• Should institutional order be reformed along
GRD lines, alternative lines, or does it not
need reform?
Recap: In this lecture
1. Positive v Negative Obligations
2. ‘Radical Inequality’
3. Global Resources Dividend (GRD)
4. Moral argument for GRD
5. Objections to argument
6. Is GRD proposal realistic?
7. Evaluating GRD proposal

You might also like